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Chapter 18 of 21 · A Foreign Policy of Freedom by Ron Paul

Chapter 15. 2004

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As the politics heated up, Congress wanted to absolve itself of blame for an unpopular war. I wanted to remind my colleagues that when this business started they had a chance to make a difference and consciously chose inaction.

February 4, 2004
CONGRESS ABANDONED ITS DUTY TO DEBATE AND
DECLARE WAR

HON. RON PAUL of TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

There is plenty of blame to go around for the mistakes made by going to war in Iraq, especially now that it is common knowledge Saddam Hussein told the truth about having no weapons of mass destruction, and that al Qaida and 9/11 were in no way related to the Iraqi government.

Our intelligence agencies failed for whatever reason this time, but their frequent failures should raise the question of whether or not secretly spending forty billion taxpayer dollars annually gathering bad information is a good investment. The administration certainly failed us by making the decision to sacrifice so much in life and limb, by plunging us into this Persian Gulf quagmire that surely will last for years to come.

But before Congress gets too carried away with condemning the administration or the intelligence gathering agencies, it ought to look to itself. A proper investigation and debate by this Congress—as we’re now scrambling to accomplish—clearly was warranted prior to any decision to go to war. An open and detailed debate on a proper declaration of war certainly would have revealed that U.S. national security was not threatened—and the whole war could have been avoided. Because Congress did not do that, it deserves the greatest criticism for its dereliction of duty.

There was a precise reason why the most serious decision made by a country—the decision to go to war—was assigned in our Constitution to the body closest to the people. If we followed this charge I’m certain fewer wars would be fought, wide support would be achieved for just defensive wars, there would be less political finger-pointing if events went badly, and blame could not be placed on one individual or agency. This process would more likely achieve victory, which has eluded us in recent decades.

The president reluctantly has agreed to support an independent commission to review our intelligence gathering failures, and that is good. Cynics said nothing much would be achieved by studying pre-9/11 intelligence failures, but it looks like some objective criticisms will emerge from that inquiry. We can hope for the best from this newly appointed commission.

But already we hear the inquiry will be deliberately delayed, limited to investigating only the failures of the intelligence agencies themselves, and may divert its focus to studying intelligence gathering related to North Korea and elsewhere. If the commission avoids the central controversy—whether or not there was selective use of information or undue pressure put on the CIA to support a foregone conclusion to go to war by the administration—the commission will appear a sham.

Regardless of the results, the process of the inquiry is missing the most important point—the failure of Congress to meet its responsibility on the decision to go, or not go, to war. The current mess was predictable from the beginning. Unfortunately, Congress voluntarily gave up its prerogative over war and illegally transferred this power to the president in October of 2002. The debate we are having now should have occurred here in the halls of Congress then. We should have debated a declaration of war resolution. Instead, Congress chose to transfer this decision-making power to the president to avoid the responsibility of making the hard choice of sending our young people into harms way, against a weak, third world country. This the president did on his own, with congressional acquiescence. The blame game has emerged only now that we are in the political season. Sadly, the call for and the appointment of the commission is all part of this political process.

It is truly disturbing to see many who abdicated their congressional responsibility to declare or reject war, who timidly voted to give the president the power he wanted, now posturing as his harshest critics.

The problems in Iraq are not new, nor the result of “mismanagement,” rather, they represent the result of a bad policy long pursued.

June 3, 2004
THE SAME OLD FAILED POLICIES IN IRAQ
HON. RON PAUL of TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Speaker, the more things change, the more they stay the same. Our allegiances to our allies and friends change constantly. For a decade, exiled Iraqi Ahmed Chalabi was our chosen leader-to-be in a new Iraq. Championed by Pentagon neocons and objected to by the State Department, Mr. Chalabi received more than 100 million U.S. taxpayer dollars as our man designated to be leader of a new Iraqi government.

But something happened on the way to the coronation. The State Department finally won out in its struggle with the Pentagon to dump Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, delivering Iraq to a competing exiled group, Dr. Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi national Accord. But never fear, both groups were CIA supported and both would be expected to govern as an American puppet. And that’s the problem. Under the conditions that currently exist in Iraq, American sponsorship of a government, or even United Nations approval, for that matter, will be rejected by a nationalistic Iraqi people.

