Chapter V - Labour on the Threshold, Part II

Where, in unlike situations, there was a common coefficient of social democracy to be found or planted, there Fabianism fastened its interest. Most often it seemed to have a policy which was the counterpart of the Government's; but the " spirit" was· different. 1 Before Labour found itself in the powerful position of H. M.'s Loyal Opposition it had begun to express itself in the field of if international politics for two main reasons: 1) To rally persons of like persuasion to the Party, since after 1919 individuals might join the Party without belonging to a union or to a Socialist society, and 2) to signal like-mindedness to Socialists on the Con tinent, whom British Socialists hoped eventually to lead into a peaceful regime of it social democracy." After the Party came into Opposition, Labour continued to express its dissatisfaction, apparently more to affect the domestic political scene than to glean a following. But the effect was to alter foreign affairs. In the following discussion the dates of some of the data descriptive of Fabians' attitudes on France and Germany run beyond 1922 . but the views are consistent with those of 1920 and are cited to show the problem which the Tories confronted in the new political 1 Cf. Fabian Tract No. 196 (November, 1929), p.7. "Social Democracy"

is a redundant term. Democracy is a social thing. To collect and organize the political coefficients from democratic units creates a republican form of government wherein, after election, the parties become unanimous in accept ing the majority decision designating the person or persons to bear authority " under God." Fabians supported the Government in the Boer War and went into coali tion in World Wars I and II; and as of today, into collaboration along with all Socialists, Progressives and Liberals in the United States in the Korean "police action." Although outside the scope of this study, it is possible to state that in all these junctures their "collaboration" has been dictated by the project to bring into the liberated areas" dynamic democracy." This means politicized social units or Socialism. What spokesmen for this ethos termed "medieval" at one time and "fascist" later, they now name II deca dent." This description is being applied to republics, such as that headed by Syngman Rhee. Although II medieval" and "fascist" have been terms applied to the Church and "decadent" to republics, one of the reasons for the term "decadent" in Fabian thought is the possible and demonstrable collaboration of Church and State in republics-not in "social democracies"

where" Church" is isolated from the unity of the body politic.

162 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919--1931 force called Labour. In other words, finding Labour in Opposi tion in 1922, we look a year or so back and a year forward to learn what one in Mr. Baldwin's place could have known of their atti tudes when he dropped the electric spark of " Protection " into the compounded political confusion of late 1923. There had to be some concise differentiations and the" Plymouth plunge" was designed to precipitate such. The effects were not visible until 1925, after an episode of Labour Government. Having in mind the policy of favoring what was best calculated to lead to Socialism by way of a Labour Government, the NS and lecturers reported in Fabian News continued a volley of blame upon the Government. For the situation in Ireland, the \veakness in France, the reparations problem in Germany, the intervention in Russia, and the debacle (or so it appeared) in the Straits, there was a Fabian opinion pejorative of the Govern ment's prestige. In the short account which follows it is clear that the "foreign policy" of the N S· was opportunistic. Expedien cies relative to the Labour Party's· growth, as· well as the effort to appeal to a kind of Socialist" centre" on the Continent, governed it. In seeking the reasons for Baldwin's action in precipitating an election on the strange issue, "Protection," the effect of these attitudes of Labour upon the handicapped Tories must be con sidered.

To examine but five points of foreign policy: The tone of the NS in 1921 was highly critical of the Government in Irish matters. Without any warmth of feeling for the Irish people, it contented itself with analysis of Irish internal forces and criticism of the reprisal-earning action of the Coalition. It described the bloody situation, blamed the Government for reprisals, allowed a letter writer to blame the Church for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and appealed to the English voters. After the drafting of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the NS revealed the activity of an Irish Labour. Party and engaged in sharp criticism of de Valera. It seemed in quest of a non-republican compromise. On February 5, 1921,2 the telling phrase of a speech by de Valera was pointed out by " an Irish correspondent"; "The British Dominions have had conceded to them all the rights that Irish Republicans 2 XX (February 5, 1921), 519.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 163 demand." The correspondent asked that Englishmen should con vince the Irish majority who agreed with de Valera that they were wrong; but the NS editor pointed up internal conflict when he praised the Sinn Fein lead~r for his courage in the face of graver dangers than Lloyd George had yet faced in -his Irish policy, since many Sinn Feiners would find the leader's idea unpalatable. Although he had not "abandon [ed] his favorite Shibboleth :[Re publicanism] ", a basal point of compromise might be" found (in Dominion status) ; here was "a Sinn Feiner on the bridge." The English Prime Minister was said to have no remaining reason for . refusing to negotiate and no excuse for using Black-and-Tans in order to hold Ireland by ties no tighter than those of Canada and Australia. Then on March 19, 1921, "an Irish Correspondent" was allowed to tell his story without comment. "Irish Churches l' had asked for a truce during St. Patrick's festival week, but the British Government had taken the occasion to execute six Irish men, thereby solidifying IRA resistance: Let GHQ proceed to kill an9 capture Republicans, even keep IRA "on the run," it would not settle the Irish problem.s The British official practice of a "no quarter" policy must, by evoking an equal intransigence in IRA, have" the effect of arousing English voters as it aroused Irishmen. 4 A letter signed H. C-H.,5 which blamed the Church for its-alleged.silence regarding-IRA, was printed in answer to one sent in a week before by Alfred -Ollivant 6 which had accused the Government of " political" use of the ceremonial burial of victims of the_ IRA. The editor believed both letter writers represented a large number of Englishmen, but that Alfred Ollivant's view (Fabian) 7 represented the spirit which had " made and sustained that unique -political phenomenon, the British Empire"; for Ollivant had noted how the people and all save subservient officials absented themselves from what he considered an "obscene cere mony." He thought the English people resented the use of the a XX (March 19, 1921), 691 £.

4 XVI (March 5, 192i), 631 f. 5" An Obscene Ceremony," NS, XVI (December 11,1920),305. eNS, XVI (December 4,1920),260. " '[ The editor thanked his God that the Government was not made up of real Englishmen, but Welshmen. The NS often stooped to impugn the nation alityof H. M/sMinisters.

164 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 reprisal-murder victims to further repeal of the " Promise" then pending in Lords. (This was the promise to liberate Ireland given on the outbreak of the war and now threatened with re pudiat~on.) , This decent attitude of the N S was the Fabian voice shepherding Irish sympathizers in England into the Labour Party and offering something-not republicanism, but a modus vivendi without H force"; to be accompanied, it was hoped, by rising Labour leadership. In October, 1922, the efforts of the Labour leader in Ireland, Mr. Johnson, to attain peace at the price of accepting the Treaty of December, 1921, were praised and de Valera's Republicanism was called "fanaticism." 8 When Irish Labour took "direct action" and struck against sending supplies to Poland in her ,var ,,,ith Russia, having at first thought' to .gain the cooperation of English Railway workers, the N S sided. with Irish Labour even after English workers had withdrawn their boycott. The Fabian purpose was perhaps merely to point up the nascent Irish labor movement a little more dearly. When the Irish Government tried to turn public opinion by seeing to it that the rail strike caused hardship, the N S looked to the return from America of John Larkin to convince de Valera of the reality of the Irish Labour movement. (Later, Larkin and Larkinism were, excoriated.) 9 Such data indicate the objective of the NS's interest in Irish affairs. NS dictated a compromising policy. It sought out, as a single strand in the mesh of Irish forces, an Irish Labour Party trend. It sought among a shocked majority in England a local Labour Party vote.

