Chapter 14: 14. The Morning of the Fateful Day New York Times December 7, 1941 Reports: Navy Secretary Knox Says: U.S. Navy “Superior to Any”

While the authorities in Washington had been deeply concerned for months behind the scenes with the significance of the Japanese intercepts being decoded daily by U.S. Army and Navy cryptographers, they were also sensitive to public opinion. Especially so, since the leak on December 4 of the government’s secret war plans.

On December 6, Secretary of Navy Knox released the July 1, 1940, to June 10, 1941, annual report of the Navy Department, which included a statement on “the current state of the Navy and its enlargement on a basis indicated by operations in the last fiscal year.” The New York Times headlined its page one announcement of this Navy report on Sunday, December 7, 1941: “NAVY IS SUPERIOR TO ANY, SAYS KNOX.” According to the news report,

The United States Navy, now in the midst of a record expansion program and recently placed on a war footing with full personnel manning the ships of three fleets, has at this time no superior in the world. . . . On any comparable basis, the United States Navy is second to none.

Knox was “proud to report that the American people may feel fully confident in their Navy.” In view of the uncertain international situation,

Our aim must always be to have forces sufficient to enable us to have complete freedom of action in either ocean while retaining forces in the other ocean for effective defense of our vital security. Anything less than this strength is hazardous to the security of the nation and must be considered as unacceptable as long as it is within our power to produce and man the forces necessary to meet these requirements.

In substance, the department’s report announced that the U.S. Navy was “second to none” and that it was capable of operating in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Moreover, it was being further strengthened and expanded. Thus the public was assured on the morning of December 7, 1941, that the U.S. Navy constituted an effective and reliable arm of our national defense.

Part 14 of Japan’s Reply to U.S. Note

The 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our November 26 note, received in Washington late on Saturday, December 6, were a fairly sober review of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations to date and the various points of agreement and disagreement—notably, the economic restrictions imposed on Japan, the embargo, the freezing of assets, the fact that the United States was assisting China, and the United States’s determined insistence (a) that Japan withdraw from China and (b) that she refuse to honor her mutual assistance pact with Germany and Italy. Part 9 of Japan’s reply was more inflammatory; it asserted that the United States

may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war . . . aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack . . . Germany and Italy . . . and exercising . . . pressure [on Japan] by economic power.^[1]

After seeing these 13 parts, the top administration, Army, and Navy officials were anxious to learn the content of the 14th part.

Part 14 was picked up by Station S at Bainbridge Island on the west coast on Sunday, December 7, at 3:05 a.m. Washington, D.C. time and was in the hands of our decoders, still in code, in Washington, D.C. by about 4:00.^[2] Like the earlier 13 parts, it was in English. It was decoded “completed and ready for delivery to Commander Kramer at 7 a.m., December 7.”^[3]

In part 14, Japan charged that it was the

intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment of peace . . . by keeping Japan and China at war.

Therefore, Japan’s attempt “to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.” The Japanese government regretted

to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.^[4]

This strong language left little room for doubt as to Japan’s intentions. According to Wilkinson, these were “fighting words.” He was “more impressed by that language than by the breaking off of negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary. Those would be hard words to eat.”^[5]

Another message from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassadors was also intercepted and teletyped from Bainbridge at the same time as part 14. It was received in Washington during the watch that ended at 7:00 a.m. Sunday morning, “passed to the Army for translation by the Navy” and then received back in the Navy “at about 7:15 a.m.” There it was held for Commander Kramer, the only person authorized to distribute translations to higher authorities.^[6] This message, in Japanese, specified the precise time—1:00 p.m. Washington time, December 7—at which the ambassadors were to deliver their government’s 14-part reply to the U.S. government. The ambassadors were to hand the Japanese reply, “if possible,” directly to the secretary of state. Because of the time specified, this cable came to be known as the “One p.m. Message.”^[7]

Admiral Hart (Manila) Inquires About U.S. Commitments in Southeast Pacific

Two other important messages also arrived in Washington during the night of December 6–7 from Admiral Hart in the Philippines. However, as a result of the heavy intercept traffic, they were not decoded immediately and did not become available to our officials in Washington until the following morning. One of these messages consisted of five parts and was signed jointly by Hart and by the British commander-in-chief, Eastern Fleet, Admiral Tom S.V. Phillips. The other was a frantic plea from Hart for advice from Washington; Hart had just learned of U.S. promises to support the British militarily in the event of a Japanese strike in southeast Asia.