We never seem to learn, and the Muslim Middle East never forgets. Our support for the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran has never endeared us to the Iranians. We’re supposed to be surprised to discover that our close confidant Ahmed Chalabi turns out to be a cozy pragmatic friend of Iran. The CIA may have questioned the authenticity of Iranian intelligence passed on to the U.S. by Chalabi, yet still this intelligence was used eagerly to promote the pro-war propaganda that so many in Congress and the nation bought into. And now it looks like the intelligence fed to Chalabi by Iran was deliberately falsified, but because it fit in so neatly with the neocon’s determination to remake the entire Middle East, starting with a preemptive war against Iraq, it was received enthusiastically.

Inadvertently we served the interests of both Iran and Osama bin Laden by eliminating the very enemy they despised—Saddam Hussein. To the Iranians delight, it was payback time for our allegiance with Saddam Hussein against Iran in the 1980s.

The serious concern is that valuable and top-secret U.S. intelligence may well have gone in the other direction: to Iran with the help of Chalabi.

These serious concerns led to the dumping of the heir apparent Chalabi, the arrest of his colleagues, and the raid on his home and headquarters to seize important documents. The connection between Chalabi and the UN food-for-oil scandal is yet to be determined.

What a mess! But no one should be surprised. Regime change plans—whether by CIA operations or by preemptive war—almost always go badly. American involvement in installing the Shah of Iran in the fifties, killing Diem in South Vietnam in the sixties, helping Osama bin Laden against the Soviets in the eighties, assisting Saddam Hussein against Iran in the eighties, propping up dictators in many Arab countries, and supporting the destruction of the Palestinian people all have had serious repercussions on American interests including the loss of American life. We have wasted hundreds of billions of dollars while the old wounds in the Middle East continue to fester.

How many times have our friends become our enemies and our enemies our friends, making it difficult to determine which is which? Our relationship with Kadafi in Libya is an example of the silliness of our policy. Does his recent “conversion” to our side qualify him for U.S. assistance? No one can possibly predict what our relationship with Kadafi will be in a year or two from now. My guess is that he too has a long memory. And even if he becomes a U.S. stooge, it will only foment antagonism from his own people for his cozy relationship with the United States. Long term, interference in the internal affairs of other nations doesn’t help us or those we support.

Those who strongly argue behind the scenes that we must protect “our oil” surely should have second thoughts, as oil prices soar over $40 with our current policy of military interventionism.

The real tragedy is that even those with good intentions who argue the case for our military presence around the world never achiever their stated goals. Not only do the efforts fall short, the unintended consequences in life and limb and dollars spent are always much greater than ever anticipated. The blow-back effects literally go on for decades.

The invisible economic costs are enormous but generally ignored. A policy of militarism and constant war has huge dollar costs, which contribute to the huge deficits, higher interest rates, inflation, and economic dislocations. War cannot raise the standard of living for the average American. Participants in the military-industrial complex do benefit, however. Now the grand scheme of physically rebuilding Iraq using American corporations may well prove profitable to the select few with political connections.

The clear failure of the policy of foreign interventionism followed by our leaders for more than a hundred years should prompt a reassessment of our philosophy. Tactical changes, or relying more on the UN, will not solve these problems. Either way the burden will fall on the American taxpayer and the American soldier.

The day is fast approaching when we no longer will be able to afford this burden. For now foreign governments are willing to loan us the money needed to finance our current account deficit, and indirectly the cost of our worldwide military operations. It may seem possible for the moment because we have been afforded the historically unique privilege of printing the world’s reserve currency. Foreigners have been only too willing to take our depreciating dollars for their goods. Economic law eventually will limit our ability to live off others by credit creation. Eventually trust in the dollar will be diminished, if not destroyed. Those who hold these trillion plus dollars can hold us hostage if it’s ever in their interest. It may be that economic law and hostility toward the United States will combine to precipitate an emotionally charged rejection of the dollar.

That’s when the true wealth of the country will become self-evident and we will no longer be able to afford the extravagant expense of pursuing an American empire. No nation has ever been able to finance excessive foreign entanglements and domestic entitlements through printing press money and borrowing from abroad.

It’s time we reconsider the advice of the Founding Fathers and the guidelines of the Constitution, which counsel a foreign policy of nonintervention and strategic independence. Setting a good example is a far better way to spread American ideals than through force of arms. Trading with nations, without interference by international government regulators, is far better than sanctions and tariffs that too often plant the seeds of war.

