Chapter 6: 6. Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! Intelligence

Information about an enemy is “intelligence.” Intelligence is one of the most valuable weapons in the arsenal of a belligerent. Most intelligence comes in bits and pieces—one fact here, another there, often seemingly unrelated. In the hands of an intelligent and capable agent, these bits and pieces may often be linked and made intelligible, yielding valuable information, “intelligence.” Thus coordination, analysis, and interpretation are extremely important. The more intelligence a nation can gain about its enemies—their forces, weapons, and plans—the more prepared it can be to forestall or oppose an attack. And the greater advantage it will have in any encounter.

To gain information about their enemies, to observe and to eavesdrop, warring powers employ every available technique—spies, telescopes, balloons, radio intercepts, electronic devices, satellite photography, cryptography, and so on. They seek to intercept secret communications. They work to expose invisible inks, and to decipher codes and ciphers, often extremely intricate and complex ones that frequently are revised and altered. Espionage and counterespionage are important to both sides in any conflict.

As we have seen, the United States had an advantage over the Japanese during the 1921–1922 Washington Naval Conference on disarmament because it was reading the Japanese government’s secret instructions to its representative. But the U.S. government closed down its cryptographic agency in 1929, although the Navy continued to maintain an intelligence office, OP-20-G, which operated after 1916 under Commander Laurence F. Safford. And in 1930 the Army established its Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), headed by William Friedman. By 1940, these two agencies were deeply involved once more in analyzing and deciphering Japanese codes.

At that time, the Japanese had many codes of varying complexities. Each was intended for a different purpose. The most intricate were their diplomatic, consular, and naval codes. When the Japanese were especially anxious to assure the security of a message, they usually transmitted it in one of these codes. They considered their diplomatic code to be their most complex and most indecipherable; they thought it was absolutely secure and used it for their very most secret messages.

Japan’s Diplomatic Code

The intelligence experts in the Army’s SIS and the Navy’s Op-20-G cooperated in the attempt to break the various Japanese codes. Although the Japanese navy code long defied U.S. cryptographers, they made considerable headway in breaking several others, including the consular code. Their most spectacular success, however, was with Japan’s diplomatic cipher.

After some 18 or 20 months of painstaking effort, the Army and Navy experts finally succeeded in breaking this code. They even constructed a machine that could duplicate the operations of the Japanese machine, including replicating the daily shuffling and transpositional changes by which the Japanese hoped to thwart would-be code-breakers. In time, six of these machines were constructed.

For some time, the U.S. code name for Japan had been “Orange.” The machine used for decoding a previous Japanese cipher had been known as the “Red” machine. So in the tradition of color code names, this new machine was called “Purple.”

The first “Purple” machine was retained in Washington. When additional machines became available, they were distributed to stations where they were expected to be most valuable. The Navy retained one, the Army two. The others were sent to commanders in the field where conflict with Japan seemed possible. Two machines were sent to England, one of which was later forwarded to Singapore. Another machine went to Corregidor in the Philippines. Because personnel was limited there and because atmospheric conditions prevented picking up more than about 10 percent of the Tokyo-Washington messages, the Philippines handled primarily local traffic.^[1] No “Purple” machine was ever sent to Hawaii. The Pearl Harbor commanders had to rely for intelligence about the Japanese on radio directional findings they could pick up and on reports relayed to them from Washington.

Intercepting and decoding a Japanese message was only the first step on the road to turning it into useful intelligence. Once deciphered, an intercept had to be translated into English. But this translation was not “intelligence”; it was only raw material. To become useful “intelligence,” it had to be properly analyzed and interpreted. Then it had to reach those who could use it to advantage. And all this had to be accomplished without the enemy’s knowledge.

