Chapter 9: 9. Tensions Mount FDR Remonstrates Against Increased Japanese Troops in Indochina

Secretary of State Hull was laid up with a cold,^[1] so Undersecretary of State Welles called the two Japanese ambassadors to the State Department on December 2, and presented them with a statement by President Roosevelt: “[C]ontinuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina,” reported during the past several days, represent “a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.” As FDR understood the Japanese agreement with the French Vichy government, the arrival of these forces brought the number of Japanese troops in Indochina well above the total permitted.

[T]hese increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region.

Such aggression could conceivably be directed against the Philippines, the East Indies, Burma, Malaya, or Thailand. This, FDR maintained, would be “new aggression . . . additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China.” He wanted to know the intentions of the Japanese government in continuing to move troops into Indochina “because of the broad problem of American defense” and he asked the Japanese ambassadors to inquire as to their government’s purpose in carrying out “this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina.”^[2] Nomura admitted that he “was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions;” he would contact them immediately.

Kurusu said, “[I]t was obvious no threat against the United States was intended,” especially as the Japanese government had offered on November 20 “to transfer all its forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina.” This shift “could not be easily effected,” however, due to the lack of adequate transportation and of communication facilities in Indochina.^[3]

Although Welles stated that the United States government “has not had any aggressive intention against Japan,” Nomura reminded him of the U.S. “economic measures” against Japan, trade embargoes and the freezing of assets. “[E]conomic measures are a much more effective weapon of war than military measures.” The Japanese people believe “they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to the American position.” The Ambassador added

that this was a situation in which wise statesmanship was needed; that wars do not settle anything . . . under the circumstances some agreement, even though it is not satisfactory, is better than no agreement at all.^[4]

The Japanese ambassadors reminded Welles that the note we had handed them on November 26 contained several points which, “in view of the actual situation in the Far East . . . the Japanese Government would find it difficult to accept.” The latest U.S. proposal raised “important questions” so that it “seemed to the Japanese Government to require a completely fresh start.” As a result, its response “might take a few days,” although they expected it “shortly.”^[5]

With respect to the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, the Japanese government “had been hopeful of being able to work out with us [the United States] some settlement of the three outstanding points on which our draft of June 21^[6] and the Japanese draft of September 25^[7] had not been reconciled.” Nomura said the situation called for “wise statesmanship. . . . [W]ars do not settle anything.” Kurusu thought considerable progress had been made and he expressed an interest in resuming the efforts to reconcile our differences. Welles agreed to refer this question to Hull.^[8]

In their cable to Tokyo, the Japanese ambassadors reported:

The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. . . . The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes.^[9]

Welles’s manner gave Nomura the “impression” that he “hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave . . . room” to maneuver. It was “clear” also, from their interview with Hull the day before

that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I [Nomura] am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your consideration of our reply to the new American proposals.^[10]

Would U.S. Fight if British or Dutch Fought in Malaya and NEI? FDR Still Plans to Address Congress

Also on Tuesday, December 2, Roosevelt met with Knox, Welles, and Stimson. Hull was still sick. “The president went step by step over the situation” and reported, through the State Department, on his request to the Japanese that they tell him “what they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina.” He “had demanded a quick reply.” FDR seemed to have “made up his mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and possibly also the message to the Emperor,” as had been discussed at his War Cabinet meeting on November 28.^[11]

These men “were watching the situation in the Far East very carefully.” Stimson, for one, “was in frequent conference” with the top Army officials—Marshall, General Miles of G-2 (Intelligence), and also General Gerow of the War Plans Division of the general staff. They were anxious to strengthen the Philippines’ defenses and were

particularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to the Philippines and additional big bombers which [they] were trying to fly over there, some of which were scheduled to start at the end of the week.”^[12]

Hull had once remarked to Marshall, apropos of the discussions he had been having with the Japanese envoys, “These fellows mean to fight and you will have to watch out.”^[13]He

was certain that the Japanese were planning some deviltry; and we were all wondering where the blow would strike. The messages we were receiving now indicated that the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again we discussed whether we would not have to fight if Malaya or the Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all three thought that we must fight if those nations fought. We realized that if Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruction or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics enormously difficult if not impossible. All the reasons why it would be necessary for the United States to fight, in case the Japanese attacked either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacific, were discusssed at length.^[14]

Intercepted Japanese Message Announces System of Codewords to be Used in Certain Emergencies

Among the Japanese messages our code people intercepted during this period was a long cable from Tokyo on November 27 addressed to its embassy in Washington and several of the more important Japanese embassies and consuls around the world. We decoded and translated it on December 2. In view of the fact that “international relations [were] becoming more strained,” it read, an “emergency system of despatches” was to be put into effect. The cable contained a long list of codewords, each with a hidden meaning, which would be substituted for other words in case of certain emergencies, which were then enumerated. To distinguish one of these special messages from other messages, it would not use the usual Japanese close, “OWARI.” Rather it would end with the English word, “STOP.”^[15]

This cable was one more indication that the Japanese government anticipated a serious “emergency” before long. It also gave our hard-worked cryptographers one more thing to keep in mind. They must watch for Japanese cables ending with “STOP” and then not only decode and translate them, but determine the hidden meanings in the special code words.