Phillips had flown from Singapore to Manila to meet Hart and discuss with him “the problems with which we are faced in the Far Eastern area.” Their joint cable was dispatched from Manila at 3:27 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), December 7 (10:27 p.m. December 6, Washington time) and received in Washington about 11:00 p.m. on December 6.^[8]

Hart and Phillips had conferred about preparations for the war with Japan they both anticipated. They assumed that “the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese.” The two commanders considered it important to coordinate British and U.S. operations, but they agreed that each would retain strategic control of his own forces. Hart expected that his fleet’s operations would be in accordance with plan “Rainbow V,” the plan prepared as the basis for U.S. offensive operations, the same plan under which Kimmel in Hawaii had been directed to operate. Their joint message discussed the disposition to be made of British ships in the Far East and recommended that Manila be made available as a base for the British battle fleet.

As soon as Phillips heard of the Japanese convoy setting out for the Gulf of Siam from Camranh Bay, on the eastern coast of French Indochina, he left Manila to return to Singapore. As he was leaving, Hart told him that four of Hart’s destroyers then at Borneo would soon be joining Phillips’s forces.^[9]

In spite of Hart’s willingness to cooperate with the British, he was startled by the news he received just after Phillips’s departure from U.S. Naval Observer John M. Creighton in Singapore. Creighton reported that Brooke-Popham, commander of the Royal Air Force in Malaya and of the British Army Forces, had been advised on Saturday by the War Department in London that they had “now received assurance of American armed support” in three eventualities: (1) if the British were obliged to forestall a Japanese landing on the Isthmus of Kra, or on any other part of Siam, (2) if the Dutch Indies were attacked and the British went to their defense, or (3) if the Japanese attacked the British. Moreover London had advised Brooke-Popham that if he had reliable information that the Japanese were advancing with the apparent intention of landing on Kra or in Siam, he need not consult London to put his operation plan into action. London also advised him that the British-Dutch plan was to be put into operation if the Netherlands East Indies was attacked.^[10]

If the United States was committed to helping the British militarily in the event of a Japanese attack in southeast Asia, it could not be long before we would be asked to fulfill that promise. The immediacy of a possible call for U.S. “armed support” led Hart to wire Washington about Creighton’s report, saying he had “received no corresponding instructions.”^[11] Hart’s message left Manila three-and-a-half hours after the one sent by Hart and Phillips jointly—6:45 a.m. GMT (2:45 p.m., December 7, Manila time, or 1:45 a.m. December 7 in Washington). It reached Washington during the night of December 6–7 but wasn’t decoded immediately. An information copy went to Kimmel in Hawaii, further reinforcing Kimmel’s impression that it was southeast Asia that was threatened by Japanese attack.

Under our Constitution the only justification for having U.S. military outposts is to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests within and around our national borders. Yet Hart was being told by our naval observer in Singapore that the U.S. government had agreed to go to the aid—not of U.S. territory or U.S. citizens—but of British military forces should they decide to take action against Japanese soldiers landing in Thailand, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, or Singapore. President Roosevelt had apparently committed U.S. forces to helping the British thousands of miles from any U.S. territory. This was news to our top naval commander in the Far East.

Part 14 of Japan’s Reply Delivered to Navy Personnel

This particular Sunday morning, anticipating he would have to deliver some messages earlier than usual, Navy courier Kramer went in to the Navy Department at about 7:30.^[12] According to official records, both part 14 of the Japanese reply and the “One p.m. Message” were available before Kramer reached the department.^[13] However, when Kramer set out on his first delivery trip of the day, the “One p.m. Message,” which required translation, was apparently not included in his locked pouch. With the receipt of part 14, the text of the Japanese government’s reply to our note of November 26 was complete, so Kramer left on his rounds.