Developing the “Purple” machine seemed almost miraculous, so the information derived from it was code-named “MAGIC.” Since this information was extremely valuable, the U.S. government was anxious not to jeopardize its source. Should the Japanese discover their code had been broken, they would undoubtedly stop using it, revise it and/or adopt a different code. The laborious task of breaking a new code would then have to begin all over again. So knowledge of “Purple” was confined to a very few officials and only about a dozen copies of each translated MAGIC intercept were made.^[2] Distribution of the MAGIC intercepts was by a high-ranking special courier who usually waited to answer questions while the intercepts were being read. To maintain security, the intercepts were then retrieved and returned to a secure file. Only four copies of each decoded/translated intercept were kept; all others were destroyed.^[3]

Once the Japanese diplomatic code was broken, the Army and Navy intercept stations rarely missed a message. With experience, the Army and Navy specialists in Washington became quite skillful at deciphering Japanese messages coded on the “Purple” machine. As time went by, specialists were often able to decode and translate messages so quickly that they were in the hands of Secretary of State Hull before his meetings with the Japanese ambassadors. “Of the 227 messages pertaining to Japanese-American negotiations sent between Tokyo and Washington from March to December 1941, all but four were picked up.”^[4] And the messages we intercepted dealt not only with the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, but also with many other matters.^[5] So throughout the months preceding the Japanese attack, U.S. officials in Washington received a continual flow of precise and accurate information directly from the innermost chambers of the Japanese government.

However, the Japanese officials did not communicate everything to their representatives abroad, not even to their Washington ambassadors. So there was still much we did not know about Japan’s plans and intentions and there was ample room for conjecture, speculation and interpretation.

Japan Proposes a Modus Vivendi

On November 19, Japanese ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu renewed their conversations with Hull at his apartment. The ambassadors told Hull that Japan was being squeezed economically by the U.S. embargo and by “our freezing measures”; she wanted a “quick settlement.” They told Hull they “were momentarily expecting instructions” from their government. Hull suggested that “if the Japanese Government could prevail over the views of the Japanese war party,” it might be possible to “work out something with us.”^[6]

By the following day, the ambassadors had received their instructions and visited Hull again. Nomura said “the Japanese Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Thailand.” It was anxious to resume trade, and to accomplish this, it was offering to restrict military operations. Nomura and Kurusu proposed a modus vivendi. Modus vivendi is Latin meaning a “living or viable method or measure.” In other words, the ambassadors were proposing a temporary working arrangement until the disputes could be settled.^[7]

The Japanese modus vivendi contained five points: (1) The governments of Japan and of the United States should agree “not to make any armed advancement” in southeastern Asia or the south Pacific, except in French Indochina, where the Japanese troops were already stationed; (2) the Japanese government would agree to withdraw its troops from French Indochina once peace was established in the Pacific, and in the meantime, it would shift them from southern to northern French Indochina; (3) the two governments would “cooperate with a view to securing” in the Netherlands East Indies the various goods and commodities they might need; (4) the governments would undertake to restore pre-embargo commercial relations, and the United States shall supply Japan “a required quantity of oil”; and (5) the U.S. government, in turn, should refrain from actions “prejudicial” to the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.^[8]

United States Makes a 6-Month Modus Vivendi Counter-Proposal

President Roosevelt expressed his view on the Japanese modus vivendi in a handwritten note to Hull:

6 months

1. U.S. to resume economic relations—some oil and rice now—more later.

2. Japan to send no more troops to Indochina or Manchurian border or any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).

3. Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact even if U.S. gets into European war.

4. U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S. to take no part in their conversations.

Later on Pacific agreements.^[9]

Apparently FDR was then willing to enter into an agreement with Japan to help relieve the economic pressures on her for six months. He would permit Japan to obtain some oil and rice. He would not insist that Japan pull out of Indochina completely. He was concerned about the Japanese-German pact. However, in item 4 FDR ignored Japan’s request that the United States “refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to . . . the restoration of general peace” in China. In other words, he did not acknowledge Japan’s request that the United States discontinue helping Chiang’s forces. To FDR, aid to China was important; by helping China we were hurting Japan, preventing her from attacking the Russian Communists in the far east, and that helped our allies, England and Russia, in their struggle against Germany in Europe.

Before responding to the Japanese proposal, Hull met on November 22 with the British and Australian ambassadors and the Dutch minister to determine the reactions of their respective governments. The Chinese ambassador, also invited, was late in arriving. Hull suggested, and the others seemed to agree, that it would be better to submit a substitute proposal than to make “a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for section.” He outlined his alternative modus vivendi, the major purposes of which were to contain Japan and to protect China. The ambassadors all “seemed to be well pleased . . . except the Chinese Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed.” But then, in Hull’s words, he “always is when any question concerning China arises not entirely to his way of thinking.”^[10]

Japanese Deadline Extended to November 29, After Which “Things Are Automatically Going to Happen.”