But Fabians took an even more direct hand. In November, 1920,10 a "Peace with Ireland Council" was formed under the presidency of a Fabian, Lord Henry Bentinck. Fabians figured prominently on it: Mr. Oswald Mosley, secretary (soon to be a Fabian if not yet elected), Mr. G. D. H. Cole, and l\1r. Ben Tillett. (Among others \vere the liberal or progressive persons, J. A. Spender and Professor Gilbert Murray, experienced in Mrs. Webb's Poor Law, or Destitution, Committee). The NS 8 NS, XX (October 7, 1922),3. 9 NS, XXII (October 27, 1923),67. 10 NS, XVI (November 12, 1920), 153.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 165 asked for contributions to support this Council's relief work in Ireland. The attempt to form a contact with the Irish at the level of social relief was significant. Another attempt was made at the political level. When the proposal for a Parliamentary commis sion failed, in the same week of November, 1920, a group of representatives sent by the Labour Party visited Ireland to find a basis for settling the dispute; four Fabians were among those delegated, General Thomson, Arthur Henderson, Arthur Green wood,ll F. W. Jowett, John Robert Clynes. Ambiguously enough, they found it " impossible . . . to hope for any composure in Ireland until that country had been placed on the same footing of self-government as England enjoyed." This meant,_of course, not a republic but dominion status under England's King. They warned furthermore that H a great and powerful country can be held at bay by bands of citizen-soldiers patriotically inspired."

The committee had full NS approval for the recommendation of a thorough judicial inquiry-as" the Labour Party demands." 12 This is the eyewitness account of Clynes who, although fre quently associated with Fabians, was first of all a Labour Party inan and one ably supported by the Irish in Manchester. In his energetic person he symbolized -the position of Fabians on the Irish question even better than the consistent reporting of the N S. His was an Irish electorate and he had connections with the Party, the unions, and the Fabians. He had worked with General Thomson, a Fabian, to arrange some kind of peace with the Irish, but lacking the cooperation of the Cabinet, had failed. His labor union viewpoint is accentuated by the naivety with which he used words then coming into use and long since part of Socialist parlance, such for· example as " citizen-soldiers."· Ho\v often he presided at Fabian lectures or spoke under Fabian auspices is not mentioned in his two volumes of Memoirs but the Fabian News witnesses to the fact that he did at least once.IS Although a Trade Union man, he was always close to the political side of the· moven Hamilton, Henderson, pp. 206 f. Greenwood wrote the report at Hen derson's suggestion.

12 NS, XVI <January 1,1921). 13 FN, Vols. 32-35 in L.C. bound collection (1921-1924), Appendix Syllabi have been bound into L.C. collection by years, and are best identified this way. There is no pagination.

166 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 ment and he professed Socialism even with cant. The Irish question was a vital one to rank-and-file union men, Labour Party voters since 1919, en bloc. Capitalizing on the Irish question, Henderson and Arthur Greenwood travelled together on a· "large""scale series of most impressive demonstrations held all over the country," as Mrs. Hamilton relates: The response, everywhere, was tremendous. It was made abundantly plain that the Government policy, and es pecially this Black-and- Tan regime of terror was detest able to the majority of the nation. The officially inspired Press tried to "blanket" [sic] the meetings, but they undoubtedly had their influence in· causing the complete change of front Mr. Lloyd George had to execute before the year was out. . . .14 It was characteristic of Henderson to go to the people with his cause-teaching and rallying them into the Party, while the NS kept before the union heads and local government leaders, as well as the dissatisfied electorate, the sordid story. The ferment of Irish agitation 15 was a never-to-be-forgotten experience in Labour Party 4istory and in the history of the collapse of Lloyd George Liberalism.

By the end of 1922, Fabians had set their pattern of behaviour. They did not support republicanism; they refused support to their own Government"; they sought contact with a labor tangent; they used. the publicity of emissaries and enquiries to build " Labour" at home. As was said above, after Labour came into Opposition the gain in opposing H. 1\1.'s Government was found in its stytnie-ing effect on the Tories. The NS attitude toward France was built upon sympathy for what was thought to be the Trade Union view; again with the aim to build the Party. However, as .the story of Cannes, Genoa and Chanak will show, the Fabian-inspired wrath with France proved a boonto the baffled Governlnent which would not officially express its disgust with its ally in the sacrosanct 14 Cf. of Hamilton op. cit., p. 207. 15 Cf. Churchill, The Aftermath,· p. 278, for the new recruit to Conserva tism's views on the relationship of the Irish to the French problem.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 167 Entente. To France for' her neurotic, even ",demented," action in the Ruhr was imputed blame, in the pages of the N S, for arousing the angry nationalism which precipitated fascism in Germany, bringing one more nation into the list-indiscriminately as it was given-Hungary, Italy, Spain, now Germany, all countries where, iIi the NS view, the democratic processes had been destroyed. 16 At one time, the N S threatened war with France, "our enemies again as they have been for a thousand years." Saying that vital British interests were involved which no British Government could long ignore, the NS spoke boldly, . . . the destruction of German industry is something which Great Britain cannot and will not tolerate. We shall be. obliged to take a hand in this new war as in all European wars which involve the issue of hegemony.17 This epitomizes the attitude of the Fabian statesman' in regard to France from 1920 to 1923. However, on the eve of election, when Baldwin fell, the N S was at pains to state it had never ad vocated war with France. Lloyd George, as later Bonar Law, received sharp criticism, the latter especially for his handling of the question of French occupation of the Ruhr. The NS's policy toward France was based upon its sympathetic attitude toward Ger many and its horror of French hegemony. But the Government itself, although traditionally seeking" equality" in the balance of power on the Rhine, was currently informed by a francophobe policy. It is pointed out by a student of Anglo-French relations 18 16 NS, XV (August 14, 1920), 514. Clynes,'op. cit., p. 335, said: "Before the French soldiers marched out of the ruined German industrial belt, France had forged ... the iron swastika of Nazi-ism." His backward glance is inaccurate. The whole Stresemann era is overlooked by him.

17 NS, XIII (January, 1923),444 f. (Italics are inserted.) The NS asked for positive interference against" the White Terror "in Hungary, while it condemned intervention in Russia or assistance in favor of Poland. Cf. Ibid., 1923, passim. 18 Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New Yo~..k: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), p. 247. Cf. also, NS, XXI, p. 288 f, where the absolute necessity for British hegemony of Europe is stated. Also, cf. ibid., p.489, where dropping the Entente with France and making one with Germany is indicated along with an appeal to the spirit of Palmerston and Salisbury for that the "vital interests of Great Britain are at stake."

