Chapter 1: 1. U.S. International Policy: 1933–1940 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Elected President

March 4, 1933, inauguration day, was a gray day in Washington, a depressing day like the economic depression that then enveloped the nation. The sun broke through the clouds only occasionally as President-elect Roosevelt, exuberant over his victory, and outgoing President Herbert Hoover, gloomy and distressed not only at having lost the election but also at not having been able to stem the economic downturn, rode together up Pennsylvania Avenue to the capitol from the White House. Roosevelt took the oath of office, promising “to the best of my ability to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Hoover and his entire Cabinet went out of office when Roosevelt was inaugurated and the new president appointed an entirely new cabinet.

The Democratic Party platform on which Roosevelt had run in the presidential election of 1932 had been “conservative,” calling for drastic economies in government expenditures and a sound currency. The economic crisis, sparked by the 1929 stock market crash, had deepened between Roosevelt’s election and his inauguration. Cooperation between the outgoing and incoming presidents during the interregnum would have been in order, but considerable antagonism existed between the two men: They had one inconclusive meeting. Roosevelt was apparently unable or unwilling to cooperate any further. He didn’t want to share the credit with anyone for what he was going to do.

For a time the new president’s energies were devoted largely to domestic economic problems. All banks in the country were closed down on March 6, two days after Roosevelt took office. It was a low point in the country’s history. However, it wasn’t long before the international situation would claim Roosevelt’s attention. The idealism that had produced the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact intended to outlaw war was eroding. Adolf Hitler had come to power in Germany, assuming dictatorial powers and beginning to undo the terms of the Versailles Treaty.

On November 16, 1933, the United States recognized the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R). The professed purpose of recognition was so “that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world.”^[1] Roosevelt named William C. Bullitt to be the first U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Bullitt considered communism a harbinger for the world and was an enthusiastic proponent of the Soviet system.

U.S.–Far East Relations

The Asian situation was of concern. Japan had occupied Chinese territory, Manchuria. Many Japanese farmers and businessmen had moved there to settle and make it their home. Moreover, the Japanese and Chinese were fighting in northern China and Russian Communists were helping the Chinese and pestering the Japanese. Asia was not peaceful. How had conditions reached this pass?

Japan had been almost completely isolated from the civilized world until 1852 when U.S. Navy Commander Matthew C. Perry sailed into Edo (Tokyo) Bay on a mission from the United States government—to open Japan up to trade. After some time and a proper display of diplomacy, Perry succeeded in his mission. Japan westernized, industrialized and her population increased. Looking for resources to power her new industries, she expanded onto the relatively empty wilderness of the Asian mainland which China and Russia had previously claimed. Japan went to war with China (the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895) in order to bring Chinese-controlled Korea into Japan’s sphere of influence. Then after the Boxer Rebellion in China (1899–1901) Japan cooperated with the international force of British, French, Russians, Americans, and Germans that lifted the siege of Peking. Some Japanese remained in northern China and in time Japanese traders developed a substantial textile industry there. However, Japan found herself in frequent conflict with Russia, whose vast territory extended east to the Pacific, and who wanted a warm water port. The Russo-Japanese War (1904) was sparked by Russian intrusions into Manchuria and ended with Japan’s gaining control of that province. Japan’s rule brought law and order to Manchuria and in time it became one of the most peaceful and stable parts of China, attracting thousands of Japanese, Chinese and Korean traders and settlers. Japan was bringing civilization and stability to the region.