Kramer’s first delivery that morning at about 8:00 a.m. was to the Navy Department, to Commander McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, Navy Intelligence. Kramer soon left McCollum’s office, but returned very shortly with a copy of the entire 14-part message for McCollum’s boss, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, who had just arrived. Wilkinson sent for McCollum and for 15 or 20 minutes the two men discussed the Far East situation. Then they heard that Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, had arrived in the Navy Department—it was quite unusual for Stark to come in to the office that early on a Sunday morning ^[14] and they went down to talk with him.

When Kramer arrived at Stark’s office with the 14 parts together with the other new material, it was “about 9:00 Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30.” Wilkinson and McCollum were there discussing the situation with Stark.^[15] McCollum stepped out of the office for a moment and was handed “the final note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassadors.”^[16]

Other Navy officers of the Division of Operations began to appear in Stark’s office—Admirals Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes, and Turner, possibly Captain Schuirmann also, as well as a few others. All joined in the discussion. McCollum himself “was in and out of Stark’s office at about 0900 or 0930” and “on one of his entries into Admiral Stark’s office [he] met General Marshall coming out of the office . . . accompanied by his aide,” Colonel Bratton.^[17] Kramer left to continue on to the State Department, anxious to arrive before 10:00 a.m., when Secretary of Navy Knox’s meeting with Secretaries Hull and Stimson was scheduled to begin.^[18] He did not take a car to cover the eight to ten blocks but walked “almost on the double . . . at least trotted part of the way.” Kramer arrived in time “almost exactly 10 minutes to 10.”^[19] He had a brief discussion with the Army courier—he thought it was Bratton— and Mr. Hull’s private secretary.^[20]

Kramer returned to the Navy Department and then went to the White House with part 14. Roosevelt’s aide Beardall immediately took the MAGIC pouch to the president, who was still in his bedroom. As FDR read the intercept, he commented, “it looks like the Japanese are going to break off negotiations.”^[21] Beardall returned the pouch to the Navy Department, about 11–11:30 a.m.^[22] As far as he knew, no other deliveries were made to FDR that morning.^[23]

Delivery of “One p.m. Message” to Navy Department

After delivering part 14, Kramer returned to the Navy Department to assemble several other intercepts that had been received in the interim. It was about 10:20. Undoubtedly the most important intercept he found there was the separate “One p.m. Message” advising the Japanese ambassadors “in rather emphatic language that delivery [of the 14-part Japanese reply] be made to the Secretary of State at 1300,” that is 1:00 p.m. Washington time. Among the other newly received intercepts was one that

directed final destruction of Japanese codes still on hand. . . . There was another message thanking the ambassador for his services, another addressed to the embassy staff, and one or two others of like nature.^[24]

A fourth intercept was a circular telegram addressed to Japanese diplomatic offices around the world concerning relations between Japan and England.^[25] These new messages made it obvious that the Japanese government was giving up all thought of negotiating further with the U.S. government, breaking relations with England, winding down its operations in Washington, and abandoning the embassy staff to their own devices.

Because the circular telegram closed with the telltale English word “STOP” instead of the usual Japanese “OWARI,” Kramer realized it was an emergency dispatch containing code words. The Tokyo-Washington Circular #2409, containing the setup for this message and defining the hidden meanings of the code words, had been translated by the Navy on December 2.^[26] Presumably it was distributed to the usual recipients of MAGIC, but it was not a subject on which witnesses were questioned during the hearings. Despite the urgency to deliver the “One p.m. Message” promptly, Kramer thought

that delay to get this one [the circular intercept] into that folder was warranted; otherwise delivery probably wouldn’t have been made until after noon since the meetings then in progress at the State Department and in CNO’s office would probably have been adjourned and the recipients not accessible, out to lunch or one thing and another.^[27]

Therefore, Kramer “dictated on [his] feet while the book concerning the 1:00 delivery and other late urgent messages was being made up.”^[28] His translation of the crucial sentence in this cable read: “Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.”^[29] Kramer delivered this new material, including the “One p.m. Message,” “within ten to fifteen minutes to Admiral Stark’s office” in the Navy Department building.^[30] Stark’s meeting was still going on, so Kramer sent word in that he had something more of importance. According to McCollum, he

held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance at [sic] the [1 p.m. delivery] time, and he it was who pointed out the times at Honolulu as 7:30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on.^[31]

McCollum took the “One p.m. Message” in to Stark. The significance of the 1:00 p.m. delivery time was discussed. McCollum pointed out that

1:00 p.m. Washington time would mean about 8:00 in the morning Honolulu time . . . 7:30 . . . very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places . . . we didn’t know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like . . . it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii.