The Japanese ambassadors had been told on November 5, that they must conclude their deliberations by November 25. Then on November 22, Tokyo cabled them, extending the deadline to November 29, but urged them to continue their efforts: “Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire.” It is “awfully hard for us to consider changing the date,” Tokyo told the two ambassadors.

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle the Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date.

But, the Japanese government added, “This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.” (Italics added.)^[11]

The Japanese ambassadors were being giving a little more time. It was obvious that the failure of the negotiations would have serious repercussions, but also that their government was not taking them into full confidence.

On November 22, Japan made another concession, offering to move her troops from the south of Indochina to the north. Kurusu told Hull it had taken

a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to their suggestion in regard to offering to withdraw the Japanese troops from southern Indochina.

Kurusu considered this “an encouraging sign.”^[12]

On November 24, two days after U.S. intelligence experts decoded Tokyo cable #812 extending the Japanese deadline to November 29, the two ambassadors received a follow-up cable from Tokyo: “The time limit set in my message #812 is in Tokyo time.”^[13] That was 14 hours earlier than Washington time. Thus we were alerted that the timing of the deadline was crucial. This cable was decoded by our cryptoanalysts in Washington the same day it was sent.

More Discussions Among Friends of the U.S. on U.S. Response to Japan

Also on November 24, Hull met once more with the Australian, British, Chinese, and Dutch diplomats. The Dutch minister said his government “would support the [U.S.] modus vivendi proposal.” However, Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih objected to several of its provisions that affected China. For one thing, he believed that permitting the Japanese to retain soldiers in Indochina would pose a threat to China’s supply line, the recently reopened Burma Road.

Hull realized the urgency of the situation. He pointed out to the four diplomats the importance of reaching a temporary agreement with the Japanese to assure a few more months of peace. He said he was

striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to [him] that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan.

Hull also

emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur—any day after this week—unless a temporary arrangement is effected. (italics added)^[14]

Information then available in the Navy Department clearly indicated that the Japanese were planning some decisive action for the very near future. In the afternoon of November 24, Chief of Naval Operations Stark authorized a circular message to his fleet commanders on the rim of the Pacific—in the Philippines (Hart), at Pearl Harbor (Kimmel), and to the commandants of the several naval districts, Panama (15th), San Diego (11th), San Francisco (12th), and Seattle (13th)—with copies for information only to SPENAVO (Special Naval Observer/London) and the commander of the Atlantic Fleet (King). (All Navy messages were identified by a six-digit number indicating the time and date filed in Greenwich, England. This system eliminated confusion that might arise when sending and receiving messages to and from different time zones.)

In his cable Stark advised his field commanders:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.… Guam will be informed separately.^[15]

The commanders were asked “to inform senior Army officers their areas.”

Following instructions, Admiral Kimmel consulted with General Short in Hawaii. Kimmel and his advisers did not dispute Japan’s “capability” for delivering “a long-range surprise bombing attack” on Pearl Harbor. Nor did they rule out the possibility that Japan “might attack without a declaration of war.” The Philippines and Guam seemed the only U.S. possessions imminently threatened by Japan. The Philippines were on the flank of the most direct route from Japan to French Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies. And Guam, the site of a U.S. naval station, lay in the midst of the Japanese-mandated, formerly German-owned, islands—the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls. (After World War I, Japan, then an ally of Great Britain and the United States, had been given these islands to administer under a League of Nations mandate, and we had known for some time that Japan was constructing naval and air bases on them.) Thus, Kimmel and his advisers did not consider it likely that Hawaii would be the target of such “a surprise aggressive movement in any direction.” They

reasoned that she [Japan] would not commit the strategic blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States territory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the American people in war against Japan.^[16]

So the effect of Stark’s message was to turn the attention of Kimmel and his advisers toward the Far East.

