Chapter 37 of 39 · Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy by Percy L. Greaves, Jr.
Footnotes Foreword
[1] Levine later founded and edited the anticommunist journal Plain Talk, a forerunner of The Freeman and National Review.
Chapter 1
[1] Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, vol. 1: The Genesis of the New Deal, 1928–1932 (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 472.
[2] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/1948), p. 233.
[3] Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses, 1935, vol. 4, pp. 345–46.
[4] Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 65.
[5] Roosevelt, August 10, 1936 memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy. Quoted in Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, p. 65.
[6] Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932–1940 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 156–75.
[7] Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses, 1936, vol. 5, pp. 289–90.
[8] U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 1931–1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 109.
[9] Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941 (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952),p. 456.
[10] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Far East, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), vol. 3, pp. 136, 165, et passim.
[11] Tansill, Back Door to War, p. 460.
[12] Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 383–87.
[13] Ibid., pp. 387–88.
[14] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 9, pp. 4272–77. Ingersoll testimony. After the war started in Europe, the 1938 London document “became a dead cat,” as Ingersoll expressed it (p. 4273), because Germany was in the war. The London conclusions were superseded by the ABC-1 plan for military U.S. cooperation with the British, the plan which was developed in Washington in 1941.
[15] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 1, p. 478.
[16] Ibid., p. 480.
[17] John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 56.
[18] Ibid., p. 48.
[19] Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, p. 807.
[20] Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 54.
[21] Department of State, Peace and War, p. 49.
[22] U.S. Congress, Events, pp. 198–99.
[23] Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, p. 189.
[24] Department of State, Peace and War, p. 485.
[25] U.S. Congress, Events, p. 215.
[26] Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jones, eds. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975),p. 89.
[27] Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), p. 65.
[28] U.S. Congress, Events, p. 216.
[29] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, p. 68.
[30] Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1939. Portion of address published in Franklin D. Roosevelt, Quotations from Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Republican National Committee, 1940), p. 37.
[31] U.S. Congress, Events, p. 223.
[32] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, p. 74.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Department of State, Peace and War, p. 511.
[35] The New York Times, January 7, 1940.
[36] As financial editor from 1934–1935 of the United States News (predecessor to U.S. News & World Report), I covered Morgenthau at the Treasury Department and came to know him well. Morgenthau was a good friend, confidant, and great admirer of FDR’s. He could walk unobserved through an underground passageway that connected the Treasury to the White House, and he often did so, to report to FDR or to assume confidential assignments. Morgenthau had a residence in New York State, not far from FDR’s Hyde Park home. He was undoubtedly closer to FDR personally than any other member of the cabinet and didn’t hesitate at times to try to influence him.
[37] John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 109.
[38] Ibid.,p. 113.
[39] Ibid., p. 117.
[40] Ibid.,p. 118.
[41] Ibid.,pp. 117–18.
[42] This description of the March 12, 1940, White House meeting is based on Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp.109–18. Morgenthau quote appears on p. 118.
[43] Roosevelt’s message to Congress, May 16, 1940. See U.S. Congress, Events, p. 239 (May 16, 1940 entry). See also H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office; Longmans, Green, 1955),p. 127 (the official British history of World War II).
[44] Ibid., p.127.
[45] Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 515–16.
[46] Hall, North American Supply, p. 92.
[47] S. Woodburn Kirby, Major-General, The War Against Japan: The Loss of Singapore (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957), vol. 1, p. 53.
[48] Ibid., p. 58.
[49] James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 308.
[50] Ibid., p. 309.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., p. 311. The complete cable read as follows:
FROM: OPNAV [Office, Chief of Naval Operations]
TO: CINCUS [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet]
SOME BRITISH AUTHORITIES FEEL THAT ITALY MAY JOIN GERMANY IN ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE x THIS FEELING IS NOT SHARED BY OTHER CLOSE OBSERVERS X OUR STATE DEPARTMENT INCLINED TO DISAGREE x REGARDING DUTCH EAST INDIES JAPAN HAS MADE TWO STATEMENTS WHICH IF TAKEN AT THEIR FACE VALUE STATE THEY WISH STATUS QUO PRESERVED x GREAT BRITAIN HAS STATED SHE HAS NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING WITH STATUS QUO AND THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE HAS ISSUED A SIMILAR STATEMENT x PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT FLEET WILL REMAIN HAWAIIAN WATERS FOR SOME TIME x HOPE TO ADVISE YOU MORE DEFINITELY NEXT WEEK x
Chapter 2
[1] Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), p. 94.
[2] Richard T. Loomis, “The White House Telephone and Crisis Management,” U.S. Naval Proceedings, December 1969, p. 63.
[3] Loewenheim, et al., eds., Roosevelt and Churchill, pp. 94–95.
[4] Ibid., pp. 95–96.
[5] James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 311.
[6] Deparment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), vol. 1, p. 245.
[7] The New York Times, April 26, 1970, pp. 30–31.
[8] Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, p. 248.
[9] Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p.185.
[10] Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, p. 250.
[11] Prior to the post-World War II reorganization of the government, when the military forces were combined under a single Department of Defense, War and Navy were separate departments, each with full cabinet ranking.
[12] James Farley, Jim Farley’s Story (Irvine Calif.: Reprint Services Corp., 1948), pp. 241–43.
[13] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947/8), p. 324.
[14] Ibid., pp. 345–48.
[15] William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 127.
[16] H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office; Longmans, Green, 1955), p. 243.
[17] John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 171.
[18] Ibid., p.170.
[19] Ibid., p.175.
[20] Hall, North American Supply, pp. 251–52.
[21] Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, pp. 170–71.
[22] Hall, North American Supply, p. 252.
[23] Ibid., p.250.
[24] R.S. Sayers, Financial Policy, 1939–1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), p. 369.
[25] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), p. 115.
[26] Ibid., p. 118.
[27] Captain Safford spent many hours with this author, sharing insights gained from his pre-Pearl Harbor work in communications and security, and talking about his experiences and his knowledge of the Japanese intercepts. He played an important role, not only in deciphering “Purple” in 1940, but also, as we shall see, in the post-Pearl Harbor investigations.
According to David Kahn (The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1967, pp. 10, 388, 503–04):
Commander Laurence F. Safford . . . founded the Navy’s communication-intelligence organization. . . . One of his principal accomplishments before the outbreak of war was the establishment of the Mid-Pacific Strategic Direction-finder Net and of a similar net for the Atlantic, where it was to play a role of immense importance in the Battle of the Atlantic against the U-boats. . . . He [Safford] built up the communications intelligence organization into what later became OP-20-G and, by adding improvements of his own to Edward Hebern’s rotor mechanisms, gradually developed cipher machines suitable for the Navy’s requirements of speed, reliability, and security. . . . [H]e is the father of the Navy’s present cryptologic organization. . . . Thanks to Commander Laurance F. Safford head of OP-20-G and father of the Navy’s communications-intelligence organization, the United States had, upon its entrance into the war, an Atlantic arc of high-frequency direction-finders to exploit the U-boat garrulity.
[28] Franklin Delano Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928–1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. 2, p. 864.
[29] Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 46n.
[30] Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 92–95.
[31] This high-handed disregard for legal procedure on the part of FDR was not an isolated incident. Stark mentioned a similar incident respecting a dry dock at Pearl Harbor (interview with author, December 10, 1962). This was long before December 1941. Moreell, whose Bureau of Yards and Docks would be constructing the dry dock, asked for written authorization. When the president refused to authorize the transaction in writing, Stark went out on a limb and provided it himself. Moreell completed the dock ten months ahead of schedule, some ten days before the Japanese attack. According to Furer (Administration of the Navy Department in World War II , p. 426) this battleship dry dock proved “invaluable in repairing damaged ships after the attack.”
[32] Walter Karig, Battle Report: The Atlantic War (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943), p. 25.
[33] Ibid., p. 15.
[34] 54 Stat Pt. 2, 2405, quoted in U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 1931–1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 255; U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 5. See also Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 564–65.
[35] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, pp. 98–102.
[36] Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 307–18, 383–95.
[37] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 1, p. 297.
[38] Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 399–400.
[39] Ibid., p. 434.
[40] Ibid., pp. 425, 427.
[41] Ibid., p. 427; Richardson’s testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee in 1945, as related in his book.
[42] Ibid., pp. 434–35.
[43] Hall, North American Supply, p. 253.
[44] Ibid., p. 249.
[45] Ibid., p. 250.
[46] Ibid., p. 253.
[47] Ibid., p. 254.
[48] Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, vol. 1: The Genesis of the New Deal, 1928–1932 (New York: Random House, 1940), p. 313; Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making: 1932–1940 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 313–14.
[49] Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1940, pp. 488ff. Partial quote in Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Quotations from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, July 1940–August 1, 1944, Republican National Committee, September 1944, p. 50. See also Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, pp. 314–15.
[50] Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1928–1932, p. 517; Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, p. 316.
[51] Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1928–1932, pp. 543ff.; Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, p. 317.
[52] Roosevelt, Public Papers, 1928–1932, pp. 546ff.; Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, p. 318.
[53] William C. Bullitt, “How We Won the War and Lost the Peace,” 2 parts. Life (August 30, 1948), pp. 83–97; (September 6, 1948), pp. 86–103.
Chapter 3
[1] H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office; Longmans, Green, 1955), pp. 256–57.
[2] U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 6.
[3] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), p. 119.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), p. 125n.
[6] Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 261.
[7] Hall, North American Supply, p. 258.
[8] Ibid., p. 259.
[9] Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941, pp. 261–62.
[10] Loewenheim, et al., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, p. 125.
[11] William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 155.
[12] William C. Bullitt, “How We Won the War and Lost the Peace.” 2 parts. Life (August 30, 1948), pp. 83–97; (September 6, 1948), pp. 86–103. See also Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941, p. 263.
[13] U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 1931–1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, pp. 1, 5.
[14] Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 599–607.
[15] Arthur Krock, The Consent of the Governed, and Other Deceits (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 40.
[16] John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 221ff.
[17] S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Againt Japan, vol. 1: The Loss of Singapore (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957), p. 38.
[18] Ibid., pp. 53–54.
[19] John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982). (1983 paperback published by Berkley Publishing, New York, includes “Postscript” dated August 21, 1982, p. 127n.)
[20] The Japanese
“had four ends in view: to secure their Manchurian frontier with the Soviet Union, thus enabling them to move southwards without having to look over their shoulders; to obtain oil supplies and concessions from the Netherlands East Indies by means other than the use of force, thus making themselves less dependent on the United States; to obtain complete control of Indo-China, so as to be able to occupy, at an appropriate moment, Siamese territory as a base from which to mount an attack on Malaya, and to prevent the United States either from entering the war on the side of Britain or interfering with their own plans for their southward advance.” (Kirby, The War Against Japan, p. 59)
[21] Ibid., p. 61.
[22] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 15, p. 1488. See also part 15, pp. 1491–92:
It was agreed at these meetings that: “If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.
[23] The Malay barrier was the string of islands, stretching west from Bathurst Island, just off the northern coast of central Australia, through New Guinea, Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, to Singapore on the Malay Peninsula. See Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2864.
[24] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1485–550.
[25] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 264; Turner testimony at Hart Inquiry; part 15, p. 1485. Pencilled notation on United States-British Staff Conversations Report cover page: Secretary of the Navy Knox on May 28, 1941, and Secretary of War Stimson on June 2, 1941.
[26] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, pp. 264–65; Turner testimony before Hart Inquiry.
[27] Department of State, Peace and War, p. 642; U.S. Congress, Events, p. 277.
[28] Loewenheim, et al., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, p. 137.
[29] Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the Atlantic Fleet, 1939–1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 191–96.
[30] Ibid., pp. 164, 176.
[31] Ibid., p. 154.
[32] Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 26.
[33] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, pp. 184–89.
[34] L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), pp. 519–20.
[35] Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 9. See also U.S. Congress, Events, p. 283.
[36] Ibid. p. 284.
[37] Ibid., p. 288; Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 686–87.
[38] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, p. 201.
[39] Ibid., pp. 213–16.
[40] Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 665.
[41] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, p. 216.
[42] Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 439–41.
[43] Ibid., p. 593, Churchill reporting by letter (November 9, 1941) to General Jan Christian Smuts, prime minister of the Union of South Africa, on the meeting at Argentia.
[44] Department of State “Memorandum of Conversation” (signed by Sumner Welles, undersecretary of state) between the president and Winston Churchill at sea, August 11, 1941.
[45] U.S. Congress, Events, p. 293; Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 718–19.
[46] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, pp. 126–29.
[47] Ibid., pp. 223–29. See also Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 11.
[48] U.S. Congress, Events, p. 297.
[49] Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 737–43.
[50] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, pp. 265–80.
[51] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 2209–11.
[52] Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, pp. 297–308. See also Department of Navy, United States Naval Chronology, World War II, p. 11, and Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), p. 37.
Chapter 4
[1] Interview by author of Captain Albert E. Hindmarsh, January 9, 1964 (typescript in author’s files). According to Hindmarsh, Japanese language expert with the Office of Naval Intelligence before the attack, the July 1941 embargo of gasoline below 86 octane really hurt Japan.
[2] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 32, p. 43. Testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry.
[3] Franklin Delano Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters: 1928–1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. 2, p. 1077.
[4] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941. vol. 2: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 37–39; Grew memorandum of February 14, 1941.
[5] Ibid., p. 39.
[6] Katherine Tupper Marshall, Together: Annals of an Army Wife (New York/Atlanta: Tupper & Love, 1946), Appendix 1, pp. 283–90.
[7] Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General: 1830–1939, (New York: Viking Adult, 1963), pp. 290–99.
[8] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, p. 1050. Quoted from Army regulations.
[9] Ibid.
[10] James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 420.
[11] Ibid., p. 424.
[12] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 565–66. Marshall’s February 7, 1941, letter to Short.
[13] Ibid., part 15, p. 1605.
[14] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2225–57.
[15] Ibid., part 5, p 2273. Stark testimony.
[16] Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 404.
[17] Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 87–88.
[18] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, p. 2148, Stark to Kimmel, February 10, 1941.
[19] Ibid., part 16, p. 2153. Stark to Kimmel, March 3, 1941.
[20] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2150–51; part 33, pp. 1203–04.
[21] Ibid., part 16, p. 2150; part 33, p. 1203.
[22] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2150–51; part 33, pp. 1203–04.
[23] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2149–50. Stark letter (February 25, 1941) to Kimmel.
[24] Ibid., part 16, p. 2229. Kimmel to Stark (February 18, 1941).
[25] Ibid., part 17, p. 2160. Stark to Kimmel (March 22, 1941).
[26] Ibid., part 8, p. 3735.
[27] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1860–61. Tokyo/Berlin cables; part 4, p. 1815, June 23, 1941 Tokyo to Mexico message cautioning vigilance: “There are suspicions that they [the Americans] read some of our [Japan’s] codes.”
[28] Ibid., part 15, pp. 1551–84 (Exhibit No. 50). American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941 (Short Title, “A.D.B.”), Report.
[29] Ibid., p. 1564.
[30] Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 274.
[31] Ibid., pp. 273–74. Here Sherwood quotes noted historian, Charles A. Beard:
If these precedents are to stand unimpeached and to provide sanctions for the continued conduct of American foreign affairs, the Constitution may be nullified by the President, officials, and officers who have taken the oath, and are under moral obligation to uphold it.
[32] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, p. 2164. Stark to Kimmel, April 19, 1941.
[33] Ibid., part 16, p. 2165. Stark to Kimmel, April 26, 1941.
[34] William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940–1941 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 451.
[35] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), pp. 336–37.
[36] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 444–45, 448–49.
[37] Ibid., p. 423.
[38] Ibid., p. 462.
[39] Ibid., pp. 444, 447.
[40] Ibid., p. 483. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 1400–01. (7/24/41, re sanctions on Japan).
[41] U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 1931–1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, pp. 286–87.
[42] Watson, The War Department, pp. 338–39.
[43] Ibid., pp. 347–49.
[44] Ibid., p. 342.
[45] U.S. Congress, Events, p. 289.
[46] Ibid., p. 290.
[47] Interview (January 9, 1964) of Japanese expert, Captain Albert E. Hindmarsh (typescript in author’s files).
[48] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, p. 43. Stark testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry.
[49] Ibid., part 24, p.1355. Stark testimony before the Roberts Commission, Exhibit 13.
[50] Ibid., part 12, p. 8.
[51] Ibid., p. 9.
[52] Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 708.
[53] Ibid., p. 715.
[54] Ibid., p. 714. FDR’s oral statement to Nomura, August 17, 1941.
[55] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941. vol. 4: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 380.
[56] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16. pp. 2225–27. Kimmel to Stark, January 27, 1941.
[57] Ibid., part 16, p. 2242.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2243–45.
[60] Ibid., p. 2181. Stark to Kimmel, August 22, 1941.
[61] Watson, The War Department, pp. 348–55.
[62] Ibid., p. 348.
[63] Ibid., p. 351.
[64] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 2212–14. Stark letter to Kimmel, September 23, 1941; postscript dated September 29.
[65] Ibid., part 14, p. 1327.
[66] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2214–15 (Stark to Kimmel, October 17,1941).
[67] Author’s notes of Albert E. Hindmarsh interview, January 9, 1954.
[68] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 2159–60. Stark to Kimmel, March 22, 1941.
[69] Ibid., part 4, p. 1724.
[70] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 261.
[71] Ibid., part 12, p. 262.
[72] Ibid., part 12, p. 263. J-19, #122. (Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941)
[73] Ibid., part 12, p. 254–70.
[74] Ibid., part 12, pp. 254, 270–316.
Chapter 5
[1] Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943). Ambassador Grew’s November 3, 1941 cable to State Department, Washington.
[2] A poll conducted by public opinion statistician George Gallup “indicated that 83% of the people in the United States would vote against a declaration of war if given the opportunity,” although they “were still convinced that the American public would take the risk of war ‘to help England win’.” James J. Martin, American Liberalism and World Politics (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964), vol. 2, p. 1275.
[3] For an account of the America First Committee, see Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971).
[4] E. Eastman Irving, ed., The World Almanac (New York: New York World-Telegram, 1942), pp. 62, 75, 78.
[5] Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 713–14. FDR’s oral statement to the Japanese ambassador, August 17, 1941.
[6] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 14, p. 1063.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1063–64.
[9] Ibid., part 14, p. 1064.
[10] Ibid., Ingersoll remark at Joint Army-Navy Board November 3 meeting.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., part 14, p. 1064.
[13] Ibid., pp. 1064–65.
[14] Ibid., part 12, pp. 92–93. November 4, 1941 cable #725 from Tokyo to Washington. Translated November 4, 1941.
[15] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1061–62.
[16] Ibid., part 12, p. 100, #736, Tokyo to Washington.
[17] Ibid., part 11, p. 5420.
[18] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), pp. 220–31, 358.
[19] Ibid., p. 359.
[20] Department of State, Peace and War, p. 137. See also Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, p. 362.