168 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 that constant British effort was exerted to wean Germany from the Soviet after Rapallo, since any increase in German power benefited Russia; but meanwhile Britain built or sustained German power against France. The Labour Party had to seek a like party in Germany in order to control such a dilemma. If ... Germany was to serve as a check on some power whose political influence and military superiority Britain might have feared, the country could apparently only have been France. It is easy to see why no documentary evidence should be available .to prove that this was Britain's thought. . . .19 During the Ruhr occupation, Ramsay MacDonald, then leader of the Labour Opposition, echoing the NS tone on "hegemony," asked, Is it something essential to a demonstration of our amity to France that we are going· to tum a blind eye to all the dangers that the development of an enormously powerful European Power [France] is going to offer to us? 20 Fabianism in all its organs expressed the feeling that the Allied treatment of Germany was unjust: Germany had been misled by the propositions offered before her surrender, which had been repudiated by the Treaty. Fabian spokesmen held that to block ade Germany as the French proposed would be wrong; that although certain reparations should be made to France and Belgium, the British coal industry must not be injured by German coal. Furthermore, Germany should be admitted into the League of Nations; and the League should be made strong enough to express and enforce the common will, not necessarily by an inter national police force~an expedient not acceptable to Fabians, since no one would contemplate putting the fleet under any save British command.21 19 Wolfers, Ope cit., p. 247. Under a Labour Government, H.Mo's Stationery Office published Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,in 1946, but started with Second Series, 1929.

2{) Ibid. 21 L. S. Woolf, "Enforcement of Decrees of the Court," International Government (New York: Brentano's, 1916), pp.A06 ff.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 169 On one occasion some concrete effects of German reparations and English debt payment to the United States roused a jovian humor in the editor of the NS. When a H realized surplus" of one hundred million pounds sterling was announced for 1922 1923 (Germany had made payment in 1922 of seven hundred and fifty million pounds), the N S suggested sending it " in gold" to America. It would dismay the American bankers, but unluckily it might also dismay the governors of the Bank of England, who still cherish a sentimental affection for the coins and ingots stored in their vaults. They still seem unable to realize that the credit of Great Britain rests not on the precious metal they so jealously guard, but on the fact that in a year of profound depression British revenue exceeds British expenditure by a hundred million pounds. 22 The facetiousness reveals an attitude toward America, an eco nomic policy, and an odd patriotism. The implied judgment on the gold standard and this new philosophy of credit will be re called in the fiscal 'anguish of 1931. At any rate, the NS now based its own bid for leadership upon English financial world hegemony. In January, 1921,23 the idea of "indemnities" had been scoffed at; the N S had then believed an official statement renouncing indemnities would be financially wise and that the proposition would even be politically feasible, because when English politicians mentioned indemnities, "their audience cheers but no one takes them too seriously." But in France it was" un fortunately, otherwise."

Early in 1923, the N S began to show some antipathy toward America. Although it criticized Mr. Baldwin for antagonizing American opinion, in an account which any close student of the-· facts would find shallow and partisan the N S said the acceptance of the American debt-funding conditions" annihilate [d] " Ameri can " moral pretensions" and imposed on Great Britain a· burden which she assun1ed as "a guarantor," not as a "beneficiary." (That is, she accepted German moneys paid in indemnity and 22 NS, XXII (April 7, 1923),761 £. 23 NS, XXVI {January 22, 1921),461.

170 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 passed them on to· America· to discharge the British debt to the United States.) Yet," by accepting the American terms sans phrase we have at least reestablished our credit, and removed one of the main obstacles to the creation of a stable measure of inter national value.." 24 This, in spite of having said, " It might have been better to. await a general settlement of international debts and reparations." Yet to have waited would have been to attempt the general settlement without first establishing measure of value. It is not difficult to see why France, where the Socialist labor front was atomized so that Poincare ignored it, found no sym pathy in the N S. France held out, ostensibly, for reparations to pay war debts, and to finance her rebuilding. As we shall see in another connection, the Baldwin-Poincare notes reveal a France bent, it would seem, on destroying Germany, whence came England's funds to pay her debts.

An article out of Figaro was reproduced in. the N S in March, ., 1923. It had borne the· three stars suspected of being Poincare's mark. 25 Its inclusion in the N S demonstrated the fact that much may be learned from the dismayed utterances of an opponent. Complaint was made of the refusal of the Allies to help force Germany to pay for French reconstruction charged by France against reparations collections. The fact was restated that·" An tagonism is inevitable inasmuch· as England produces, and seeks to sell that which France can produce and endeavors to sel1." To Britain was imputed the blame for stiffening German resistance to French demands: "The degree of resistance of Germany has been constantly regulated by the attitude of the British Govern ment." The signer of three stars adroitly threatened a Franco German alliance. He was realistic: While France exhausts herself in vain discussions ...

the German capitalists find· shelter in the banks of neutral countries; they thus escape from our control; they have built up vast reserves ... for [purchase of] raw ma24. NS, XX (February 3, 1923),501. 25 NS, XX (April 7, 1923),767. The article in Figaro was undoubtedly Poincare's. He said the same substantially in his reply to Curzon's statement of His Majesty's Government regarding the Ruhr, August, 1923. Cf. Wol£ ers, op. cit., p. 91.

Labour on the threshold, Part 2 171 terials with which Great Britain is .ready to furnish [Germany] .26 The NS rejoined 21 with comment that the" elite" in England maintainecl the opinion that the French adventure in ·the Ruhr was "not a debatable issue" although popular opinion was less de cisive since" its leaders have not yetspbken out." The guidance of popular leaders Fabianism would itself assume. A delegation made up of Labour Party. persons had visited the Ruhr and after the reports of its findings, advocating" internationalisation," were published, .the N S in disagreement suggested the Labour Party should "edit" the pronouncements' of any such future delega tions.28 Subsequent comments of· the N S upon the proposal for internationalising the Ruhr were equally disparaging. Sometimes, however, the expression, "some persons," loyally shielded mis taken Labourites. The ,Labour Party delegation to France was not so felicitous as the one to Ireland. We find no Fabians boast ing of association with the first named delegation, except Ben Tillett who memorialized his own (anti-Fabian) view on inter nationalising the Ruhr in Who's Who.

The foregoing notes represent very briefly the position of the N S on the relation of France and Britain where Germany was the point of tension, and Russia that of divergence. As Lloyd George was excoriated for his opportunism, Bonar Law was condemned for his "tranquillity," or "benevolent impotence." "Mr. Bonar Law," it was said, "would loyally support anyone." Hence, if Conservatives would only unite and give him for Ministers, Austen Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, and Sir Robert Horne, there would be a "Government which the Opposition could fight" and one which would " say what England thinks"; for" we are not a third-rate Power. Why should we act as if we were? " 29 (Even in its patent belligerence, it did not nominate Churchill for the Cabinet it would like to fight.) Better articulation of British 26 NS, XX (April 7, 1923), 767. 21 Ibid. 28 NS, XX (February 24,1923),585. 29 NS, XX (April 7, 1923), 765. Let it be recalled the next election took place in December. The Bonar Law-Baldwin Government lasted all through 1922 to the end of 1923.