The principle of self-determination should be permitted for all nations and all demographically defined groups. The world tolerated the breakup of the ruthless Soviet and Yugoslavian systems rather well, even as certain national and ethnic groups demanded self-determination and independence.

This principle is the source of the solution for Iraq. We should suggest and encourage each of the three groups—the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Kurds—to seek self-government and choose voluntarily whether they want to associate with a central government.

Instead of the incessant chant about us forcing democracy on others, why not read our history and see how thirteen nations joined together to form a loose-knit republic with emphasis on local self-government. Part of the problem with our effort to re-order Iraq is that the best solution is something we have essentially rejected here in the United States. It would make a lot more sense to concentrate on rebuilding our Republic, emphasizing the principles of private property, free markets, trade, and personal liberty here at home rather then pursuing war abroad. If this were done, we would not be a militaristic state spending ourselves into bankruptcy, and government benefits to the untold thousands of corporations and special interest would be denied.

True defense is diminished when money and energy are consumed by activities outside the scope of specifically protecting our national security. Diverting resources away from defense and the protection of our borders while antagonizing so many around the world actually serves to expose us to greater danger from more determined enemies.

A policy of non-intervention and strategic independence is the course we should take if we’ re serious about peace and prosperity. Liberty works!

Just as we saw in Iraq, the ground begins to be laid for war with Iran.

May 6, 2004
DON’T START A WAR WITH IRAN!
HON. RON PAUL of TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this ill-conceived and ill-timed legislation. Let’s not fool ourselves: this concurrent resolution leads us down the road to war against Iran. It creates a precedent for future escalation, as did similar legislation endorsing “regime change” in Iraq back in 1998.

I find it incomprehensible that as the failure of our Iraq policy becomes more evident—even to its most determined advocates—we here are approving the same kind of policy toward Iran. With Iraq becoming more of a problem daily, the solution as envisioned by this legislation is to look for yet another fight. And we should not fool ourselves: this legislation sets the stage for direct conflict with Iran. The resolution “calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons…” Note the phrase “…use all appropriate means….”

Additionally, this legislation calls for yet more and stricter sanctions on Iran, including a demand that other countries also impose sanctions on Iran. As we know, sanctions are unmistakably a move toward war, particularly when, as in this legislation, a demand is made that the other nations of the world similarly isolate and blockade the country. Those who wish for a regime change in Iran should especially reject sanctions—just look at how our Cuba policy has allowed Fidel Castro to maintain his hold on power for decades. Sanctions do not hurt political leaders, as we know most recently from our sanctions against Iraq, but rather sow misery among the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society. Dictators do not go hungry when sanctions are imposed.

It is somewhat ironic that we are again meddling in Iranian affairs. Students of history will recall that the U.S. government’s ill-advised coup against Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and its subsequent installation of the Shah as the supreme ruler led to intense hatred of the United States and eventually to the radical Islamic revolution of 1979. One can only wonder what our relations would be with Iran if not for the decades of meddling in that country’s internal affairs. We likely would not be considering resolutions such as this. Yet the solution to all the difficulties created by our meddling foreign policy always seems to always be yet more meddling. Will Congress ever learn?

I urge my colleagues to reject this move toward war with Iran, to reject the failed policies of regime-change and nation building, and to return to the wise and consistent policy of non-interventionism in the affairs of other sovereign nations.

Resolutions commending, absolving or condemning service members usually have language designed to support bad policy as well. Seldom do such resolutions look at our policy errors and so often they are designed to give political cover to House Members.

May 6, 2004
STATEMENT ON THE ABUSE OF PRISONERS IN IRAQ
HON. RON PAUL of TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution as written. Like so many resolutions we have seen here on the Iraq war, this one is not at all what it purports to be. Were this really a resolution condemning abuse of prisoners and other detainees, I doubt anyone here would oppose it. Clearly the abuse and humiliation of those in custody is deplorable, and the pictures we have all seen over the past week are truly horrific.