There was no way of knowing just where the Japanese might strike, but, McCollum reasoned, “because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which would move at that time.”^[32]

Stark “immediately called the White House on the telephone.”^[33] McCollum thought Stark also phoned Marshall.^[34] There was considerable coming and going; not everyone was there all the time.^[35] There is no record of what these top naval officers talked about in Stark’s office that morning in the light of the crucial intercepts they had just received. In any event, no special notice or advice of impending conflict was sent out by CNO Stark to the field commanders.

Delivery of “One p.m. Message” to State Department

Kramer was anxious to get to the State Department before the Hull-Knox-Stimson meeting broke up.^[36] When he, Kramer, arrived at Hull’s office with the “One pm. Message,” he talked, not with Hull, but with “a State Department Foreign Service Officer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull.” He explained the importance of the material he was delivering and pointed out that “the directive for delivery of the Japanese note at 1300 was a time which was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and was a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu [British Malaya].” In talking with the foreign service officer, Kramer “made a point of . . . inviting the attention of Mr. Knox to the times involved.” He thought “that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary of Navy, might not have seen at first glance the implications of the times.” So he “simply pointed out the coincidence of those times to the Secretary.” The officer then “took the folder into Mr. Knox, together with [Kramer’s] remarks.”^[37]

Kramer proceeded across the street to the White House for his second delivery that morning. Kramer handed the new intercepts to a senior assistant to Beardall, possibly Lieutenant Commander Leahy.^[38]

When Kramer returned to the Navy Department this time—at about 12:30—he discovered that, in his haste to translate the circular message containing code words, so as to be able to deliver it along with the “One p.m. Message” and the other Japanese intercepts, he had failed to note an important code word, “minami,” meaning “United States.” Thus the sentence he had translated as “Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations” was wrong; it should have read, “Relations between Japan, and England and the United States are not in accordance with expectations.” Kramer made a few phone calls, but it was lunchtime and he found his recipients scattered. No re-translation was made and delivered, as was usual when messages were garbled or misinterpreted. That afternoon, after the attack had occurred, Kramer realized it would be pointless to send out a corrected translation.^[39]

Delivery of “One p.m. Message” to Army Personnel

The Army courier, Colonel Bratton, drove into Washington at about 9:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, December 7, with Colonel John R. Deane.^[40] Bratton was in charge of the Far Eastern section of Military Intelligence. He went at once to his office in G-2. Deane proceeded to his office in the Munitions Building, right across the hall from the office of Army Chief of Staff Marshall.

Because of the furor created nationwide by the Chicago Tribune’s publication on December 4 of the secret U.S. war plans, Congress had called on our top military officials to answer some questions. Marshall was scheduled to testify on December 8,^[41] and he had asked Deane to compile a one-page summary statement on the number of planes, antiaircraft guns, etc., in the United States, together with basic information on the war plans. FDR had also asked Marshall to have this information available, all on a single sheet, when he came to the meeting the president had called for 3:00 p.m. Sunday.^[42] That was why Deane went into his office early.^[43]

Prior to December 7 there was no officer on duty around the clock in the office of the Army’s chief of staff, no 24-hour per day duty officer (D.O.), so his office was not officially open. However, Deane opened his office in the Munitions Building.^[44]

As soon as Bratton reached his office in G-2, he received the “One p.m. Message” from the Navy Department. It was “immediately apparent” to Bratton that this message

was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to the Chief of Staff [Marshall], the A.C. of S. [assistant chief of staff military intelligence, Miles], and Chief of WPD [war plans chief, Gerow] with the least practicable delay.^[45]

It was then “about 9:00 or shortly before.” Bratton was

immediately stunned . . . into frenzied activity because of its implications and from that time on [he] was busily engaged trying to locate various officers of the General Staff and conferring with them on the exclusive subject of this message and its meaning.^[46]