[21] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 130–31. Tokyo to Washington, #781, November 15, 1941.
[22] Ibid., p. 130. Tokyo to Washington, #775.
[23] Ibid., p. 133. Washington to Tokyo, #1098.
[24] Ibid., pp. 137–38. Tokyo to Washington, unnumbered dispatch.
[25] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2,pp. 740–43.
[26] Ibid., pp. 743–44.
[27] Ibid., pp. 744–50. Memorandum of Hull’s November 18, 1941 conversation with Japanese ambassadors.
[28] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 153–54.
Chapter 6
[1] Percy L. Greaves, Jr., “The Pearl Harbor Investigations,” in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953), p. 410; David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), p. 23. See also Laurence F. Safford, two-hour tape, notes in author’s possession.
[2] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 36, p. 23. McCollum testimony at Hewitt Inquiry.
[3] Safford interview, April 5, 1966, notes in author’s possession.
[4] Kahn, The Codebreakers, p. 13.
[5] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, p. 915.
[6] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 751–52.
[7] Ibid., p. 753.
[8] Ibid., pp. 755–56.
[9] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 1108–09, undated, probably shortly after November 20, 1941; Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved the West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 467.
[10] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 4: The Far East, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 640, Hull memorandum of November 22, 1941.
[11] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 165. Tokyo cable #812 to Japanese Ambassador in Washington.
[12] Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, p. 758. State Department memorandum of Hull’s November 22 conversation with the Japanese ambassadors.
[13] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 173. Tokyo message #823 to Washington.
[14] Department of State, The Far East, pp. 646–47, Hull’s memorandum of conversation.
[15] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1405.
[16] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39 (Report),p. 314, analysis here as culled from testimony during the JCC hearings and presented in its final report.
[17] David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), p. 125.
[18] John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 389.
[19] U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 1931–1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 169. November 3, 1938 entry quotes from Prime Minister Prince Konoye’s November 3, 1938 radio speech announcing Japan’s intention of creating a “new order” in east Asia. For entire speech, see Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, pp. 478–81.
[20] Department of State, The Far East, p. 650–51, memorandum of conversations of State Department’s adviser on political relations, Stanley K. Hornbeck.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, p. 135. Quotation from Army Pearl Harbor Board Report. See also U.S. Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing an Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating Thereto and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 513.
[23] Department of State, The Far East, p. 644.
[24] Ibid., p. 649.
[25] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433. Excerpt reprinted from Stimson’s November 25 diary.
[26] Department of State, The Far East, pp. 655–56. British Embassy to Department of State.
[27] Ibid., pp. 685–87, Hull memorandum concerning November 29 conversation with the Japanese ambassadors.
[28] Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 124.
[29] Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 386.
[30] Department of State, The Far East, pp. 660–61, telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Dr. T.V. Soong, November 25, 1941.
[31] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Institute of Pacific Relations, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, part 9, pp. 3209–12.
[32] Department of State, The Far East, p. 652; Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1160.
[33] Department of State, The Far East, p. 654, November 24, 1941 telegram, Quo Tai-chi to Hu Shih.
[34] Ibid., pp. 653–54.
[35] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 137.
[36] Department of State, Japan: 1941, p. 558.
[37] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, excerpt from Stimson’s diary, November 25, 1941.
[38] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 5433–34, from Stimson diary, as quoted in JCC hearings.
[39] Department of State, The Far East, p. 665.
[40] Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 386.
[41] Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 125. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, July 26, 1951, part 1, pp. 153–54.
[42] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5434, from Stimson’s diary, November 26, 1941.
[43] Ibid., part 11, p. 5387, Hull reply to interrogatory submitted by the Joint Congressional Committee.
[44] The Communist affiliations of these several advisers are on the record. The evidence offered by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley that White engaged in Soviet espionage was considered “conclusive” by Attorney General Brownell, “uncontradictable” by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and “incontrovertible” by President Eisenhower (Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 424). After Lattimore finished testifying during the investigation of the Institute for Pacific Relations conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, the Subcommittee reported that Lattimore had been “from some time in the middle 1930s a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy” (Francis X. Gannon, Biographical Dictionary of the Left, Belmont, Mass.: Western Islands, 1969, consolidated vol. 1., p. 416). On November 8, 1945, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover informed President Truman that Currie was “one of many persons within the federal government who ‘have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to agents of the Soviet Government’ ” (Ibid., p. 299). When testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on July 1, 1948, former Soviet espionage agent Elizabeth Bentley accused Currie of having “furnished United States government secrets to a Soviet spy ring” (Ibid., p. 299).
[45] Department of State, Japan: 1931-1941, pp. 768–70.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:
1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands [sic] and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
[46] Ibid., p. 76. See also Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 257–58.
[47] Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, pp. 764–66. State Department memorandum of November 26, 1941 meeting.
[48] Department of State, The Far East, p. 666, Telegram #783 to Grew; and p. 666n. Telegram #274 to Gauss.
[49] Ibid., pp. 666–67, Welles’s November 27, 1941 memorandum.
[50] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 126–27.
[51] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5214.
[52] Ibid., part 12, pp. 174–75.
[53] Robert Payne, The Marshall Story (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1952), p. 148; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New York: Viking Press 1965), p. 208.
Chapter 7
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), part 26, p. 264, testimony of Admiral Turner at Hart Inquiry.
[2] Ibid., part 6, p. 2502; also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 17, pp. 2568–600, Exhibit No. 114 (Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five).
[3] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), pp. 103–04.
[4] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1491–92.
[5] Ibid., p. 1511.
[6] Ibid., part 17, p. 2585.
[7] Ibid., part 17, pp. 2568–600.
[8] Ibid., part 14, p. 1083.
[9] Ibid., part 11, pp. 5434–35.
[10] William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 299; also Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved the West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 473.
[11] Francis Bowes Sayers, Glad Adventure (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 221.
[12] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5435, from Stimson’s November 27, 1941, diary.
[13] Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimson’s November 27.
[14] Ibid., part 23, p. 1012.
[15] Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimson’s November 27, 1941, diary.
[16] Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
[17] Ibid., part 8, p. 3454.
[18] Ibid., part 14, p. 1330.
[19] Ibid., part 3, pp. 1027–28.
[20] Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, CNO message #272337.
[21] Ibid., part 14, p. 1405, CNO dispatch #242005.
[22] Ibid., part 39, p. 315, NCI report.
[23] Stimson’s November 28, 1941 note in ibid., part 11, p. 5435.
[24] On December 12, 1938, Japanese planes had bombed a U.S. river gunboat, the Panay near Nanjing, China. The ship was sunk, killing two and wounding 30. The U.S. demanded apologies, reparations, and guarantees against further incidents. On December 14, the Japanese complied.
[25] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 5435–36, account of the War Cabinet meeting based on Stimson’s diary.
[26] Ibid., part 14, p. 1330; idem, part 24, pp. 1778, 1823.
[27] Ibid., part 24, pp. 1824–25.
[28] Ibid., part 14, p. 1330.
[29] Ibid., part 17, p. 2479.
[30] Ibid., part 6, p. 2520; see also Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), pp. 46–48.
[31] Ibid., part 26, pp. 317–32, Halsey testimony at Hart Inquiry.
[32] Ibid., part 17, pp. 2480–84 (Serial 0114W).
[33] Ibid., part 26, p. 343, Newton testimony at Hart Inquiry.
[34] Ibid., part 26, pp. 141–46, Brown testimony at Hart Inquiry.
[35] Ibid., part 12, p. 195.
[36] Ibid., part 12, p. 154.
[37] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4126–28.
[38] Ibid., part 10, pp. 4520–22, testimony of colonel Bratton.
[39] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3915–18, testimony of Lieutenant Commander Kramer.
Chapter 8
[1] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 684–85, Welles November 28 memorandum of conversation with Halifax.
[2] Ibid., pp. 685–87, Hull November 29 memorandum of conversation.
[3] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 12, p. 199. Tokyo to Washington cable #857.
[4] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 148–49.
[5] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 207. Nomura October 30 Washington to Tokyo cable.
[6] Ibid., part 12, pp. 206–07, Kurusu Washington to Tokyo dispatch concerning Tojo.
[7] Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 777, as reported by the Japanese Embassy’s First Secretary Terasaki to State Department’s Joseph W. Ballantine.
[8] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 223, message #1234.
[9] Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 777–78, memorandum of Terasaki’s conversation with Ballantine and statement handed Ballantine by Terasaki.
[10] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 210–11, December 1 cable #1225 of Japanese ambassadors to Tokyo.
[11] Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 772–77. This account of Hull’s December 1 meeting with the Japanese ambassadors is taken from State Department’s Joseph W. Ballantine’s memorandum.
[12] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 13. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[13] Ibid., part 36, p.13. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[14] Ibid., part 15, pp. 1839–42; part 36 (Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit #10),pp. 659–60.
[15] Ibid., part 36, p. 17, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[16] Ibid., part 4, p. 1847, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee.
[17] Ibid., part 36, p. 19, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[18] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1373–83.
[19] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), p. 73.
[20] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 23, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[21] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1373–84. Miles memorandum and Supporting Estimates.
[22] Ibid., part 6, p. 2548, Kimmel statement presented to the Joint Committee.
[23] Ibid., part 12, p. 204. #985 (Part 1 of 3).
[24] Ibid., pp. 204–05. #985 (Part 3 of 3).
[25] Ibid., part 12, pp. 205–06.
[26] Ibid., part 12, pp. 208–09.
[27] Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 528–29.
[28] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1564, 1568–69, American-Dutch-British agreement, pp. 13, 17, 18.
[29] Department of State, Far East: 1941, p. 701.
[30] Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962), pp. 185–86.
[31] Ibid., pp. 186–87.
[32] Birkenhead, Halifax, p. 529.
[33] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1407. OPNAV cable #012356.
[34] Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), pp. 484–85.
[35] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 1301–02.
[36] Grew, Ten Years in Japan, p. 485.
Chapter 9
[1] Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull: American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, vols. 12 and 13 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), 2 vols., p. 516.
[2] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, p. 779.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., p. 780.
[5] Ibid., pp. 779–81.
[6] Ibid., pp. 486–92. U.S. draft proposal to Japanese government, June 21, 1941.
[7] Ibid., pp. 637–41. Japanese proposals submitted to U.S. ambassador in Japan, September 25, 1941.
[8] Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, pp. 780–81.
[9] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, Washington to Tokyo message #1232, part 1 of 2, December 2, 1941, pp. 221–22.
[10] Ibid., part 12, Washington to Tokyo message #1232, part 2 of 2, December 2, 1941, pp. 221–22.
[11] Ibid., part 3, p. 1148, Marshall testimony.
[12] Ibid., part 11, p. 5427. Excerpt from Stimson diary.
[13] Ibid., part 3, p. 1148. Quote from Marshall testimony.
[14] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 5428–29, excerpt from Stimson diary.
[15] Ibid., part 12, pp. 186–88, Tokyo Circular #2409.
[16] U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Events Leading up to World War II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence, 1931-1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 216, September 8 entry. The dates in this and the following paragraphs are taken from the 1942 World Almanac.
[17] E. Eastman Irving, ed., The World Almanac (New York: New York World-Telegram, 1942), p. 71.
[18] Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 156.
[19] Ibid., pp. 182–83.
[20] John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 391–93.
[21] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 791, General Miles testimony before the Joint Committee.
[22] Ibid., part 12, p. 261, Tokyo September 24 J-19 message to Honolulu, translated October 9, 1941.
[23] Ibid., part 12, p. 262, Tokyo J-19 message to Honolulu #111, translated December 3, 1941.
[24] Ibid., p. 215.
[25] Ibid., part 15, p. 1866, exhibit No. 83. #031850 to CINCPAC, CINCAF, Coms. 14, 16 concerning Japanese instruction to destroy codes and ciphers.
[26] Ibid., part 9, p. 4269, Ingersoll testimony before the Joint Committee.
[27] Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV #031850, December 3, 1941.
[28] Ibid., part 12, p. 209, Tokyo to Washington #2444, December 1, 1941.
[29] Ibid., part 29, p. 2396. Safford testimony before the APHB.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid., part 26, pp. 392–93, Safford testimony before the Hart Inquiry.
[32] Ibid., p. 392.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., part 14, p. 1408.
[35] Ibid., part 14, p. 1407.
[36] Ibid., p. 1408.
[37] Ibid., part 2, p. 777, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee.
[38] Ibid., p. 841, Miles testimony before the Joint Committee; part 29, p. 2445, Bratton testimony before the APHB. See also part 14, p. 1409.
[39] Ibid., part 14, p. 1408. OPNAV #040339.
[40] Ibid., OPNAV #042017.
[41] Ibid., part 29, p. 2397, Safford before the APHB.
Chapter 10
[1] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), p.337.
[2] Ibid., pp. 338–39.
[3] Ibid., pp. 347–49.
[4] Albert C. Wedemeyer, Reports! (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), pp. 20–21.
[5] Watson, The War Department, pp. 358–59.
[6] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 12, p. 154, Tokyo Circular #2353.
[7] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 34, p. 111.
[8] Ibid., part 8, p. 3640, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee.
[9] Ibid., p. 3580.
[10] Ibid., part 33, p. 853, Kramer testimony, September 13, 1944, at Navy Court of Inquiry; ibid., part 8, pp. 3915–18, and ibid., part 9, pp. 4126–28, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee; and ibid., part 10, p. 4624, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[11] Ibid., part 8, p. 3581, Safford statement before the Joint Committee.
[12] Ibid. p. 3640.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid., p. 3615, Safford 1945 memorandum re “Winds Execute” prepared for Sonnett.
[15] Ibid., p. 3581. See also pp. 3581–85 for Safford statement to the Joint Committee (February 1, 1946) concerning radio reception at our various intercept stations and our preparations for picking up the “Winds Execute.”
[16] Ibid., p. 3640, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee.
[17] These three paragraphs based on Bettina B. Greaves’s interview of Ralph T. Briggs in Las Vegas, Nevada, August 14, 1988. See also John Toland’s interview of Briggs, April 13, 1980, filed with Toland papers at Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Also see John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 195–99.
[18] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3619. Safford testimony; also ibid., part 18, p. 3344.
[19] Considerable confusion has surrounded the actual time when the “Winds Execute” was received. Safford’ s recollection, based on the timing of messages he dispatched immediately upon receipt, was that it was picked up on the morning of December 4 (ibid., part 8, pp. 35 86–88). Briggs’s surmise, when he was interviewed by Toland (April 13, 1980), was that he may have intercepted a winds message during his mid-watch at Cheltenham from 0001 [12:01 a.m.] to 0800 [8:00 a.m.], Washington, D.C., time on December 2. He came to this conclusion on the basis of missing messages as recorded on his Station “M” log sheet. However, later Briggs’s investigations convinced him that the date was actually December 4, as Safford maintained consistently throughout his testimony and interrogations.
[20] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3586. See also Kramer testimony, September 13, 1944, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Joint Committee, part 33, p. 853.
[21] Ibid., part 8, p. 3586, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee.
[22] Ibid. See also p. 3611 and ibid., part 18, p. 3347, the memorandum of May 14, 1945, prepared by Safford for Lieutenant Commander John F. Sonnett, legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt.
[23] Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nichi-bei Joho Senki (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1980), pp. 146, 235; 1982, pp. 191, 232. This paragraph is based on translations by Kentaro Nakano and Toshio Murata of pertinent passages in the autobiography of naval historian Sanematsu. At the time of the attack, Sanematsu was the ranking assistant naval attaché and chief intelligence officer in the Japanese embassy in Washington. After the war he was tried in the Japanese war crimes tribunal and served time in prison.
[24] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2398, Safford testimony before the APHB.
[25] Ibid., p. 2397.
[26] Ibid., p. 2398, Serial No. 042017. See also ibid., part 14, p. 1408.
[27] Ibid., part 29, p. 2398, Safford testimony before the APHB.
[28] Ibid., p. 2397, Serial No. 042018.
[29] Ibid., Serial No. 042019.
[30] Briggs interview, August 14, 1988, by Bettina B. Greaves.
[31] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3586, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee.
[32] Ibid., part 12, p. 263.
[33] Ibid., part 12, pp. 261–63.
[34] Ibid., p. 231.
[35] Ibid., p. 224. Tokyo to Washington, #875.
[36] Ibid., p. 227. Washington to Tokyo, #1243.
[37] Henry M. Adams, Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), p. 257.
[38] Ibid., p. 256.
[39] Ibid., p. 257.
[40] Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962), pp. 187–88.
[41] Ibid., p.188.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 109.
[45] S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. 1: The Loss of Singapore (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957), p. 175.
Chapter 11
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 2, p. 688, Testimony of Joseph C. Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan.
[2] New York Times, December 5, 1941, pp. 1, 4.
[3] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), vol. 4, p. 717.
[4] Ibid., pp. 717–19.
[5] Ibid., p. 719.
[6] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, p. 784.
[7] Ibid., pp. 781–82, Joseph W. Ballantine report of December 5 meeting between Hull and the Japanese ambassadors.
[8] Ibid., pp. 782–83.
[9] New York Times, December 6, 1941, p. 3.
[10] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), p. 359.
[11] New York Times, December 6, 1941 p. 3.
[12] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 227.
[13] Ibid., part 12, p. 209.
[14] Ibid., part 8, p. 3585, Safford statement prepared for Joint Committee.
[15] Ibid., part 12, p. 234.
[16] Ibid., part 9, p. 4214, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also ibid., part 18, p. 3350. #031030 (5 Dec. 1941) from ALUSNA, Batavia (Thorpe).
[17] Ibid., part 33, p. 886. Turner testimony before the NCI.
Chapter 12
[1] Mark Skinner Watson, The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1950), p. 64.
[2] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 36, pp. 229–31, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, June 5, 1945, before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[3] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 195, Tokyo to Washington “Purple” message #844.
[4] Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony.
[5] Ibid., part 32, p. 356, Testimony of Navy Captain William S. Heard before the NCI.
[6] Ibid., part 8, p. 3559, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee.
[7] Ibid., part 8, p. 3560, Safford testimony.
[8] Ibid., part 14, p. 1413.
[9] Ibid., part 12, pp. 238–39.
[10] Ibid., part 9, p. 4510, testimony of Colonel Rufus Bratton before the Joint Committee.
[11] Ibid., part 12, pp. 238–39.
[12] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4508–10, 4512–13, 4536, 4574, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[13] Ibid., part 10, p. 4668, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee; ibid., part 11, p. 5271, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[14] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1761, 1874, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee.
[15] Ibid., part 11, pp. 5277–81, Beardall testimony.
[16] Ibid., part 17, p. 2485.
[17] Ibid., part 15, p. 1564, ADB (April 1941) Conversations.
[18] Ibid., part 14, p. 1246. See also ibid., part 2, p. 493.
[19] Ibid., part 14, p. 1247. See also ibid., part 2, p. 494.