172 Fabianisn~ in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 foreign policy would furnish better rallying points for the Labour Party's internationalism. So, through .1920-1923, the Fabian organ tried to enlist English opinion by means of its sympathy with the Labour Party and its appeal to a Socialist" elite" in favor of a bellicose attitude toward France. Not so with regard to Russia. The Government of Bonar Law, and Stanley Baldwin's Government, were well a\vare of Labour's pro-Russian proclivities, even though 1920 seemed long ago. J. R. Clynes witnessed to the following episode from within Labour and Fabian ranks: The threat of civil war in Russia passed; then, in 1920, answering, it was said, Poland's invasion of the Ukraine, "the Cossacks came clattering to the very gates of Warsaw." 30 Following the Pilsudski victory (which was a grave and unexpected disappointment to the NS) ,31 "General vVrangel, his government encouraged" furtively," said Clynes, by Britain and recognized by France, tried to advance in South Russia. Churchill gave orders to concentrate warships in the Baltic, to alert the remaining British troops in Russia and to pre pare" floods of propaganda." It ,vas then that Arthur Henderson sent telegralTIS to all local Labour par~ies, urging that demonstrations should be made agaInst the implication of Britain in a war against Russia. 32 I-lis suggestions were seconded by the Council of the TUC in conference V\rith the Parliamentary Labour Party (J. R. Clynes, J. H. Thomas~ Arthur Henderson) and the Labour Party Execu tive (Webb, Mary MacArthur, Susan Lawrence) 33 to form a "Council of Action." The threat of \var to aid Poland against Russia was removed. This boycott· by Labour, led by Fabians, against the Government's implemented policy was "The most formidable challenge ever made to democracy," said the Prime Minister. But, said Clynes, We knew our own people and the people of· Britain and---30 Clynes, op. cit., p. 322.

31 NS, XV (September 25, 1920),661 and passim. 32 Clynes, op. cit, pp. 322 f. Clynes never questioned his mentors. 33 FN, XXXI (July, 1920). Lansbury was elected in July.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 173 we knew they would not fight a war to set a Romanov sprig on the throne his father had so vilely misused,34 with characteristic confusion as to the issues involved..Somewhat the ,same sort of reasoning had stopped the civil war ~n Russia; " Whites" were as bad as " Reds" and no one wanted al Romanov. (This 'is an early presentation of the pattern so often repeated down to 1950: British Social-Democrats scold both sides, neglect to distinguish at the given moment, "Bolshevik" and "Men shevik "; also refuse to support the truncated element of " authority and property.") The differences between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were as little understood, outside initiated circles, as the difference between democracy-and-industrial-pursuits and the "industrial democracy" of Fabian-Socialism. The real reason for Trade Union interest in Russia was based on what unionists had been told of the potentialities for trade. This is not the only juncture in which amazing irresponsibility is to be remarked. Welcoming the news of a British firm's contract with the Bolshevik Government to repair locomotives, the NS rejoiced that this would force politicians to stop belaboring the Bolsheviks, hasten the Trade Agreement then pending, and illustrate "the reality and urgency of the Labour Party's, demand for reopening trade with Russia as a practical means of lessening unemploy ment in this country." 35 The editor was not speaking for ideal istic Socialism, only to encourage the unions to trust the Labour Party.

Better reasoning and more trust in what Webb would call " the nature of things" was found in the observations and conclusions of Dr. L. Haden Guest, a Fabian who lectured on "Russia Under the Bolsheviks," July 16, 1920.36 He described his ~laborate entertainment by the Bolshevik Government;' but, since "they [Guest and his fellow travellers, including Margaret Cole] 31 84t Clynes, Ope cit., p. 323. The NS, when the IFTU heard proposals for similar action during the Genoa Conference in 1922, opposed in agreement with J. H. Thomas, saying it could only serve "at the head of a national protest" as, in Thomas' opinion, the Council of Action was in 1920. Cf. NS, XIX (April 29, 1922),82 f. 85 NS, XVI (February 5, 1921), 517. 38 FN, XXXI:8 (August, 1920). $1 NS, XV (April 24, 1920), 58. Soviet Russia agreed to receive a delega• 174 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 managed to see a good deal for themselves," he told also of terror and militarized labour; of the Soviet village system turning into It praesidiums "-bureaucracies backed by the Army; of laws made by proclamation, and of secret police. This report marks the beginning of a .legend which has been uncritically accepted ever since, a twofold legend.. There is no proof that" national patriotism" was anything but repression and there is no evidence that any force remained to counter Bolshevism.

They [the Bolsheviks]. are supported by a strong senti ment of national patriotism due to the fact of the Entente Powers attacking Russia.... When peace comes, op position' to the Bolsheviks will a.rise from the other political parties and Jactions. ..; . Russia. wants help and frank criticism. Unless the Socialists in Germany, Russia, and all other countries can come together and take hold of Europe, there is grave danger that a large part of European civilization will be destroyed. 88 This was said at a special meeting for members, associates and subscribers in Essex Hall. If they disapproved of Bolsheviks, they must but wait for the overthrow from within. Russia wanted H frank criticism." Yet this might only rouse pat~iotism and cement Russia behind their wrong leaders. One point was positively stated:. Europe should be Socialist. Further treatment of the Fabian attitude toward Russia is pre cluded by the scope 0-£ this study; otherwise, the lectures of other Fabians, for example, of·. Mrs. Snowden and of Julius West, might be discussed at this point; also, those of George Lansbury.

All three were visitors to Moscow at one time or another. This suffices to show the position of Fabians in the leadership of Opposition, 1918-1922. It remains but to add that theNS attributed to the British blockade the ill-omeried success of the Bolsheviks; and, for the sake of H peace" and reconstruction, it hoped the Bolshevik Government-they "have shown that they tion of TUC and Labour Party members after refusing to receive a Com mission appointed by the League .of Nations. The NS promised no "undue tenderness" for Lenin and Trotsky if rumors as t() Russia's abandonment of democratic methods and.so forth should be confirmed. 88 Ibid. I talics inserted.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 175 can rule "-would be recognized by His Majesty's Government. 39 Again the inconsistency or illogicality is in the text. In summary, it can be said that Fabians disapproved of Bolshevik methods; also of past interventions against them; they hoped for gradual internal revolution but they would· recognize the Soviet State as presently constituted. The most vivid account of the culmination of a crisis among crises at Chanak is found in Winston Churchill's The World Crisis: The Aftermath. 40 It was a story of division: Republican Greeks against Royalist Greeks ; Nationalist Turks against the Sultan, head of the Mo~lem cult; British policy against French policy; French Radical Socialists against Poincare followers; British Coalition Cabinet members against other British Coalition Cabinet members; the Irish issues against the Eastern issues; the NS inspired opinion in England supporting now Socialist pacifism on Russia, now Labour Party belligerence toward France or regarding Ireland.