Japan had been an ally of Britain and the U.S during the Great War (1914–1918) and she was included in the Washington Naval Conference (November 12, 1921–January 12, 1922) when the Allied military powers sought to reduce the worldwide arms race. The resulting Naval Limitation and Non-Fortification Treaty cut the British-American-Japanese navies down in size to a ratio of 5:5:3 for capital ships. In the hope of maintaining peace in the Far East, an “Open Door” agreement was reached, providing that the participant nations have equal commercial rights of entry into China. Although China was not then a united nation, she was to have her integrity preserved. Japan was to be restrained from mainland adventures and to have no military planes or ships in the mandated islands. Japan resented the second-rate status to which she had been reduced by the Naval Limitation Treaty, and also the racial slur inherent when Japanese immigration was banned by the U.S. Exclusion Act (1924) and by Australia’s anti-oriental “Whites Only” policy. Moreover, Japan’s relations with the rest of the world deteriorated in the 1920s. Her markets for her chief export, silk, suffered as a result of worldwide protectionism and the Great Depression and yet her dependence on U.S. oil and raw materials increased.

There was an explosion on the Japanese railroad line at Mukden on September 18, 1931, which was blamed on local Chinese. One faction in the Japanese military had been pressing their government to take a more expansionist role in Manchuria. The Japanese responded harshly to the Mukden explosion, fought the “bandits” and seized several of China’s northern provinces. Manchuria gained its independence and then on September 15, 1932, became a protectorate of Japan, Manchukuo.

U.S. Secretary of State Stimson held that Japan’s intervention in Manchuria was a violation of international treaties and proposed, in place of the “Open Door” agreement, a “Nonrecognition doctrine” which would deny recognition to any nation which had acquired territory by aggression. Stimson wanted the U.S. to impose sanctions against Japan for her aggression in Manchuria. President Hoover vetoed the idea; he “was opposed in every fiber of his being to any action which might lead to American participation in the struggles of the Far East. In this view he had the support of the American people.”^[2] The League of Nations investigated the “Manchurian incident” and issued a report blaming Japan. Japan and Britain disagreed with the League’s report. However, it was accepted and in 1933 Japan withdrew from the League.

After the death in 1925 of Sun Yat-sen, revolutionary leader and president of the Southern Chinese Republic, Chiang Kai-shek assumed the presidency. Chiang began trying to unite the country. The communists intervened, sometimes for, sometimes against, Chiang’s nationalist forces. There was almost constant fighting by and among Chiang’s nationalists, the warlords, the Chinese communists and the Russian communists. When the Chinese boycotted Japanese textiles, the Japanese retaliated by bombarding and sending troops to the Shanghai International Settlement (January 28–March 4, 1932). Many were killed. U.S. sympathy was with the Chinese; the Japanese were portrayed as the aggressors. After fierce fighting, the Japanese retreated temporarily, and the boycott was brought to an end. Another time when Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces threatened Japan’s economic and industrial interests in Manchuria, Japan called up 5,000 troops to protect her merchants there. The Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists were both heavily involved. Finally, after communist leader Mao Tse-tung told Chiang that if he stopped fighting the Red Army the Chinese Soviet government would help Chiang against Japan, Chiang finally agreed. The Kuomintang-Communist agreement (July 5, 1937) called for the nationalists and communists to cooperate in driving the Japanese out of Peking and the rest of North China. Peace prevailed there for a time. But not for long.

Official U.S. Foreign Policy

During the 1930s, U.S. opinion opposed involvement in foreign wars. Congress responded in 1935 by passing neutrality legislation prohibiting trade in arms or implements of war with any belligerent nation. As FDR signed this legislation (S.J. Resolution 173) on August 31, 1935, he explained that “it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war.” “The purpose,” he said, “is wholly excellent.” Emphasizing U.S. neutrality in international conflicts still more emphatically, Roosevelt added: “The policy of the Government is definitely committed to the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of any entanglements which would lead us into conflict.”^[3]

In spite of FDR’s professed neutrality, however, he was apparently already considering the possibility of conflict with Japan. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) whose duty it was to collect and analyze pertinent information for the Navy, was then assembling material about potential Japanese and communist espionage agents. For instance, the ONI “carded” Japanese residents in the New York area for use in “corralling the individuals for internment or breaking down any system of espionage or sabotage” in the event of a conflict.^[4] In an August 10, 1936, memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy, FDR sanctioned this operation. He “expressed his support . . . for locating all Japanese for possible incarceration in a ‘concentration camp’ during a crisis.”^[5]