Objections Raised to U. S. Proposed Modus Vivendi

Another November 24 meeting concerning the U.S. proposed modus vivendi took place in the office of Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. Also present were Harry Dexter White, an assistant secretary, and Russian embassy counselor (later ambassador) Andrei Gromyko. White protested against “a Far Eastern Munich.” He drafted a letter to Roosevelt for Morgenthau’s signature stating that to sell China

to her enemies for thirty blood stained pieces of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the luster of American world leadership in the great democratic fight against fascism.^[17]

Morgenthau didn’t send that letter. He didn’t have to; he realized “the president needed no prodding to stand for precisely the policy which the Secretary then and later considered essential. He had, in a sense, deemed it essential ever since the fall of 1938.”^[18] It was in November 1938 that Japan had announced her intention of establishing an anticommunist “New Order” in Asia. Japan, Manchukuo, and China were to cooperate “to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defense against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout east Asia.”^[19]

In the evening of November 24 Chinese ambassador Hu Shih called on Stanley K. Hornbeck, State Department adviser on political relations, to register his objections to the modus vivendi the United States was considering. The ambassador said “he realized that it would be very helpful to keep the Japanese in suspense for another three months, but he doubted whether that could be achieved.” However, he assured Hornbeck “that he would try to cause his Government to see the problem in the light in which the American Government sees it.”^[20]

The Dutch minister had told Hull on November 22 that his government supported the U.S. proposal. However, the Dutch government had contacted him again to express reservations, as the Chinese ambassador had, to the number of Japanese troops that might be left in Indochina. The minister also called on Hornbeck that evening to relay to him his government’s second thoughts.^[21]

The U. S. Proposes 3-Month Modus Vivendi

The U.S. counterproposal to the Japanese modus vivendi went through several drafts. The one finally approved—by both the War and Navy departments and then later, at a White House meeting, by FDR’s so-called “War Cabinet”—provided for a three-month respite.

The United States was still, of course, officially neutral and nominally at peace. However, a War Cabinet had been set up as an informal body to coordinate the activities of the civil and military branches of the executive department. This War Cabinet consisted of the president; the secretaries of State (Hull), War (Stimson), and Navy (Knox); the Army chief of staff (Marshall), chief of naval operations (Stark), and occasionally the commanding general of the Air Force (Arnold).

It was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group.^[22]

The U.S. proposal called on Japan to withdraw her troops from French Indochina and to make no further advances in Asia or the Pacific. These provisions would accomplish the administration’s goals of restraining Japan and protecting China. In return for these concessions, the United States would agree to relax her trade restrictions for three months. The export of petroleum to Japan would be permitted “upon a monthly basis for civilian needs” only. The United States also would try to induce the Australian, British and Dutch governments to relax their trade restrictions.^[23]

In a November 24 telegram to Churchill, Roosevelt summarized this three-month modus vivendi:

This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon.^[24]

Stimson and Knox met in Hull’s office on November 25, where they discussed the proposal at some length. Stimson thought it “adequately safeguarded all our interests,” but he didn’t think the Japanese would accept it because it was “so drastic.”^[25]

British Ambassador Lord Halifax called on Hull later that same morning and relayed Britain’s approval of the U.S. decision to present the Japanese with a counterproposal. The British, he said, had “complete confidence in Mr. Hull’s handling of these negotiations.” They believed “the Japanese will try to force a hurried decision by magnifying the dangers of delay” and urged

that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned.^[26]

China Objects to U.S. Revised 3-Month Modus Vivendi

Word of the proposed U.S. modus vivendi soon reached Chiang Kai-shek. On November 25 “numerous hysterical cable messages to different Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government” began arriving from him and his associates.^[27] They “bombarded Washington with demands that no further concessions be made to Tokyo.”^[28] Chiang cabled Knox, Stimson, and Morgenthau to say the same thing.^[29] He also cabled Churchill in England.

Chiang appeared frantic. He asked his brother-in-law and personal emissary in Washington, Dr. T.V. Soong of China Defense Supplies, Inc., to contact Stimson and Knox.

If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless.^[30]

Another cable was sent that same day by one of Chiang’s advisers, Owen Lattimore, to Lauchlin Currie, then an administrative assistant to President Roosevelt and a friend of Lattimore’s. Currie had helped Lattimore obtain the appointment as Chiang’s U.S. political adviser.^[31] Lattimore cabled that he had “never seen him [Chiang Kai-shek] really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan’s military advantage in China.” According to Lattimore, Chiang believed that

A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any Modus Vivendi now arrived at with China [sic; Japan?] would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. . . . It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo [Chiang] has deep confidence in the President’s fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan’s escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.^[32]

Still another cable arrived from China, this one from Foreign Minister Quo Tai-chi to Ambassador Hu Shih. “[T]he Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction” at the news he was receiving from Washington. Quo Tai-chi’s wire was somewhat calmer than Lattimore’s: Chiang “got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese question in its conversation with Japan.” Apparently, Chiang believed that the United States was “still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China.” Quo Tai-chi had explained to Chiang that “the Secretary of State has always had the greatest respect for the fundamental principles, and that I believe he has made no concession to Japan.” But his main point came through loud and clear.