Royalist Greece under King Constantine launched a lone offen sive against the Nationalist Turks under Kemal Pasha. France favored Kemal, who could help her in Cilicia, and Britain favored the Sultan in Constantinople; and, unofficially, since King Con stantine's recall, Britain favored the Greeks as the guardians of theJ\1editerranean. French Radical Socialists asked for co operation of France and England; Poincare's party made every step as difficult as possible for Lord Curzon. The Coalition Cabinet divided between the Churchill group which favored making peace with the Turks and winning French cooperation in dealing with Kemal, and the. Lloyd George group which was pro-Greek but was· then baffled by the Irish question· and misled by Russia. The Germans at Genoa threw aside caution regard39 NS, XV (June 5, 1920), 240:fI. There occurred ~t this time a "trial" in Russia of a member of the Catholic hierarchy (one case to reach the press) . The NS pretended that the case represented the attempt of the Church to set up a rival· system of ecclesiastical courts; it held that the "priest" should take his chances with any other person accused ofpecula tions. Then, when after about a year, the prelatewas executed,the NS raged in righteous indignation. Cf. NS, XXI, p. 12.

40 Winston Churchill, The Aftermath: A Sequel to The World Crisis (London: The Macmillan Company, 1941).

176 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 ing France and openly hoped for a Greek victory while they made a separate settlement ,vith Russia. At Chanak all these forces converged. Kemal, having estab lished his Capital at Angora, took the road to Constantinople. The Greeks rej ected their King again for Venizelos after the disasters in which Kemal's strategic two years of "waiting" eventuated. The British Cabinet now took a stand ostensibly against further Turkish progress in Europe. The sequel to Northcliffe's alarum, "These men mean war!" was tragi-comic. British forces, left unaided by French and Italians and with only the promise of Dominion cooperation, met-with "most formal frowns" -the "unabashed good humor" on the part of the Turks il1vading the neutral zone at Chanak. 41 The Cabinet sent a message to its commander in the neutral zone, General Harington, to serve an ultimatum to the Turks, but laid down certain conditions which he was shrewd enough to interpret correctly. As well as Churchill he knew that if Kemal attacked Chanak, it would give the Greeks time to consolidate in Thrace. Kemal did not attack Chanak or quit the neutral zone, nor run into a "death trap in Thrace." 42 "As long as the British fleet held this line of deep salt water [the Straits] the war could not be carried into Thrace." ,43 The Pasha agreed with General Harington to confer at Mudania. Here the French represented by M. Franklin-Bouillon deadlocked the Conference by the offer of too great concessions. A British flourish of mili tary might in the Dardanelles released the ensuing deadlock and the way was laid for the Lausanne Treaty to replace that of Sevres. The English Cabinet, when it united on the eve of H Chanak," had publicly resolved to fall, lose allies, bear the howls of the press, but" force the Turk to a negotiated peace before he set foot in Europe." 44 But, at Lausanne, the Turk was re established at Constantinople, he regained much of Eastern Thrace, he shed the tutelage of the (French) Capitulations, he regained sovereignty over the Turkish Straits" under the thinnest 41 Ibid., p. 433.

42 Ibid.J p. 435. 43 Ibid., p. 425. 44 Ibid., p. 423.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 177 of disguises." Churchill wrote that Curzon made skillful use of prestige gained at Chanak to gain certain concessions, for example, "repatriation" of Greeks numbering a million and a quarter (these Greeks had constituted the backbone of Turkish economic life), and excision of Arab provinces from nationalis;t Turkey. The NS's ·reaction is shown in the following comments. The NS said 45 the" war party," "which included the Prime Minister and Mr. Churchill," decided upon " expelling the Turks from the neutral zone by force of arms," (as if the NS believed this!) . General Harington had angered the war party by his negotiations continued "at his own peril." Only deference for popular opinion had checked a move to censure him. ( Churchill writing in 1929 had no anger against Harington to record.) The NS admitted the "precise words" of Harington's instructions were not made public. There is no doubt but that the N S favored Russia's aspirations toward Santa Sophia and was not prepared to encourage Turkish hegemony on the Straits. It took the usual position: Against its own Government, against the national forces, and in favor of Russia. The old Sultan was a " push over" for Russia.

It was no doubt difficult even then for the uninitiated to ascer tain what the NS's objectives were. It opined that the" wrong headed" policy was "not wholly unintelligible." It would be easy to whip the Turks at Chanak and restore British and Christian prestige, " for it is certainly undesirable that the Turks should remain under the illusion that they can challenge Europe with impunity." But British prestige did not need such meas ures-only "honesty and commonsense." The Government was_ expected to argue the Turks out of their .position, not fight. "We are not the sentimental people we were ten years ago . . . not inclined to regard dead British soldiers as sufficient justification for any expenditure." 46 Churchill's success in setting up Kemal Pasha to guard the Straits was a hard blow NS took the trouble 45 NS, XX (October 7, 1922),1 f. 4:8 NS, XX (October 7, 1922), 1. It would seem to stand for containing Kemal but not for fighting him. I t was against Lloyd George's pro-Greek stand so probably thought of Kemal as a means of curbing Greek aspirations, too. (A weak Greece meant aid and comfort to the Soviets.) 178 'Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 to feign to ignore. The Turk was not a threat to Europe but a road block to Red Russia.

As in several other places, the N S writer insinuated that the Coalition was not made up of Englishmen or gentlemen,-" our Welsh-Tory Government." The confusion is only apparent and is part of the psychological technique by which Socialists sought to capitalize on feelings of inferiority induced in those whom they criticized. 47 Noteworthy, also, from the point of view of method, is the remark that "a few calm lies of the inspired 'Political Corre spondent' variety" would have served Downing ·Street better than'" very angry" outbursts of chagrin. (Evidently, the" war party" was suspected by the N S of making a show of chagrin over peace at Chanak.) The NS itself used the device of the "correspondent." It seems on this occasion to have been misled by a " Student of Politics" who had served Downing Street as a rager, "inspired" or not, over the Chanak business. 48 We see, however, that the Government concealed its purposes from Bolshe vik sympathizers and began to develop a new buffer in Kemal Pasha's Turkey. Kemal knew he could have been ruined at Chanak. .Now the Cabinet (Lloyd George had had to relinquish his pro-Greek policy) as well as a Fabian' spokesman, for a dif ferent reason, favored the Turks. The Fabian ,would give Turkey .under the Sultan" self-determination "-so that it could determine to go freely into the orbit of the Bolshevik Government; instead, the Government mastered Kemal Pasha and so Turkey was built into an " independent" bulwark against a Russia forever yearning toward Holy Sophia on the Bosphorus.

Whether the N S knew better or not, it kept up the allegation that the Government was war-mongering. October 14, 1922,49 "all [was] over in Chanak." Harington had used Nelson's trick of turning a blind eye; "if he had carried out the Cabinet's in structions . . . vve should have been plunged into war with Turkey." Lloyd George was claiming the honors of a peace maker after warlike" ultimatums and manifestos" to the Jugo47 Ibid., p. 1 f. ~8 Ibid., p. 2. 49 NS, XX (October 14, 1922),33 f.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 179 slavs and the Dominions. "But the British public knows Mr. Lloyd George and is waiting to register its opinion". on his "peace-making" and Near East "bungling." "We are never inclined to be prophetic upon any question," so the NScould not say if there would be a general election that year or not. Discussing Lausanne, the N S revealed its pro-Russian bent which it did not emphasize, in its attitude toward Turkish " self determination" before the Chanak denouement December 16, 1922,50 the .Russians were wrathy. The Government should pla cate them and recognize the Soviet Government. A week later,51 the terms of Lausanne were revealed. "Freedom of. the Straits" the NS termed a hollow, if not mischievous, triumph for as serted British naval power. Fabian C. M. Lloyd contributed " The Danger in the Near East" for the February, 1923, issue.52 He compared IJausanne and the Ruhr, opined that the Government " amid its wrecked hopes of ' tranquillity' [had no] clear policy."

