Chapter 20: 20. 1942–1944 Top Secrecy on the Washington Home Front

Once we had declared war, a wave of patriotism swept over the country. All open criticism of the government’s foreign policy ceased. Yet a desire to know the truth simmered under the surface. Many people believed that Admiral Kimmel and General Short, who had been pilloried in the eyes of the public, should have a chance to present their side of the story in open court, but attempts were being made to forestall their courts martial.

There were, of course, legitimate reasons why their case should not be investigated while the war was going on. Information would undoubtedly be revealed in a courts martial trial that would be damaging to the war effort. It would undoubtedly be brought out (1) that the Japanese were still using their diplomatic code, “Purple,” for secret messages. As our armed forces were gaining information from reading “Purple” intercepts, which was valuable for fighting the war, this was a legitimate argument for postponing a trial. A trial would probably reveal also (2) that U.S. intelligence personnel had deciphered “Purple” before the attack on Pearl Harbor and had been reading Japanese intercepts ever since. Also (3) that Washington had, therefore, had considerable pre-attack intelligence about Japanese intentions. And (4) that little of this pre-attack intelligence had been sent to Pearl Harbor.

The administration and top military officials were determined that there be no security leaks about “Purple” and MAGIC, the intelligence derived from it. Some of them may also have harbored guilt about the information they had sent, or had failed to send, our military commanders before the attack. If that was the case, they would not have wanted it known that our decryption of Japanese intercepts had started before the attack. Thus those who were anxious to delay or postpone indefinitely a hearing for Kimmel and Short because they did not want it to be revealed that we were decoding post-attack Japanese messages had the support of those who wanted to conceal the fact that we had been reading pre-attack Japanese messages.

To safeguard this major source of intelligence, Army and Navy personnel familiar with “Purple” had been sworn to secrecy. General Marshall himself, in his office a week after the attack, had warned his staff officers to go to their graves with the secret of MAGIC. Then in 1944, witnesses to appear before the Army Pearl Harbor Board were again sworn “not to reveal the facts,” i.e., the “Purple” code decrypts.^[1]

Similar precautions had also been taken in the Navy. Admiral Stark testified, “Anybody who was let in on that [MAGIC] had to sign a paper never to disclose it, practically so long as he lived, or ever to talk about it”—not ever!^[2]

Navy intelligence officers too were warned to maintain security. “Sometime within the week following Pearl Harbor,” then Commander Safford and other officers were “called into conference in the office of the Director of Naval Communications [Admiral Noyes]. . . . [A]ll section heads were asked to tell all [their] people not to talk.” Any written memoranda, personal notes—not official files—were to be destroyed immediately and the officers were to “pass that word on to [their] subordinates.”^[3]

But questions about Pearl Harbor did not let up.

Post-Attack Personnel Shakeup

As we have seen, both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were peremptorily removed from their commands after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Replacement officers were named, then promptly retired from the military.^[4] Some suspicion rested on Chief of Naval Operations Stark for not having kept Kimmel and Admiral Hart in the Philippines better informed. On March 26, Admiral E.J. King took over Stark’s position as CNO.^[5] Stark was in effect “kicked upstairs,” transferred out of Washington, sent to London and on April 30, 1942, given command of the recently established (March 17, 1942) United States Naval Forces Europe.^[6]

Chief of Staff Marshall appeared to be above reproach. In spite of questions about his whereabouts on the morning of December 6, he remained in his position and went on later to still more important and prestigious positions—special representative of the president to China with ambassadorial rank (1945–1946), secretary of state (1947–1949), and secretary of defense^[7] (1950–1951). He even received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for his proposal, which became known as the Marshall Plan, for U.S. government grants to help post-war Europe’s economic recovery.

Naval intelligence and naval communications were especially hard hit by personnel changes. The Navy’s traditional pride in service at sea meant that the path to promotion clearly lay in sea duty; those who served in intelligence were much less likely to advance. As a result, few naval officers were willing to make a career in cryptography. One notable exception was Commander L.F. Safford, who had been in charge of the security section of naval communications and had made brilliant contributions to deciphering and interpreting Japanese intercepts. Shortly after the United States entered the war, he was promoted to captain (January 1, 1942), but at the same time his duties and responsibilities were sharply curtailed.^[8]