FDR was a charming, charismatic, and convincing speaker. From 1935, when he signed the Neutrality Act, until the attack on Pearl Harbor, he reassured the American people from time to time of his steadfast commitment to peace.^[6] He delivered one of his most eloquent anti-war speeches in Chatauqua, New York, only four days after signing the August 10 memorandum about the possible incarceration of U.S. Japanese residents:

I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men coughing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed. I have seen two hundred limping, exhausted men come out of line—the survivors of a regiment of one thousand that went forward forty-eight hours before. I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war. . . .

I wish I could keep war from all Nations; but that is beyond my power. I can at least make certain that no act of the United States helps to produce or to promote war…

I speak from a long experience—the effective maintenance of American neutrality depends today, as in the past, on the wisdom and determination of whoever at the moment occup[ies] the offices of President and Secretary of State.^[7]

During this period, Germany and Japan were being driven together out of fear of the expansionist and disruptive policies of their common enemy, the Soviet Union. Both Germany and Japan recognized “that the aim of the [U.S.S.R.-sponsored] Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command.” They held that the Comintern “not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world.”^[8] So Germany and Japan decided to cooperate against Communist subversive activities. On November 15, 1936, they signed the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.

Prospects for Peace in the Far East?

There was a turnover in the Japanese Cabinet on June 4, 1937. Prince Konoye became prime minister. Konoye desired and sought peace with the United States. But there was still turmoil and little prospect of peace in the Far East.

In 1937, the U.S.S.R. led Nationalist China to understand that “if it would undertake to offer armed resistance to Japan it would confidently expect the armed support of the Soviet Union.”^[9] Not long after receiving this assurance, the Chinese did resist the Japanese. On July 7, 1937, a Japanese soldier was missing at the Marco Polo Bridge in China. The Chinese not only refused to search for him, they also refused to let the Japanese do so. Japanese troops resorted to force and soldiers from the two countries clashed.

The inclination was to blame this incident on impetuous Japanese soldiers at the scene. However, the fault may not have been entirely on the Japanese side. The U.S. ambassadors in France, China, and Japan all cabled Secretary of State Hull denying this anti-Japanese contention. Reports had come to their attention indicating that the Chinese had the encouragement and support of the Russians in fighting the Japanese, that the Russians had been “very generous,” that they “had furnished China with munitions . . . costing 150,000,000 Chinese dollars,” and that they had even “shipped some munitions before China had promised to pay for them.”^[10]

U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew wired Hull that “there was not sufficient evidence to justify the hypothesis that ‘either the Japanese Government or the Army deliberately engineered the [Marco Polo Bridge] incident in order to force a showdown.’ ” Grew also found that communist agitators contributed to the crisis by “disseminating misinformation with regard to the concentration of both Chinese and Japanese troops.”^[11] Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out. Tokyo announced a “punitive expedition against the Chinese troops, who have been taking acts derogatory to the prestige of the Empire of Japan.” This was the beginning of the undeclared Japanese-Chinese war. Bombers struck three cities and shelled others as ground troops attacked Chinese forces all over the Peking area.

The outbreak of fighting between the Japanese and the Chinese aroused strong feelings among many in the United States who had emotional ties to China. The Neutrality Act then in force prevented the U.S. from using U.S. ships to send arms to either side. On September 14, acting under this Act, FDR forbade the shipment of arms on U.S. government-owned ships to either China or Japan, thus averting the possibility of a Japanese blockade of U.S. shipping had aid to China been allowed. Throughout this entire period, U.S. and British trade was continuing, in accord with China’s agreement to open the country to foreign traders.