[20] Ibid., part 34, pp. 59–61, Lieutenant Robert H. O’Dell testimony before Clarke Inquiry, October 6, 1944.
[21] Ibid., part 12, pp. 228–29.
[22] Ibid., p. 234.
[23] Ibid., part 9, p. 4201. Note added by courier Kramer for the benefit of Navy recipients, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
[24] Ibid., part 12, pp. 236.
[25] Ibid., p. 237.
[26] Ibid., part 12, p. 245.
[27] Ibid., part 5, p. 2082.
[28] Ibid., part 12, p. 215. Tokyo to Washington #867.
[29] Ibid., part 11, p. 5284, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[30] Ibid., part 8, p. 3780, memorandum on the stationery of the War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, dated December 6, 1941.
[31] Ibid., part 5, p. 2077.
[32] Ibid., part 12, p. 339, table of distances.
[33] Distances as cited in the Encylopaedia Britannica (1955), “Guam” entry, vol. 10, p. 929.
[34] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 2398–99, Safford testimony at APHB.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid. For text of message #061743, see Joint Committee, part 14, p. 1408.
[37] Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), pp. 121–22.
[38] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, p. 5081, Creighton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[39] Ibid., p. 5083–84.
[40] Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, p. 122.
[41] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2300, testimony before APHB of O’Dell.
[42] Ibid., part 30, p. 3223 (APHB Exhibit No. 70, Exhibit A, “Summary of Far Eastern Documents” paragraph FE 366). See also ibid., part 9, p. 4565, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[43] Ibid., part 29, p. 2303, O’Dell testimony before the APHB.
[44] Ibid., p. 2301.
[45] Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962), p. 188n.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 5082–83; Creighton testimony before the Joint Committee, quoting War Department London telegram, relayed from Singapore to Manila December 7, Manila time.
[48] Ibid., part 14, p. 1412, Exhibit No. 40.
Chapter 13
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 12, pp. 238–39, Tokyo “Purple” message #901.
[2] Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13, 1944.
[3] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1413–15, exhibit No. 41.
[4] Ibid., part 36, p. 66, Safford testimony at Hewitt Inquiry, May 21, 1945.
[5] Ibid., part 4, p. 1761, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee, December 17, 1946.
[6] Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., part 36, p. 66, Safford testimony at Hewitt Inquiry, May 21, 1945.
[9] Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
[10] Ibid., part 11, pp. 5166–67.
[11] Ibid., part 19, pp. 3536–37. See also memorandum read into the record, Joint Committee, part 11, pp. 5247–54.
[12] Ibid., part 33, pp. 848–52, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13, 1944.
[13] Ibid., part 10, pp. 4661, 4668, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
[14] Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI, September 13, 1944.
[15] Ibid., part 10, pp. 4659–71. Schulz testimony before Joint Committee.
[16] Ibid. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
[17] Ibid., part 10, pp. 4659–71, especially pp. 4662–63, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
[18] Ibid., p. 4663. Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
[19] Ibid., pp. 4663–64, Schulz testimony before the Joint Committee.
[20] Ibid., part 33, p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI. Also ibid., part 9, p. 4514, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[21] Ibid., p. 857, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
[22] Ibid., part 4, p. 1970, Turner testimony before the Joint Committee.
[23] Ibid., part 33, p. 809, Ingersoll testimony before the NCI.
[24] Ibid., p. 858, Kramer testimony before the NCI.
[25] Ibid., part 29, pp. 2421, 2423, Bratton testimony before the APHB.
[26] Ibid., p. 2421.
[27] Ibid., part 9, p. 4514, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[28] Ibid., part 2, p. 441, Hull’s 1945 deposition to the Joint Committee.
[29] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), vol. 4, pp. 722–23.
[30] Ibid., pp. 723–25.
[31] Ibid., p. 762n. Transmitted in Telegram No. 818, December 6, 9 p.m.
[32] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 784–86.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 692, Grew testimony before the Joint Committee.
[35] Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, p. 784n. See also Department of State, Far East: 1941, p. 726n.
[36] Department of State, The Far East, p. 727.
[37] Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, p. 784n. See also Department of State, The Far East, p. 726n.
[38] Letter from James G. Stahlman to Admiral Kemp Tolley, USN (Ret.), November 26, 1973. Copy in author’s files.
Chapter 14
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 12, pp. 239–45, Tokyo to Washington 14-part #902.
[2] Ibid., part 14, p. 1415.
[3] Ibid., part 33, pp. 803–04.
[4] Ibid., part 12, p. 245.
[5] Ibid., part 4, p. 1766, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee.
[6] Ibid., part 33, pp. 803–04. Testimony of Lt. Cmdr. Alfred V. Pering at NCI.
[7] Ibid., part 12, p. 248.
[8] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1933–35.
[9] Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 122.
[10] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 5082–83. See Creighton (ALUSNA), Singapore telegram, December 6, 1941, to Admiral Hart in Manila, included in Creighton testimony before Joint Committee hearings.
[11] Ibid., part 14, p. 1412.
[12] Ibid., part 33, pp. 858–59, Kramer testimony at NCI, September 13, 1944.
[13] Ibid., part 33, p. 803, Pering testimony.
[14] Ibid., part 8, p. 3905, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See also part 33, p. 869.
[15] Ibid., part 36, p. 25. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[16] Ibid., p. 26.
[17] Ibid., p. 27. McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. See also this author’s interviews of McCollum (May 18, 1945, with Admiral Kimmel and Kimmel’s attorneys, Charles Rugg and Captain Robert A. Lavender; and May 3, 1961, at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D.C., with Admirals Samuel Morison, Walter DeLany, John Shafroth, also Dr. Charles Tansill, and Mrs. Wohlstetter present).
[18] Ibid., part 9, p. 4043, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
[19] Ibid., part 8, p. 3907. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
[20] Ibid., part 33, p. 868.
[21] Ibid., part 11, p. 5283, Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[22] Ibid., part 11, p. 5287. Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[23] Ibid., part 11, p. 5283. Beardall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[24] Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI. For intercepts referred to, see ibid., part 12, pp. 248–49.
[25] Ibid., part 12, p. 251.
[26] Ibid., pp. 186–87, part 37, pp. 665–66, and part 36, p. 77.
[27] Ibid., part 36, pp. 344, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[28] Ibid., part 36, p. 343, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[29] Ibid., part 36, pp. 82–83, 343, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. See also part 9, pp. 4071, 4073, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
[30] Ibid., part 33, p. 859, Kramer testimony at NCI.
[31] Ibid., part 36, p. 27, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[32] Ibid., pp. 25–26.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., p. 27.
[35] Ibid., p. 26.
[36] Ibid., part 9, p. 4052. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
[37] Ibid., part 33, pp. 859–60, Kramer testimony at NCI.
[38] Ibid., part, 33, p. 865, Kramer testimony at NCI.
[39] Ibid., part 36, pp. 82–83, Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry. Also ibid., part 9, pp. 4071–73, Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee. See Friedman testimony at Hewitt Inquiry (ibid., part 36, p. 308).
[40] John R. Deane interview, January 2, 1964, by the author.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 221.
[43] Deane interview.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB.
[46] Ibid., part 9, p. 4517, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[47] Ibid., p. 4524.
[48] Ibid., part 3, p. 1430, Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[49] Ibid., part 9, p. 4524, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB.
[52] Ibid., part 9, p. 4525, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[53] Ibid., part 34, pp. 19–20, Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation, September 14, 1944.
[54] Ibid., part 9, p. 4517. Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[55] Ibid., part 29, p. 2420, Bratton testimony at APHB. Marshall believed he arrived earlier, “more nearly 11;” see his testimony before the Joint Committee (ibid., part 3, p. 1431).
[56] Ibid., part 34, pp. 19, 29–30. Also ibid., part 29, p. 2346. Bratton at Clarke and APHB, testifying both times from notes made by him and General Miles on or about December 8, 1941.
[57] Ibid., part 9, p. 4518, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[58] Ibid., part 33, p. 827, Marshall testimony at NCI.
[59] Ibid., part 29, p. 2346, Bratton testimony at APHB. See also ibid., part 34, pp. 19–20, Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation.
[60] Ibid., part 29, p. 2346. Bratton testimony before the APHB. Also ibid., part 34, pp. 19–20. Bratton testimony at Clarke Investigation.
[61] Ibid., part 9, p. 4518. Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry.
[64] Ibid., part 32, p. 136. Stark testimony before the NCI.
[65] Ibid., part 3, p. 1111. Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[66] Ibid. The record of phone calls through the White House switchboard on the morning of December 7, 1941, lists two a.m. calls by Marshall to Stark 10 minutes apart, 11:30 and 11.40.
[67] Ibid., part 34, p. 20. Bratton statement during Clarke Inquiry.
[68] Ibid., part 33, p. 822. Marshall testimony before the NCI. See also Bratton testimony, ibid., part 9, p. 4541. Bratton said sending the same message in different codes “jeopardized” code security.
[69] Ibid., part 32, p.136. Stark testimony before the NCI.
[70] Ibid., part 27, p. 114, Colonel French testimony before the APHB.
[71] Ibid., part 14, p. 1334, Washington to Fort Shafter #529. See also ibid., part 15, p. 1640, Exhibit 61. Also ibid., part 3, p. 1112, Marshall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[72] Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid., part 34, p. 32, French statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
[75] Ibid., p. 33.
[76] Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[77] Ibid., part 34, p. 20, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
[78] Ibid., part 27, p. 108, French testimony before the APHB.
[79] Ibid., part 34, p. 33, French testimony during Clarke Investigation.
[80] Ibid. See also part 27, pp. 108–10, French testimony before the APHB.
[81] Ibid., part 34, p. 21, Bratton statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
[82] Ibid., p. 33. French statement before the Clarke Inquiry.
[83] Ibid., part 9, p. 4519, Bratton testimony before the Joint Committee. See also part 34, p. 21.
[84] Ibid., part 33, p. 1282.
[85] Ibid., p. 823. Marshall testimony before the NCI.
[86] Deane interview.
[87] Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948), vol. 2, p. 1095. See also Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull: The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), vols. 12 and 13, p. 517.
[88] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5393, Hull’s reply to Joint Committee interrogatory.
[89] Ibid., p. 5394.
[90] Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.
[91] Ibid., p. 5427, Stimson statement to Joint Committee.
[92] Ibid., pp. 5427–28, Stimson statement to Joint Committee.
[93] Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.
[94] Ibid., pp. 5439–40. Proposed Hull statement.
[95] Ibid., p. 5440. Knox suggestions.
[96] Ibid., p. 5437, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.
[97] Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1095. See also Pratt, Cordell Hull, vol. 2, pp. 517–18.
[98] Ross T. McIntire, White House Physician (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946), p. 3.
[99] Ibid., pp. 136–37.
[100] Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 530.
[101] Helen Lombard, While They Fought: Behind the Scenes in Washington, 1941–1946 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), p. 10.
[102] Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 340.
[103] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438. Excerpt from Stimson’s December 7, 1941 diary reprinted in Joint Committee hearings.
[104] National Archives, Civilian Records Branch, Record Group 59, Entry 398, Box 3, Location 250/46/04/01, 30pp. Hornbeck draft. FDR’s intended speech printed in full in Appendix.
[105] Pogue, George C. Marshall: 1939–1942, p. 221.
[106] Deane interview.
[107] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, excerpt from Stimson diary quoted in Joint Committee hearings.
[108] Ibid., part 8, p. 3828. Testimony of Maj. John H. Dillon, aide to Knox.
Chapter 15
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 10, pp. 4845–46.
[2] Ibid., part 10, pp. 4673, 4687, testimony of Commander Joseph John Rochefort.
[3] Ibid., pp. 4674, 4676, 4677.
[4] Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
[5] Ibid., p. 1330.
[6] Ibid., p. 1406, Chief of Naval Operations TOP SECRET cable #272337.
[7] Ibid., p. 1330, War Department SECRET cable 482 to Short.
[8] Ibid., part 26, pp. 321–24, Admiral William F. Halsey testimony before the Hart Inquiry.
[9] Ibid., p. 43, Admiral John Henry Newton testimony before the Hart Inquiry.
[10] Ibid., part 12, p. 199.
[11] Walter Karig, Battle Report: The Atlantic War (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943), p. 8.
[12] Ibid., p. 11.
[13] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, p. 4680, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee. Ibid., pp. 4836–37, Edwin Thomas Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[14] Ibid., p. 4682, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee.
[15] Ibid., pp. 4837–38, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[16] Ibid., p. 4680, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee.
[17] Ibid., p. 4681.
[18] Ibid., p. 4838, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[19] Ibid., pp. 4831, 4833. See also Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: W. Morrow, 1985), pp. 228–30.
[20] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4837–39, Layton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[21] Ibid., part 8, p. 3454, Testimony of Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander, Patrol Wing Two, Pearl Harbor. See also Homer N. Wallin, Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, 1968), p. 45.
[22] Ibid., p. 45, quoting Bellinger letter, January 16, 1941.
[23] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 329, Halsey testimony before the Hart Inquiry.
[24] Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p. 46.
[25] Karig, Battle Report, pp. 6–8.
[26] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, pp. 56–57, Outerbridge testimony at Hewitt Inquiry.
[27] Karig, Battle Report, pp. 13-14.
[28] Ibid., pp. 14–16.
[29] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 57, Outerbridge testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[30] Wallin, Pearl Harbor, p. 49.
[31] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, p. 2951, Short statement prepared for the Joint Committee.
[32] Ibid., part 27, pp. 531–33, Lockard testimony before the APHB.
[33] Ibid., part 7, pp. 2951–52, Short statement prepared for the Joint Committee. There is a good description of the radar installations and December 7 sightings in George Raynor Thompson, et al., The Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), pp. 3–5.
[34] Wallin, Pearl Harbor, pp. 48–50.
[35] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 27, p. 533, Lockard testimony before the APHB.
[36] Ibid., part 5, p. 2439, as reported by the Naval Observatory.
[37] Ibid., part 14, p. 1410; also ibid., part 34, p. 7.
[38] Ibid., part 6, p. 2675.
[39] Ibid., part 8, p. 3452, Bellinger testimony before the Joint Committee.
[40] Ibid., part 11, p. 5351.
[41] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3828–29, 3834–37, Testimony of Knox’s Marine aide, Major John H. Dillon.
[42] Ibid., p. 3829, Dillon testimony before the Joint Committee.
[43] Ibid., p. 3837.
[44] Robert Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins. 2 vols. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), vol. 1, p. 435, and Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 430–31; and Henry H. Adams, Harry Hopkins: A Biography (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), p. 258.
[45] Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 604–05.
[46] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1411, Deane’s June 8, 1942 memorandum to Brigadier General W.B. Smith.
[47] Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan, 1948), vol. 2, p. 1095.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., p. 1096.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid. Also Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 786–87, and Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 831–32.
[52] Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1096–97.
[53] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5438, Stimson diary excerpt, as reprinted in Joint Committee hearings.
[54] Ibid., part 14, p. 1411, Deane June 8, 1942, memorandum for General W.B. Smith.
[55] Author’s interview of Deane, January 2, 1964.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary except.
[58] Deane interview.
[59] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, Stimson diary excerpt.
[60] Ibid., p. 5438.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 435–36, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 431.
[63] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5351, John Ford Baecher April 8, 1946, memorandum to Joint Committee Counsel Seth Richardson.
[64] Admiral Ben Moreell letter to Harry Elmer Barnes, December 17, 1961.
[65] Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, p. 437, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 431.
[66] James Roosevelt, Affectionately, FDR: A Son’s Story of a Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), pp. 327–28. Also James Roosevelt with Bill Libby, My Parents: A Differing View (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1976), p. 266.
[67] Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, A Rendezvous with Destiny: The Roosevelts of the White House (London: W.H. Allen, 1977), p. 304.
[68] Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 233–34.
[69] Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 436–37, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 431–32.
[70] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, Stimson’s diary report on the White House meeting of November 25.
[71] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1933–35, Hart-Phillips December 7, 1941, report from Manila.
[72] Ibid., pp. 1935–36.
[73] Ibid., part 9, p. 4566.
[74] Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 379.
[75] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5349, excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7, 1941.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p. 379.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7, 1941.
[80] Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, p. 437, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 433. See also excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7 (Joint Committee, part 11, p. 5439).
[81] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5439, excerpt from Stimson diary entry, December 7, 1941.
[82] Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p. 380.
[83] Ibid., pp. 380–81.
[84] Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, p. 432, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 428.
[85] Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp. 432–33, and Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 428.
Chapter 16
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 6, p. 2675.
[2] New York Times, December 8, 1941, p. 1.
[3] Ibid., p. 2.
[4] Department of State Bulletin, vol. 5, p. 474; Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 839–40.
[5] New York Times, December 8, 1941, p. 1.
[6] Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 849–50.
Chapter 17
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 36, pp. 83–84. Kramer testimony at Hewitt Inquiry.
[2] Harry Elmer Barnes 1953 interview of Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty, on file at Naval Academy Library, Annapolis, p. 8.
[3] Ibid., p. 7.
[4] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2338. From Knox’s report on his trip.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., part 5, p. 2338. From Knox’s report.
[7] Ibid., part 5, p. 2342. From Knox’s report.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., pp. 2342–43.
[10] Ibid., p. 2342.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., p. 2339.
[13] Ibid., p. 2340.
[14] Barnes interview with Beatty, cited above, p. 9.
[15] Beatty 1953 interview cited above, p. 13.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., p.14.
[18] The New York Times, December 16, 1941, pp. 1, 7.
[19] Knox’s formal statement, as published in ibid.
[20] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2338. From Knox’s report.
[21] Ibid., part 5, p. 2342, from Knox’s report on his trip to Hawaii.
[22] Ibid., p. 2340. See also Homer N. Wallin, Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, 1968) pp. 88, 150, 166.
[23] Ibid., part 5, p. 2345, from Knox’s report on his trip to Hawaii.
[24] The New York Times, December 16, 1941, p. 7.
Chapter 18
[1] The New York Times, December 10, 1941, p. 7.
[2] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 5, p. 2210; part 6, p. 2674.
[3] Charles A. Lindbergh, The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), p. 595.
[4] Ibid., pp. 595–96.
[5] The New York Times, December 11, 1941, p. 15.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3565.
[8] Ibid., p. 3571.
[9] Ibid., p. 3566.
[10] Ibid., p. 3565.
[11] Ibid., p. 3571.
[12] Ibid., part 8, p. 3570. Safford testimony.
[13] Ibid., p. 3570.
[14] Ibid., p. 3566.
[15] Ibid., p. 3571.
[16] An Army officer, who was in a position to know, told this author on two occasions—once in the presence of General Bonner Fellers and a second time in the presence of General Albert C. Wedemeyer—about the vow of secrecy exacted by Marshall from his officers. The Army officer refused to let his name be used lest it jeopardize his son’s Army career.
[17] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, p. 2468, Stark testimony before the Joint Committee.