We are, however, firmly opposed to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China’s difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan’s power in her aggression against China. Please inform the Secretary of State.^[33]

When Hu Shih showed Hull this telegram, Hull again explained that the United States was just trying to give the U.S. military more time to build up its defenses. “[T]he official heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks,” Hull said, “have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area.” Therefore, “at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan . . . we have been carrying on conversations and [have been] making some progress thus far.”

Hull told Hu Shih that the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek had “very recently . . . flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid.” Hull pointed out that

practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the president does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road. . . . [O]ur proposal would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area.

Hull continued,

Of course, we can cancel this proposal, but it must be with the understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward.^[34]

It would seem that either Hu Shih had completely misunderstood the provisions of the proposed modus vivendi or Chiang had. Perhaps these provisions had been misrepresented to China. As Hull explained to Hu Shih, the draft Hull had outlined previously would have required Japan to withdraw all military and police forces from China proper and from Indochina. Japan would also have had to agree to support no other government or regime in China except Chiang’s, then headquartered at Chungking. If Japan acceded to these provisions, it would constitute a great victory for Chiang’s government.

Japanese Attack Appears Imminent; Stimson: Can They Be Maneuvered Into “Firing the First Shot?”

On November 25, Navy intelligence deciphered and translated a Japanese J-19 circular message (#2330) sent ten days before from Tokyo to all Japan’s representatives abroad. It gave them “detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines” to be carried out “in the event of an emergency.”^[35] Here was clear evidence that Japan was contemplating more hostile action in the near future.

At noon on November 25, FDR’s War Cabinet met at the White House. “[I]nstead of bringing up the Victory Parade,” that is the plan “for the actual winning of a war not yet declared,” as Stimson had expected, Roosevelt raised another subject. He announced, Stimson recalled, “that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1].” The Japanese were undoubtedly planning an “expedition to the South,” which would be likely to interfere with “our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia.” Hull “laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing [our response to Japan’s proposed modus vivendi] should be rested—the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression.”

FDR reminded the group that the Japanese were “notorious for making an attack without warning.” The question before the War Cabinet was “how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.” Stimson confided to his diary that this was indeed “a difficult proposition.” The possibility of issuing Japan an ultimatum was also raised at this meeting. Stimson pointed out that the president

had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer [August 17]^[36] that if she crossed the border into Thailand, she was violating our safety. . . . [H]e had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow [sic; allow?] any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull was asked to prepare such a statement to be submitted to Japan.^[37]

When Stimson returned to his office from this meeting, he learned from Army Intelligence, G-2, that five Japanese divisions were headed southward from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai. The ships had been sighted south of Formosa. He immediately phoned Hull and sent him a copy of the G-2 message. He also sent a copy to the president.^[38]

U.S. Proposed Modus Vivendi Scuttled

At 6:00 a.m. the next day, a Triple Priority cable, addressed to FDR from “the former Naval person,” Winston Churchill, was received in Washington. Churchill acknowledged receipt of the U.S. proposed modus vivendi. “Of course, it is for you to handle this business,” Churchill cabled, “and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? . . . If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase.”^[39]

Early that morning, T.V. Soong, Chiang’s brother-in-law and emissary in Washington, called on Harry Dexter White. Soong pleaded with White to use his influence with Morgenthau to try to have the proposed U.S. modus vivendi killed. White approached Morgenthau and persuaded him to call on the president. Morgenthau walked through the underground passageway linking the Treasury building to the White House to see Roosevelt. After Morgenthau described the Chinese ambassador’s and Soong’s agitation, FDR agreed to see them. “I will quiet them down,” he said.^[40]

White also

sent an “urgent telegram” to Edward C. Carter, the former secretary-general of the Institute of the Pacific Relations in New York . . . [asking] Carter to come to Washington to lobby against making any concessions to the Japanese.^[41]