This Fabian friend of Cole blamed the rise of Turkish nationalism on the Treaty of Sevres and on Lloyd George, wh? " nourish [ed] the monster" by his pro-Greek policy. Lloyd found fault with Lord Curzon. for championing the British Straits plan· (sov ereigntY' for Turkey) and rejecting the Russian plan, since to have done so would have made it possible to exert through the Russians "a powerful influence on the Turks." It must be observed that the. allegation that the Government had no policy is unwarranted; that it needed Russian aid with the Turks, is facti tious. That Turkish nationalism was an 'unmitigated evil and a mere accident of Lloyd George's policy is not provable. The edi torial slant of the NS through this period is pronouncedly pro Russian. Had the N S been able. to .force Lloyd George, Russia would be in Constantinople today. Again the pacifist, if not peace-loving strain: In the question of leaving· Mosul (Iraquian protectorate of Britian) to the disposition of the League, Lloyd wrote " the British people do not want to go to war . and will rightly refuse to go to war for [Mosul] ."5.3 50 NS, XX (December 16, 1922),317.

lJINS, XX (December 23,1922),345. ("2 NS, XX (February 3, 1923), 506 f. 53 N S writers apparently claimed a certain assurance of competence to 180 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 The most effective propaganda weapon which pro-Greeks and anti-Bolsheviks used came from "atrocity stories." The NS mininlized such accounts with calm reasoning, naming the agita tion "Gladstonism"; 54 or it employed the dialectical technique of exposing past injuries inflicted upon the present torturers by prototypes of their present victims.55 It offered no constructive suggestions regarding Armenians, victims of Turkish ferocity, unless that of Noel-Buxton (Fabian) embodied in a letter to the NS from the scene was such. The conference at Lausanne from November 20, 1922, to July 17, 1923, grew out of the Chanak. settlement. Lausanne confer ences resulted in the Straits settlement which lasted until Russia's renewed efforts to achieve hegemony for herself at Montreux op ened the "great debate" of 1945-1946. Rather unreasonably, " Chanak " lent itself to those internal forces which were shaping up to a well-grounded Party of Opposition in 1922 heading toward capture of the Government by 1923-1924.

In 1920, the threat of war with Russia caused no dissolution. The efficacy of Labour's threat to "down tools" if war were made against Russia had been augmented by the war-weariness of the populace. In 1922, while ,var-like threats of Fabians against France went unheeded, their criticism of the Government's Turkish policy was seconded in other quarters and resulted in the gauge public opinion. This was a new kind of journalism now permeating bourgeois ranks. It had long been effective in proletariat and doctrinaire milieux. It does not seek to measure public opinion but to create it by polemic. This presuming to speak for" the people" by persons who were not of the people marks the literature of the upper bourgeoisie as unrelia'ble. 54. In reply to a letter writer, the NS's editor remarked, February 10, 1923, "Post war Democracy" was not" Gladstonism." Cf. NS, XX (February 10, 1923), 539. (As of 1950, "dynamic democracy" is not democratic re publicanism.) 55 NS, XX (October 14, 1922), 33. Cf. also, idem. (March 17, 1923), 703, which carried a half-page advertisement of the Society of Friends, plead ing for contributions for food for" Pagachev, a district of Russia adjoining Bazuluk" where the peasants were eating grass. The Quakers paid for the advertisement and the NS made no comment on conditions in the Socialists' new civilization. Mrs. Webb argued in her last years that climatic conditions had caused the later famine of 1932-33. Cf. Margaret Cole, Beatrice Webb, p.179.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 181 end of Lloyd George's rule. Lord Beaverbrook of the Daily Express proclaimed that the situation at Chanak called for resort to the electorate because the leaders in the Coalition Cabinet "meant war!" This was a blow struck upon well-polarized poli tical metal. Already the work for dissolution had been initiated along party lines. In September of 1922, Henderson and Clynes had inserted in the annual report of the Labour Party this con clusion cited by the latter: 56 The sooner the record of this Government is submitted to the electorate, and . . . this Parliament is purged, the better for the welfare of the nation. The Conservatives, having begun in April to re-form their ranks and withdraw from the Coalition, now in October, following the Labour Party's crystallizing pronouncement, recognized that the time was ripe and withdrew from the Coalition, g~ving for reason their disapproval of the Prime Minister's pro-Greek attitude.

Lloyd George on October 19, 1922, resigned the Premiership and Bonar Law consented to head the proposed Conservative Cabinet. The latter shared. the conviction, if he was not the servant of Lord Beaverbrook, that the Government was wrong in its ostensibly anti-Turk policy. The latter had visited the area involved and, after the Greeks' collapse in the projected siege of Angora and their retreat into Smyrna, he took a positive stand against the official policy of England. He learned from an interview with the leaders that "these men [Winston Churchill, Lord Birken head, and Lloyd George] mean war," knowledge which he com municated to Bonar Law. This statesman then wrote a letter to the press, 51 and the sequel is well known. "Chanak" brought the Tories into power but it disclosed the decided pro-Russian attitude of Labour which now became the Opposition. The N5 would have been as little effectual in this as in the matter of France had it not been that Lord Beaverbrook and the Daily Express spread similar views on Turks and Tartars to rapidly increasing numbers of subscribe,rs. The N 5, however, 58 Clynes, op. cit., p. 327.

57 Cf. Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the Press (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1925), p. 49.

182 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 garnered Labour Party strength as the Conservatives swarmed ott from the Coalition, themselves developing a new party spirit. The assumption of an air of chagrin with all the Government's efforts abroad was feelingly expressed, indeed, on December 23, 1922.58 when H all were expected to be cheerful," and the end of the Coalition was the only approved event in a long list of debacles and grievances ascribed to the Coalition :_H Cannes Genoa-Anatolia-Chanak-Lausanne-unemployment." Without discrimination as to the causes of failure or measurement of the extent to which Government and Labour had been agreed on political if not on Socialistic objectives, and with the significant omission of the Irish settlement, this sounded the election drums. The N S was now clear cut: H We have no love and very little respect for the present British Government [now Bonar Law's]."

The downfall of Lloyd George had not been enough. Bonar Law was soon to find his position untenable in his bad state of health and to make way for Stanley Baldwin, May, 1923. The new Prime Minister was Baldwin and not Curzon because of the pres ence and the attitude of Socialist-Labour. According to Lloyd George's secretary, A. J. Sylvester, it was J. C. C. Davidson, Parliamentary Private Secretary to Bonar Law, who underscored in the mind of Lord Stamfordham, the King's advisor, this atti tude of Labour. Davidson had begun to cultivate Baldwin as soon as it became evident Bonar Law's health was precarious. That Webb and Henderson were acquainted with Davidson is a possi bility since the latter had served as P.P.S. in Colonies in 1910 and in both the Exchequer and the Leader's Offices in 1916-1920. The perennial interest of Webb in the ministry for colonies since his clerkship there, and the incumbency of Henderson in the war cabinet w"arrant the inference that Davidson was known to these two Fabians.