He “washed [his] hands of all other matters, turning them over to [his] assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to take steps with the 1:00 p.m. delivery message.”^[47]

Bratton could not locate in their offices any of the generals for whom he was looking. He phoned Marshall’s quarters at Fort Myer. Marshall had three orderlies, one of whom was always on duty when Marshall was out—“to answer the telephone, to be there until [Marshall] got back.”^[48] When Bratton phoned that morning, “[o]ne of his orderlies answered the telephone and informed [Bratton] that the General had gone horseback riding.”^[49]

“Well,” Bratton said, “you know generally where he has gone. You know where you can get ahold of him?”

“Yes, I think I can find him.”

“Please go out at once,” Bratton continued,

get assistance if necessary, and find General Marshall, ask him to—tell him who I am and tell him to go to the nearest telephone, that it is vitally important that I communicate with him at the earliest practicable moment.

The orderly said “he would do so.”^[50]

Bratton then called his boss, General Miles. Bratton told him what he had done and also “recommended that he [Miles] come down to the office at once.” One of them telephoned Gerow to summon him to the office.^[51]

Miles arrived at his office about 10:00 a.m., and Bratton joined him there. They discussed “this whole business.” Thus “General Miles was thoroughly conversant with the entire matter” before the two men met with Marshall later that morning.^[52]

Bratton held on to Marshall’s copy of the “One p.m. Message,” waiting anxiously for the general to call back. Marshall did phone, finally, “sometime between ten and eleven.” Bratton told Marshall that he had a message “of extreme importance which he [Marshall] should see at once.” Bratton offered to take it out to his quarters and could be there in ten minutes. But Marshall told him not to do that, “to report to him in his office, as he was on his way there.”^[53]

There were two doors into Marshall’s office. One opened directly into the hall, the other from the anteroom, the secretary’s office. The anxious Bratton waited in the anteroom while watching the hall door. Marshall finally arrived through the hall door.^[54] According to Bratton, it was 11:25.^[55] Bratton immediately reported to him. Miles arrived shortly thereafter.^[56]

“One p.m. Message” Spurs Action—Finally!

When Bratton and Miles walked into Marshall’s office, Marshall “had this 14-part message arranged in a book in front of him” and “was reading the 14 parts.” Since Bratton and Miles were both concerned about the deadline implied in the “One P.m. Message,” they “attempted to interrupt General Marshall to get him to read this One p.m. message.”^[57] But Marshall continued reading the fairly lengthy 14-part message, re-reading parts of it, and reflecting on it, which took a while, even though Marshall said he read “much more rapidly than the average man.”^[58]

When Marshall had finally finished, Bratton handed him the short “One p.m. Message,” which Bratton had been trying to deliver to Marshall since about 9:00 a.m. Only then did Marshall read it. He then “asked General Miles and [Bratton] what [they] thought it meant.” Both men were

convinced it meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1:00 that afternoon. At about this time General Gerow and General Bundy came into the room and there was some discussion of the 14 parts, which were then regarded in the light of an ultimatum, and of the One p.m. delivery message.^[59]

Marshall asked each of the men in turn, starting with Miles, “for an evaluation of the situation.” They thought it

probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o’clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that they, the Commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert.”^[60]

After the men had all

concurred in urging that our outlying possessions be given an additional alert at once by the fastest possible means, Marshall drew a piece of scratch paper toward him and picked up a pencil and wrote out in longhand a message to be sent to our overseas commanders. When he reached the bottom of the page he picked up the telephone and called the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. . . . General Marshall, in a guarded way, told Admiral Stark what he had in front of him and . . . that he was going to send a warning to Hawaii, Panama, and the Philippines and so on.^[61]

After some conversation with Stark, Marshall put down the phone and said: “Admiral Stark doesn’t think that any additional warning is necessary.”^[62] Stark said that “all the forces had already been several times alerted,”^[63] they had “sent so much”^[64]that he “feared that that [another warning] would tend to confuse them.”^[65] More discussion. Marshall again phoned Stark.^[66] He read Stark the message he had just written. This time apparently Stark concurred and asked Marshall to add a phrase to the effect “that the naval forces be also informed.”^[67]