Stimson phoned FDR that same morning and told him about the Japanese expedition southward-bound from China. This was news to him, for he hadn’t seen the G-2 message Stimson had sent him the evening before. According to Stimson, Roosevelt

blew up—jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said . . . that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were negotiating for an entire truce—an entire withdrawal (from China)—they should be sending this expedition down there to Indochina.”^[42]

FDR met with the two Chinese and then called Hull to the White House. The proposed modus vivendi would be scuttled and a statement of “broad basic proposals” would be offered instead.^[43]The Dutch government’s shift from support to criticism of our modus vivendi, the reversal of the British government’s position from “complete confidence” in Hull and “support” for a U.S. counterproposal to concern with Chiang’s “very thin diet,” buttressed by Chiang’s campaign of cables, had tipped the scales against Japan.

Without consulting his other advisers, Roosevelt authorized Hull to give the Japanese a ten-point note based on White’s suggestions. Neither War nor Navy department was notified of this decision. Both Roosevelt and Hull realized their note would be unacceptable to the Japanese.

Chiang’s anti-Japanese campaign, orchestrated largely by three communist sympathizers—White, Lattimore, and Currie, with Edward C. Carter standing in the wings ready to help if need be—had paid off.^[44]

U. S. Note Delivered to Japanese Ambassadors

That afternoon, November 26, Hull summoned the two Japanese ambassadors to his office and handed them the statement FDR had approved. Section I set forth a number of diplomatic platitudes. The governments of the United States and Japan were both “solicitous for the peace of the Pacific.” Then several general principles were presented on which their mutual relations should be governed—principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, equality of commercial opportunity, international cooperation, etc. Section II listed “Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan.” Ten points followed.^[45]

After reading the documents, Kurusu asked “whether this was our reply to their proposal for a modus vivendi . . . . Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the proposed agreement. He noted that in our statement of principles there was a reiteration of the Stimson doctrine.” He was referring to the Doctrine of Non-recognition advocated by Stimson when he was President Hoover’s secretary of state.^[46] Kurusu

objected to the proposal for multilateral non-aggression pacts and referred to Japan’s bitter experience of international organization, citing the case of the award against Japan by the Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter.

Kurusu did not believe his government could agree to paragraph (3) calling on Japan to withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from both China and Indochina, or paragraph (4) asking her to refrain from supporting—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than Chiang’s national government. Kurusu did not think the United States should expect Japan to “take off its hat to Chiang Kai-shek and propose to recognize him. . . . He said that if this was the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible.”

Hull asked if this couldn’t be “worked out.” Kurusu responded “that when they [the Japanese ambassadors] reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands.” However, he said, “this was a tentative proposal without commitment.” Perhaps they should “not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally here.” Hull said they might want to study the document carefully, but he explained that “our proposal was as far as we could go at this time.” With specific reference to the oil question, Hull said “public feeling [in the United States] was so acute . . . that he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan.”

Kurusu “felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end.” He wanted to know if we weren’t interested in a modus vivendi. “The Secretary replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it was because the other powers would not agree.” The Japanese must have been aware of the plans we had been making to cooperate with the British and Dutch in the southwest Pacific. The secretary [Hull] replied simply that “he had done his best in the way of exploration.” With that the two Japanese ambassadors were dismissed.^[47]

British Notified of Modus Vivendi Rejection

Almost immediately after delivering to the Japanese ambassadors the U.S. note with its unacceptable ten points, Hull cabled Ambassador Grew in Japan and Ambassador C.E. Gauss in China.^[48] That evening Hull telephoned British Ambassador Lord Halifax “to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys.” Neither our War nor Navy department was advised.

The following morning, Lord Halifax called on Undersecretary of State Welles to ask why the proposed modus vivendi had been overthrown and a virtual “ultimatum” issued. “[O]ne of the reasons for the determination reached,” Welles replied, “was the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier proposal.” Halifax “could not understand this in as much as he had communicated to Hull the full support of the British Government.” Welles responded that Churchill’s expressed concern with Chiang’s “thin diet” “could hardly be regarded as ‘full support’.” Halifax admitted that he “had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese objections.” He had thought “that the course proposed by Hull gave positive assurances to the Chinese government that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated.” He believed that the Chinese government’s attitude

was based partly on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown of Chinese morale.