But why are we condemning a small group of low-level service members when we do not yet know the full story? Why are we rushing to insert ourselves into an ongoing investigation, pretending that we already know the conclusions when we have yet to even ask all the questions? As revolting as the pictures we have seen are, they are all we have to go by, and we are reacting to these pictures alone. We do not and cannot know the full story at this point, yet we jump to condemn those who have not even yet had the benefit of a trial. We appear to be operating on the principle of guilty until proven innocent. It seems convenient and perhaps politically expedient to blame a small group of “bad apples” for what may well turn out to be something completely different—as the continuously widening investigation increasingly suggests.

Some of the soldiers in the photographs claim that their superior officers and the civilian contractors in charge of the interrogations forced them to pose this way. We cannot say with certainty what took place in Iraq’s prisons based on a few photographs. We have heard that some of those soldiers put in charge of prisons in Iraq were woefully unprepared for the task at hand. We have heard that they were thrown into a terribly confusing, stressful, and dangerous situation with little training and little understanding of the rules and responsibilities. What additional stresses and psychological pressures were applied by those in charge of interrogations? We don’t know. Does this excuse what appears to be reprehensible behavior? Not in the slightest, but it does suggest that we need to get all the facts before we draw conclusions. It is more than a little disturbing that this resolution does not even mention the scores of civilian contractors operating in these prisons at whom numerous fingers are being pointed as instigators of these activities. While these individuals seem to operate with impunity, this legislation before us all but convicts without trial those lowest in the chain of command.

But this resolution is only partly about the alleged abuses of detainees in Iraq. Though this is the pretext for the legislation, this resolution is really just an enthusiastic endorsement of our nation-building activities in Iraq. This resolution “expresses the continuing solidarity and support of the House of Representatives…with the Iraqi people in building a viable Iraqi government and a secure nation.” Also this resolution praises the “mission to rebuild and rehabilitate a proud nation after liberating it…” At least the resolution is honest in admitting that our current presence in Iraq is nothing more than a nation-building exercise.

Further, this resolution explicitly endorses what is clearly a failed policy in Iraq. I wonder whether anyone remembers that we did not go to war against Iraq to build a better nation, or to bring about “improvements in…water, sewage, power, infrastructure, transportation, telecommunications, and food security…” as this resolution touts. Nor did those who urged this war claim at the time that the goals were to “significantly improve…food availability, health service, and educational opportunities” in Iraq, as this legislation also references. No, the war was essential, they claimed, to stop a nation poised to use weapons of mass destruction to inflict unspeakable harm against the United States. Now, historical revisionists are pointing out how wonderful our nation building is going in Iraq, as if that justifies the loss of countless American and Iraqi civilian lives.

This resolution decries the fact that the administration had not informed Congress of these abuses and that the administration has not kept Congress in the information loop. Yet, Congress made it clear to the administration from the very beginning that Congress wanted no responsibility for the war in Iraq. If Congress wanted to be kept in the loop it should have vigorously exercised its responsibilities from the very beginning. This means, first and foremost, that Congress should have voted on a declaration of war as required in the Constitution. Congress, after abrogating this responsibility in October 2002, now is complaining that it is in the dark. Indeed, who is to say that the legal ambiguity created by the congressional refusal to declare war may not have contributed to the notion that detainees need not be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention, that governs the treatment of prisoners during a time of war? Until Congress takes up its constitutional responsibilities, complaints that the administration is not sufficiently forthcoming with information ring hollow.

This resolution calls on the administration to keep Congress better informed. But Congress has the power—and the obligation—to keep itself better informed! If Congress is truly interested in being informed, it should hold hearings—exercising its subpoena power if necessary. Depending on the administration to fulfill what is our own constitutional responsibility is once again passing the buck. Isn’t this what has gotten us into this trouble in the first place?

I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution.

The 9/11 commission largely offered “more of the same.” Until we question our foreign entanglements, we will not search for the right answers.

April 22,2004
THE LESSONS OF 9/11
HON. RON PAUL of TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

We are constantly admonished to remember the lessons of 9/11. Of course the real issue is not remembering, but rather knowing what the pertinent lesson of that sad day is.

The 9/11 Commission soon will release its report after months of fanfare by those whose reputations are at stake. The many hours and dollars spent on the investigation may well reveal little we don’t already know, while ignoring the most important lessons that should be learned from this egregious attack on our homeland. Common sense already tells us the tens of billions of dollars spent by government agencies, whose job it is to provide security and intelligence for our country, failed.