[18] Ibid., part 3, p. 1530. Mashall testimony before the Joint Committee.
[19] Ibid., part 5, pp. 2430, 2432. Stark testimony before the Joint Committee.
[20] Ibid., dispatch to Kimmel, #162105. Admiral Pye was to be Kimmel’s temporary relief.
[21] Ibid., part 3, p. 1529.
[22] The New York Times, December 16, 1941, p. 7.
[23] Ibid., p. 1.
[24] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 22, p.359, Kimmel testimony.
[25] William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), pp.82, 83.
[26] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 1104, French testimony.
[27] Ibid., part 24, p. 1828.
Chapter 19
[1] The New York Times, December 17, 1941, p. 9.
[2] William H. Standley, Admiral (USN, Ret.) June 1, 1962, interview by Harry Elmer Barnes, p. 7; notes in author’s possession.
[3] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 5, p. 2210; part 23, p. 1247; part 24, p. 1306.
[4] William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), pp. 81–82. See also Standley interview in US. News & World Report, April 16, 1954, pp. 40–46.
[5] Standley, Barnes June 1, 1962 interview, p. 8.
[6] Standley, U.S. News & World Report, April 16, 1954.
[7] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 24, pp. 1355–61. “Precis of Testimony.”
[8] Ibid., part 23, p. 1245.
[9] Ibid., p. 1246.
[10] Ibid., pp. 1, 2. See also ibid., part 14, pp. 1409–10(Exhibit No. 39), memoranda prepared for the record by L.T. Gerow and W.B. Smith regarding Marshall’s December 7, 1941 warning.
[11] Ibid., part 23, p. 1357. Brief of Admiral Stark’s Testimony.
[12] Ibid., part 23, p. 1361. Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson.
[13] Ibid., part 24, pp. 1307–08.
[14] Standley and Agerton, Admiral Ambassador, pp. 83–84.
[15] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 22, p.55.
[16] Ibid., part 22, p. 11, testimony of Major William S. Lawton, general staff corps liaison officer with the Navy, in charge of joint Army-Navy activities.
[17] Ibid., part 23, p. 1149. Kimmel testimony; part 22, pp. 10–11. Kimmel memorandum of December 21, 1941; part 23, 1211 Kimmel testimony.
[18] Ibid., part 22, p. 55. Short testimony.
[19] Ibid., part 23, pp. 1129–34.
[20] Ibid., part 23, p. 1129.
[21] Ibid., part 23, pp. 1217–18.
[22] Ibid., part 23, p. 1218; part 24, p. 1564. From Report of Army-Navy Board, October 31, 1941.
[23] Ibid., part 23, pp. 554–55. Bellinger testimony.
[24] Ibid., part 22, p. 40. Short testimony.
[25] Ibid., part 23, p.1209.
[26] Ibid., 1092–94. Correspondence of January 24, 1941.
[27] Stimson memorandum, February 7, 1941. Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, pp. 1094–95.
[28] Ibid., part 22, pp. 460–61, Bloch testimony.
[29] Ibid., part 23, pp. 1144–48. Martin-Bellinger memo, March 31, 1941.
[30] Ibid., p. 1145 (emphasis added).
[31] Ibid., part 23, pp. 1134, 1183. Kimmel testimony.
[32] Ibid., part 22, p. 460. Bloch testimony.
[33] Ibid., pp. 469–70. Bloch testimony.
[34] Ibid., p. 487. Kimmel testimony.
[35] Ibid., p. 466. Bloch testimony.
[36] Ibid., p. 462. Bloch testimony.
[37] Ibid., part 23, p. 1183. Kimmel testimony.
[38] Ibid., p. 1137.
[39] Ibid., p. 1139.
[40] Ibid., p. 1236.
[41] Ibid., p. 1235.
[42] Ibid., part 23, p. 1236.
[43] Ibid., p. 1184.
[44] Ibid., p. 1185. Kimmel testimony.
[45] Ibid., part 22, pp. 329–31.
[46] Ibid., part 22, p. 104. Short testimony.
[47] Ibid., part 23, p. 1155. Kimmel memo to CNO, May 26, 1941.
[48] Ibid., p. 1151. Kimmel testimony.
[49] Ibid., part 22, p. 76. Short testimony.
[50] Ibid., part 14, p. 1403. From CNO to CINCPAC, #171458.
[51] Ibid., part 23, p. 1240. Kimmel testimony.
[52] Ibid., part 6, p. 2518.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid., part 23, p. 1151.
[55] Ibid., part 22, p. 43.
[56] Ibid., part 22, p. 43. Short testimony.
[57] Ibid., part 23, p. 1190. Kimmel testimony.
[58] Ibid., part 23, p. 608. Halsey testimony.
[59] Ibid., p. 1166. Kimmel.
[60] Ibid., part 22, p. 471. Bloch testimony.
[61] Ibid., pp. 461, 469. Bloch testimony.
[62] Ibid., p. 469. Bloch testimony.
[63] Ibid., p. 39. Short testimony.
[64] Ibid., p. 39, p. 58. Short testimony.
[65] Ibid., part 24, pp. 1774–76.
[66] Ibid., part 22, p. 39.
[67] Ibid., pp. 45–48.
[68] Ibid., p. 48.
[69] Ibid., part 23, pp. 1152–53. ONI December 1, 1941 report of Japanese Naval Situation.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid., p. 1167.
[72] Ibid., p. 1167.
[73] Ibid., p. 1129.
[74] Ibid., part 22, pp. 673, 676–77. Rochefort testimony.
[75] Ibid., pp. 677–78.
[76] Ibid., pp. 677–78.
[77] Ibid., part 23, p. 679. Rochefort testimony. See also part 22, p. 664. Layton testimony. And Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: W. Morrow, 1985), pp. 228–30.
[78] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 679. Rochefort testimony.
[79] Ibid., part 23, p. 1238.
[80] Ibid., p. 1238. Chairman Roberts.
[81] Ibid., part 22, p. 89. Short testimony.
[82] Ibid., part 23, p. 1153. Kimmel testimony.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., p. 1050. Kimmel testimony.
[86] Ibid., p. 1153. Kimmel. testimony.
[87] Ibid., pp. 1075ff.
[88] Ibid., part 23, pp. 1075–82.
[89] Ibid., p. 1081.
[90] Ibid., p. 1081. Marshall testimony.
[91] Ibid., p. 1079.
[92] Ibid., part 24, pp. 1771–76. Short’s “Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941.” The steps to be taken under Alerts #1, 2, and 3 are itemized: the phrase “against acts of sabotage and uprisings” appear on page 1771 in SECTION II-ALERTS, paragraph 14, ALERT NO. 1.
[93] Ibid., part 22, p. 36. Short testimony.
[94] Ibid., part 23, p. 1077.
[95] Ibid., pp. 1082–92.
[96] Ibid., pp. 1085–86.
[97] Ibid., p. 1086.
[98] Ibid., p. 1087.
[99] Ibid., p. 1108.
[100] Ibid., part 23, p. 1109.
[101] Ibid., p. 1112.
[102] Ibid., part 39, p. 1.
[103] Ibid., part 22, p. 315.
[104] Ibid., pp. 317ff. For corrected testimony, see part 23, pp.123ff; part 22, pp. 317–411 (corrected pages interleafed), 415–59, 931–1051.
[105] Ibid., part 23, pp. 1123–44.
[106] Ibid., pp. 1092–95.
[107] Ibid., part 39, pp. 18–19.
[108] Ibid., p. 12.
[109] Ibid., p. 18.
[110] Ibid., p. 19.
[111] Ibid., p. 20.
[112] Ibid., p. 20.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid., part 39, p. 21.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid., p. 19.
[117] Ibid., part 39, p. 21.
[118] Ibid., part 7, pp. 3133–34.
[119] Ibid., pp. 3134–35. Short’s January 25, 1942 letter to Marshall.
[120] Ibid., part 7, pp. 3134–35. Short letter to Marshall, January 25, 1942.
[121] Ibid., p. 3139.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid., pp. 3140–41. Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General J.H. Hildring’s letter of February 14, 1942, to the Attorney General.
[124] Ibid., pp. 3145–46. Judge Advocate General Myro C. Cramer memorandum of January 27, 1942.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid., part 7, p. 3142.
[129] Ibid., part 33, p. 691. Kimmel statement to NCI September 27, 1944.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid., part 19, p. 3965, Letter to Captain Gatch, February 14, 1942, signed by Edwin Dickinson, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; part 19, pp. 3966–67, part 7, pp. 3141–42, Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General J.H. Hildring’s February 14, 1942 memorandum for Attorney General Francis Biddle.
[133] Ibid., part 19, p. 3963; part 33, p.692, Kimmel’s statement to Naval Court of Inquiry. And Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. 182.
[134] Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, pp. 181–82. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2562.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid., part 33, pp. 691–92. Kimmel’s statement to the NCI.
[137] The NewYork Times, August 11, 1942, p. 4.
[138] Ibid., September 4, 1949, p. 49. Short’s obituary.
[139] Ibid., May 15, 1968, pp. 1, 24. Kimmel’s obituary.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid., August 11, 1942, p. 4.
Chapter 20
[1] An admission by a retired Army general as to the Army’s rule of secrecy was made to the author twice, once in the presence of General Bonner Fellers and then again in the presence of General Albert C. Wedemeyer. See also report of Harry Elmer Barnes’ interview of Major Henry C. Clausen, January 3, 1964, pp. 2–3 (typescript in author’s possession): “[O]aths had been taken not to reveal the facts [the “Purple” code decrypts]. . . . The witnesses Miles, Marshall, MacArthur, et al., all revealed to Clausen that they were sworn not to reveal Purple when they were before APHB.” N.B., by March 1945, Clausen had been promoted to lieutenant colonel.
[2] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 5, p. 2468, Stark testimony before the Joint Committee.
[3] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3565–66, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee.
[4] Short’s command was turned over to Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons. Kimmel was replaced temporarily as Chief of the Pacific Fleet by Admiral William S. Pye and then, once the arrangements for the transfer could be worked out, by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
[5] U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 22.
[6] Ibid, p. 24.
[7] On September 18, 1947, the Departments of War and Navy were incorporated into a new Department of Defense.
[8] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3556, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee. See also L.F. Safford, “Victims of the Kita Message,” April 8, 1968, p. 46, unpublished manuscript (typescript in author’s files).
[9] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3388–90, McCollum testimony before the Joint Committee; part 26, p. 392, Safford testimony before the Hart Inquiry; part 29, p. 2396, Safford testimony at APHB. See also McCollum letter, May 21, 1944, to Kimmel and Kimmel interview, May 18, 1945, of McCollum (typescripts of both papers in author’s files).
[10] Safford, “Victims of the Kita Message,” pp. 49–50. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3382. McCollum was reassigned from Washington to the Southwest Pacific Force in October 1942. See Kimmel’s interview of McCollum.
[11] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 4679–80, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee. Rochefort was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal posthumously, in 1985, for his success in cracking the Japanese codes revealing the time, date, and place of Japan’s plan to invade Midway (New York Times, November 17, 1985; BBG). See Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: W. Morrow, 1985), p. 464.
[12] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 4679, Rochefort testimony before the Joint Committee. Rochefort left Pearl Harbor in October 1942.
[13] Layton, And I Was There, p. 468 (BBG).
[14] Safford, “Victims of the Kita Message,” pp. 50, 54.
[15] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3894–95. According to Kramer’s testimony, he was on duty with Safford’s office from June 1940 to June 1943.
[16] “Kimmel Seeks ‘Open Trial’ at ‘Earliest Date’, ” Washington Star, March 29, 1944, pp. A–1, 4. See also Kimmel letter of March 16, 1944 (typed copy in author’s possession).
[17] Kimmel’s September 17, 1943 letter to Knox quoted in Washington Star, March 29, 1944.
[18] Knox memo to Kimmel, September 10, 1943.
[19] Kimmel memo to Knox, November 26, 1943.
[20] Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), p. ix. Rugg was hired January 19, 1944, according to John Toland’s interview of Edward B. Hanify, August 29,1979, on file with Toland’s papers in FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Captain Robert A. Lavender (Annapolis, class of 1912, #03895) was Kimmel’s “counsel” (Kimmel January 24, 1944 memorandum).
[21] John Toland interview of Hanify.
[22] In March 1944 some members of Congress urged a still further extension of the statute of limitations. They argued that the courts martial of Kimmel and Short should not continue to be postponed indefinitely. The House Rules Committee approved a measure extending to June 7, 1945, the possible starting date for their courts martial. Moreover, rather than merely lengthening the time during that Kimmel and Short might be court martialed, the House committee’s measure proposed that the Army and Navy be ordered to schedule their courts martial. The Senate Committee then voted to consider the House committee’s resolution in closed session (Washington Star, March 29, 1944). Thus the chances that Kimmel and Short would get their open hearing were improving. However, the House committee’s proposal was not accepted as worded. Rather the court-martial deadline was extended again for another six months only, i.e., until December 7, 1944. On that date it was extended once more, into 1945. (Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, pp. 1517–18).
[23] Washington Star, March 29, 1944, p. 24.
[24] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3601, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee.
[25] Ibid., part 36, p. 69, Safford testimony before Hewitt Inquiry; reprinted in ibid., part 8, p. 3602.
[26] Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, p. 129.
[27] Ibid., p. ix.
[28] Toland interview.
Chapter 21
[1] Knox memorandum to Kimmel, March 4, 1944. Typed copy of original in author’s files.
[2] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 26, pp. 3–4.
[3] Hart letter to Kimmel, February 15, 1944. Typed copy of original in author’s files.
[4] Kimmel memorandum to Knox, March 16, 1944. Typed copy of original in author’s files.
[5] Kimmel memorandum to Knox, February 29, 1944. Thermofax copy of original in author’s files.
[6] Knox memorandum to Kimmel, March 4, 1944. Typed copy of original in author’s files.
[7] Kimmel/Rugg/Lavender memorandum, undated, copy forwarded to Kimmel by Lavender under date of March 18, 1944. Typed copy of original in author’s files.
[8] Kimmel memorandum to Knox, March 16, 1944. Typed copy of original in author’s files.
[9] Hart’s itinerary, Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, pp. 9, 217, 241, 291, 299, 349, 367, 397, 403, 453, 465.
[10] Honolulu Advertiser, November 30, 1941, p. 1.
[11] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 489, Dispatch #031850.
[12] Ibid., p. 62.
[13] Ibid., p. 73.
[14] Ibid., pp. 105, 109.
[15] Ibid., p. 226.
[16] Ibid., p. 237.
[17] Ibid., p. 44.
[18] Ibid., pp. 434–35.
[19] Ibid., p. 331.
[20] Ibid., p. 47.
[21] Ibid., p. 158.
[22] Ibid., p. 124.
[23] Ibid., p. 125.
[24] Ibid., p. 123.
[25] Ibid., pp. 193, 201. See also ibid., pp. 47, 65.
[26] Ibid., p. 140.
[27] Ibid., pp. 318–19.
[28] Ibid., p. 153.
[29] Ibid., p. 303, quoting from ONI’s December 1, 1941 fortnightly summary of international news, airmailed to all flag officers afloat.
[30] Ibid., p. 303.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., p. 267.
[33] Ibid., p. 469.
[34] Ibid., p. 461.
[35] Ibid., p. 470.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., p. 387.
[38] Ibid., p. 390.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid., pp. 390–92.
[42] Ibid., p. 390, italics added.
[43] Ibid., p. 394.
[44] Ibid., p. 390.
[45] Ibid., p. 391.
[46] Ibid., p. 392.
[47] Ibid., part 14, p. 1408,Safford’s Top Secret dispatch of December 3.
[48] Ibid., part 26, pp. 392–93.
[49] Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. xxiii. Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26.
[50] Ibid., pp. 471–72.
[51] Safford’s conversations with author; notes in author’s files.
[52] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3689, Safford testimony before the Joint Committee. At the time, Safford was under the impression the folder of intercepts was being assembled for the use of the Roberts Commission.
[53] Ibid., part 36, p. 71, Safford testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[54] Ibid., part 36, p. 71, Safford testimony.
[55] Ibid., pp. 83–84, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
[56] Safford, “The Kita Message: No Longer a Mystery,” manuscript (copy in author’s files).
[57] Kimmel, May 25, 1944, letter to Senator Sinclair Weeks (R., Mass.). Copy in Thomas Kimmel Collection. Quoted in Toland, Infamy, 1982, pp. 78–79.
[58] The New York Times, June 8, 1944, p. 14.
[59] Ibid., June 15, 1944, p. 10.
Chapter 22
[1] Public Law 339, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (June 13, 1944); see also 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 27, p. 12; part 31, p. 3173; part 39, p. 24.
[2] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 29, pp. 2087–89.
[3] Ibid., part 39, p. 24.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., part 27, p. 14.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., p. 15.
[8] Ibid., pp. 16–18.
[9] Ibid., part 27, p. 18.
[10] Ibid., p. 285.
[11] Ibid., p. 798 (Admiral Bloch); part 28, p. 1447 (Businessman Walter Francis Dillingham).
[12] Ibid., part 39, p. 77. APHB Report; part 7, pp. 2941–44.
[13] Ibid., part 27, p. 22, Marshall testimony.
[14] Ibid., pp. 22–23. Marshall testimony.
[15] Message #472 quoted in APHB hearings, part 27, p. 155.
[16] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 27, pp. 156, 158. Short testimony.
[17] Ibid., part 14, p. 1330; part 27, p. 158: “Re your radiogram 472, Department alerted to prevent sabotage.”
[18] Ibid., part 27, pp. 156, 158.
[19] Ibid., part 14, p. 1329.
[20] Ibid., part 27, p. 66, 98–99, testimony of General H.H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces.
[21] Ibid., part 27, p. 25.
[22] Ibid., p. 239.
[23] Ibid., part 14, p. 1330.
[24] Ibid., part 27, p. 240.
[25] Ibid., p. 89, Arnold testimony.
[26] Ibid., part 29, p. 2158.
[27] Ibid., p. 2326.
[28] Ibid., part 27, pp. 64–65.
[29] Ibid., p. 240.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1327, 1402.
[32] Ibid., part 27, pp. 218–19.
[33] Ibid., part 29, p. 2159.
[34] Ibid., part 14, p. 1327.
[35] Ibid., pp. 1328, 1405, CNO Dispatch #242005, November 24, 1941.
[36] Ibid., part 27, p. 220.
[37] Ibid., part 29, p. 2329.
[38] Ibid., p.169.
[39] Ibid., part 29, p. 2328.
[40] Ibid., p. 800.
[41] Ibid., pp. 800–01.
[42] Ibid., p. 548.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid., pp. 539–40.
[45] Ibid., p. 62.
[46] Ibid., p. 58. See also U.S. State, Peace and War: 1931–1941, pp. 788–99.
[47] Ibid., part 27, p. 62.
[48] Ibid., part 27, p. 550.
[49] Ibid., p. 554.
