61. The Liberation of South Carolina

Greene was far too expert a strategist to pursue Cornwallis; instead, he took the opportunity to wheel southwest and march against South Carolina, for which he was hailed by many American leaders. Shorn of the Virginia and North Carolina militia, whose terms were now up, Greene marched swiftly into northern South Carolina with about 1,700 men, and mobilized Sumter in the north and Pickens in the west to help him. Greene also sent Lee’s crack legion to join Marion on the lower Pee Dee River. Lord Rawdon, in charge of the British troops after Cornwallis’ abandonment, had over 8,000 men under his command, but these were scattered throughout Georgia and South Carolina, most of them at Savannah and Augusta in Georgia, in the forts ranging up the Santee River and its tributaries in central South Carolina (Watson, Motte, Granby, and Ninety-Six); and at Georgetown at the mouth of the Pee Dee. The main striking force of 1,500 was at Camden.

Lee and Marion, uniting forces on April 14, quickly laid siege to Fort Watson on the lower Santee River. After days of siege, Col. Hezekiah Maham, of Marion’s South Carolina force, imaginatively thought of building a high wooden tower from which the riflemen could shoot down into the fort. Fort Watson was forced to surrender on April 23, the Americans taking over a hundred prisoners while losing but a few men. Rawdon had dangerously depleted 500 of his Tory troops, sending them under Col. John Watson to save the fort; as it was, they were lucky to escape Lee’s and Marion’s forces. In the meantime, Greene’s main force, having begun to march southwest on April 5, arrived before Camden and encamped at Hobkirk’s Hill. Rawdon had only 900 men against more than 1,400, and he decided to attack Greene’s force where they were stationed before Sumter, Lee, and Marion might unite with him. Actually, Sumter apparently had no intention of cooperating with Greene, and Lee and Marion were still chasing Watson’s troops.

Rawdon attacked on April 25; the fighting was a fiercely waged tactical battle of wits, with Rawdon outmaneuvering Greene on the field. Greene tried to take advantage of Capt. Simon Morgan’s advance on a narrow front by executing a double envelopment; but Rawdon quickly broadened his line and forestalled defeat. A break in the line of Maryland Continentals and subsequent defeat could have been more serious had not Washington’s cavalry saved the American guns. The battle was an undoubted victory for the British, but once again a tactical victory was soon to turn to the ashes of a strategic defeat. For one thing, both armies had lost about 270 men, and Rawdon’s force could scarcely afford this loss. For another, after finally being joined by Watson’s force on May 7, he marched northwest to fight Greene once more, but was outfoxed and gave up the pursuit to return to Camden.

At this point, Greene could have surrounded and captured Rawdon at Camden if Sumter had joined him with his 1,000 South Carolina guerrillas, but Sumter simply refused to do this. The Virginia and North Carolina militia failed to assemble and reinforce Greene, and Congress did not send any aid. But Rawdon was in no position to take advantage of these weaknesses. Increasingly, guerrilla bands were cutting him off from food and supplies, while his Tories were threatening to mutiny because several Tory deserters had been hanged by the Americans after being taken prisoner at Hobkirk’s Hill. Their exposed position now rendered the British decidedly uneasy. With food dwindling and his men restive, Rawdon evacuated Camden on May 10 to withdraw to lower South Carolina, where he finally stopped at Monck’s Corner, 40 miles north of Charleston.

This withdrawal acted as the signal for widespread guerrilla attacks on the other British forts on the Santee chain. On May 11, Sumter easily seized Orangeburg, in the central part of the state without the loss of a man; the archers of Marion and Lee fired flaming arrows into Fort Motte and induced it to surrender on May 12. On May 15, Lee cleverly induced the strong Tory garrison at Fort Granby to surrender by promising that they could keep any private property in their possession. Only Georgetown, Ninety-Six, and Augusta remained to the British in the entire lower south, outside of the Charleston-Savannah coastal plain and the port of Wilmington.

Lee and Pickens, with a troop of Georgia and South Carolina militia, were sent west against Augusta, which they besieged on May 22. On the same day, Greene laid seige to Ninety-Six; Marion was sent to Charleston, but his attack did not begin until about a month later.