A full-fledged investigation into the bureaucracy may help us in the future, but one should never pretend that government bureaucracies can be made efficient. It is the very nature of bureaucracies to be inefficient. Spending an inordinate amount of time finger pointing will distract from the real lessons of 9/11. Which agency, which department, or which individual receives the most blame should not be the main purpose of the investigation.

Despite our serious failure to prevent the attacks, it’s disturbing to see how politicized the whole investigation has become. Which political party receives the greatest blame is a high stakes election-year event, and distracts from the real lessons ignored by both sides.

Everyone on the Commission assumes that 9/11 resulted from a lack of government action. No one in Washington has raised the question of whether our shortcomings, brought to light by 9/11, could have been a result of too much government. Possibly in the final report we will discuss this, but to date no one has questioned the assumption that we need more government and, of course—though elusive—a more efficient one.

The failure to understand the nature of the enemy who attacked us on 9/11, along with a pre-determined decision to initiate a pre-emptive war against Iraq, prompted our government to deceive the people into believing that Saddam Hussein had something to do with the attacks on New York and Washington. The majority of the American people still contend the war against Iraq was justified because of the events of 9/11. These misinterpretations have led to many U.S. military deaths and casualties, prompting a growing number of Americans to question the wisdom of our presence and purpose in a strange foreign land 6,000 miles from our shores.

The neoconservative defenders of our policy in Iraq speak of the benefits that we have brought to the Iraqi people: removal of a violent dictator, liberation, democracy, and prosperity. If all this were true, the resistance against our occupation would not be growing. We ought to admit we have not been welcomed as liberators as was promised by the proponents of the war.

Though we hear much about the so-called “benefits” we have delivered to the Iraqi people and the Middle East, we hear little talk of the cost to the American people: lives lost, soldiers maimed for life, uncounted thousands sent home with diseased bodies and minds, billions of dollars consumed, and a major cloud placed over U.S. markets and the economy. Sharp political divisions, reminiscent of the 1960s, are arising at home.

Failing to understand why 9/11 happened and looking for a bureaucratic screw-up to explain the whole thing—while using the event to start an unprovoked war unrelated to 9/11—have dramatically compounded the problems all Americans and the world face. Evidence has shown that there was no connection between Saddam Hussein and the guerilla attacks on New York and Washington, and since no weapons of mass destruction were found, other reasons are given for invading Iraq. The real reasons are either denied or ignored: oil, neoconservative empire building, and our support for Israel over the Palestinians.

The proponents of the Iraqi war do not hesitate to impugn the character of those who point out the shortcomings of current policy, calling them unpatriotic and appeasers of terrorism. It is said that they are responsible for the growing armed resistance, and for the killing of American soldiers. It’s conveniently ignored that had the opponents of the current policy prevailed, not one single American would have died nor would tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians have suffered the same fate.

Al Qaeda and many new militant groups would not be enjoying a rapid growth in their ranks. By denying that our sanctions and bombs brought havoc to Iraq, it’s easy to play the patriot card and find a scapegoat to blame. We are never at fault and never responsible for bad outcomes of what many believe is, albeit well intentioned, interference in the affairs of others 6,000 miles from our shores.

Pursuing our policy has boiled down to “testing our resolve.” It is said by many—even some who did not support the war—that now we have no choice but to “stay the course.” They argue that it’s a noble gesture to be courageous and continue no matter how difficult. But that should not be the issue. It is not a question of resolve, but rather a question of wise policy. If the policy is flawed and the world and our people are less safe for it, unshakable resolve is the opposite of what we need. Staying the course only makes sense when the difficult tasks are designed to protect our country and to thwart those who pose a direct threat to us. Wilsonian idealism of self-sacrifice to “make the world safe for democracy” should never be an excuse to wage preemptive war—especially since it almost never produces the desired results. There are always too many unintended consequences.

In our effort to change the political structure of Iraq, we continue alliances with dictators and even develop new ones with countries that are anything but democracies. We have a close alliance with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, many other Arab dictatorships, and a new one with Kadafi of Libya. This should raise questions about the credibility of our commitment to promoting democracy in Iraq—which even our own government wouldn’t tolerate.

Show me one neo-con that would accept a national election that put the radical Shiites in charge. As Secretary Rumsfeld said, it’s not going to happen. These same people are condemning the recent democratic decisions made in Spain. We should remember that since World War II, in 35 U.S. attempts to promote democracy around the world none have succeeded.