[50] Ibid., part 29, p. 2316.
[51] Ibid., part 27, p. 89.
[52] Ibid., p. 92.
[53] Ibid., p. 96.
[54] Ibid., p. 166.
[55] Ibid., p. 168.
[56] Ibid., part 29, p. 2329.
[57] Ibid., p. 2326.
[58] Ibid., p. 2327.
[59] Ibid., part 29, p. 2329.
[60] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1061–62, Exhibit No. 16.
[61] Ibid., pp. 2330–31, Grunert letter of August 31, 1944.
[62] Ibid., p. 2313; part 27, p. 169.
[63] Ibid., part 14, p. 1327, Navy message #162203 of October 16.
[64] Ibid., part 28, pp. 909–48.
[65] Ibid., p. 944; part 29, pp. 2279–81.
[66] Ibid., part 28, p. 945.
[67] Ibid., p. 946.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid., p. 947.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid., part 29, pp. 2330–31.
[73] Ibid., part 28, pp. 951–1352.
[74] Ibid., part 29, pp. 2007–60.
[75] See for example, ibid., part 27, p. 414, and part 28, pp. 1364–65, 1369, 1382–83, 1420–23, and 1441.
[76] Ibid., part 28, pp. 1355–2003.
[77] Ibid., part 29, pp. 2333–57.
[78] Ibid., pp. 2143–44.
[79] Ibid., p. 2144.
[80] Ibid., p. 2152.
[81] Ibid., p. 2151.
[82] Ibid., p. 2154.
[83] Ibid., p. 2270, Major General Ulio, adjutant general, August 24, 1944, response to Short.
[84] Ibid., p. 2251, Grunert statement.
[85] Ibid., p. 2254.
[86] Ibid., part 29, p. 2261 (Powell October 1941 memo to Short).
[87] Ibid., p. 2255. In part 10, Short read from the testimony before the Roberts Commission of Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant to the department G-2 in Honolulu; part 22, p. 192.
[88] Ibid., part 29, p. 2257.
[89] Ibid., p. 2258.
[90] Ibid., p. 2259.
[91] Ibid., pp. 2434–35.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid., p. 2435.
[94] Ibid., p. 2436.
[95] Ibid., pp. 2436–37.
[96] Ibid., pp. 2437–38.
[97] Ibid., pp. 2330–31, Grunert August 31, 1944, letter to Marshall.
[98] Ibid., pp. 2308–09.
[99] Ibid., p. 2309.
[100] Ibid., p. 2326.
[101] Ibid., p. 2328.
[102] Ibid., pp. 2317, 2318.
[103] Ibid., p. 2321.
[104] Ibid., p. 2324.
[105] Ibid., pp. 2323, 2325.
[106] Ibid., pp. 2324–25.
[107] Ibid., p. 2320.
[108] Ibid., pp. 2310, 2311.
[109] Ibid., p. 2328.
[110] Ibid., pp. 2313, 2319.
[111] Ibid., p. 2329.
[112] Ibid., pp. 2329–30.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid., pp. 2413–15.
[115] Ibid., pp. 2335–55.
[116] Ibid., pp. 2346–47.
[117] Ibid., p. 2338.
[118] Ibid., p. 2335.
[119] Ibid., pp. 2450–51.
[120] Ibid., p. 2417.
[121] Ibid., p. 2451.
[122] Ibid., p. 2453
[123] Ibid., pp. 2344–45.
[124] Ibid., p. 2346.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid., p. 2344.
[127] Ibid., part 14, p. 1334, Marshall radio message #529 to Hawaii.
[128] Ibid., part 29, pp. 2338, 2341.
[129] Ibid., p. 2341.
[130] Ibid., pp. 2340–41.
[131] Ibid., pp. 2361–400.
[132] Ibid., pp. 2362, 2367.
[133] Ibid., pp. 2367–68.
[134] Ibid., pp. 2368–71.
[135] Ibid., p. 2371.
[136] Ibid., p. 2372.
[137] Ibid., p. 2397, OPNAV dispatch #042019. See also part 14, p. 1408, Message #040330, supplementing #042019, which is not included with other Navy Department dispatches to field officers in Exhibit No. 37, ibid., part 14.
[138] Ibid., part 29, pp. 2371–72.
[139] Ibid., pp. 2368–73.
[140] Ibid., pp. 2392–93.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid., p. 2370.
[143] Ibid., pp. 2396–97.
[144] Ibid., p. 2379.
[145] Ibid., p. 2375.
[146] Ibid., p. 2403.
[147] Ibid., p. 2402.
[148] Ibid., p. 2405.
[149] Ibid., p. 2402.
[150] Ibid., pp. 2404–05.
[151] Ibid., p. 2409. See also Bratton testimony, ibid., p. 2349.
[152] Ibid. See also Bratton testimony on delivery, ibid., pp. 2349–50.
[153] Ibid., p. 2409.
[154] Ibid., p. 2410.
[155] Ibid., pp. 2409–11.
[156] Ibid., p. 2413.
[157] Ibid., part 31, pp. 3201–35, Exhibit A to Army Pearl Harbor Board Top Secret Transcript: Summary of Far Eastern Documents; and pp. 3235–58, Exhibit B to Army Pearl Harbor Board Top Secret Transcript. Exhibit consists of copies of the 45–50 most important documents themselves.
[158] Ibid., part 29, p. 2417.
[159] Ibid., p. 2416.
[160] Ibid., part 12, p. 215; part 31, p. 3250.
[161] Ibid., part 29, p. 2442.
[162] Ibid., pp. 2444, 2453.
[163] Ibid., p. 2444.
[164] Ibid., part 29, pp. 2421–23.
[165] Ibid., p. 2422.
[166] Ibid., p. 2421.
[167] Ibid., pp. 2422, 2419.
[168] Ibid., pp. 2419, 2420, 2422.
[169] Ibid., p. 2424.
[170] Ibid., p. 2449. For list of documents, see ibid., pp. 2456–57; for documents themselves, see part 31, pp. 3235–58.
[171] Ibid., part 39, pp. 23–178, APHB Report, October 20, 1944; ibid., pp. 179–230, Appendix to Report; ibid., pp. 231–69, Judge Advocate General (Major General) Myron C. Cramer’s analyses.
[172] Ibid., part 39, p. 139.
[173] Ibid., p. 90.
[174] Ibid., p. 91.
[175] Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy #272337; p. 1328, Army #472; p. 1329, Miles, G-2, #473; and p. 1330, Army Adjutant General, #482.
[176] Ibid., part 39, p. 141.
[177] Ibid., p. 61.
[178] Ibid., p. 145.
[179] Ibid., p. 140.
[180] Ibid., pp. 144–45. APHB report, part 39.
[181] Ibid., p. 175.
[182] Ibid., pp. 175–76.
[183] New York Times, October 24, 1944, p. 12, col. 2.
[184] New York Times, December 2, 1944, pp. 1, 5.
Chapter 23
[1] New York Times, June 15, 1944, p. 10.
[2] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 32, p. 5.
[3] Ibid., p. 9.
[4] Ibid., p. 12.
[5] Ibid., p. 19.
[6] Ibid., p. 54.
[7] Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. 130.
[8] Ibid., pp. 53–54. Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 53–54.
[9] John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), p. 81.
[10] Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, p. 123.
[11] Ibid.See also Toland, Infamy, p. 82.
[12] Toland, Infamy, p. 82.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 103–04.
[15] Ibid., pp. 120–21.
[16] Ibid., part 33, p. 735.
[17] Ibid., part 32, pp. 11–152, 247–50, 527–38, 727–31.
[18] Ibid., p. 82.
[19] Ibid., p. 99.
[20] Ibid., part 33, pp. 727–28.
[21] Ibid., p. 729.
[22] Ibid., p. 730.
[23] Ibid., part 32, pp. 132–33.
[24] Ibid., pp. 134–36.
[25] Ibid., p. 159.
[26] Ibid., part 33, pp. 732–33.
[27] Ibid., p. 733.
[28] Ibid., p. 759.
[29] Ibid., part 32, p. 186.
[30] Ibid., p. 291.
[31] Ibid., p. 233.
[32] Ibid., part 33, p. 1282.
[33] Ibid., part 32, p. 253.
[34] Ibid., p. 264.
[35] Ibid., p. 254.
[36] Ibid., p. 259.
[37] Ibid., part 33, p. 1177.
[38] Ibid., part 32, p. 238.
[39] Ibid., pp. 624, 629.
[40] Ibid., p. 628.
[41] Ibid., pp. 627–28.
[42] Ibid., p. 624.
[43] Ibid., p. 628.
[44] Ibid., p. 626.
[45] Ibid., p. 282.
[46] Ibid., pp. 461, 473–74.
[47] Ibid., Lockard and Elliott testimony, pp. 475–96.
[48] Ibid., p. 501, Bellinger testimony referring to Stark serial letter O95323.
[49] Ibid., part 33, pp. 735, 767–69.
[50] Ibid., part 32, p. 521.
[51] Ibid., pp. 249–50. When the hearings were published after the war, these special sections were printed out of context in a later part of the hearings, forcing the reader to shuffle pages continually back and forth to follow a witness’s testimony.
[52] Ibid., p. 159.
[53] Ibid., part 33, pp. 738, 755.
[54] Ibid., p. 749.
[55] Ibid., p. 758.
[56] Ibid., pp. 759–70.
[57] Ibid., p. 769.
[58] Ibid., p. 775.
[59] Ibid, part 12, p. 100 (Japanese intercept #736, November 5); also part 33, p. 1365.
[60] Ibid., part 33, p. 776 (Japanese Circular 2319); also part 12, pp. 126–27.
[61] Ibid., part 33, p. 775, 1366; also part 12, pp. 137–38.
[62] Ibid., part 33, p. 1366 (Japanese intercept #812); also part 12, p. 165.
[63] Ibid., part 33, p. 776 (Japanese intercept #985); also part 12, p. 204.
[64] Ibid., part 33, p. 776 (Berlin to Tokyo #1393, November 29, 1941); also part 12, pp. 200–02.
[65] Ibid., part 33, p. 776–77 (Japanese circular #2444, December 1, 1941); also part 12, p. 209.
[66] Ibid., part 33, pp. 755–56 (Japanese intercept #893); also part 12, pp. 09–10).
[67] Ibid., part 33, p. 776 (Japanese intercept #781); also part 12, p. 198.
[68] Ibid., part 33, p. 777 (Japanese intercept #111); also part 12, p. 262.
[69] Ibid., part 12, p. 263 (Japanese intercept #111).
[70] Ibid., part 33, pp. 777, 1379 (Japanese intercept #122); also part 12, p. 263.
[71] Ibid., part 33, pp. 738, 1368 (Japanese circular #2353); also part 12, p. 154.
[72] Ibid., part 33, pp. 770–75, Safford testimony.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid., part 26, pp. 390–94, especially p. 394, Safford testimony before the Hart Inquiry.
[75] Ibid., part 33, pp. 772–73.
[76] Ibid., p. 773.
[77] Ibid., pp. 738, 1368 (Japanese circular #2353); pp. 755, 1367 (Japanese circular #2354); also part 12, pp. 154–55.
[78] Ibid., part 33, p. 772.
[79] Ibid., p. 782.
[80] Ibid., part 12, p. 195, Japanese intercept #844.
[81] Ibid., part 33, p. 784.
[82] Ibid., p. 783.
[83] Ibid., p. 783.
[84] Ibid., p. 782.
[85] Ibid., p. 782. For Tokyo-Berlin message, see part 12, pp. 204–05.
[86] Ibid., part 33, pp. 774–75.
[87] Ibid., p. 788; see CNO Dispatch 242005, part 14, p. 1405.
[88] Ibid., part 33, p. 789; see CNO Dispatch 272337, part 14, p. 1406.
[89] Ibid., part 33, pp. 788–89.
[90] Ibid., p. 789.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid., p. 791.
[93] Ibid., pp. 793–94.
[94] Ibid., p. 792.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid., p. 801.
[97] Ibid., p. 791.
[98] Ibid., part 32, p. 557.
[99] Ibid., pp. 554–59.
[100] Ibid., p. 560.
[101] Ibid., p. 561.
[102] Ibid., part 33, p. 820.
[103] Ibid., pp. 821–22.
[104] Ibid., p. 821.
[105] Ibid., pp. 825–26.
[106] Ibid., p. 823.
[107] Ibid., pp. 826–27.
[108] Ibid., p. 822.
[109] Ibid. For text of Marshall/Stark message, see ibid., p. 1282.
[110] Ibid., p. 823.
[111] Ibid., pp. 848, 849.
[112] John Toland interview of Hanify, August 29, 1979, on file with Toland papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
[113] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, pp. 847–76.
[114] Ibid., pp. 851–52.
[115] Ibid., p. 852.
[116] Ibid., pp. 859–60.
[117] Ibid., p. 867.
[118] Ibid., p. 869. See also part 12, p. 204 (Japanese intercept #985).
[119] Ibid., part 33, p. 873.
[120] Ibid., p. 853.
[121] Ibid., p. 738, (Tokyo-Washington Circular #2353). See also part 12, p. 154.
[122] Ibid., part 33, p. 853.
[123] Ibid., p. 871.
[124] Ibid., p. 853.
[125] Ibid., p. 853.
[126] Ibid., p. 871.
[127] Ibid., p. 853.
[128] Ibid., p. 867.
[129] Ibid., p. 867.
[130] Ibid., p. 852.
[131] Ibid., p. 856.
[132] Ibid., part 33, pp. 870, 1370; also part 12, p. 195. Japanese intercept #844, November 28, 1941.
[133] Ibid., part 33, p. 870.
[134] Ibid., part 12, p. 195. Tokyo to Washington, #844, November 29, 1941.
[135] Ibid., part 33, p. 1380. Also part 12, pp. 238–39. Tokyo to Washington #901 (Pilot Message).
[136] Ibid., part 14, pp. 239–45. Tokyo to Washington #902, 14 part message, December 6/7, 1941.
[137] Ibid., part 33, p. 857. It was in the Japanese code so it had to be decrypted, but “[a]ll parts of the [14-part] message were in English, so that translation was not required” (ibid., part 14, p. 1413).
[138] Ibid., part 33, p. 857.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid., pp. 858–59.
[141] Ibid., p. 859.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid., p. 886.
[144] Ibid., pp. 881–82.
[145] Ibid., part 32, p. 605.
[146] Ibid., p. 604.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid., part 33, pp. 1173–74, CNO Stark November 24, 1941 dispatch to field commanders, #242005; also part 14, p. 1405.
[149] Ibid., part 33, p. 878.
[150] Ibid., pp. 877–78.
[151] Ibid., p. 878.
[152] Ibid., part 32, p. 616.
[153] Ibid. Included in the November 27, 1941 “war warning message” (#272337): ibid., part 33, p. 1176; also part 14, p. 1406, was the directive “Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.”
[154] Ibid., part 33, p. 879.
[155] Ibid., part 32, p. 616.
[156] Ibid., part 33, p. 889.
[157] Ibid., p. 892.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid., pp. 1178–79, OPNAV message #-042017; see also part 14, p. 1408.
[161] Ibid., part 33, p. 893.
[162] Ibid., pp. 893–94.
[163] Ibid., p. 894.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid., p. 853, Kramer testimony.
[166] Ibid., p. 899.
[167] Ibid., p. 895.
[168] Ibid., pp. 895–96.
[169] Ibid., p. 896.
[170] Ibid., p. 898.
[171] Ibid., p. 897.
[172] Ibid., p. 894.
[173] Ibid., p. 900.
[174] Ibid., pp. 905–06.
[175] Ibid., pp. 908 and Exhibit #68, pp. 1391–96. For more complete compilation of such messages including those not made available to NCI, see part 12, pp. 270–310.
[176] Ibid., part 33, pp. 914–15.
[177] Ibid., Japanese Intercept #222, translated December 6, 1941, pp. 1384–85.
[178] Ibid., p. 917.
[179] Ibid., p. 915.
[180] Ibid., p. 917.
[181] Ibid., pp. 915, 918.
[182] Ibid., part 32, p. 654.
[183] Ibid., p. 653.
[184] Ibid., pp. 658–59.
[185] Ibid., pp. 655–57.
[186] Ibid., p. 659.
[187] Ibid., p. 660.
[188] Ibid., part 33, p. 920.
[189] Ibid., pp. 920–21.
[190] Ibid., p. 921.
[191] Ibid., part 32, p. 659.
[192] Ibid., p. 661.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid., p. 662.
[195] Ibid., p. 663.
[196] Ibid., part 39, pp. 297–322, Addendum, pp. 323–30.
[197] Ibid., p. 321.
[198] The New York Times, October 21, 1944, pp. 1, 9.
Chapter 24
[1] James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940–1945 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 501.
[2] Jonathan Daniels, White House Witness, 1942-1945 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), p. 234; William D. Hassett, Off the Record with F.D.R., 1942–1945 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 260–61.
[3] Letter to Robert E. Hannegan, White House release, July 10, 1944.
[4] James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), pp. 141–45.
[5] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 3, pp. 1130, 1133.
[6] Ibid., p. 1130.
[7] Ibid., p. 1133.
[8] Ibid., p. 1135.
[9] Ibid., pp. 1128–35.
[10] Stimson, Henry L. Diary. Yale University Library. Volume 48, p. 101, September 21, 1944.
[11] Ibid., p. 102.
[12] Ibid., September 26, 1944, p. 107.
[13] Ibid., October 13, 1944, p. 142.
[14] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, p. 321.
[15] Stimson Diary, vol. 49, p. 51, September 27, 1944.
[16] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 175–76.
[17] Ibid., pp. 135ff., 175.
[18] Ibid., pp. 144ff., 175.
[19] Ibid., pp. 142ff., 176.
[20] The New York Times, October 21, 1944, p. 9.
[21] Ibid., October 21, 1944, pp. 1, 9.
[22] Stimson Diary, vol. 48, p. 186, October 26, 1944.
[23] The New York Times, October 21, 1944, p. 9.
[24] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 330–32.
[25] Ibid., pp. 332–35.
[26] Ibid., pp. 231–69.
[27] Ibid., p. 260.
[28] Ibid., p. 267.
[29] Ibid., pp. 239, 268.
[30] Ibid., p. 344. Yet King “admitted” to Kimmel a month later, in an interview December 7, 1944, that “he had never read the proceedings upon which the Court had based their findings” (Admiral Kimmel’s Story,Henry Regnery, 1955, p. 161).
[31] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39, pp. 333–34.
[32] Stimson Diary, vol. 49, p. 22, November 11, 1944.
[33] Ibid., p. 36, November 20, 1944.
[34] Ibid., p. 47, November 24, 1944.
[35] Ibid., p. 51, November 27, 1944.
[36] Ibid., p. 49, November 24, 1944.
[37] Ibid., p. 27, November 15, 1944, and p. 36, November 20, 1944.
