37. Planning in the Winter of 1777

Howe’s next objective was Philadelphia; but instead of taking it as he could at any time, he dawdled in New York through winter and early spring, while Washington’s army grew stronger. Several sporadic forays took place during the spring. In March, the British burned the American port at Peekskill. The following month, they sent New York Governor Tryon with 2,000 men to burn and destroy the large quantity of American military stores at Danbury, Connecticut. After successfully accomplishing their mission unopposed, the British were neatly harried on the way back by impromptu militia led by Gen. Benedict Arnold. Arnold had been at home in Connecticut, all but resigned from the army. The fiery Arnold had made many enemies, and had been passed over by Congress for promotion, in favor of a brace of inferior generals. After his exploit near Danbury, Congress gave Arnold a belated promotion, and he was persuaded to rejoin the northern army.

British planning for the campaign of 1777 was in the hands of three men: Lord George Germain in London, General Howe, and Gen. John Burgoyne. All three of them were to share responsibility for the British disaster of that year, but the greatest share must fall upon the bizarre strategy and tactics of Howe. Burgoyne had been put in charge of the British army in Canada, replacing General Carleton; Carleton was one of the best of the British generals, but he had become personally repugnant to the colonial secretary. Burgoyne’s idea was that he would descend from Canada down Lake Champlain, a smaller force would cut through Fort Oswego and the Mohawk Valley eastward, and General Howe would bring his massive army up the Hudson Valley—the three to meet triumphantly in Albany. The colonies would be cut in two, and the combined British forces could proceed to capture New England, and then to turn upon the South. Given the rising American strength in 1777 and the nature of popular revolutionary warfare, the British might well not have succeeded in securing territory they had militarily captured, but at least such a plan had a good prospect of success. A greater emphasis on Howe’s strike north than on a move southward from Canada would have been an improvement, however, for the terrain of Canada and northern New York was not well suited for an unpopular invading army.

Howe, however, confused the situation completely by submitting three completely different strategic plans in succession—each one worse than the one before. To begin with, he no longer saw any prospect of winning the war in 1777, neither, as Gruber puts it, “did his subsequent performance endanger the fulfillment of his prediction.”*

His first plan, made while Washington was in the flood of retreat across Jersey, was sound and similar to Burgoyne’s. The key was that Howe would take 10,000 troops up the Hudson to join Burgoyne in Albany; Rhode Island would then be used as a base to strike at New England; and then they would march southward to victory. Soon after, even before Trenton when the military situation had not yet changed, he submitted a radically different and much poorer plan: to take the bulk of his army to capture Philadelphia. Only 3,000 troops would be stationed in the lower Hudson Valley to assist Burgoyne. Philadelphia, at this stage, was a needless diversion and distraction, accomplishing little, disastrously splitting the British forces, and putting virtually the entire burden on Burgoyne’s Canadian force. Apart from his political views (which were probably treasonable), Howe was bemused by the chimera of innumerable Pennsylvania Tories arriving to greet him—a chimera fostered in all good faith by Galloway, the Aliens, and the other eager Tory emigrés in the British camp. In April, he submitted a third and even worse plan; now there would not even be 3,000 men to assist Burgoyne. Moreover, Howe would put his army to sea to invade Philadelphia by the circuitous route of the Chesapeake Bay. In this plan, his troops would be completely cut off from the possibility of helping Burgoyne in case of trouble. He did promise to raise 3,000 Tories under Governor Tryon to operate out of New York City and up the Hudson, but he never bothered to do so.

If Howe made the principal errors of strategy, Germain erred in not cracking down on Howe, while “Gentleman Johnny” Burgoyne, a wit and poseur full of fustian, was supremely overconfident. Hence, neither Germain nor Burgoyne realized the disaster that Howe’s strategy would open up for the British.

In addition to Sir William’s plans for 1777, the Howes’ true outlook may be gauged by Lord Howe’s disobeying the crown’s orders to blockade the coast of the United States. Instead, he directed his captains to allow subsistence fishing, to “cultivate... [the] good will and confidence of the Americans,” and to “grant them every other indulgence” legally possible. The aim was to conciliate the “friendly dispositions” of the Americans. Moreover, the British sea captains were prohibited from raiding the American coast and the American ports. Howe persisted in this course despite the vigorous objections of his superiors in England, and Germain bitterly charged that, as a result of Howe’s indulgence, the waters of Great Britain were teeming with American privateers.

At the end of May, Washington had moved his camp southward to Middlebrook, in the hills above New Brunswick. General Howe made no attempt to seize Philadelphia quickly and then return to aid Burgoyne, but instead, he spent most of June trying to lure him down in to open combat, once almost succeeding. Finally giving up, Howe evacuated New Jersey altogether at the end of June and moved his men to New York. The astute General Clinton as well as most of the other top British officers, pleaded with him to change his mind and adopt the sound first plan to march north up the Hudson, but he proved adamant. On July 23, his armada of over 260 ships, carrying 15,000 troops, set sail from New York toward Philadelphia. The enraged Clinton was left in New York City with 7,000 men, of whom half were American Tories, a force barely large enough to defend the city, let alone move north to aid Burgoyne’s army in the north. Burgoyne was left to fend for himself.

* Ira D. Gruber, “Lord Howe and Lord George Germain,” p. 241.