In Chicago on October 5, 1937, President Roosevelt spoke out against nations that were engaging in aggression:

The peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 percent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining 10 percent, who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. . . . It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease. . . . War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.^[12]

Roosevelt had not mentioned Japan, but a State Department release the next day made it clear that he had been referring to Japan’s attack on China;

Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict of composing by pacific methods the situation the Far East. . . . In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations. [The Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928]^[13]

On December 12, the United States was brought close to war when the Japanese sank the U.S.S. Panay, a U.S. gunboat, and three Standard Oil tankers in the Chinese Yangtze River. Several Americans were killed. However, sentiment in the United States was strongly opposed to war over the loss of a few American lives in the Far East. Therefore, when the Japanese apologized, demoted several top military officials, and paid several million dollars in indemnity, the matter was considered closed.

Serious fighting continued in China, however. In December 1937, Japanese forces took Nanking, committing mass murder and rape. Over 50,000 Chinese men were killed, many thousands more women raped, 200,000 to 300,000 civilians slaughtered. Japan was clearly the culprit.

Anticipating War in the Pacific

In late December FDR ordered Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, director of the U.S. War Plans Division, to London for conversations with officials of the British Admiralty. According to Ingersoll, it was generally assumed in military circles at that time that sooner or later the United States would become involved in a war against Japan in the Pacific, a war that would involve the British, the Dutch, the Russians, and possibly the Chinese. This London meeting was to explore U.S.-British arrangements in such an event for command, communications, ciphers, intelligence, etc. The conference took place during the first two or three weeks of January 1938. No firm commitments were made.^[14]

On November 3, 1938, Japan announced a “New Order” in China, “a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchukuo [Japan’s name for Japanese-occupied Manchuria] and China.”^[15] Prime Minister Prince Konoye pointed out in a public statement that the Chiang Kai-shek administration in China was little more than a local regime. Konoye declared further that Japan wanted the development and cooperation, not the ruin, of China and that she wished to establish stable conditions in the Far East without prejudice to the interests and rights of other foreign powers. However, Konoye went on: “The world knows that Japan is earnestly determined to fight it out with communism. What the Comintern intends to do is bolshevisation of the Far East and disturbance of world peace.” And lest there be any misunderstanding, he added: “Japan expects to suppress in a drastic manner the sources of the evils of bolshevisation and their subversive activities.”^[16] Konoye’s position was that Japan’s conflict was not with China so much as it was with the Comintern that was backing China.

Japan compared her Manchurian venture to the way England had acquired her empire—India, Hong Kong, etc.—and to the way the United States had wrested its western territory from the Indians. And Japan thought the United States’s Monroe Doctrine protecting the Western Hemisphere from foreign intervention was similar to Japan’s wish to preserve Asia for Asians.^[17] According to Japan’s Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (1940–1941) Japan was fighting for two goals: “to prevent Asia from falling completely under the white man’s domination and to save China from Communism.”^[18]

In the United States’s view, Japan’s “New Order” was violating the rights of Americans in China. In a note to the Japanese Foreign Minister (November 7, 1938), Ambassador Grew objected to actions Japan was taking on the mainland. He could see no reason why U.S. shipping on the Yangtze River should be restricted, since hostilities in that area had ceased. Grew also claimed (November 21) that there was no real excuse for the frequent “accidental” incidents in China involving “not only the loss of American property but the loss of American life and the desecration of our flag.”^[19]

The Japanese continued to win in China. They took Hankow and Canton. They were preventing China’s access to the coast and thus making it increasingly difficult for her to obtain supplies. As a result, Chiang was forced to move his government inland to Chungking. But the Japanese “were conquering territory, not people, and by the beginning of 1939, they were still far from final victory. They had lost thousands of men, millions of yen and incurred the wrath of the Western world, and Americans in particular.”^[20]

In 1937–1938, the Chinese built the Burma Road over rugged mountain terrain—a remarkable feat of engineering. The Burma Road was opened on December 2, 1938. War supplies could then be landed in Rangoon, British Burma, shipped by train to Lashio, then over the Burma Road to Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province, and thence to Chungking.