[38] Ibid., p. 36, November 20, 1944.
[39] Ibid., p. 42, November 22, 1944.
[40] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 34, p. 2.
[41] Ibid., part 35, p. 6.
[42] Ibid., part 36, p. 359.
[43] Ibid. pp. 39–40, November 21, 1944.
[44] Ibid., p. 40.
[45] The New York Times, November 26, 1944, p. 44.
[46] Stimson Diary, vol. 49, p. 62, November 30, 1944.
[47] The New York Times, December 2, 1944, p. 5.
[48] Ibid. pp. 1, 5.
[49] Ibid., December 5, 1944, p. 22.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., editorial, p. 22.
[52] Stimson Diary, vol. 49, pp. 68–69, December 1–10, 1944.
Chapter 25
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 34, p. 2.
[2] Ibid., part 35, p. 5.
[3] Ibid., part 36, p. 359, Forrestal’s May 2,1945, memorandum to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt.
[4] Ibid., part 34, p. 1.
[5] Ibid., p. 21.
[6] Ibid., p. 19.
[7] Ibid., pp. 10, 19–20, 20–21.
[8] Ibid., pp. 32–33.
[9] Ibid., p. 41.
[10] Ibid., p. 40.
[11] Ibid., p. 50.
[12] Ibid., p. 49.
[13] Ibid., p. 58.
[14] Ibid., p. 58.
[15] Ibid., p.72.
[16] Ibid., pp. 70, 72.
[17] Ibid., pp. 42–48.
[18] Ibid., p. 48.
[19] Ibid., p. 71.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., part 34, p. 34.
[22] Ibid., p. 36.
[23] Ibid., p. 68.
[24] Ibid., part 34, pp. 60, 63. Testimony of Lt. Robert H. O’Dell.
[25] Ibid., part 35, p. 5.
[26] Ibid., p. 7, Stimson February 6, 1944, letter to Navy Secretary.
[27] Ibid., p. 9.
[28] Ibid., p. 5. Stimson’s directions to assistant chief of staff, G-2, re Clausen’s assignment.
[29] Ibid., p. 1, 20–21.
[30] Ibid., p. 10, Stimson March 24, 1944, memorandum.
[31] Ibid., pp. 25–26.
[32] Ibid., part 34, p. 21.
[33] Ibid., part 29, p. 2349.
[34] Ibid., p. 2421.
[35] Ibid., part 35, pp. 39–40.
[36] Ibid., p. 91. Smith’s June 15, 1945, affidavit.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., p. 96, Deane’s July 24, 1945, affidavit.
[39] Ibid., p. 93.
[40] Ibid., part 10, p. 4616. Bratton before the Joint Committee.
[41] Ibid., part 35, pp. 97–98.
[42] Ibid., pp. 98–99, August 13, 1945, affidavit.
[43] Ibid., p. 91, June 15, 1945 affidavit.
[44] Ibid., p. 92, June 20, 1945 affidavit.
[45] Ibid., pp. 99–100.
[46] Ibid., pp. 101–02.
[47] Ibid., pp. 104–05.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.See also p. 30, Bicknell’s February 25, 1945, affidavit for Clausen.
[51] Ibid., part 36, p. 359, Forrestal’s May 2,1945, memorandum to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt.
[52] Ibid., p. 364.
[53] Ibid., pp. 7–9.
[54] Ibid., pp. 7–355, 361, 573–74.
[55] Ibid., pp. 13–15.
[56] Ibid., pp. 18–19.
[57] Ibid., p. 23.
[58] Ibid., pp. 68–77.
[59] Ibid., p. 81.
[60] Ibid., p.71.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Forrestal’s appointment records (Princeton University Library).
[63] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 72, Safford testimony.
[64] Ibid., p. 70.
[65] Ibid., part 34, pp. 84–85.
[66] Ibid., part 36, pp. 305–06 (Hewitt).
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid., pp. 25–26.
[69] Ibid., p. 84.
[70] Ibid., p. 35.
[71] Ibid., p. 37.
[72] Ibid., p. 128.
[73] Ibid., p. 137.
[74] Ibid., pp. 164–65.
[75] Ibid., p. 20.
[76] Ibid., p. 182.
[77] Ibid., p. 193.
[78] Ibid., p. 293.
[79] Ibid., p. 201.
[80] Ibid., pp. 205, 212, 220.
[81] Ibid., part 37, p. 949.
[82] Ibid., part 36, p. 285.
[83] Ibid., pp. 278–302.
[84] Ibid., p. 194.
[85] Ibid., p. 297.
[86] Ibid., part 39, p. 526.
[87] Ibid., p. 524.
[88] Ibid., pp. 523–27.
[89] Ibid., p. 523.
[90] Ibid., pp. 388–89.
[91] Ibid., p. 387.
[92] Ibid., part 34, p. 77.
[93] Ibid., pp. 78–79.
[94] Ibid., part 29, p. 2416.
[95] Ibid., part 2, p. 789.
[96] Ibid., part 34, p. 78 (see Hewitt, part 36, pp. 305–06).
[97] Ibid., part 34, p. 78.
[98] Ibid., pp. 79–81.
[99] Ibid., p. 82.
[100] Ibid., p. 86.
[101] Ibid., pp. 86–87.
[102] Ibid., p. 86.
[103] Ibid., p. 90.
[104] Ibid., pp. 90–93.
[105] Ibid., pp. 98–99.
[106] Ibid., pp. 99–102.
[107] Ibid., pp. 101–02.
[108] Ibid., pp. 79–81.
[109] Ibid., p. 81.
[110] Ibid., p. 80.
[111] Ibid., p. 86.
[112] Ibid., p. 86.
[113] Ibid., p. 90.
[114] Ibid., pp. 90–93.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid., pp. 101–02.
[117] Ibid., pp. 75–76. (August 13, 1945) Clarke report (part 34, p. 76).
[118] Ibid., part 35, pp. 13–19.
[119] Ibid., pp. 14–16.
[120] Ibid., p. 16.
[121] Ibid., p. 18.
[122] Ibid., pp. 18–19.
[123] Ibid., part 29, p. 2349. Bratton testimony before APHB, September 30, 1944.
[124] Ibid., part 35, pp. 97–98.
[125] Ibid., p. 17. Stimson’s “Official Report” regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster (August 29, 1945).
[126] Ibid., p. 19.
Chapter 26
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 8, pp. 3681–82. (Safford testimony).
[2] Ibid., part 35, p. 101 (Miles’s affidavit for Clausen).
[3] Ibid., part 8, p. 3735.
[4] Ibid., pp. 3735–38.
[5] Ibid., part 3, pp. 1124–36.
[6] Ibid., part 29, p. 2413.
[7] Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, vol. 91, part 3, p. 3196.
[8] Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), p. 127.
[9] Ibid., p. 127.
[10] Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, vol. 91, part 3, p. 3267.
[11] Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, p. 127.
[12] Washington Post, April 12, 1945, p. 8.
[13] The New York Times, April 13, 1945, p. 30.
[14] Ross T. McIntire, White House Physician (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946), pp. 241–43.
[15] Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, p. 127.
Chapter 27
[1] New York Times, August 30, 1945. pp. 1, 4, 5, 6, and S. 6-15.
[2] Ibid., p. 1.
[3] Congressional Record, September 6, 1945, reprinted in 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 1, p. 11.
[4] Ibid, p. 16.
[5] The New York Times, September 6, 1945, p. 1. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 14, which reprints Ferguson’s suggestion from the Congressional Record, September 6, 1945.
[6] The New York Times, September 7, 1945, p. 7. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 13, which reprints Barkley’s concurrent resolution from the Congressional Record, September 6, 1945.
[7] Congressional Record, September 6, 1945, reprinted in Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 10–23.
[8] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 3–4.
[9] Ibid., p. 4.
[10] Ibid., part 4, p. 1587.
[11] Ibid., part 1, p. 4.
[12] Ibid., p. 12.
[13] Congressional Record, September 6, 1945, reprinted in Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, p. 22.
[14] The New York Times, November 15, 1945, p. 3.
[15] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 1, pp. 1–253.
[16] Ibid., pp. 254–316.
[17] Ibid., part 2, p. 677.
[18] Ibid., p. 680.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., part 16, p. 2229.
[21] Ibid., part 4, p. 1835.
[22] Ibid., pp. 1729, 1834–49.
[23] Ibid., part 5, p. 2460.
[24] Ibid., part 4, p. 1730.
[25] Ibid., part 5, p. 2460. Congressman Keefe, committee member, summarizing to Stark his interpretation of Wilkinson’s testimony.
[26] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1731–32.
[27] Ibid., part 2, p. 791.
[28] Ibid., part 4, p. 1923.
[29] Ibid., part 14, p. 1328, Army’s Dispatch #472.
[30] Ibid., p. 1406, Navy’s November 27, 1941, “war warning” Dispatch #272337.
[31] Ibid., part 35, p. 104.
[32] Ibid., pp. 104–05. Marshall affidavit for Clausen.
[33] Ibid., part 2, p. 791. See also pp. 810, 811–12.
[34] Ibid., p. 877.
[35] Ibid., p. 801.
[36] Ibid., p. 793.
[37] Ibid., p. 839.
[38] Ibid., pp. 877–78.
[39] Ibid., pp. 879–80.
[40] Ibid., pp. 900–01.
[41] Ibid., pp. 940–42.
[42] Ibid., pp. 875–76, 902, and 921–22.
[43] Ibid., pp. 890–91.
[44] Ibid., p. 902.
[45] Ibid., pp. 921–22.
[46] Ibid., p. 922.
[47] Ibid., p. 942.
[48] Ibid., part 3, p. 1362.
[49] Ibid., part 2, p. 931.
[50] Ibid., p. 863.
[51] Ibid., part 39, p. 264.
[52] Ibid., part 2, p. 839.
[53] Ibid., part 3, p. 1021.
[54] Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
[55] Ibid., p. 1330.
[56] Ibid., part 7, p. 2941.
[57] Ibid., part 11, pp. 5426, 5429.
[58] Ibid., part 3, pp. 1027, 1031.
[59] Ibid., pp. 1028–29. See also Exhibit 46, ibid., part 15, pp. 1472–75, photos of messages routed to Marshall.
[60] Ibid., part 3, p. 1031.
[61] Ibid., p. 1036.
[62] Ibid., part 4, p. 1632.
[63] Ibid., p. 1594.
[64] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1632, 1594.
[65] Ibid., p. 1595, also p. 1632.
[66] Ibid., part 3, p. 1042.
[67] Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), vol. 2, pp. 765–66.
[68] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947/1948), pp. 331, 656, 668.
[69] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, p. 820.
[70] Ibid., part 3, p. 1091.
[71] Ibid., p. 1110.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid., p. 1108.
[74] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4524–25.
[75] Ibid., part 3, p. 1108.
[76] Ibid., p. 1109.
[77] Ibid., part 9, p. 4517.
[78] Ibid., part 3, p. 1108.
[79] Bratton testimony, APHB and below, pp. 778–85 and 802–04; Gerow testimony, above, pp. 627–31.
[80] Ibid., p. 1109.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid., pp. 1109–10. Emphasis added.
[83] Ibid., p. 1114.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1416–21, Exhibit 42.
[86] Ibid., part 3, p. 1115.
[87] Ibid., p. 1115.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid., part 33, p. 857.
[90] Ibid., part 3, p. 1148.
[91] Ibid., p. 1149.
[92] Ibid., p. 1338.
[93] Ibid., p. 1163.
[94] Ibid., pp. 1172–73.
[95] Ibid., pp. 1176–77.
[96] Ibid., p. 1181.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid., p. 1182.
[99] Ibid., pp. 1320–21.
[100] Ibid., pp. 1182–83.
[101] Congress had provided no funds for a research staff to assist the Committee’s minority members. Therefore, journalist John T. Flynn, who had been interested for some time in establishing the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, had raised funds to pay for me and a staff of seven to assist the Republicans. Flynn had written and published privately two pamphlets which had created quite a sensation: “The Truth About Pearl Harbor” (first published in the Chicago Tribune, October 22, 1944) and “The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor” (September 1945).
[102] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, pp. 1183, 1188.
[103] Ibid., pp. 1188, 1202.
[104] Ibid., pp. 1114, 1184–85.
[105] Ibid., pp. 1196–97.
[106] Ibid., p. 1198.
[107] Ibid., p. 1199.
[108] Ibid., p. 1203.
[109] Ibid., p. 1206.
[110] Ibid., p. 1218.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid., p. 1221.
[113] Ibid., pp. 1229–30.
[114] Ibid., pp. 1170–71.
[115] Ibid., p. 1163.
[116] Ibid., pp. 1321–22.
[117] Ibid., p. 1372.
[118] Ibid., p. 1373 (December 11).
[119] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1719–20 (December 17).
[120] Ibid., p. 1720.
[121] Ibid., pp. 1443–97.
[122] Ibid., pp. 1421–22, 1429–30.
[123] Ibid., p. 1507.
[124] Ibid., p. 1541.
[125] Ibid., p. 1555.
[126] Ibid., part 4, p. 1586.
[127] Ibid., pp. 1585–86.
[128] Ibid., part 4, p. 1638.
[129] Ibid., p. 1640.
[130] War Department. Staff Officers’ Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders. FM 101-5. August 19, 1940, prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff, G.C. Marshall, p. 39, paragraph 63, “Supervision of Execution.”
[131] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 4, p. 1647.
[132] Ibid., p. 1653.
[133] Ibid., pp. 1627–30.
[134] Ibid., p. 1631.
[135] Ibid., pp. 1634–36
[136] Ibid., part 32, p. 604.
[137] Ibid., part 33, p. 878.
[138] Ibid., part 4, p. 1940.
[139] Ibid., p. 2041.
[140] Ibid., p. 2042.
[141] Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, p. 519.
[142] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 4, p. 2041.
[143] Ibid., pp. 1970–71.
[144] Ibid., p. 1971, Stark testimony. See also ibid., pp. 1935–16, Turner testimony concerning reply prepared December 7 for Hart, andpart 10, pp. 5082–83, Creighton testimony before the Joint Committee.
[145] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1971–72.
[146] Ibid., part 5, p. 2172.
[147] Ibid., pp. 2097–35.
[148] Ibid., p. 2458.
[149] Ibid., pp. 2100–01.
[150] Ibid., p. 2459.
[151] Ibid., p. 2112.
[152] Ibid., p. 2102.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid., pp. 2109, 2175–77.
[155] Ibid., part 33, pp. 1357–58.
[156] Ibid., part 18, p. 2889, Exhibit 129.
[157] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2160–61.
[158] Ibid., part 5, p. 2102.
[159] Ibid., part 18, pp. 2875–941, Exhibit 129.
[160] Ibid., part 5, p. 2391.
[161] Ibid., part 5, p. 2107.
[162] Ibid.See also part 6, p. 2505,Kimmel statement to the Joint Committee.
[163] Ibid., part 5, pp. 2154–71.
[164] Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, CNO Dispatch #272337.
[165] Ibid., part 5, p. 2447.
[166] Ibid., p. 2151.
[167] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1328–29.
[168] Ibid., part 5, p. 2447.
[169] Ibid., pp. 2447–48.
[170] Ibid., p. 2448.
[171] Ibid., p. 2445.
[172] Ibid., pp. 2173–74, 2396–400.
[173] Ibid., p. 2182.
[174] Ibid., pp. 2183, 2187.
[175] Ibid., p. 2187.
[176] Ibid., pp. 2187, 2291, 2335.
[177] Ibid., pp. 2183, 2335.
[178] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1766–68.
[179] Ibid., part 5, pp. 2184–85.
[180] Ibid., part 36, p. 26.
[181] Ibid., part 5, p. 2185.
[182] Ibid., p. 2185.
[183] Ibid., pp. 2185–86.
[184] Ibid., pp. 2338–45.
[185] Ibid., p. 2338.
[186] Ibid., p. 2340. Testimony concerning the timing of the three waves of Japanese attack vary according to the different vantages of the several witnesses. For instance, see ibid., part 1, pp. 43, 47, and 48, account of Admiral T.B. Inglis; part 24, p. 1569, account of Kimmel; and part 22, pp. 87–88, account of Short at the Roberts Commission.
[187] Ibid., part 5, p. 2342.
[188] Ibid., p. 2337.
[189] Ibid., p. 2352.
[190] Ibid., p. 2493.
Chapter 28
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 8, pp. 3675–76.
[2] Ibid.
[3] This account of Safford’s contact with Briggs is based primarily on Bettina Greaves’s interview of Briggs in Las Vegas, Nevada, August 14, 1988, typescript in the author’s files.
[4] Captain L.F. Safford, Cryptolog, 4:2, December 7, 1982.
[5] Quotations as reported by Briggs in Bettina Bien Greaves’s 1988 interview.
[6] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2498.
[7] Ibid., p. 2499.
[8] Ibid., pp. 2720, 2722.
[9] Ibid., p. 2719.
[10] Ibid., p. 2565. See also part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to Stark, September 12, 1941.
[11] Ibid., part 6, p. 2505.
[12] Ibid., p. 2499, Kimmel letter to Nimitz, February 16, 1941.
[13] Ibid., p. 2731.
[14] Ibid., part 7, pp. 2970, 3203.
[15] Ibid., part 6 pp. 2499–500, Nimitz March 3, 1941, letter to Kimmel.
[16] Ibid., part 10, pp. 4873–75, War Department February 14, 1946 memorandum furnished the Joint Congressional Committee at request of Seth W. Richardson, general counsel.
[17] Ibid., part 6, p. 2628.
[18] Ibid., p. 2540.
[19] Ibid., pp. 2718–19.
[20] Ibid., pp. 2848–49.
[21] Ibid., p. 2548.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid., p. 2547.
[24] Ibid., p. 2549.
[25] Ibid., p. 2547.
[26] Ibid., pp. 2854–55. See also ibid., part 12, pp. 205–06, Japanese Message #986.
[27] Ibid., part 6, p. 2549.
[28] Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy Department Dispatch 272337.
[29] Ibid., part 6, p. 2520.
[30] Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, CNO Message #290110, dated November 29, drafted November 28, 1941.
[31] Ibid., p. 1328, Army Message #472, November 27, 1941.
[32] Ibid., part 6, p. 2525.
[33] Ibid., part 18, pp. 2877–941, Exhibit No. 129, Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46). See especially ibid., p. 2909.
[34] Ibid., part 6, p. 2864.
[35] Ibid., pp. 2525–26.
[36] Ibid., part 16, p. 2238, Kimmel letter to Stark, May 26, 1941.
[37] Ibid., pp. 2239–42.
[38] Ibid., p. 2251.
[39] Ibid., part 33, p. 1360.
[40] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2220–21. Stark November 14, 1941, letter, enclosing copy of Marshall/Stark November 5, 1941, “Memorandum for the President” (part 14, pp. 1061–62).
[41] Ibid., pp. 2222–23, italics added.