The degree of justice to be found in the criticism of the above 58 NS, XX, p. 345. The tensions are reviewed briefly in Churchill's Gathering Storm, p. 20. But the part played by Lloyd George in the agreement of December 5, 1921, and the latter's reliance upon Lord Birkenhead are told in A. J. Sylvester, The Real Lloyd George, pp. 55-66. " Austen quailed, but F. E. [Lord Birken head, who was F. E. Smith] never. He was better even than Churchill in that matter," p. 65.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 183 list of events from Cannes to Lausanne and "unemployment" is impossible to judge and not part of the present task. The identi fication of each name must suffice: At Cannes there met together for the purpo.se of settling the amount of reparations the Germans might produce, Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Bonar Law, and others, with Briand for France, Bonomi for Italy, and Rathenau for Germany. Lord Beaverbrook and L. Guest were observing. Lloyd George had been adamant with Briand on the eve of the Conference and had sent an ulti matum to the French Minister involving even the breaking up of the Conference if a certain interview attributed to Briand and published in a· Belgian paper' was not repudiated. 59 Repudiation came in the. same night. This evidenced the fact that there was no soft sentiment in George's friendly attitude toward Briand. A game of golf in a normal interlude in which the Frenchman and the Italian caused great ·amusement by their inexperience, was used by Briand's opponents in Paris to disparage him as one who was soft with Britain,' and to dissolve his Government. Lost were the effect of the candor and cooperation of Rathenau, the plans for mutual agreement between England and France on repara tions. Only the project of an International Economic Conference to include Russia and to meet at Genoa remained. (As Lorwin's Labor and I nternationalis11J shows, the Labour and Socialist Inter national, as at Berne and Geneva in relation to Versailles, sched uled a concomitant meeting in Genoa.) It is hard to find any reason for Labour Party or Fabian criticism of the Prime Minis ter's views and policies at Cannes. He aimed to satisfy the reasonable demands of Socialists without Socialism, so much so that Churchill accused him of being pro-Bolshevik. 60 On the way home from illfated Cannes, Lloyd George met Poincare only to find that the "greedy, suspicious, grasping Frenchman" had to have. everything" in writing" and the pledged word of England that in the case of threat to Fr~nch security" everything we have, 59 That the series of disruptive publications of half-truths, if examined and checked for sources, would make an indictment of Russia is a likely hy pothesis. It must be borne in mind that all the Socialist organizations who spoke through ILO favored the Russian experiment, if not the Russian way of organizing and the cruelty of Russian methods.

60 Cf. Churchill, The Aftermath l p. 415..

184 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 just as we did in the last war" would be used in behalf of France. 61 This was in January, 1922. On February 25, Lloyd George and Poincare met again. At this time, Conservative criti cism in London was repeated to him by his secretary. The Prime Minister' then wrote a letter to Austen Chamberlain offering to resign in his favor, since he had a large following-of young Con servatives. Chamberlain rejected the suggestion and the -Tories were silenced for the time being, according to Sylvester. Accord ing to Spender, they were busy with the" Cabin Boy's" revolt. This accounts for the quiet period in the Fabian News regarding elections. Conservatives were doing the work and they need only wait, as the bloc des Gauches waited in France. Spender 62 credits the Conservatives' youthful organizer, Sir William Young, with preventing an election from being held in 1922 when the Coalition might easily have been returned. Lord Birkenhead dubbed Young the "Cabin Boy" and his movement, the " Cabin Boy's" revolt.

Lord Curzon and Lloyd George quarrelled but the irascible Lord stayed on to serve in the Foreign Office. Currently, the honors lists revealed that men of war-gotten wealth were making large contributions to Liberal (Lloyd George branch) Party funds. In any case, Conservatives, at this time, headed off a repetition' of the reelection of the Coalition~ So much for "Cannes." As to "Genoa": In April, 1922, thirty-four nations Sent representatives to Genoa, the Conference which was" Lloyd George's Own Child." He was disappointed that Lenin did not come himself. Tchicherin, Litvinoff, and Kassin catne, with Rakovsky the official spokesman. The French, headed by Barthou, were unwilling to have Germany and Russia admitted as equals. At this meeting Mr. Garvin and Sir Maurice Hankey were notably present and Lord Birkenhe~d was at Lloyd George's side, as usual. While a select committee-Sir Sidney Chapman, M. Felcourt, M. Litvinoff, and M. Alphand-was strug gling toward agreement, the ne,vsarrived from London, sent there by a curious news reporter who had followed a "picnic"

to Santa Margherita, that Germany and Russia, through the in61 Sylvester, op. cit., pp. 76 f. 62J. A. Spender, Great Britain: Empire and Commonwealth, 1886-1935 (London: Cassell and Company, 1936), p. 634.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 185 strumentality of Rathenau and Tchicherin, with Litvinoff, had arrived at a secret agreement. The basis of the future Treaty of Rapallo, it was officially announced by Rakovsky and Rathenau. Toward the last days of the Genoa Conference, Lloyd George addressed over seven hundred members of the press and called attention to those who H did not want the Conference to succeed. . . . Quarrelsome people who like to keep up hatred and conflict between nations." All present knew he meant the French. 63 But it was also clear that the Russians had been unmanageable. While the NS scolded that they should be reasonable about property rights, Sylvester wrote in his diary that they were impossible to convince that the occasion was not one on which to make separate agreements with the several assembled nations. But the most un reasonable intransigence came from the French who feared a resurgent Germany and officially detested Russian Reds. Barthou, never a free negotiator, received up to twenty-two telegrams a day from Poincare. The latter made a speech at Bar-Ie-due which ended all hope for success for the Genoa Conference. In contrast with the tolerance for Germany and Russia and the hope for dis armament entertained by the British Prime Minister, Barthou manifested only harshness" in the extreme." . The London Times and the Daily Mail, Northcliffe papers and Francophile, made the political most of the trouble resulting from the French Premier's confusion of the issue of reparations with the Genoa agenda which was economic and monetary. They even announced that Lloyd George had severed the Anglo-French entente. This was one of those disruptive press releases the printed text of which was dis claimable at its source of origin. 64 Although explanatory letters were read in Parliament, the Genoa Conference ended in bootless efforts of Barthou and Sir Edward Griggs (for Lloyd George) to counteract the allegations. All that was achieved was a docu ment which represented a " breathing space " and the surrender of the problem of world peace to the Hague Conference. Only anti French sentiment could have moved the N S to disapprove this final desperate effort and the weekly could hardly have asked for 63 Lord Birkenhead, in attendance unofficially, was living in his moored yacht, and Lord Riddell usually fronted for Lloyd George with the press.