“[T]o safeguard the codes,” messages to Army officers in the field frequently included a request that the Navy be notified, and vice versa. Since two similar coded cables containing essentially the same message made the task deciphering a code that much easier, Marshall and Stark “tried to avoid . . . both sending a message about the same things, to the various commanders concerned at Panama, Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines.” So Marshall penciled a short sentence at the bottom of his message, “Notify naval opposite.”^[68]

During their second conversation, Stark asked Marshall if he wouldn’t like to use the Navy’s more powerful transmitting facilities, its 25,000-kilowatt versus the Army’s 10,000-kilowatt radio station.^[69] The Navy’s station had little difficulty transmitting messages, while the Army’s was “normally out of service with Honolulu between 11 and 1:00.”^[70] Atmospheric conditions over the Pacific at that time of the year were poor. Marshall declined Stark’s offer.

Marshall’s handwritten message read,

Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.^[71]

Marshall gave his handwritten message to Bratton and told him “to take it to the Message Center and see that it was dispatched at once by the fastest safe means.”^[72]

When Bratton was about to leave, the question was raised as to whether Marshall’s message shouldn’t be typed. Because “time was an important factor,” however, Bratton was asked “to take it in its draft form to the Message Center.” As he was leaving, Gerow called out, “If there is any question of priority, give the Philippines first priority.” Bratton took the message down the hall to the Army Message Center. As he handed it to Colonel Edward F. French, the signal officer in charge, Bratton said: “The Chief of Staff wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means.”^[73] French found the penciled message “rather difficult to read;”^[74] neither he nor his clerk could interpret Marshall’s handwriting. So French asked Bratton to “help [him] get this into readable script.” Bratton dictated it to a code-room typist, which took perhaps a minute, then “verified and authenticated the message”^[75] and put it into code. According to Bratton, it was then about 11:58 a.m.^[76]

French started processing the message immediately, “giving the Philippines first priority.”^[77] He went to the Signal Center himself and had the operator check the channel to Honolulu. Due to atmospheric conditions, Honolulu had been out of contact since about 10:20 that morning.^[78] Transmitting the message to Honolulu via Army facilities would not only have slowed it down, but would have run a risk of garbling when it was copied and retransmitted in San Francisco. The Army’s normal method when atmospheric conditions prevented sending messages via its own radio station was to use commercial facilities that were available in the Army’s Signal Center—Western Union to San Francisco, tube relay across the city, and then RCA to Honolulu.^[79] So French decided “the quickest method of dispatch would be via commercial service,” especially as RCA had just installed a teletype circuit to Fort Shafter, Army headquarters in Hawaii, on the western outskirts of Honolulu.^[80]

When Bratton returned to Marshall’s office, Marshall asked him to go back to the Message Center and find out how long it would take for his message to reach its several addressees. Bratton returned, talked with French, who told him “that the messages would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes.”^[81] With respect to the message to Honolulu, French estimated that it would reach there “within a half hour to 45 minutes.”^[82] Bratton “looked at [his] watch at that time and, as [he] remember[ed] it, it was about 11:58 a.m.”^[83] Bratton reported back to Marshall.

Marshall’s message was in code by 11:52 a.m. (Washington D.C. time) and was dispatched to Panama at noon, to the Philippines at 12:05, to the Presidio in San Francisco at 12:11, and to Hawaii at 12:17.^[84] It was Marshall’s understanding that his message went right through to the Philippines, Panama, and San Francisco. The only problem came in raising Hawaii.^[85]

By noon Deane had finished the one-page statement he had been preparing for Marshall to use that afternoon at his meeting with FDR and/or for testifying the next day before Congress. Marshall called him into his office, and he handed Marshall his memorandum. As Marshall read it, he said to Deane, “it looks as though the Japs were going to issue an ultimatum about 1:30.” Deane had not known of the information that administration and top military officials had been learning during recent months from MAGIC, so was not aware of the significance of Marshall’s announcement.^[86]