Commander A.H. McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in December 1941, was another victim of the post-attack reorganization of naval operations. He had recognized the seriousness of the Japanese threat prior to the attack and had drafted messages to the Pacific commanders warning of impending Japanese action. His superiors had watered down his messages so much, however, that they failed to deliver the sense of urgency McCollum had intended to convey.^[9] McCollum got disgusted with naval intelligence and applied for sea duty. En route to his new post in the southwest Pacific he passed through Hawaii. There he was guest of honor at a party given by several officers who had served on Kimmel’s staff. McCollum told them some of the things he had known through his work with intelligence in Washington.^[10]

Cracks in the Administration’s Wall of Secrecy

One of the officers in Hawaii who heard McCollum speak was Commander Joseph John Rochefort, chief intelligence officer, district staff of the commandant in Hawaii. Rochefort spoke Japanese; his work in radio intelligence, cryptography, and cryptanalysis had made him one of the mainstays of the intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor. It had been his responsibility to prepare daily intelligence summaries for Kimmel’s fleet intelligence officer, Lieutenant Commander Edwin Thomas Layton.^[11] In spite of

his knowledge and expertise, Rochefort became a victim of the post-attack personnel changes in intelligence; he was transferred out of cryptography in October 1942,^[12] ordered to Washington, and assigned to command a floating drydock in San Francisco.^[13] In preparation for his new assignment, he was sent to New York to consult with the marine engineering firm of Frederick R. Harris, Inc.

In New York, Rochefort encountered his old “boss,” Kimmel, who was then himself working on floating drydocks for the Harris firm. Rochefort told him what McCollum had reported about pre-attack knowledge in Washington.^[14] Thus by a series of coincidences, Kimmel learned in late 1942 that crucial information about Japanese intentions had been available in Washington prior to the attack, which had not been relayed to him in Pearl Harbor.

Another responsible Navy officer who left intelligence was Lieutenant Commander Alwin Dalton Kramer, a Japanese-language scholar. In late 1941, he had been in charge of the translation group of the communications security group in Washington. As Navy courier he had delivered many confidential intercepts, including MAGIC, to top Navy officers during the crucial weeks preceding the attack. In June 1943 Kramer was transferred to Pearl Harbor. And in January 1944, he was ordered to sea duty in the South Pacific.^[15]

Kimmel and Short Waive Statute of Limitations

Over and over again Kimmel reviewed in his mind the orders he had received as fleet commander and his responses to them. He kept asking himself what sins of commission or omission he could have committed. He even began to think that perhaps he had been somewhat responsible for the disaster. Yet he could never figure out just how. Until he spoke with Rochefort in late 1942, he had assumed, as Stark had assured him, that he was being supplied with all available intelligence necessary for him to fulfill his responsibilities as commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet. Not until he learned from Rochefort of McCollum’s revelations did Kimmel have any hint that Washington officials had been privy to crucial information that had been denied him in Hawaii.

The only hope Kimmel and Short had for vindication was to obtain a hearing at which they could reveal the orders under which they had been operating prior to the attack and to explain why they had taken the actions they had. They were both anxious for a speedy and open court-martial.^[16] According to the regulations then in effect, the opportunity for the government to court-martial Kimmel and Short “for any alleged offenses” they might have committed and with which they might be charged would expire in two years, on December 7, 1943. The Navy, in no hurry to see the two commanders court-martialed, was willing to extend the deadline. Or even to let the statute of limitations expire. Kimmel, for his part, was anxious not to let that happen, lest the chance for a hearing be lost forever. He reminded Knox (September 17, 1943) of his desire for a speedy trial in open court. However, Kimmel wrote, he did not wish to put his own interests above those of the national welfare, which he recognized “appears to require that my trial be delayed.”^[17] Knox sympathized with Kimmel and commended him for his “patriotic spirit,” which was, he said, “in keeping with the best naval traditions.”^[18]

Kimmel was eager to do battle and undertook an active campaign to learn the truth. He would not let the matter rest. He began to prepare for the hearing he hoped to have. In November 1943, he asked Knox for copies of Navy Department dispatches, letters, intelligence reports, etc., sent between January 1 and December 17, 1941, plus copies of the war plans and operating plans that were in effect on December 7, 1941.^[19]

In January 1944, “on the advice of [his] trusted long-time friend, Captain Robert A. Lavender, U.S. Navy,” Kimmel hired Charles B. Rugg of the Boston law firm of Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge and Rugg, to help in his crusade.^[20] On January 27, Kimmel, Rugg, and Lavender met to discuss the situation.