Promoters of war too often fail to contemplate the unintended consequences of an aggressive foreign policy. So far, the anti-war forces have not been surprised with the chaos that has now become Iraq, or Iran’s participation—but even they cannot know all the long-term shortcomings of such a policy.

In an eagerness to march on Baghdad, the neo-cons gloated—and I heard them—of the “shock and awe” that was about to hit the Iraqi people. It turns out that the real shock and awe is that we’re further from peace in Iraq than we were a year ago—and Secretary Rumsfeld admits his own surprise.

The only policy now offered is to escalate the war and avenge the deaths of American soldiers—if they kill 10 of our troops, we’ll kill 100 of theirs. Up until now, announcing the number of Iraqi deaths has been avoided purposely, but the new policy announces our success by the number of Iraqis killed. But the more we kill, the greater the incitement of the radical Islamic militants. The harder we try to impose our will on them, the greater the resistance becomes.

Amazingly, our occupation has done what was at one time thought to be impossible—it has united the Sunnis and Shiites against our presence. Although this is probably temporary, it is real and has deepened our problems in securing Iraq. The results are an escalation of the conflict and the requirement for more troops. This acceleration of the killing is called “pacification”—a bit of 1984 newspeak.

The removal of Saddam Hussein has created a stark irony. The willingness and intensity of the Iraqi people to fight for their homeland has increased many times over. Under Saddam Hussein, essentially no resistance occurred. Instead of jubilation and parades for the liberators, we face much greater and unified efforts to throw out all foreigners than when Saddam Hussein was in charge.

It’s not whether the Commission investigation of the causes of 9/11 is unwarranted; since the Commissioners are looking in the wrong places for answers, it’s whether much will be achieved.

I’m sure we will hear that the bureaucracy failed, whether it was the FBI, the CIA, the NSC, or all of them for failure to communicate with each other. This will not answer the question of why we were attacked and why our defenses were so poor. Even though $40 billion are spent on intelligence gathering each year, the process failed us. It’s likely to be said that what we need is more money and more efficiency. Yet, that approach fails to recognize that depending on government agencies to be efficient is a risky assumption.

We should support efforts to make the intelligence agencies more effective, but one thing is certain: more money won’t help. Of the $40 billion spent annually for intelligence, too much is spent on nation building and activities unrelated to justified surveillance.

There are two other lessons that must be learned if we hope to benefit by studying and trying to explain the disaster that hit us on 9/11. If we fail to learn them, we cannot be made safer and the opposite is more likely to occur.

The first point is to understand who assumes most of the responsibility for the security of our homes and businesses in a free society. It’s not the police. There are too few of them, and it’s not their job to stand guard outside our houses or places of business. More crime occurs in the inner city, where there are not only more police, but more restrictions on property owners’ rights to bear and use weapons if invaded by hoodlums. In safer rural areas, where every home has a gun and someone in it who is willing to use it is, there is no false dependency on the police protecting them, but full reliance on the owners’ responsibility to deal with any property violators. This understanding works rather well—at least better than in the inner cities where the understanding is totally different.

How does this apply to the 9/11 tragedies? The airline owners accepted the rules of the inner city rather than those of rural America. They all assumed that the government was in charge of airline security—and unfortunately, by law, it was. Not only were the airlines complacent about security, but the FAA dictated all the rules relating to potential hijacking. Chemical plants or armored truck companies that carry money make the opposite assumption, and private guns do a reasonably good job in providing security. Evidently we think more of our money and chemical plants than we do our passengers on airplanes.

The complacency of the airlines is one thing, but the intrusiveness of the FAA is another. Two specific regulations proved to be disastrous for dealing with the thugs who, without even a single gun, took over four airliners and created the havoc of 9/11. Both the prohibition against guns in cockpits and precise instructions that crews not resist hijackers contributed immensely to the horrors of 9/11.

Instead of immediately legalizing a natural right of personal self-defense guaranteed by an explicit Second Amendment freedom, we still do not have armed pilots in the sky. Instead of more responsibility being given to the airlines, the government has taken over the entire process. This has been encouraged by the airline owners, who seek subsidies and insurance protection. Of course, the nonsense of never resisting has been forever vetoed by all passengers.