Although most Americans did not want to become involved in a war, by the end of 1938, FDR was beginning to resent the Neutrality Act. His sympathies in the Far East lay with China in her struggle against Japan. And the Act prevented the United States from lending support. Out of his desire to aid China, FDR sought an end to the blanket embargo on shipping arms to belligerent nations. So in his January 4, 1939, message to Congress, he launched a campaign for the Act’s repeal: “[O]ur neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly—may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim.”^[21] Congress rejected his reasoning, and on March 20 the Senate turned down Roosevelt’s proposal for repeal. FDR repeated his request. Hull also asked for its repeal.

Britain’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s view of the Far East situation differed from that of U.S. officials. Chamberlain did not want to prevent Japan from obtaining the military supplies she needed for her campaign in China. He recognized “the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress” and noted that

as long as that state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order. . . . His Majesty’s Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by Japanese forces.

Chamberlain urged that “British authorities and British nationals in China . . . refrain from such acts and measures.”^[22]

The United States and Japan had been trading partners for years. A commercial treaty permitting and encouraging trade between the two countries had been in effect since 1911. Under its terms, if one party wanted to terminate the treaty, it was required to notify the other party six months in advance. In accordance with that provision, Hull gave the Japanese ambassador notice on July 26, 1939 of our intentions to terminate. This dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese economy—also to world trade. And it represented a significant deterioration in our relations with Japan.^[23]

War Breaks Out in Europe

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Britain and France immediately notified Germany that unless it withdrew its forces, they would honor their agreement to defend Poland. Hitler did not pull out. Two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany. World War II had begun.

At this juncture, FDR again reassured the country of our neutrality. He went on the radio on September 3 and announced in his very convincing manner: “This Nation will remain a neutral nation.”^[24] Two days later on September 5, President Roosevelt issued an official proclamation of neutrality prescribing “certain duties with respect to the proper observance, safeguarding, and enforcement of such neutrality.” It called on all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to exercise “an impartial neutrality.”^[25]

On September 11, only a very few days later, FDR initiated a secret correspondence with “a former naval person” in belligerent Great Britain’s cabinet. This “former naval person” was Winston Churchill, newly recalled by Prime Minister Chamberlain to serve as First Lord of the Admiralty, the same position Churchill had held during World War I. (Churchill did not become prime minister until May 1, 1940.) Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, had visited England and been entranced by the British espionage and intelligence services. But he hadn’t then met Churchill.

FDR’s first letter to Churchill began: “I want you to know how glad I am that you are back again in the Admiralty.” He continued:

What I want you and the Prime Minister to know is that I shall at all times welcome it if you will keep me in touch personally with anything you want me to know about. You can always send sealed letters through your [diplomatic] pouch or my pouch.^[26]

This expression of warm friendship was hardly the “impartial neutrality” he was asking of “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”

U.S. “Neutrality Patrol” in the Atlantic

On September 6, Roosevelt announced that the Navy would start a “Neutrality Patrol” of the Atlantic up to 200 or 300 miles offshore, ostensibly to protect U.S. merchantmen:

The patrolling ships were to report all belligerent warships, except convoy escorts, by radio. In the event of a submarine contact, “the movements of the submarine shall be observed and a surveillance patrol maintained in the general area.”^[27]

And then on September 8, he proclaimed a national emergency.^[28]

Disturbed at the delay in getting the “Neutrality Patrol” underway, FDR sent a secret message on October 9, 1939, to the U.S. Navy Department: “When any aircraft or surface ship sights a submarine, a report thereof will be rushed to the Navy Department for immediate action.” This report was to be submitted in English, permitting anyone capable of monitoring the Patrol’s English-language transmissions to benefit from the sightings. “The plane or surface ship,” FDR continued,

will remain in contact for as long as possible. . . . Planes or Navy or Coast Guard ships may report the sighting of any submarine or suspicious surface ships in plain English. . . . [L]oss of contact with surface ships cannot be tolerated. Signed “FDR.”^[29]