There were two British forts in Augusta; the smaller was first surrounded and captured, the Tory Colonel Grierson being shot after capture by one of the Georgia militia. The larger fort was a much tougher prey; even the erection of a “Maham Tower” could not hasten surrender. But finally, the 300-man Augusta garrison surrendered on June 5. Georgetown also proved to be no problem; Marion had hardly begun his attack when the British evacuated hurriedly by sea on June 20 and retreated to Charleston. After capturing Augusta, Lee and Pickens joined Greene at Ninety-Six. The fort had a strong Tory garrison of 550 crack troops under Col. John Cruger, and Greene tried everything in his arsenal against it— approaches built by Kosciuszko, Maham Tower, flaming arrows—all to no avail. Only cutting off the fort’s water supply was taking any toll. Finally, Rawdon received reinforcements from overseas, and, with his 2,000 men, he marched swiftly from Charleston to relieve the garrison; Sumter failed to intercept and delay him, and the Americans were forced to retire from Ninety-Six on June 20. They had lost nearly 150 men to the enemy’s 85. But once again a tactical defeat only delayed a strategic victory, for Rawdon pursued Greene’s force northeastward in vain. The British prudently decided to abandon Ninety-Six on July 3 and fall back on the lower part of the state.

Both armies were now exhausted by the heat; Rawdon stationed his troops at Orangeburg, while Greene summered to the northeast on the cool and healthy plateau of the High Hills of Santee. During this rest period, Marion, Sumter, and Lee managed to force the British to evacuate Monck’s Corner, while Rawdon, broken in health by the campaign, sailed for England, leaving Col. Alexander Stuart in charge of all British forces south of Virginia.

At the end of August, Greene, with 2,000 refreshed troops, was ready to attack. He was eager to crush Stuart to forestall any possible two-front war in case Cornwallis should decide to move south from Virginia. He was not able to cross the swollen rivers between him and the British troops directly, so he marched north to Camden, picked up Sumter, Marion, and Pickens to swell his force to 2,200, crossed the river, and marched southeast to Eutaw Springs in the lower part of the state, where Stuart had cautiously withdrawn with his 2,000 men. Paradoxically, Stuart’s force consisted mostly of Tory regulars and deserters from the Continental Army, while many of Greene’s Continentals had deserted from the British.

Greene’s attack on Stuart at Eutaw Springs almost took the British by surprise, and they captured 150 members of a largely unarmed unit before the battle, nearly equalizing the numbers of the two forces. The Battle of Eutaw Springs, on September 8, 1781, was a fierce confrontation; the quality was high on both sides, each army consisting of crack troops. It turned out to be Greene’s last battle of the war and, characteristically, it was another tactical defeat and another strategic victory.

At first, Greene did very well; he placed his men in the Morgan manner, with militia in the front line and Continentals in the second. The first line fought well for a long time; when it began to give way, the British rushed forward in disorder and seeming triumph, only to meet a devastating volley and bayonet charge. The Americans routed the British, with only the cavalry and light infantry of Maj. John Marjoribanks on the British right flank holding firm. But, as luck would have it, on the point of a truly shattering victory, the rank and file of Virginia and Maryland Continentals abandoned pursuit and stopped to loot the food and liquor in the British camps. This lapse permitted the almost shattered British to re-form, and, while the battle was yet undecided, Greene prudently withdrew from the field. Stuart could only race back to Charleston, and reinforcements on the march prevented the Americans from falling upon his army. Losses were extremely heavy on both sides; but Greene’s 520 casualties were more than matched by the nearly 870 men lost by the British—over 40 percent of their force. Once again, the British had a narrowly technical win, thanks to the sudden failure of American discipline; but the losses meant a smashing strategic defeat.

Eutaw Springs was the last major battle of the war in the lower South. The British now held only the ports of Charleston and Savannah (and Wilmington in North Carolina). All the rest of the Carolinas and Georgia were back in American hands, and the state governments there were quickly reestablished. Greene stayed in South Carolina to keep the British penned in at Charleston.