Unfortunately, the biggest failure of our government will be ignored. I’m sure the Commission will not connect our foreign policy of interventionism—practiced by both major parties for over a hundred years—as an important reason 9/11 occurred. Instead, the claims will stand that the motivation behind 9/11 was our freedom, prosperity, and way of life. If this error persists, all the tinkering and money to improve the intelligence agencies will bear little fruit.

Over the years, the entire psychology of national defense has been completely twisted. Very little attention had been directed toward protecting our national borders and providing homeland security.

Our attention, all too often, was and still is directed outward toward distant lands. Now a significant number of our troops are engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq. We’ve kept troops in Korea for over 50 years, and thousands of troops remain in Europe and in over 130 other countries. This twisted philosophy of ignoring national borders while pursuing an empire created a situation where Seoul, Korea, was better protected than Washington, DC, on 9/11. These priorities must change, but I’m certain the 9/11 Commission will not address this issue.

This misdirected policy has prompted the current protracted war in Iraq, which has gone on for 13 years with no end in sight. The al Qaeda attacks should not be used to justify more intervention; instead they should be seen as a guerilla attacks against us for what the Arabs and Muslim world see as our invasion and interference in their homelands. This cycle of escalation is rapidly spreading the confrontation worldwide between the Christian West and the Muslim East. With each escalation, the world becomes more dangerous. It is especially made worse when we retaliate against Muslims and Arabs who had nothing to do with 9/11—as we have in Iraq—further confirming the suspicions of the Muslim masses that our goals are more about oil and occupation than they are about punishing those responsible for 9/11.

Those who claim that Iraq is another Vietnam are wrong. They can’t be the same. There are too many differences in time, place, and circumstance. But that doesn’t mean the Iraqi conflict cannot last longer, spread throughout the region and throughout the world—making it potentially much worse than what we suffered in Vietnam. In the first 6 years we were in Vietnam, we lost less than 500 troops. Over 700 have been killed in Iraq in just over a year.

Our failure to pursue al Qaeda and bin Laden in Pakistan and Afghanistan—and diverting resources to Iraq—have seriously compromised our ability to maintain a favorable world opinion of support and cooperation in this effort.

Instead, we have chaos in Iraq while the Islamists are being financed by a booming drug business from U.S.-occupied Afghanistan.

Continuing to deny that the attacks against us are related to our overall policy of foreign meddling through many years and many administrations, makes a victory over our enemies nearly impossible. Not understanding the true nature and motivation of those who have and will commit deadly attacks against us prevents a sensible policy from being pursued. Guerilla warriors, who are willing to risk and sacrifice everything as part of a war they see as defensive, are a far cry, philosophically, from a band of renegades who out of unprovoked hate seek to destroy us and kill themselves in the process. How we fight back depends on understanding these differences.

Of course, changing our foreign policy to one of no pre-emptive war, no nation building, no entangling alliances, no interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and trade and friendship with all who seek it, is no easy task.

The real obstacle, though, is to understand the motives behind our current policy of perpetual meddling in the affairs of others for more than a hundred years.

Understanding why both political parties agree on the principle of continuous foreign intervention is crucial. Those reasons are multiple and varied. They range from the persistent Wilsonian idealism of making the world safe for democracy to the belief that we must protect “our” oil.

Also contributing to this bipartisan, foreign policy view is the notion that promoting world government is worthwhile. This involves support for the United Nations, NATO, control of the world’s resources through the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, NAFTA, FTAA, and the Law of the Sea Treaty—all of which gain the support of those sympathetic to the poor and socialism, while too often the benefits accrue to the well-connected international corporations and bankers sympathetic to economic fascism.

Sadly, in the process the people are forgotten, especially those who pay the taxes, those whose lives are sacrificed in no-win undeclared wars, and the unemployed and poor as the economic consequences of financing our foreign entanglements evolve.

Regardless of one’s enthusiasm or lack thereof for the war and the general policy of maintaining American troops in more than 130 countries, one cold fact soon must be recognized by all of us in Congress. The American people cannot afford it; and when the market finally recognizes the over-commitment we’ve made, the results will not be pleasing to anyone.