Most Americans were, of course, very much concerned about the war going on in Europe. To many it looked like a repeat of the 1914–1918 World War. Some wanted the United States to join England and France immediately against Germany. But the majority were still anxious to stay out of the struggle. FDR, always sensitive to public opinion, again reassured the people of our neutrality. At a New York Herald Tribune Forum on October 26, he stated most emphatically:

In and out of Congress we have heard orators and commentators and others beating their breasts and proclaiming against sending the boys of American mothers to fight on the battlefields of Europe. That, I do not hesitate to label as one of the worst fakes in current history. It is a deliberate setting up of an imaginary bogeyman. The simple truth is that no person in any responsible place in the national administration in Washington, or in any State government, or in any city government, or in any county government, has ever suggested in any shape, manner or form the remotest possibility of sending the boys of American mothers to fight on the battlefields of Europe. That is why I label that argument a shameless and dishonest fake.^[30]

Finally in November, after German Chancellor Adolf Hitler had attacked Poland and after Great Britain and France had declared war, Roosevelt’s campaign against the Neutrality Act met with some success. Congress repealed the arms embargo, which had prohibited all sales of military supplies to any belligerent nation, and replaced it with a cash and carry policy. The Neutrality Act of 1939 permitted “cash and carry” transactions; arms and other military supplies could be sold to belligerent nations, if they were paid for in cash, not credit, and if they were not transported in U.S. vessels.^[31]

Our “Neutrality Patrol” had not been in operation two months when the U.S. heavy cruiser Tuscaloosa, on patrol in the Atlantic, trailed and greeted by radio the German ocean liner Columbus. Columbus, on a cruise in the Caribbean when war broke out in Europe, had managed to reach Vera Cruz, Mexico. Her captain wanted to dispose of his ship there because he did not believe he would be able to run the blockade to return to Germany. However, Berlin ordered him home. He set out on December 13 and soon found his ship accompanied, in relays, by two U.S. destroyers. As Columbus sailed eastward, Tuscaloosa took over surveillance. In accordance with FDR’s directive, it announced in English every four hours the position of the German ship. The British destroyer Hyperion heard the announcement and investigated. She located Columbus on December 19, about 425 miles off Cape May, New Jersey, and fired two shots. The Germans scuttled their ship. Two of her crewmen were lost. Tuscaloosa picked up the 555 German survivors and brought them to this country as “distressed mariners.”^[32]

At the president’s request, little publicity was given this incident. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. chief of naval operations, radioed Captain Harry A. Badt of Tuscaloosa asking that he give the impression his ship had come upon the German liner by accident and, fortunately, just in time to pursue her humane role. Captain Badt was to state that the British ship had not appeared ready to commence an action. Stark noted: “We do not desire you to make public the details of the work of our . . . patrol.”^[33] Nevertheless, accounts of the event did appear, although they caused little excitement; people apparently approved, considering this consistent with the Patrol’s ostensible purpose—to protect U.S. merchantmen—and to keep hostilities from invading our shores.

FDR again professed devotion to neutrality when he addressed Congress on January 3, 1940. “The first president of the United States warned us against entangling foreign alliances. The present president of the United States subscribes to and follows that precept.” ^[34] The next day, he appointed Navy Admiral J.O. Richardson to be commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (CINCUS), replacing Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Richardson was an old Navy hand, well-equipped through training and experience to take over the operation of the Fleet. Command was transferred on January 6, 1940.^[35]

U. S. Relations with Japan

The six months’ notice we had given Japan of our intention to terminate our 1911 commercial treaty expired on January 26, 1940. With the cancellation of that treaty, uncertainty prevailed with respect to U.S.-Japanese trade. The Japanese were more or less assured by U.S. officials, however, that they could expect trade to continue about as usual. But the abrogation of the treaty meant that tariffs, quotas, or embargoes could be imposed at any time. The president and Congress were thus in a position to dictate the terms under which Japan might continue to trade with us.

