Interpreting the Elections

November 1, 1954

On the basis of the returns from Maine and Alaska, and of their own opinion samplings, the political pundits have been forecasting a Democratic Congressional victory. What would be the probable economic consequences of such an outcome?

These would certainly depend in part upon the interpretation generally placed on the election results. Millions of voters will vote as they do for hundreds of different reasons. Yet among the political factors now at work we may select three that are outstanding:

1—The Eisenhower Administration may be punished as much for its merits as for its defects. This is always what is likely to happen when pressure groups have been encouraged to think that they have a right to be subsidized at the public expense. Many farmers, for example, have come to feel through long custom that they have this right. The President and his Secretary of Agriculture have courageously fought the continuance of fantastic support prices that have built up appalling surpluses, drained the taxpayers of billions, and raised the cost of food for city workers. The Administration’s own compromise proposals have been nearly as bad, but it may be rebuked at the polls even for its attempt to mitigate the evil.

In the last year and a half, again, the policy of the Eisenhower Administration has been inflationary. But it has not been recklessly inflationary enough to satisfy the Stevensons or the Reuthers, or to wipe out every pocket of unemployment everywhere no matter what its special cause. And for this restraint the Administration may again be punished.

2—One defect from which the present Administration suffers more than any within living memory is political amateurishness and inarticulateness. It just does not seem to know how to dramatize its achievements or defend itself against attacks. It is true that President Eisenhower has recently made a couple of speeches ably summarizing some of his major achievements. Foremost among these was stopping “the futile sacrifices in Korea.” Others were abolishing stifling controls, slashing taxes by $7.4 billions, cutting expenditures, getting the government out of some socialistic activities. Yet the President has continued and promised expansion of many New Deal programs.

3—It is this so-called middle-of-the-roadism, this semi-New Dealism, which will probably be the main cause of a Republican Congressional defeat if it occurs. It is amazing that President Eisenhower should exactly duplicate the incredible error that caused Governor Dewey to snatch defeat out of the very jaws of victory in 1948. Like Dewey, he has ignored the traditional Republican philosophy in order to go after the votes of the supposed moderate New Dealers—the so-called middle-of-the-roaders of both parties. Like Dewey, he has taken for granted the votes of the orthodox Republicans on the assumption that they cannot vote for New Deal Democrats and therefore “have nowhere else to go.” But Republican conservatives proved in 1948 as they seem only too likely to prove again in 1954—that they do have a place to go. That place is anywhere but to the polls. They can stay home, play golf, or take a walk.

This is precisely and demonstrably what they did in 1948. Only 49 million voters bothered to vote for a President in that year compared with 62 million in 1952. Truman won by default. He got the votes of only about 25 percent of the total eligible electorate. Mr. Eisenhower’s real problem today, like Dewey’s unrecognized problem in 1948, is not that the American public is hot for a return to Trumanism and New Dealism; the real problem is the indifference and apathy of conservative Republicans.

And the real danger is that a Republican Congressional defeat this year will be just as grossly misinterpreted as the Dewey defeat in 1948. It may be taken as a mandate for a resumption of New Deal spending, inflation, and paternalism of big government. The voters may collectively bring about a result that the majority of them do not individually foresee or intend.