Kimmel asked Rugg to go to Washington and try to arrange to have the deadline for his court-martial extended. Rugg warned him:

Admiral, this is the crossroads. If I go down there and have this Statute [the extension of the court martial statute of limitations] passed, we’re going to be in for a tempestuous time.

It could mean embarrassment and unfavorable publicity. “If we don’t pursue this matter,” Rugg went on, they may “drop this business and you will be free from any more public discussion.” Kimmel was “determined that the American people . . . know this story” and he “authorized [Rugg] to go all out to see that it is done.” [He was] “prepared to face the consequences, embarrassment, misunderstanding, time, anything.” He told Rugg, “Go to it!”^[21]

Thus it was largely as a result of Kimmel’s efforts that the statute of limitations on court-martialing Kimmel and Short was extended—six months from December 7, 1943, to June 7, 1944. And extended yet again to December 7, 1944.^[22]

Short also wanted a chance to present his case, but he was a very different personality and less aggressive than Kimmel in his pursuit of a hearing.^[23]

Captain Safford Talks with Kimmel

Captain Safford played a key role in the whole Pearl Harbor picture, both before the attack and also afterwards during the investigations. He served with the Navy Department communications intelligence unit from May 1936 until after the attack. He had worked in radio intelligence and cryptology, the deciphering of codes. As chief of the communications security section of naval communications during the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, he was responsible for the security of the secret Japanese intercepts and for keeping them from reaching unauthorized hands.

In the fall of 1943 Safford, “by the direction and instruction of the Director of Naval Intelligence,” was under orders to work on “a history of radio intelligence from 1924 to 1941.”^[24] Like most people in the country, Safford had believed that Kimmel had failed to fulfill adequately his responsibilities as fleet commander, that he had been remiss in interpreting the intelligence and orders sent him and thus was partially culpable for the severe damage done to the fleet during the Japanese attack.

Because of his pre-Pearl Harbor responsibilities, Safford expected that he would be called to testify in any Kimmel court-martial proceedings that might be held. So, as he looked through the files for the historical research to which he was assigned, he started to review the pre-Pearl Harbor situation also and to assemble material he would need as a witness.^[25] To his amazement he discovered that the intelligence derived from the Japanese intercepts, which Safford’s section had decoded in the months before the attack, had not been forwarded to the Pearl Harbor commanders as he had assumed. When he realized this, he was aroused by the injustice of the situation. In effect, Kimmel had been dismissed from his position and pilloried because he had not been sent the pre-attack information available in Washington.

In February 1944 Safford called on Kimmel in New York. He told Kimmel that many Japanese messages had been intercepted and deciphered prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. He gave Kimmel “a verbal summary of their contents.”^[26] From the few notes he had made and from his memory, Safford related much of the information that had been known in Washington from reading those intercepts, information which would have been invaluable to the Pearl Harbor commanders.

When he returned to Washington he sought to document his statements. But he searched in vain. The crucial intercepts were missing from the files!

On March 23, 1944, Kimmel asked Edward B. Hanify, a lawyer in the same legal firm as Rugg to come on board also to assist in his case.^[27] Hanify promptly started work on the Kimmel case.^[28] Kimmel would not let it die.

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1944 became a year of inquiries and investigations. Lest some individuals in the military who might have knowledge concerning the attack became casualties of the war, the Hart Inquiry was set up. Both the Army and Navy held separate, but concurrent, hearings. These hearings were supplemented by the follow-up Clarke, Clausen, and Hewitt inquiries that extended into 1945. On the grounds of military security, all these inquiries were conducted in greatest secrecy behind closed doors, and their reports were not released to the public.

Many facts that exonerated Kimmel and Short were revealed in these closed-door hearings. Yet these facts were not made public. At the end of 1944 Kimmel and Short were still the principal culprits in the eyes of the public, their negligence considered responsible for the extensive loss of ships, planes and men at Pearl Harbor.

1944 was also a presidential election year. FDR was running for an unprecedented fourth term. Thus political considerations, as well as military, played a role in these investigations. How should these secret reports be handled? What would the public think if it knew the truth was being concealed? How would the voters respond if they knew the facts that had been uncovered by these investigations? What would they think of the top civilian and military authorities, who were still directing the war effort, if they learned from these reports about their pre-war decisions? How much information could, or should, be made public? The “top brass” in Washington faced a dilemma.