Japan at this time was trying to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity scheme “New Order” that she had announced in November. On February 1 the Japanese foreign minister invited other nations to join in this effort. Japan, he said, welcomed foreign trade and investments, and he asked us to participate. But we turned a cold shoulder on him and on Japan.

British Military Procurement and Politics

1940 was an election year. FDR decided to break all precedents and run for a third term as president.

For most of FDR’s time in office, his treasury secretary was Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr. Morgenthau was Jewish and thus understandably strongly anti-Hitler, eager to help England and to get the United States into the war against Germany.^[36] Morgenthau served as Roosevelt’s “designated agent from September 1939 to April 1940, for dealing with the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission,” newly established to handle British and French procurement. His sympathies clearly lay with the Allied cause. He felt frustrated by the Neutrality Act, which put all purchases on a “cash and carry” basis, thus limiting the assistance that could be given England and France. “It was his [Morgenthau’s] intention to help the democracies as much as possible.” He “was making an unparalleled effort to supply the Allies”^[37] and “he encouraged the British and French to make purchases as large as possible, for he believed they were not arming fast enough.”^[38]

Although the United States was still officially neutral in the conflict between Germany and Great Britain, Morgenthau, as FDR’s intermediary, was seeking for the “allies” some of the newest superchargers developed by the U.S. armed forces, but not yet released, as well as certain engines and designs classified as secret. Secretary of War Harry Hines Woodring, who had assumed that post in 1936, and Commanding General of the Army Air Corps Henry Harley (”Hap”) Arnold refused the necessary permission. “Morgenthau had therefore once again to take the Allies’ case to the president.”^[39] At a White House conference March 12, 1940, he told the president “if he wanted me to do this job [the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission] . . . he would just have to do something”^[40] to halt the opposition coming from the War Department and the military. Roosevelt then announced that, in Morgenthau’s words, “there was to be no more resistance from the War Department. . . . Uncooperative officers would find themselves assigned to duty in Guam. . . . ‘Well, [FDR said] if Arnold won’t conform, maybe we will have to move him out of town’.” The president continued: “Arnold has to keep his mouth shut. He can’t see the press any more.” Morgenthau was delighted; he reported to his staff later, “Oh boy, did General Arnold get it!”^[41]

At that White House conference FDR revealed that the British and French were not his only worries. He was also concerned about the U.S. economy. The New Deal programs had not solved the unemployment problem. There were as many people unemployed in 1938 as there had been when he took office. The only way FDR knew to provide jobs to U.S. workers was by government spending and the European “cash and carry” war orders were putting people to work. “These foreign orders,” he told Morgenthau, “mean prosperity in this country and we can’t elect a Democratic Party unless we get prosperity.” Secretary Morgenthau agreed, “And he’s right.”^[42]

In May, FDR asked Congress for more funds—over a billion dollars—to pay for 50,000 planes.^[43] He was impatient. Only two weeks later he urged Congress to hurry up with the funds.^[44] Thus in that election year FDR sought to solve his political problem by putting workers to work on war orders. The manufacture of 50,000 planes would create jobs. FDR probably gave little thought to the fact that the cost of these 50,000 planes would be added to the federal debt and thus to the problems of future presidents.

On April 17, 1940, Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned Japan that the U.S. would oppose “Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes.”^[45]

British procurement of military supplies from the United States in that election year was precarious. FDR wanted to help, but the American public did not fully approve of the administration’s partiality for the British and French. Since Roosevelt was anxious to avoid arousing the opposition of the voters who wished the United States to remain neutral, the administration’s non-neutral agreements had to be made in secrecy.