Government Prepares for War

On September 8, 1939, a few days after the start of the war in Europe, Roosevelt had announced a limited “national emergency.” As international tension mounted, especially after FDR’s third term reelection in November 1940, various emergency interventionist measures were enacted aimed at placing this country on a wartime footing. A throng of government agencies were created; some controls on industrial production were initiated; and a system of priorities was established in the attempt to assure that firms producing military equipment and supplies could obtain the materials they needed.^[16]

The Office of Production Management, headed by William S. Knudsen, Sidney Hillman, Stimson, and Knox, was established on January 7, 1941. On February 20, FDR’s personal aide, Harry L. Hopkins, was appointed to a newly created Production Planning Board. By executive order of February 24, the production of aluminum and machine tools was granted government priority. On February 25, “in the interest of national defense,” export licensing procedures were instituted for a long list of items, and the list was lengthened substantially in March and April. A National Defense Mediation Board was formed on March 19, to mediate strikes of labor-union members in defense industries. The Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, headed by Leon Henderson, was set up on April 11. The Office of Civilian Defense was organized on May 20, with New York Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia in charge.

Then on May 27 FDR declared an “unlimited national emergency.” By this declaration the president gained control over labor, management, and other elements of the economy. Also, his authority to eliminate internal strife and to suppress subversive activities was increased. The “emergency” agencies continued to proliferate. On May 31 Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes was appointed to the newly created position of petroleum coordinator for national defense. As of June 2 “mandatory priorities of wartime scope” were imposed on industry. On June 25 U.S. air space was “zoned” by the Civil Aeronautics Board to “facilitate the movement of military aircraft.” On August 3, to conserve gasoline, nighttime sales (7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) were banned to motorists on the eastern seaboard, and on August 15 gasoline deliveries to 17 eastern states were cut 10 percent. On August 9, steel was placed under 100 percent priority control by the Office of Production Management. On August 11, by executive order, installment credit for consumers’ durable goods was curbed. On August 16 the president signed a bill extending from one to two and a half years the period of military duty required of draftees under the Selective Service Act and of members of the Army and National Guard.^[17] Then on August 28 the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (SPAB) was set up, with Donald M. Nelson, then on leave from Sears, Roebuck & Co., as executive director, to handle procurement and to coordinate national-defense purchases.^[18]

Top Washington Officials Consider War Imminent

Early in the first week in December, Roosevelt called Nelson to his office to talk about a priorities meeting. Their discussion had hardly begun when the president’s appointment secretary, “Pa” Watson, “came into the room and said, ‘Mr. President, Secretary Hull is outside with the two Japs’.” FDR then told Nelson, “Don, I think we shall have to postpone this discussion; I am very anxious to conclude the discussions with Nomura and Kurusu.” As Nelson got up to leave, he asked, “How does it look?” FDR “shook his head gravely and replied, ‘Don, I wouldn’t be a bit surprised if we were at war with Japan by Thursday [December 4]’.”

Nelson had “a second shock” later in the week. He was giving a dinner Wednesday evening for Vice President Henry A. Wallace and had invited the members of SPAB. Wallace sat at Nelson’s right and his fellow Chicagoan, Navy Secretary Frank Knox, was on his left. Remembering the president’s presentiment of war, Nelson “made guarded inquiries of Knox concerning the Japanese situation.” Knox “was not at all reticent” in his reply. “Don,” he said, “we may be at war with the Japs before the month is over.” Nelson asked, “Is it that bad?” Knox replied, “You bet your life it’s that bad.” Then Nelson asked Knox “what kind of a fight would we have out there in the Pacific.” Knox replied, “we’ll hunt their navy down and blow it right out of the water’.”^[19]

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau Asks if Anything Might Disturb a U.S. Bond Sale

Treasury Secretary Morgenthau was responsible for arranging the government’s financing. On December 1 he was preparing to make an offering on the market of $1.5 billion in U.S. bonds. Before settling on a date for the offer, he wanted to know the likelihood that some crisis might occur to disturb the financial markets. As Morgenthau was not privy to MAGIC, he lacked detailed inside knowledge of the international situation; he asked Roosevelt’s advice. FDR told him to go ahead with the bond offer. But he said, “I cannot guarantee anything. It is all in the laps of the gods,” adding, “it was apt to be worse in the following week than in the week just beginning.”