[42] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2224–25.
[43] Ibid., part 6, p. 2858.
[44] Ibid., p. 2857. Gearhart quotes from the Navy’s November 27 “war warning” (Ibid., part 14, p. 1406), NCO #272337.
[45] Ibid., part 18, pp. 2875-2941, Exhibit 129, Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46). For U.S. Pacific Fleet’s task, see chapter II. Section 1, Task “a.”
[46] Ibid., part 4, p. 2044, italics added.
[47] Ibid., part 6, p. 2866.
[48] Ibid., p. 2867; see Turner testimony re his July 21, 1941 conversation with Nomura, ibid., part 4, pp. 2041–42.
[49] Ibid., part 6, p. 2867. See also Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 527–28.
[50] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2868.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., p. 2867. See also Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, “Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941,” pp. 556–57.
[53] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2866.
[54] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel September 12, 1941, letter to Stark.
[55] Ibid. See also part 6, p. 2861, Kimmel testimony.
[56] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to Stark.
[57] Ibid., part 6, pp. 2823–24. See also part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to Stark.
[58] Ibid., part 6, pp. 2881–82.
[59] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2212–13, Stark’s September 23, 1941, letter to Kimmel.
[60] Ibid., part 14, p. 1401, OPNAV August 14, 1941, Dispatch #142155 to CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT.
[61] Ibid., part 14, p. 1402, CNO October 16, 1941, Dispatch #162300.
[62] Ibid., p. 1403, OPNAV October 17, 1941, Message #162258 to the Philippines, CINCAF COM.12.
[63] Ibid., p. 1403, OPNAV October 23, 1941 Message #222250 to commanders of Pearl Harbor, Manila, and San Francisco Naval Districts.
[64] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2222–23, Marshall/Stark November 5, 1941, memorandum to FDR. Copy sent Kimmel with Stark’s letter of November 14, 1941 (Ibid., part 16, pp. 2220–21; see also pp. 2222–23).
[65] Ibid., part 14, p. 1404, OPNAV November 18, 1941 Message #181705.
[66] Ibid., part 6, p. 2878.
[67] Ibid., pp. 2877–78.
[68] Ibid., p. 2877. Kimmel testimony.
[69] Ibid., p. 2868.
[70] Ibid., pp. 2869–70. For Stark’s November 25, 1941, letter, see part 16, pp. 2223–25.
[71] Ibid., part 6, p. 2874.
[72] Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV Message #012356 to CINCAF.
[73] Ibid., p. 2872.
[74] Ibid., part 6, pp. 2872–73. See also part 5, pp. 2190–91 and 2416–17, Stark testimony re FDR’s role in ordering the dispatch of the three small vessels and the effort to coordinate with the British and Dutch the search to determine where the Japanese were aiming—toward the Kra Peninsula or the Dutch East Indies.
[75] Ibid., part 16, pp. 2223–25.
[76] Ibid., part 6, p. 2882.
[77] Ibid., part 15, pp. 1741–43, Exhibit 74A.
[78] Ibid., part 6, pp. 2875–76. Readings from State Department December 4, 1941, document, part 15, pp. 1741–43, Exhibit 74A.
[79] Ibid., part 6, pp. 2864–65.
[80] Ibid., part 14, p. 1246, Exhibit No. 21, December 6, 1941, telegram from London to State Department.
[81] Ibid., part 6, p. 2871.
[82] Ibid., pp. 2871–72. See part 16, pp. 2223–25, Stark’s November 25 letter.
[83] Ibid., part 10, pp. 5082–83, December 5, 1941, telegram from John M. Creighton, (ALUSNA) naval attaché in Singapore, to Hart.
[84] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1933–35, Hart-Phillips five-part report, December 7, Philippine time, i.e., December 6 in Washington.
[85] Ibid., part 14, p. 1412, CINCAF telegram 070645.
[86] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1935–36, Turner testimony.
[87] Ibid., part 6, p. 2883.
[88] Ibid., p. 2876.
[89] Ibid., p. 2915.
[90] Ibid., part 7, p. 2921, Short testimony.
[91] Ibid., part 28, pp. 946–47.
[92] Ibid., part 7, p. 3155, Short testimony. See also part 29, pp. 2435–38.
[93] Ibid., part 7, pp. 2921–22, Short testimony.
[94] Ibid., pp. 2966–67, Short testimony.
[95] Ibid., p. 2967.
[96] Ibid., part 15, pp. 1601–02, Exhibit 53, Marshall’s February 7, 1941, letter to Short on his assumption of command. See also part 7, p. 3083, Short testimony.
[97] Ibid., part 15, p. 1601.
[98] Ibid., part 7, p. 2970.
[99] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1326–34, Exhibit 32; part 15, pp. 1600–26, Exhibit 53.
[100] Ibid., part 14, pp. 1395–1409, Exhibit 37; part 16, pp. 2144–57, Exhibit 106.
[101] Ibid., part 7, p. 2925. Short statement.
[102] Ibid., p. 2963. Short statement.
[103] Ibid., pp. 2969–70, 3157–58. Short testimony.
[104] Ibid., pp. 2958, 2971.
[105] Ibid., pp. 2931–35, 2945–46. Short testimony.
[106] Ibid., part 18, p. 3205, January 27, 1942, memorandum to Marshall.
[107] Ibid., part 39, p. 265, memorandum.
[108] Ibid., also part 7, p. 2961.
[109] Ibid., part 34, p. 45, testimony of Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, chief, intelligence branch, G-2, before Clarke Inquiry.
[110] Ibid., pp. 47–48, testimony of General Kroner.
[111] Ibid., part 7, pp. 2988–89.
[112] Ibid., p. 2989.
[113] Ibid., part 2, pp. 902–03.
[114] Ibid., part 7, p. 2989. Short testimony. See also part 34, pp. 47–48, Kroner testimony at Clarke.
[115] Ibid., part 7, p. 2930.
[116] Ibid., part 15, pp. 1593–1600, Exhibit 52, especially pp. 1597–58.
[117] Ibid., part 7, p. 2930.
[118] Ibid., p. 3176.
[119] Ibid., p. 3217.
[120] Ibid., p. 3203.
[121] Ibid., p. 3204.
[122] Ibid., pp. 2931–35; part 14, pp. 1326–34, Exhibit No. 32.
[123] Ibid., part 14, p. 1326, War Department radio, July 8, 1941. This telegram, as transcribed in Roberts Commission Report (ibid., part 24, p. 2164, Exhibit 36), varies slightly in punctuation, etc., and is dated July 7 (not July 8), 1941.
[124] Ibid., part 7, p. 3180.
[125] Ibid., p. 3072.
[126] Ibid., p. 2933. See part 14, p. 1327, October 16, 1941, Navy Message 162203.
[127] Ibid., part 7, p. 2933. See part 14, p. 1327, War Department October 20, 1941, message. This telegram as transcribed in Roberts Commission Report (part 24, p. 2164, Exhibit 36) is dated October 18 (not 20), 1941.
[128] Ibid., part 7, p. 3173.
[129] Ibid., p. 3174.
[130] Ibid., p. 3180.
[131] Ibid., p. 3175.
[132] Ibid., p. 3174.
[133] Ibid., part 7, p. 2934; part 14, p. 1328, November 24, 1941, Navy Message 242005.
[134] Ibid., part 7, p. 2935; part 14, p. 1328, November 27, 1941, Army Message 472.
[135] Ibid., part 7 pp. 2953–54. See also part 29, p. 2403.
[136] Ibid., part 7, p. 2954. See also part 2, p. 791, Miles testimony.
[137] Ibid., part 7, p. 2983. See part 14, p. 1327, Navy October 16, 1941, Message 162203, and War Department October 20, 1941, Message 1234P.
[138] Ibid., part 7, p. 3176.
[139] Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV #031850.
[140] Ibid., p. 1408, OPNAV #031855.
[141] Ibid., part 7, p. 3105.
[142] Ibid., pp. 2978–79.
[143] Ibid., part 12, pp. 261–63, 248.
[144] Ibid., part 7, pp. 3220, 3041.
[145] Ibid., pp. 2940, 3220–322.
[146] Ibid., p. 2961. See War Department, FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations: Operations, May 22, 1941, p. 40, paragraph 194.
[147] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, p. 2986.
[148] War Department, FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations: Operations, May 22, 1941, pp. 46–47, paragraphs 227 and 228.
[149] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, pp. 3012–13.
[150] Ibid., p. 3096.
[151] Ibid., pp. 3068, 3069–70.
[152] Ibid., p. 3165.
[153] Ibid., p. 3210.
[154] Ibid., part 7, p. 3170.
[155] Ibid., p. 2964.
[156] Ibid., p. 3169.
[157] Ibid., part 18, pp. 3211–15, F. Granville Munson, Colonel, J.A.G.D., April 20, 1942, memorandum for judge advocate general.
[158] Ibid., part 7, pp. 3191–95.
[159] Ibid., pp. 3157–58.
[160] Ibid., p. 3192. See also pp. 3057–58, 3182–84.
[161] Ibid, pp. 3194–95.
[162] Ibid., p. 3231.
Chapter 29
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), part 9, pp. 4223–24, portions of Hart and NCI testimony reproduced.
[2] Ibid., p. 4226.
[3] Ibid., pp. 4232–33.
[4] Ibid., pp. 4236–37.
[5] Ibid., pp. 4235–36.
[6] Ibid., pp. 4237, 4239.
[7] Ibid., p. 4246.
[8] Ibid., pp. 4246–47.
[9] Ibid., p. 4249.
[10] Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV Dispatch #012356.
[11] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4252–53. Of these three small vessels, only one got to sea before the Japanese attack. The Isabel left Manila on December 3, with orders to proceed to Camranh Bay on the Indochina coast, ostensibly to search for a lost Navy PBY plane. On the 5th, about 22 miles from the Indochina coast, she was sighted by a Japanese Navy plane, and ordered to return to Manila, where she arrived on December 8 (Kent Tolley, Cruise of the Lanikai [Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 1973], pp. 269–70). The second ship, the Lanikai, skippered by then Lieutenant Kent Tolley, was preparing to leave Manila when the attack came. She patrolled the coast of the Philippines for a couple of weeks, finally departing Manila on December 26, and after some adventures reached Australia (ibid., p.120). The third small ship selected, the Molly Moore, was never commissioned; when the attack came, her mission became “superfluous” (ibid., p. 272). Author’s note: Apparently Hart looked on the mission of these three small vessels as “mission impossible.” When ordering the Lanikai to the coast of Indochina (ibid., p. 19), Hart said he had felt he was sending its skipper “on what looked like a one way mission.” Tolley thought FDR may have been offering these small ships and the men aboard “to bait an incident, a casus belli” (ibid., p. 279). Hart wanted to know why the president had sent the message ordering these vessels to sea; he felt the order might have been a reflection on his overflight reports. (PLG 1962 interview of Hart.)
[12] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 5, pp. 2190–91.
[13] Ibid., part 11, p. 5433, Stimson’s diary entry of November 25, 1941.
[14] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3736–40.
[15] Ibid., Report, p. 498.
[16] Ibid., part 8, p. 3859.
[17] Ibid., pp. 3715, 3877.
[18] Ibid., p. 3715.
[19] Ibid., pp. 3857–59.
[20] Ibid., p. 3751.
[21] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3555–813, 3842–93.
[22] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3675–76.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Safford’s conversations with the author. See also chapter 21, pp. 432–33.
[25] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1409, Secret radiogram No.40, December 3, 1941. See also part 2, p. 841, Miles testimony.
[26] Ibid., part 8, p. 3782; part 14, p. 1408, Message #040330.
[27] Ibid., part 8, p. 3770; part 14, p. 1408, Message #040343 to CO MARDETs, Peiping and Tientsin.
[28] Ibid., part 12, Exhibit 1, p. 154, Japanese Circular #2353, translated November 28, 1941, and p. 155, Japanese Circular #2354, translated November 26, 1941.
[29] Ibid., part 8, p. 3580.
[30] Ibid., p. 3579.
[31] Ibid., p. 3704.
[32] Ibid., p. 3655.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., p. 3584.
[35] Ibid., pp. 3678, 3683, 3796–97.
[36] Ibid., p. 3640.
[37] Ibid., p. 3770; part 12, p. 165, Tokyo Message #812.
[38] Ibid., part 8, p. 3770; part 12, various Tokyo Messages, pp. 209, 215, 216, 231.
[39] Ibid., part 8, p. 3770.
[40] Ibid., pp. 3711, 3770.
[41] Ibid., p. 3663.
[42] Ibid., p. 3664.
[43] Ibid., p. 3663.
[44] Ibid., p. 3579, Safford statement, and pp. 3642, 3708, 3769, 3843, 3848, Safford testimony.
[45] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3580, 3586.
[46] Ibid., p. 3586.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., p. 3690.
[49] Ibid., pp. 3587, 3683.
[50] Ibid., pp. 3587, 3690.
[51] Ibid., pp. 3667, 3761, 3811, 3812.
[52] Ibid., p. 3667.
[53] Ibid., pp. 3796, 3811–12.
[54] Ibid., p. 3812.
[55] Ibid., pp. 3701, 3715, 3812, 3878. See also pp. 3761–62, Safford’s January 22, 1944, letter to Kramer.
[56] Ibid., p. 3781.
[57] Ibid., pp. 3810, 3844; part 29, p. 2397, OpNav. No. 042019, with an information copy to the commander-in-chief Asiatic Fleet (Hart) but not to the C-in-C of the Pacific Fleet (Kimmel).
[58] Ibid., part 29, p. 2397, #042018. No information copy was sent to Kimmel.
[59] Ibid., p. 2397, #042000.
[60] Ibid., part 8, p. 3845; part 14, p. 1408, #042017; part 29, p. 2398, #042017. Safford testimony at APHB; part 33, pp. 1178–79. #042017, NCI Exhibit 21. Information copy to commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet.
[61] Ibid., part 29, p. 2399.
[62] Ibid., part 14, p. 1408; part 29, p. 2399.
[63] Ibid., part 29, p. 2399.
[64] Ibid., p. 3668.
[65] Ibid., p. 3655.
[66] Ibid., pp. 3756–58. Regulations required the receiving stations, including Cheltenham, to retain one copy of every intercept only until notified that the other two copies forwarded to the Navy Department had been received. Then the receiving stations were free to destroy their copies if they wished. Or they could retain them temporarily for reference.
[67] Ibid., p. 3727.
[68] Ibid., p. 3611; part 18, p. 3347, Exhibit 151.
[69] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3759–60.
[70] Ibid., p. 3727.
[71] Ibid., pp. 3788–90, Ingersoll testimony before the Hart Inquiry. Concerning others who admitted having seen a “Winds execute” prior to the attack, Ferguson cited an affidavit by a Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew referring to an “implementation message” which he had seen “on or about the 5th of December 1941.” Ferguson also quoted from NCI Top Secret testimony by Admiral Turner to the effect that he had learned on December 6 that “The Winds message came in” and that it meant “at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war.” Also a Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder who had testified before the Roberts Commission to “three signal words . . . as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned” (ibid., part 8, pp. 3792–94).
[72] Ibid., p. 3793.
[73] Ibid., p. 3689.
[74] Ibid., pp. 3693, 3697.
[75] Ibid., pp. 3731, 3774–76.
[76] Ibid., pp. 3602, 3693.
[77] Commander Wesley A. Wright. As of December 7, 1941, Wright was Assistant Communications Officer, in Pearl Harbor on the Staff of C-in-C. See Hewitt Inquiry, Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 261.
[78] Ibid., part 8, p. 3701, Safford January 22, 1944, letter to Kramer.
[79] Ibid., p. 3706.
[80] Ibid., p. 3691.
[81] Ibid., p. 3698.
[82] Ibid., pp. 3699–700. Kramer to Safford, December 28, 1943.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid., pp. 3700–04. Safford to Kramer, January 22, 1944.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid., p. 3700.
[87] Ibid., pp. 3804–05, 3806–07.
[88] Ibid., p. 3710.
[89] Ibid., p. 3606.
[90] Ibid., pp. 3608–09, From Safford July 14, 1945, “Memorandum of Conversations in Connection With Admiral Hewitt’s Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Disaster.”
[91] Ibid., p. 3607.
[92] Ibid., p. 3610.
[93] Ibid., part 10, pp. 5009–12.
[94] Ibid., part 8, p. 3645.
[95] Ibid., part 8, p. 3652, Safford testimony.
[96] Ibid., p. 3686.
[97] Ibid., pp. 3721–22.
[98] Ibid., pp. 3723–24.
[99] Ibid., pp. 3704–06.
[100] Ibid., pp. 3684–86.
[101] Ibid., p. 3684.
[102] Ibid., pp. 3715–18.
[103] Ibid., p. 3746.
[104] Ibid., p. 3777.
[105] Ibid., p. 3746.
[106] Ibid., pp. 3807–08.
[107] Ibid., p. 3717.
[108] See Chapter 28, pp. 671ff.
[109] See John Toland’s Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: Berkley Books, 1983), “Postscript,” section 4, pp. 346–47. Toland reports the recollections of the Japanese naval attaché in Washington, Captain Yuzuru Sanematsu, who picked up the “Winds Execute” on December 4, 1941, and those of assistant attaché, Lieutenant Commander. Yoshimori Terai. See chapter 10, pp. 228–29.
[110] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, p. 4344.
[111] Washington Star, May 18, 1973.
[112] The New York Times, August 27, 1983.
[113] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3894–95, 3897.
[114] Ibid., part 36, p. 81.
[115] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3698–99.
[116] Ibid., pp. 3700–04.
[117] Ibid., part 9, p. 4093.
[118] Ibid., p. 4080–81; also part 18, pp. 3333–34, Exhibit 150, Kimmel letter to Halsey.
[119] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4079–84. See also pp. 4096–124, Kramer 1944 memorandum.
[120] Ibid., pp. 4153–56.
[121] Ibid., part 33, pp. 847–76.
[122] Ibid., part 36, pp. 79–85.
[123] Ibid., pp. 339–50.
[124] Ibid., part 9, p. 4060.
[125] Ibid., pp. 4061, 4063.
[126] Ibid., pp. 3964, 4060.
[127] Ibid., pp. 3964–65.
[128] Ibid., p. 3966.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid., p. 3965. Also C.P. Trussel, New York Times, November 12, 1945.
[131] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, p. 3964.
[132] Ibid., p. 4078.
[133] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4080–81.
[134] Ibid., pp. 4093ff.
[135] Ibid., p. 4128.
[136] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4128–29.
[137] Ibid., pp. 4131–32.
[138] Ibid., pp. 4133–35.
[139] Ibid., pp. 4136–37.
[140] Ibid., pp. 4138–39.
[141] Ibid., pp. 4141–42.
[142] Ibid., p. 4144.
[143] Ibid., part 9, p. 4126.
[144] Ibid., pp. 4126–27.