A “guns and butter” policy was flawed in the 60s, and gave us interest rates of 21 % in the 70s with high inflation rates. The current “guns and butter” policy is even more intense, and our economic infrastructure is more fragile than it was back then. These facts dictate our inability to continue this policy both internationally and domestically. It is true, an unshakable resolve to stay the course in Iraq, or any other hot spot, can be pursued for years. But when a country is adding to its future indebtedness by over $700 billion per year, it can only be done with great economic harm to all our citizens.

Huge deficits, financed by borrowing and Federal Reserve monetization, are an unsustainable policy and always lead to higher price inflation, higher interest rates, a continued erosion of the dollar’s value, and a faltering economy. Economic law dictates that the standard of living then must go down for all Americans—except for the privileged few who have an inside track on government largess—if this policy of profligate spending continues. Ultimately, the American people, especially the younger generation, will have to decide whether to languish with current policy or reject the notion that perpetual warfare and continued growth in entitlements should be pursued indefinitely.

CONCLUSION

I’m sure the Commission will not deal with the flaw in the foreign policy endorsed by both parties for these many decades. I hope the Commission tells us why members of the bin Laden family were permitted, immediately after 9/11, to leave the United States without interrogation, when no other commercial or private flights were allowed. That event should have been thoroughly studied and explained to the American people. We actually had a lot more reason to invade Saudi Arabia than we did Iraq in connection with 9/11, but that country, obviously no friend of democracy, remains an unchallenged ally of the United States with few questions asked.

I’m afraid the Commission will answer only a few questions while raising many new ones. Overall, though, the Commission has been beneficial and provides some reassurance to those who believe we operate in a much too closed society. Fortunately, any administration, under the current system, still must respond to reasonable inquiries.

Once again, resolutions to support our troops are often designed to reinforce bad policy. These resolutions are rushed to the floor, without committee review, for purely political purposes.

March 17, 2004
OPPOSEA FLAWED POLICY OF PREEMPTIVE WAR
HON. RON PAUL of TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Speaker, today during the floor debate on H. Res. 557 (the Iraq resolution), I unfortunately was denied time to express my dissent on the policy of preemptive war in Iraq—even though I am a member of the International Relations committee. The fact that the committee held no hearings and did not mark up the resolution further challenges the fairness of the process.

I wish to express my opposition to H. Res. 557, obviously not because our armed forces do not deserve praise, but rather because our policy in the Persian Gulf is seriously flawed. A resolution commending our forces should not be used to rubber-stamp a policy of folly. To do so is disingenuous. Though the resolution may have political benefits, it will prove to be historically incorrect.

Justifying preemption is not an answer to avoiding appeasement. Very few wars are necessary. Very few wars are good wars. And this one does not qualify. Most wars are costly beyond measure, in life and limb and economic hardship. In this regard, this war does qualify: 566 deaths, 10,000 casualties, and hundreds of billions of dollars for a victory requiring self-deception.

Rather than bragging about victory, we should recognize that the war raging on between the Muslim East and the Christian West has intensified and spread, leaving our allies and our own people less safe. Denying we have an interest in oil, and denying that occupying an Islamic country is an affront to the sensitivities of most Arabs and Muslims, is foolhardy.

Reasserting UN Security Council resolutions as a justification for the war further emphasizes our sacrifice of sovereignty, and only underscores how Congress has reneged its constitutional responsibility over war.

This resolution dramatizes how we have forgotten that for too long we were staunch military and economic allies of Saddam Hussein, confirming the folly of our policy of foreign meddling over many decades. From the days of installing the Shah of Iran to the current worldwide spread of hostilities and hatred, our unnecessary involvement shows so clearly how unintended consequences come back to haunt generation after generation.

Someday our leaders ought to ask why Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Mexico, and many others are not potential targets of an Islamic attack. Falsely believing that al Qaeda was aligned with Saddam Hussein has resulted in al Qaeda now having a strong presence and influence in Iraq. Falsely believing that Iraq had a supply of weapons of mass destruction has resulted in a dramatic loss of U.S. credibility, as anti-Americanism spreads around the world. Al Qaeda recruitment, sadly, has been dramatically increased.

We all praise our troops and support them. Challenging one’s patriotism for not supporting this resolution and/or policy in the Persian Gulf is not legitimate. We should all be cautious about endorsing and financing a policy that unfortunately expands the war rather than ends it.

A Foreign Policy of Freedom

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