Morgenthau also asked Welles “if something would be happening Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday [December 3, 4, or 5] of real importance—I mean that might upset the people of this country.” Welles was reassuring: “I don’t anticipate anything within that brief period.”

Morgenthau spoke with Roosevelt again on December 3. FDR said “he had the Japanese running around like a lot of wet hens” and thought “the Japanese are doing everything they can to stall until they are ready.” Morgenthau had long been anxious for the United States to become involved in the war against Hitler, so from Morgenthau’s viewpoint, “The most important thing” was that the president was “talking with the English about war plans as to when and where the USA and Great Britain should strike.”

When Morgenthau learned that the New York branch of the Bank of Japan was going to close down on December 4 or 5, he became still more worried about the market for his bond offer. He contacted the president again and finally got “an all clear signal.” So on Thursday, December 4, he announced “the Treasury offering—$1 billion of 2-1/2 per cent bonds maturing 1967–1972, and $500 million of 2 per cent with a shorter maturity 1951–1955.”^[20]

Japanese Consul in Hawaii Asked to Report Weekly on Ships in Pearl Harbor

For some months, U.S. intelligence officers in Hawaii had been intercepting Japanese messages to and from the Japanese consul in Hawaii and Tokyo, messages sent in the J-19 (consular) code. U.S. intelligence personnel in Hawaii did not have the facilities to decipher these coded intercepts and were under instructions to airmail them as they were intercepted to Washington. Airmail from Hawaii to Washington took two or three days.^[21] Once in Washington, their decoding and translation was often delayed still further, for “Purple” messages, which usually dealt with urgent and sensitive matters, had priority.

On October 9 Washington cryptographers had deciphered a September 24 “berthing plan” intercept, instructing the Japanese consul in Hawaii to plot the location of ships in Pearl Harbor on a grid system and to notify Tokyo.^[22] However, the Pearl Harbor commanders were not notified. On December 3 Navy cryptanalysts in Washington decoded and translated a J-19 message more than two weeks old (November 15), sent from Tokyo to its consul in Hawaii. It read: “As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ‘ships in harbor report’ irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.”^[23]

Again, this information was not passed on to our commanders in Hawaii—not to General Short, who was responsible for the safety of the fleet while in port, and not to Admiral Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor. Thus the U.S. commanders in Hawaii remained ignorant of the fact that the Japanese consul in Honolulu was keeping a close watch on the ships of the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor.

Japan Orders Its Embassy in Washington to Destroy Codes; U.S. Naval Intelligence Warns Outposts

On December 2, Tokyo time, the Japanese government cabled its embassy in Washington further instructions about destroying its codes. This message was promptly decoded and translated by our Army cryptographers on December 3.^[24] It said that all codes but those now being used with the machine and all secret files and documents were to be destroyed. Also, “[s]top at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.” On the completion of these tasks, the embassy should wire back the one code word, “haruna.”

This code-destruct message and others addressed to Japanese embassies and consulates indicated to anyone familiar with such matters that the Japanese were planning to go to war very soon. Junior officers in Naval Intelligence, who were working with these Japanese intercepts, were disturbed. Navy Captain Arthur H. McCollum, who was in charge of the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence’s foreign branch, suggested that warning messages be sent to the U.S. outposts in the Pacific, and he drafted the following cable:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong x Singapore x Batavia x Manila x Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents xFrom foregoing infer that Orange [Japan] plans early action in Southeast Asia.^[25]

McCollum’s superior, Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, chief of the intelligence division, sought permission from Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, assistant chief of naval operations, to send this cable. When asked during the Pearl Harbor hearings if the destruction of codes “necessarily mean[s] war, that a country that destroys its codes is going to commit an overt act of war or declare war,” Ingersoll replied, “It meant that to us, particularly the destruction of codes in the consulates.”^[26] Therefore, Ingersoll apparently assumed that the last sentence of the proposed cable was unnecessary. In any event, he okayed the code-destruction message, with the final sentence deleted. The shortened message was dispatched priority on December 3 at 6:50 p.m. Greenwich time (1:50 p.m., Washington time), to Admiral Hart (Manila), Admiral Kimmel (Pearl Harbor), and to commandants of the naval districts in Hawaii and the Philippines.^[27]

Navy Captain L.F. Safford in the Office of Naval Communications knew of the latest Japanese intercept regarding the destruction of codes in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila.^[28] Then he learned that the Japanese embassy in Washington also had been ordered “to destroy everything they had except one copy of their high-grade [decoding] machine.” And “on the 3rd we received a signal from Admiralty London that [the Japanese embassy in] London had already complied.”^[29]

Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer, who was attached to the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, told Safford that McCollum was “greatly worried by the lack of information that was being sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.” Safford phoned McCollum and asked “if he had read the messages which we had been getting in the last three days.” McCollum said he had. “Do you appreciate their significance?” Safford asked. McCollum said he did. Then Safford asked, “Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?” “We are doing everything we can”—McCollum emphasized both “we’s”—“to get the news out to the Fleet.”^[30]

Safford didn’t learn then that McCollum had finally succeeded in having a warning sent, even if a watered-down one. So Safford and Kramer set out to draft their own warning. According to Safford,

The C.I. [Communications Intelligence] Unit in Washington had no authority to forward to the C.I. Units in Pearl Harbor or Corregidor, or to the Commanders-in-Chief direct, any information other than technical information pertaining to direction finding, interception, and so forth. The dissemination of intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the Office of Naval Intelligence as prescribed in Communication War Plans approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in March, 1940.^[31]

Therefore, the dissemination of intelligence was not permitted to Safford’s unit. He acted because he “thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released.”^[32]

Safford’s message, OpNav 031855, was “released by Captain [Joseph R.] Redman, Assistant Director of Naval Communications.” It was addressed to the Philippines (CinCAF and Com 16) for action and routed to Hawaii (CinCPac and Com 14) for information. It was “written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U.S.N., on CinCPac’s Staff, could have explained its significance.”^[33] Safford’s message advised that on December 1 Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy their “Purple” machines; Batavia’s machine had already been returned to Tokyo. Then on December 2 the Japanese embassy in Washington had been told to destroy its secret documents, its “Purple” machine, and all but one copy of other systems. It also reported that the Japanese embassy in London had complied.^[34] When Safford’s message reached Pearl Harbor, Kimmel’s intelligence officer had to ask Coleman what a “Purple” machine was. The Pearl Harbor command had never heard of the Japanese diplomatic code, a code machine named “Purple,” or of MAGIC, the valuable intelligence derived from “Purple.”

McCollum’s watered-down dispatch (#031850)^[35] had actually been released by Wilkinson just five minutes before Safford’s (#031855).^[36] McCollum’s message had been sent for action to Hart in Manila, Kimmel in Pearl Harbor, and to the commandants of the 14th (Hawaii) and 16th (Philippines) naval districts. Safford’s message went for action to the Philippines, with an information copy to Hawaii.

U. S. Orders Destruction of Codes at Some Overseas Embassies

The repeated reminders that the Japanese were planning some aggressive action in the very near future spurred Army officials in Washington to action. General Sherman Miles, head of G-2, the military intelligence division of the Army general staff, was responsible for the collection, analysis, estimation, and dissemination of information primarily for the chief of staff and the secretary of war.^[37] On December 3, he cabled the U.S. military attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo to destroy its codes.^[38]

The office of the chief of naval operations (OPNAV) also acted. Late in the evening of December 3, Washington time, instructions to destroy the Navy’s codes were sent to U.S. naval attachés in the Asiatic theater—ALUSNA (naval attaché) in Tokyo and Bangkok, and ASTALUSNA (assistant naval attaché for air) in Peiping and Shanghai, China. Information copies only were sent to CINCAF (commander-in-chief, Asiatic Fleet), that is Admiral Hart in Manila, COM 16 (commandant, 16th naval district, Philippines), and ALUSNA, Chungking, China. No copy was sent to Kimmel in Pearl Harbor, 14th naval district, Hawaii.^[39] A similar message was sent a few minutes later to the naval attaché in Peiping and to the marine commander in Tientsin, China.

Some 17 hours later a message (042017) was sent to the naval station on Guam, the mid-Pacific island more than 3,000 miles west of Hawaii, which lay practically in the midst of the Japanese mandated islands. Guam was told to “destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter,” except that necessary “for current purposes and special intelligence” and to be “prepared to destroy instantly” any other classified matter retained.^[40] Information copies were sent to Hart and the 16th naval district in the Philippines, and to Kimmel and the 14th naval district in Hawaii.

On December 4, just two minutes after the one to Guam, a cable (042019) was dispatched from OPNAV in Washington to the naval attachés at Tokyo and Bangkok and to the assistant naval attachés in Peiping and Shanghai. They were told to “destroy all secret and confidential files with the exception of those which are essential for current purposes.” Also “all other papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the United States” were to be destroyed.^[41]

These code-destruct messages meant Japanese action was imminent—in the west Pacific and southeast Asia, probably in Indochina and Thailand. Hawaii was an ACTION addressee in only one of these urgent cables—McCollum’s #031850. (Manila was a second addressee). However, the information reported in that message, gleaned from a Japanese intercept, had concerned primarily southeast Asia, ordering the destruction of codes and ciphers at Japanese diplomatic and consular posts in Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, and Manila, as well as Washington and London.

No one in Washington seemed concerned about Hawaii.