This was the dilemma that was continuously in the mind of the president and of the Secretary of the Treasury. The Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee was thus made aware that in the then state of American public opinion the Administration could not give the Allies all the help it would wish to give.^[46]

The assistance Morgenthau could give the British fluctuated with public opinion.

European War Impacts Asian Situation

At this time, the Battle of Britain was in full force over England with German planes flying hundreds of sorties almost nightly over London, British airfields and airplane factories. She was also losing ships to German submarine attacks in the Atlantic faster than they could be replaced. Her situation was desperate; she had no ships to spare for the defense of Singapore and could not afford to expand the war into the Far East. So when pressured by Japan to close the Burma Road, she agreed. Thus, the main route by which China’s Nationalist Army had been able to receive war materiel was closed for three months from July 18, 1940 to October 18, 1940.

Upon the defeat of France in June 1940 by the Nazis, the Japanese began negotiations with the Vichy government of unoccupied France to obtain permission to send troops to French Indochina in order to prevent aid from reaching China by that route. The weak Vichy government, in no position to protest, finally gave permission on September 23. The Japanese occupation of French Indochina then began with the arrival of 6,000 Japanese soldiers.

Japan joined the Axis Powers on September 27, 1940, when she entered into a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. All three nations pledged total aid to each other if any one of the three were attacked by a third party with which they were not then at war. German and Japanese relations with the U.S.S.R. were not to be affected.

The British were anxious to avoid war with Japan at almost any price. They realized their territories in southeast Asia were vulnerable if Japanese forces should move into Indochina. But rather than trying to appease Japan into not striking, which they felt would be interpreted as weakness, they determined to show firmness. Both the United States and Britain decided that the best way to oppose Japan was to strengthen and encourage China. Britain decided in January 1941 to enter into closer relations with Chiang so that, if war came, Chiang would help Britain in Burma and Hong Kong.^[47]

The U.S. government made $100 million available to Chiang in December 1940 and promised him also a supply of up-to-date fighter planes. Britain even though strapped financially, contributed £5 million to the Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund and granted export credits to China up to a maximum of £3 million.^[48]

U.S. Fleet Stationed in Pearl Harbor

On April 2, 1940, the U.S. Fleet left the west coast for maneuvers in Hawaiian waters. Since the fleet was scheduled to return in early May for war games, the families of the Navy personnel remained on the U.S. mainland. Then on May 4, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Richardson, received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations Stark:

IT LOOKS PROBABLE BUT NOT FINAL THAT THE FLEET WILL REMAIN IN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SHORT TIME AFTER MAY 9TH.^[49]

Then on May 7, Stark again cabled Richardson from Washington asking him to issue a press release saying:

I HAVE REQUESTED PERMISSION TO REMAIN IN HAWAIIAN WATERS TO ACCOMPLISH SOME THINGS I WANTED TO DO WHILE HERE. THE DEPARTMENT HAS APPROVED THIS REQUEST.

Richardson was told to delay the fleet’s departure for a couple of weeks and to carry out regularly scheduled overhauls and movements. At the end of that time he could expect further instructions.

Richardson was disturbed at being asked to make a request for which there was no logical reason. As he explained later, “The Fleet had just completed its annual Fleet Problem, the culmination of a year’s tactical training.”^[50] Further, although tactical training of senior officers could be accomplished in Hawaii, training in air and surface gunnery, which was also necessary, needed large-scale facilities not available there. To use the extra two weeks to advantage called for making adjustments that would result in losing three to six weeks out of a tightly scheduled training year.

Richardson felt that the Navy Department had placed him, the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet, “in a completely false position, with a requirement that he announce to the public something which, on its very face, every tyro ensign would recognize as a phony.”^[51] He was even more disturbed by the cable he received from Washington a week later reporting on the war in Europe and concluding:

PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL REMAIN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SOME TIME.^[52]

Richardson was very much opposed to retaining the fleet in Hawaii. He went to Washington several weeks later to explain his reasons to the president in person.