Sunday Morning at the State Department

Hull went to his office that Sunday morning “as [he] had done almost every Sunday since [he] entered the State Department in 1933.” Because of the Japanese situation, however, this one was a little out of the ordinary. Hull talked first with the department’s Far Eastern experts—Stanley K. Hornbeck, adviser on political Relations; Maxwell M. Hamilton, chief of the division of Far Eastern affairs; and Joseph W. Ballantine, an expert on Japan.^[87]

Hull had asked Stimson and Knox to meet with him at the department at 10:00 a.m. to discuss “the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indochina.”^[88] The administration officials “were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements, their probable destination, etcetera.”^[89]

Stimson, Knox, and Hull were all well aware that that day was

the day that the Japanese [were] going to bring their answer to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. . . . Hull [was] very certain that the Japs [were] planning some deviltry.^[90]

The three secretaries were “all wondering where the blow will strike. The messages [they] were receiving now indicated that the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam.”^[91]

Hull, Stimson, and Knox

discussed whether we would not have to fight if Malaya or the Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all three thought [recalled Stimson] that we must fight if those nations fought. . . . [I]f Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics enormously difficult if not impossible. All the reasons why it would be necessary for the United States to fight, in case the Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacific were discussed at length.^[92]

“The main thing,” Stimson wrote in his diary, “is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together—the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese.” According to Stimson, both Hull and Knox held that the Japanese military advances in the southwest Pacific represented a threat to the United States that should be countered by us on grounds of self-defense. “Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it. . . . Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together.” Stimson had both men dictate their views to a stenographer.^[93]

Hull stated in his “Proposed Statement” for the president that the Japanese government,

dominated by the military fireeaters, [was] deliberately proceeding . . . to acquire military control over one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. . . . [D]efense of life and commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area must be commenced with the South Sea area.^[94]

According to Knox’s typed-up “Suggestion,” we were

tied up inextricably with the British [and Dutch] in the present world situation. . . . [A]ny serious threat to the British or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States. . . . We should therefore be ready jointly to act together.^[95]

Hull, Knox, and Stimson “stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done.”^[96]

Japanese Ambassadors Request One P.m. Appointment with State Secretary Hull

Ambassador Nomura telephoned Hull about noon to ask for an appointment for himself and Kurusu at 1:00. Hull agreed. Nomura phoned again shortly after 1:00 to ask for a postponement until 1:45. Hull agreed to the time change.^[97]

Sunday Morning at the White House

The morning of December 7 was a busy one for FDR. He had been up late the night before with Marshall, Stark, Stimson, Knox, and Hopkins, discussing until the early hours of the morning the crescendo toward which the situation in the Far East was building. At about 10:00 a.m., FDR’s naval aide, Beardall, delivered to him in his bedroom the final 14th part of the Japanese reply. It is possible that FDR’s busy day began even earlier when Stark phoned giving him advance notice of that morning’s two crucial Japanese intercepts—part 14 of Japan’s final reply and the extremely important “One p.m. Message.” In any event, when the MAGIC pouch containing the “One p.m. Message” was delivered to FDR later that morning, he learned firsthand about that as well as the other urgent Japanese intercepts.

FDR’s personal physician, Dr. Ross T. McIntire, was one of the president’s closest associates. He admired FDR greatly and faithfully kept his secrets, both medical and non-medical. From the day of FDR’s first inauguration until the day of FDR’s passing in 1945, McIntire saw the president “each morning and again in the evening.”^[98] December 7, 1941, was no exception. McIntire was “with him [FDR] on that Sunday morning from ten to twelve o’clock, while Mr. Hull was waiting over in the State Department for the Japanese envoys to bring their government’s reply to the American note.” According to McIntire, FDR thought that even given “the madness of Japan’s military masters [they] would not risk a war with the United States.” They “might well . . . take advantage of Great Britain’s extremity and strike at Singapore or some other point in the Far East, but an attack on any American possession did not enter his [FDR’s] thought.” In McIntire’s view, the president clearly “counted only on the usual evasions” from the two ambassadors.^[99]

FDR was also in touch that Sunday morning with the British ambassador, Lord Halifax. Halifax had sent to the White House for Roosevelt’s comments a copy of the British government’s proposed message to Japan. He was waiting at the British embassy for a phone call from Roosevelt.^[100]

China was also very much in FDR’s thoughts. The Chinese government had appreciated his efforts to strangle Japan economically. As a result, Chinese ambassador Hu Shih and FDR had developed a close and confidential relationship. Roosevelt had tried to get in touch with Hu the day before, but he had been in New York. On his return Sunday morning, he returned FDR’s call, and the president summoned him to the White House for a confidential chat. Hu arrived about 12:30. FDR showed him the statement he had sent the Japanese emperor, his “very last gesture toward peace,” Roosevelt said. “[I]f Hirohito didn’t respond—well, it would be war!”