[145] Ibid., pp. 4123–24; part 18, pp. 3323–31, Exhibit 142D, for November 7, 1945, report on interrogation of Japanese officials re “Winds.”
[146] Ibid., pp. 4145–46.
[147] Ibid., part 12, pp. 238–39.
[148] Ibid., part 14, p. 1413, Exhibit 41, message time sheet.
[149] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4100–01.
[150] Ibid., part 8, p. 3898.
[151] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4017–18.
[152] Ibid., pp. 4015.
[153] Ibid., p. 4019.
[154] Ibid., pp. 4019–20.
[155] Ibid., p. 4102.
[156] Ibid., p. 4188.
[157] Ibid., p. 4208.
[158] Ibid., p. 4153.
[159] Ibid., pp. 4155–56.
[160] Ibid., pp. 4148–49.
[161] Ibid., p. 3931.
[162] Ibid., p. 4140.
[163] Ibid., p. 3978.
[164] Ibid., p. 3939.
[165] Ibid., part 9, p. 3939.
[166] Ibid., pp. 4096–97.
[167] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3903–04, 4025.
[168] Ibid., part 9, p. 4027.
[169] Ibid., p. 4026.
[170] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1970–71.
[171] Ibid., part 9, p. 4029.
[172] Ibid., pp. 4175–76 (extension #2027).
[173] Ibid., p. 4176.
[174] Ibid., p. 4175.
[175] Ibid., p. 4176–77.
[176] Ibid., part 12, p. 261, Exhibit 2, p. 12, Tokyo to Honolulu Message #83.
[177] Ibid., part 9, p. 4174.
[178] Ibid., p. 4177.
[179] Ibid., p. 4178.
[180] Ibid., p. 4179.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid., part 34, p. 21.
[183] Ibid., part 29, p. 2349.
[184] Ibid., pp. 2349 (September 30, 1944); 2419, 2421–22 (October 2, 1944); and 2455 (October 6, 1944).
[185] Ibid., part 10, p. 4616.
[186] Ibid., part 35, pp. 96–98, Bratton affidavit.
[187] Ibid., part 3, p. 1036.
[188] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4015, 4018–19, 4022, 4101–02.
[189] Ibid., part 3, p. 1874; part 4, pp. 1761, 1874, 1972, 2056; part 10, p. 4668.
[190] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4509–12.
[191] Ibid., p. 4513.
[192] Ibid., pp. 4513, 4536.
[193] Ibid., p. 4510.
[194] Ibid., pp. 4513–14.
[195] Ibid., p. 4514.
[196] Ibid., part 3, p. 1554.
[197] Ibid., part 9, p. 4515.
[198] Ibid., p. 4515.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4597; part 10, 4611–12.
[201] Ibid., pp. 4668–69.
[202] Ibid., pp. 4666, 4669.
[203] Ibid., p. 4669.
[204] Ibid., p. 4664.
[205] Ibid., p. 4660.
[206] Ibid., p. 4668.
[207] Ibid., p. 4661.
[208] Ibid., p. 4668.
[209] Ibid., part 11, p. 5278, Beardall testimony.
[210] Ibid., part 9, p. 4025.
[211] Ibid., part 10, pp. 4660–61.
[212] Ibid., p. 4662.
[213] Ibid., pp. 4662–63.
[214] Ibid., p. 4663.
[215] Ibid., p. 4671.
[216] Ibid., p. 4663.
[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Ibid., p. 4664.
[221] Ibid., p. 4665.
[222] Ibid., p. 4666.
[223] Ibid., Marshall testimony, part 11, pp. 5193–94; Stark testimony, part 5, pp. 2291–92.
[224] Ibid., part 11, p. 1594.
[225] Ibid., part 5, pp. 2291–92.
[226] James G. Stahlman letter of November 26, 1973 to Admiral Kemp Tolley.
[227] The sequence of Kramer’s December 7 morning deliveries varied slightly from account to account:
At the NCI (Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 33, pp. 858–60), in mid-1944, he said he had delivered the 13 parts plus part 14 and other new material to (1) Stark, (2) the White House and (3) Knox at the State Department. Then upon his return to the Navy Department at 10:20, he found the “One p.m. Message” had been received.
On February 6, 1946 before the Joint Committee, he testified (ibid., part 8, pp. 3904–08) that he had delivered all 14 parts to (1) McCollum, (2) Wilkinson, (3) Stark, possibly through McCollum and Wilkinson, and (4) directly to Knox, whom he saw personally, at State. He had then returned to the Navy Department where he had encountered the “One p.m. Message.” This account made no mention of delivering the 14 parts to the White House (Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3904–08).
Kramer testimony February 6, 1946 at the JCC:
Richardson: Now, how early did you go to the office the next morning?
Kramer: My recollection is it was very shortly after 7:30. . . . The normal office hours commenced at 8 o’clock . . . I further wanted to be at the office earlier that morning [December 7] than usual because of the likelihood that I would have to make earlier disseminations that morning than usual [late morning]. . . . I had a specific appointment to be at the State Department by 10 that morning, on instructions from Secretary Knox. I gathered from conversation with Admiral Wilkinson that Admiral Stark would very likely be in Sunday morning, which was not a usual practice. . . . it was an unusual thing for Admiral Stark to be there on Sunday morning [italics added]. On a number of occasions that fall on Sunday morning I had delivered folders to his home and had been received in his study on the second deck, he being in pajamas and dressing gown on one occasion having breakfast. I recollect that because I was offered some coffee. . . .
Richardson: Now you got in your office around 7 o’clock on Sunday morning.
Kramer: Shortly after 7:30, is my best recollection. . . . [M]y recollection is that the fourteenth part was there shortly after I got in that morning, or possibly when I got in that morning. . . . I was on a 24-hour basis, and my translators were also. I had on at least two dozen occasions, during the course of 1941, been called to my office at odd hours of the night, sometimes 2 or 3 in the morning. I had standing instructions with the GY watch officer to call me any time they felt a translator was required. . . . I was the nearest translator to my office, only 5 minutes away in Arlington near Fort Myer. I therefore put myself in the status of being the first one called rather than one of the translators whose homes were in outlying districts. . . .
Richardson: When the delivery was made on Sunday morning then the entire 14-part message was delivered as one message?
Kramer: That is correct, sir. . . . Some details of delivery between 8 and 9 o’clock I have only in the last month or so had my memory refreshed on, in conversations with other officers. The first delivery, to my present best recollection, was made to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. . . . It was probably about 8 o’clock or a few minutes after. . . . Another delivery was made, I believe, about a quarter of 9 to Captain McCollum also, or Commander McCollum then, when I was informed that Admiral Wilkinson had arrived at his office, and I therefore automatically delivered another copy to Admiral Wilkinson. It was about that time, or shortly afterward that another copy was delivered to Admiral Stark’s office. . . . That first delivery to Admiral Stark’s office, I believe, was done by either Admiral Wilkinson or Captain McCollum. . . . My first positive recollection of seeing Admiral Stark is when I was on my way to the State Department to keep my 10 o’clock appointment when I left a copy of some of the other traffic that had come in in Admiral Stark’s outer office. That was probably 9:30 or 9:40. . . . I was at the State Department almost exactly 10 minutes of 10.
Richardson: And to whom did you make delivery actually?
Kramer: Actually to Mr. Knox directly. He came in, as I recollect, about 5 minutes of 10, a few minutes after I got there, and went into the conference room, Mr. Hull’s office. . . . There was a brief discussion between myself, the Army courier, and Mr. Hull’s private secretary in Mr. Hull’s outer office. It lasted probably not more than 3 or 4 minutes, and then I headed back for the Navy Department.
Richardson: What time did you return to the Navy Department?
Kramer: My best recollection is about 10:20. . . . On my arrival there at 10:20, the most striking recollection I have is the first sighting of that message from Tokyo directing the delivery of this note from Tokyo at 1 o’clock p. m., December 7, Washington time. . . . I immediately instructed by chief yeoman to prepare another set of folders so I could make immediate delivery of them.
[228] Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, pp. 4102–03. Kramer testimony.
[229] Ibid., p. 4097. Kramer February 9, 1946 testimony.
[230] Ibid., p. 4098. Kramer February 9, 1946 testimony.
[231] Ibid., p. 4105. Kramer testimony.
[232] Ibid., p. 3997. Including also the “Pilot Message,” if Bratton’s “refreshed” JCC testimony is believed, although Bratton doesn’t mention it in his testimony concerning his Sunday morning delivery rounds.
[233] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3908–09. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee:
Kramer: On my arrival there [back at the Navy Department] at 10:20, the most striking recollection I have is the first sighting of that message from Tokyo directing the delivery of this note from Tokyo at 1:00 p.m., December 7, Washington time . . . I immediately instructed my chief yeoman to prepare another set of folders so I could make immediate delivery of them. . . . Just as I was about to leave the office, a plain language Japanese message was sent in to my office by the GY watch officer that carried, I believe the so-called hidden word message. . . . I recognized it as such from an external indicator, namely the word “Stop” at the end, and recognized the first word as being one of the code words referring to England. In scanning the rest of the message, as I recollect, the sixth or seventh word had another code word, which, incidentally, were all proper names. The word was “Hattori” which, although I recognized [it] as a code word, I did not immediately recall the meaning of, and hastily referred to the list of such code words . . . interpreted as “relations between Japan and (blank) country,” to be inserted, was not in accordance with expectations. I dictated to my chief yeoman the sense of that message.
[234] Ibid., part 9, p. 4110. Keefe’s description of Kramer’s 1944 account.
[235] Ibid., part 33, pp. 859–60. Kramer testimony re “One p.m. Message” at the NCI in mid-1944:
At the NCI, Kramer said that he had returned to the Navy Department after his first delivery on the morning of December 7. There he had discovered the “One p.m. Message” along with several others. Within ten or fifteen minutes he was at Admiral Stark’s office. From there he had gone to the White House and then [italics added] to State, where Knox and Stimson were meeting with Hull. Kramer said he had not seen Knox personally, but he had “made a point of verbally inviting the attention of Mr. Knox” through a State Department Foreign Service Officer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull “the implications of the times.” 1300 Washington time was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu, where the Japanese appeared to be heading.
[236] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3909–12. Kramer testimony:
Kramer told the JCC (part 8, pp. 3910–12) that he had delivered the “One p.m. Message” to (1) the State Department where he had “most emphatically not” spoken with Knox, (2) the White House, and then (3) back to the Navy Department.
[237] Ibid., part 8, pp. 3910, 3912. Kramer testimony.
[238] Ibid., part 9, p. 4180. Excerpt reprinted from Safford NCI testimony.
Ibid., part 9, p. 3909. Kramer testimony:
Kramer: I stopped off at Admiral Stark’s office [Stark was in his office; it was between 10:30 and 10:35]. . . . The office door was closed. . . . Word was sent in . . . that I had something for him. My impressions earlier have been that it was his Flag Secretary, then Commander Wellborn. That has only quite recently been corrected on that score since I am informed that Wellborn was not there that morning at all. My recollections were fully refreshed in a conversation only in the last few days with Captain McCollum to the effect that he was the one who came to the door. I distinctly recollect that now. I further recollect pointing out to Captain McCollum the tie-up of the time, 1:00 Washington, with the scheme that had been developing for the past week or so in the Southwest Pacific with reference to Malaya and the Kra Peninsula. Captain McCollum reacted instantaneously to my pointing that out. His reactions, I believe, were identical with mine. I do not believe our conversation lasted more than 10 seconds or so, and then I headed for the State Department.
Ibid., part 8, p. 3910:
[Arriving at State at about 10:45, Kramer made delivery to] one of the private secretaries of Mr. Hull. . . . Before that folder was taken in to Mr. Hull there was a brief conversation of the identical nature that I had had with Captain McCollum at Admiral Stark’s door, pointing out the tie-up of the time 1:00 Washington, with the situation in the Southwest Pacific.
Richardson: One o’clock Washington meant dawn in Hawaii, did it not?
Kramer: It was 7:30 in Hawaii, yes, sir.
Richardson: And was that fact pointed out in your conversation with McCollum, and at the State Department?
Kramer: It was mentioned in passing, yes, sir.
[239] Ibid., p. 3911. Kramer testimony.
[240] Ibid., pp. 3909–12. Kramer testimony:
Questioned by Richardson, Kramer said: “The primary point of that [the 1:00 delivery time] was the conviction, at least in my mind, that the Japanese intended to carry out their plans against Kota Bharu, with the intention and purpose of forcing the hand of the Thai Premier, Pibul, who had been maintaining, for some time past, the position that his country was neutral, that any foreign nation that invaded his quarters would be considered an enemy, and that the moment such an invasion took place he would call on the other party for assistance. By ‘other party’ I refer to Japan or to Britain.”
Ibid., part 9, pp. 4110, 4116. Excerpts of Kramer’s 1944 memorandum reprinted. Kramer explained the significance of the “One p.m. Message” for Knox’s benefit, as he often had explained other Japanese intercepts to the Navy personnel authorized to see them:
The implications were so obvious in the light of what we know, that it was not necessary to state that invasion of British territory was undoubtedly scheduled for 1300 (EDT), and that at least a complete break with the U.S. was scheduled simultaneously. . . . I recollect conversation only for Mr. Knox’ benefit regarding the implications of the 1300 hour. I distinctly remember that the tie-up of these times would be apparent to experienced naval officers, but that a civilian (Mr. Knox) might overlook it. Hence the pains I took to point it out at the State Department. I repeated this point at least half a dozen times that morning to others, chiefly subordinates, I think, but including one of Mr. Hull’s secretaries who handled this material for him, to one or two of my office workers, and I believe also to Colonel Bratton [the Army courier] in Mr. Hull’s outer office, probably to Commander Wellborn, and Admiral’s flag secretary, possibly to McCollum, and probably to you [Safford] too.”
[241] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4180–82. Kramer testimony.
[242] Ibid., p. 4180. Kramer quoting from 1944 memorandum prepared for Halsey.
[243] Ibid., part 8, p. 3911. Kramer testimony.
[244] Ibid., part 29, p. 2347, APHB.
[245] Ibid., part 34, p. 19, Clarke investigation.
[246] Ibid., part 9, p. 4516.
[247] Ibid., p. 4517.
[248] Ibid., p. 4524.
[249] Ibid., p. 4525.
[250] Ibid., p. 4524.
[251] Ibid., p. 4525.
[252] Ibid., p. 4546.
[253] Ibid., p. 4525.
[254] Ibid., pp. 4548–50.
[255] Ibid., part 14, p. 1411, Exhibit 39.
[256] Ibid., part 9, pp. 4546, 4573.
[257] Ibid., p. 4544.
[258] Ibid., p. 4573.
[259] Ibid., p. 4547.
[260] Ibid., part 3, p. 1112.
[261] Ibid., part 9, p. 4554.
[262] Ibid., p. 4555.
[263] Ibid., p. 4547.
[264] Ibid., pp. 4544–45, 4547.
[265] Ibid., pp. 4547–48, 4573.
[266] Ibid., p. 4524.
[267] Ibid., part 14, p. 1411, Exhibit 39, Deane June 8, 1942, memorandum about the events of the morning of December 7, 1941.
[268] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1762, 1874.
[269] Ibid., part 5, p. 2183.
[270] Ibid., p. 2291.
[271] Ibid., pp. 2291–92.
[272] Ibid., p. 2183.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Ibid., p. 2184.
[275] Ibid.
[276] Ibid., part 33, p. 865.
[277] Ibid.
[278] Ibid., part 9, p. 4006.
[279] Ibid., part 9, p. 4038. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee.
[280] Ibid., part 36, p. 236.
[281] Ibid., part 4, pp. 1766–67.
[282] Ibid., p. 1800.
[283] Ibid., part 5, pp. 2132–33.
[284] Ibid., part 5, p. 2133; Stark opening statement.
[285] Ibid., part 17, p. 2457, Exhibit 111; part 6, p. 2495.
[286] Ibid., part 10, pp. 5150–51.
[287] Ibid., part 11, p. 5153.
[288] Ibid., part 11, pp. 5186–87.
[289] This story, related to me by Ferguson, lends credence to Stahlman’s assertion that Marshall and Stark along with Knox, Stimson, and Hopkins, had “spent most of the night before [the attack] at the White House with FDR.” See James G. Stahlman’s November 26, 1973 letter to Admiral Kemp Tolley (copy in author’s files). Several attempts were made in the course of the JCC hearings to determine if there had been such a White House meeting. See for instance the questioning of Marshall. Ibid., part 3, pp. 1110 and part 11, p. 5193. And the interlocutory with Stark at part 11, p. 5549.
[290] Ibid., part 11, pp. 5193–94.
[291] Ibid., pp. 5191, 5194.
[292] Ibid., p. 5154.
[293] Ibid., pp. 5157, 5159.
[294] Ibid., p. 5232.
[295] Ibid., p. 5155.
[296] Ibid., p. 5163.
[297] Ibid., part 11, p. 5364.
[298] Ibid., pp. 5367–416, “Replies to Interrogatories Propounded by the Honorable Homer Ferguson.”
[299] Ibid., pp. 5416–40, 5441–63, “Secretary of War Stimson’s Statement of Facts as Shown by My Current Notes and My Recollection as Refreshed Thereby.”
[300] Ibid., pp. 5439–41.
[301] Ibid., p. 5542.
[302] Ibid., pp. 5543–44.
[303] Ibid., pp. 5544, 5555.
[304] Ibid., p. 5544, quoting Stark’s letter to Barkley.
[305] Ibid., p. 5548.
[306] Ibid., p. 5549 (part 11).
[307] Ibid., pp. 5554–55.
[308] Ibid., p. 5550.
[309] Ibid., p. 5552.
[310] Ibid., p. 5558.
[311] Ibid., p. 5557.
[312] Ibid., p. 5558.
[313] Ibid., p. 5560.
[314] Ibid.
Chapter 30
[1] 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. i.
[2] Ibid., p. xiv.
[3] Ibid., pp. 266–266W.
[4] Ibid., pp. 251–52.
[5] Ibid., p. 252.
[6] Ibid., p. 251.
[7] Ibid., pp. 252–53.
[8] Ibid., p. 266A.
[9] Ibid., pp. 266B–266C.
[10] Ibid., pp. 495–573.
[11] Ibid., p. 495.
[12] Ibid., p. 496.
[13] Senate Bill S.805. See Congressional Record, April 9, 1945, p. 3196, and Congressional Record, April 11, 1945, p. 3267.
[14] Joint Committee, Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster, p. 498.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., p. 500.
[17] Ibid., pp. 503–06.
[18] Ibid., pp. 504–05.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., pp. 523–24.
[21] Ibid., pp. 505–06.
[22] Ibid., p. 553.
[23] Ibid., p. 558.
[24] Ibid., p. 505.
[25] Ibid., p. 497.
[26] Ibid., pp. 561, 563.
[27] Ibid., pp. 572–73.
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
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