Welles told Halifax that in his view the Chinese had real cause for concern. “Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already very active. . . . Japanese forces there were being quickly increased in number . . . [indicating] that the threat against Thailand was imminent.” Moreover, Welles pointed out, “it was evident from the information received here that the Japanese were preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The gravity of the situation . . . could not be exaggerated.”^[49]

Japan Vows to Destroy British and American Power in China

Another “Purple” intercept, sent from Tokyo on November 14, and deciphered in Washington on November 26, reminded us again, forcibly, of Japan’s intentions in the Far East. This cable had been addressed to “Hongkong” and to the Japanese diplomatic officers in 11 Chinese cities.

“[T]he Imperial Government [still] hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations,” it read. However, “they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis.” The Japanese cabinet had made several momentous foreign policy decisions:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.

b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

The Japanese were under no illusion as to the problems involved in fighting an expanded war. Their forces were widely extended and their resources severely strained. They wanted to “avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops.” However, they were prepared to “cope with a world war on a long-time scale.” If their “reserves for total war and . . . future military strength wane,” they would “reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire.”

To carry out these foreign policy objectives, the Japanese would

encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East.

However, because of the U.S. embargo on exports to Japan, resources were a primary concern; “great importance [was placed] upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas).” The entire Japanese cabinet “concurred.”^[50]

The military and administration officials in Washington who read this intercept could have had little doubt as to the seriousness of the consequences if the negotiations with the Japanese ambassadors failed.

FDR Notifies the Philippines That Japanese Aggression Appears Imminent

While Hull was making plans to present the U.S. ten-point note to the Japanese ambassadors, FDR prepared a message to our high commissioner in the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre. Roosevelt explained that the Far East was a veritable tinderbox. “The Japanese are strongly reenforcing their garrisons and naval forces in the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by US forces.” However, FDR was not so much concerned by the Japanese attempts to defend themselves against the United States as he was by the “increasing opposition of Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to the Formosa area.” It was apparent, he continued, that the Japanese were making preparations in China, Formosa, and Indochina “for an early aggressive movement of some character.” However, it was not yet clear whether this move would be “directed against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines.” The most likely target seemed to be Thailand.

FDR was fearful that “this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan.” He asked Sayre to discuss the situation with the U.S. military commanders in Manila, Admiral Hart and General MacArthur. The commissioner should then “present my views to the president of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people.” FDR’s cable was transmitted by the Navy to the Philippines on the afternoon of November 26.^[51]

Japanese Cabinet Expected to Decide Soon Between Peace and War

Also on November 26, we deciphered a “Strictly Secret” cable sent the day before, via “Purple,” from Hanoi in Indochina, to Tokyo.^[52] Japanese diplomatic officials in Indochina had heard from military sources that the United States was expected to present its reply to the Japanese envoys’ modus vivendi proposal that very day, November 25. “If this is true,” Hanoi cabled, if the

U.S. did answer Japan’s request for a modus vivendi as expected, the United States’ response would bring matters to a head. In that event, Hanoi assumed that the Japanese Cabinet would be making “a decision between peace and war within the next day or two.”

“[I]f the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination,” Hanoi continued, they had plans for launching various enterprises. “Should, however, the negotiations [in Washington] not end in a success,” as the military sources had implied would be the case, “since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day.”

Hanoi was disturbed that representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and even China had been meeting with U.S. officials in Washington and must be aware of the status of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Japan’s officials in Hanoi knew from Tokyo’s circular message #2353 (which we had not intercepted and translated before we read this Hanoi cable to Tokyo) that the situation was “becoming exceedingly critical.”

Our officials in Washington who were privy to MAGIC learned from this telegram that the Japanese cabinet would soon make a decision between peace and war. If the Japanese envoys in Washington succeeded in obtaining an acceptable modus vivendi, the decision would be for peace. If not, it would be for war. And by handing the Japanese ambassadors a note that we knew their government could not accept, we were rejecting a modus vivendi. The Japanese negotiations were not ending in success. And this, our reading of MAGIC told us, meant war! Moreover, the Japanese forces in Indochina would “be able to move within the day.”

On the afternoon of November 26, Marshall and several members of his staff flew down to North Carolina from Washington to attend the final phases of the First Army’s maneuvers. For some 36 hours at this crucial time, he was out of touch with Washington.^[53]