FDR told Hu about the Japanese envoys’s insistence on a 1:00 p.m. appointment with Hull. Roosevelt expected “either an answer [from Hirohito] or a nasty move from the Japs before Tuesday morning.”^[101] He fully “expected ‘foul play’; he had a feeling that within forty-eight hours something ‘nasty’ might happen in Thailand, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and ‘possibly’ the Philippines.”^[102]

In between these several interruptions, FDR was working on the draft of a speech, which had been prepared in the State Department that he contemplated delivering to Congress the following Tuesday or Wednesday if he received no response to his message to Emperor Hirohito. Phrasing what he wanted to say was a difficult proposition, in view of his pledge to the American people that he would not send our boys to fight on foreign soil “except in case of attack” and in view of the Constitutional provision that only Congress could declare war. Eight months of U.S. negotiations with Japan in the attempt to reach a peaceful solution had ended in failure. FDR had decided he would present the issue as one of national defense. He would compare Japanese aggressions with those of the Nazis in Europe. He would describe Japan’s conquest and exploitation in China and point out that she was now threatening the Philippines and British and Dutch territories in Southeast Asia, as well as trade routes of vital importance to them and to us. Japan’s practice of aggression and conquest

sets up a continuing and growing military threat to the United States. . . .Within the past few days large additional contingents of troops have been moved into Indo-China and preparations have been made for further conquest. . . .We cannot permit, and still less can we support, the fulfilment by Japan of the aims of a militant leadership which has disregarded law, violated treaties, impaired rights, destroyed property and lives of our nationals, inflicted horrible sufferings upon peoples who are our friends.

How to respond to the current crisis in the light of FDR’s pledges to the American people and his assurances of “armed support” to the British and Dutch was difficult. FDR relied on the advice of his three secretaries, Knox, Hull, and Stimson. And that was, as Stimson put it, “what we were at work on our papers about” that morning.^[103] Roosevelt would not ask for a declaration of war, but he would conclude by announcing his intention to embark on a de facto war: “As Commander in Chief, I have given appropriate orders to our Forces in the Far East.”^[104]

In addition to working on his proposed speech, Roosevelt must also have been thinking about the White House meeting of his “War Cabinet” he had called for 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. He apparently wanted to discuss his intended address with his advisers and to talk with them about “the possible showdown that might follow in the Far East.”^[105]

Lunch Break

At about 12:30, after being reassured that his warning message to his field commanders was on its way, Marshall left for lunch at his quarters.^[106] Hull’s meeting with Knox and Stimson wound up in time for lunch. Knox and Stimson left the State Department, Knox for his office and Stimson for lunch at his spacious estate, Woodley.^[107] When Knox returned to his office in the Navy Department, he found a message from Admiral Stark who wanted him to phone. Knox immediately called Stark and the Admiral went over to Knox’s office. Captain (later Admiral) Turner came too and the three men met for about an hour.^[108]

After Dr. Hu’s departure at 1:10 p.m., FDR retired for lunch and to prepare for the 3:00 p.m. meeting with his advisers.

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To the outside observer, peace and normality appeared to reign. Yet beneath the outer calm, official Washington was uneasy. It was obvious that a blow was coming, but they didn’t know where. If it fell on British, Dutch, or Thai territory, as seemed likely, what should the United States do? Should it implement the administration’s secret and unconstitutional agreement to furnish the British and Dutch with “armed support,” as it seemed FDR was planning to do? Would the people of this country be willing to support such a venture? Or would they reject the idea of U.S. involvement in a Japanese conflict with the British, Dutch, or Thai in southeast Asia, thousands of miles from our shores?