84 Cf. Sylvester, op. cit., pp. 96 f.

186 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 greater effort against the French. (In January, 1923, Bonar Law faced the same difficulties in Paris with Poincare. " Only by the utmost tactful handling did Bonar Law avert an open breach.") 65 Commenting on Genoa, the NS-regretted the Russi~ns sent· not Trotsky or Lenin or Radek, who were comparable in skill at international conferences, the NSsaid, to Lloyd George, but the "childishly provocative," "street corner idealist," Tchitcherin " the Arthur Ponsonby of Russia." 66 This was the only type· of criticism the N S .ever meted out to Russia. After the closing of the Conference in failure, the NS, in line with the Tory press, reported the Entente dead and declared no agreement was possible between England and France on Russia, whose representative evinced an It impossibilism " like that of Poincare. We have seen that the NS encouraged the Trade Unions and the Labour Party to agitate for de jure recognition in order to foster trade with Russia. Now the NS said it was "nonsense" for Russia to ask aid and credit without recognition of the rights of private prop erty.67 The NS seemed let down by the befriended Russians and constrained to placate the property-minded Trade Unionists. That was in spring. By Christmas it threw in " Genoa" for good meas ure and did not spare the British statesmef;l criticism for their failure to achieve the impossible, and the Fabian dissatisfaction with the Coalition was saddled upon Bonar La,v's Ministry. It is clear that at Cannes and Genoa Lloyd George had the same aims as Labour and his failure was hardly of his own making. He had to uphold the Entente; Fabian adverse opinion of France could be boldly spoken.

As to " Anatolia," as Spender points out, there took place there one of the makeshift efforts to deal with a beaten Turkey and with a lost ally, in revolutionary Russia. In 1919, by the Treaty of Sevres, the Turkish Straits had been internationalized and " spheres of influence [assigned] to France, Italy, and Greece in the Turkish homelands of Anatolia." 68 The NS never approved , 85 Sylvester, Ope cit., pp. 67-98. 86 NS, XIX (April 15, 1922), 30. Fabians criticize Fabians freely. Lans bury thought Tchicherin was like the Webbs. 67 NS, XIX (May 20, 1922), 169. 68 A. J.Spender, Ope cit., p. 628. Cf. al~o, ibid., pp. 631-634,· for the Chanak <:risis.

Labour on the Threshold, PiJrt 2 187 ofS~vres. "Anatolia" had another significance; it was the scene of terrible massacres and atrocities early. in 1922 which provoked the Greeks to active war again.69 This was really what brought Churchill back to direct England's policy at Chanak where Britain made the stand.· It was the reaction to Anatolia which led.Churchill to write to Curzon, inApril of 1922, his view that LloydGeorge was working for. Russia at Genoa, which illustrates the view taken here that the Prime Minister had the same aims as Labour: "The great objective of the Prime Minister's policy has been Moscow, to make Great Britain the nation in the closest possible relatjon with the Bolsheviks." 10 He pointed out the fatuousness of the hope for trade advantages which led to " separating ourselves in our atti tude toward Russia from ... the United States and France." This is strqng evidence that Lloyd George was trying again to satisfy the demands of the increasingly vocal Labour element speaking as it did in the NS.

This was the period when in September, 1922, Churchill, Austen C~amberlain, Birkenhead and Horne rallied to the support of Lloyd George in what was ostensibly anti-Turk (if not a pro-Greek) policy. It is to be recalled that a little less than two years before Labour had stopped a move to aid Poland against Russia. There was no threat to boycott a war over Chanak. After" Chanak," the Turk was set up to stop Russia at the Dardanelles, a piece of diplomacy· far more adroit than the patent attempt to stem Bolshe vism in 1920. Fabian spokesmen signalized their sympathy with Russia's drive for· hegemony in the Black Sea regions. Socialist organs never referred to their defeat at this point. As Wolfers says, there are no documents to reveal the struggle for hegemony with France; and· there are none to expose the use of a new force, nationalist Turkey, against Russia looming over all in the East.

The naive support given by theN S to the idea of self-determina tion for Turkey consistently up to I ..ausanne, would never have made sovereign Turkey the stopper where East and West flow together at the Straits. ' We have accounted for themorhid holiday summary, II Cannes, Genoa, Anatolia, Chanak/' As to ." unemployment "-that drew 69 NS refused to be greatly disturbed by the reports of. atrocities. '10 ef. Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 415.

188 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 attention to the forces gathering in England proper, creative of social upheaval. B. EVIDENCE OF THE GROUND SWELL OF FABIAN-LABOUR Many persons, including Lord Beaverbrook, believed that the Chanak crisis was the cause of the Dissolution of 1922.71 It was the immediate cause but the underlying cause was less apparent. The underlying cause was also the reason why the election of 1922 was indecisive and led to that of 1923. The behavior of the Fabian News is significant. Fabians on the NS level kept large issues before· the electorate, while the Fabian News like a little tug working about a freighted nlerchantman, churned the domestic waters. Dissolution had been deeply desired, when, in October, 1921, a whole year before the crisis, Fabian News called for names of prospective candidates, not necessarily for publication, " in view of the approach of a General Election." 72 Then, " many signs and portents" suggested to members the same idea one month later.

It was announced that forty prospective candidates had been ap proved and would be helped out of the Fabian Election Fund. This fund was justified, Fabian News stated, from its history. Started in 1892, it had been efficacious in 1910 and 1918.13 In December, 1921, reference was made to "the approaching election." Names had come in and the list was still open; funds \vere sought.74 By January, 1922, Executive approval for the collection of funds had 71 " Lausanne" in the formula of grievance was the first abortive confer ence; when the second transpired it met little Fabian fault-finding. A glance at the N S for December 2, 9, and 16, 1922, will show the Fabian mouthpiece expressing encouragement of Russian claims to hegemony of the Black Sea area (NS, XX, pp. 253 f, 285, 317). By February 10 (ibid., p. 533 ff, the NS was in favor of acceptance of the Curzon settlement; it found France (which had an eye on Anatolian railways) and not the "Marquess Curzon"

the villain of the piece. The NS did not like the situation in the Straits (Turkish armed sovereignty) nor the settling of the Greeks in Western Thrace but it was visibly changing over to acceptance of the Draft Treaty and by March 24, 1923 (ibid., p. 710), still blaming France for recalcitrance while pointing out her helplessness, the NS admitted that respect must be shown the" tiger" Turk if only for his" inconvenient passion for freedom." 12 FN, XXXII :10 (October, 1921). The Election came about a year later. 13 FN, XXXII :11 (November, 1921). 74 FN, XXXII :12 (December, 1921).

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 189 been received and, although Fabian News professed to have" no more knowledge than anyone else as to when " the general election might come, it was said that those candidates would receive finan cial assistance who had Labour Party approval· and that of all the trustees of the Fabian campaign funcl(all the members of the Fabian Executive). 75 The list of approved candidates had grown by about twenty more names by February .. In April, it was re marked that all Labour candidates would need help" in the event" of a general election. Probably the dull tone was indicative of the f~ct that Fabians were watching the" Cabin Boy" revolt,76and that Genoa and Lausanne offered too great a challenge. Their irrespon sible pro-Soviet views must have pained themselves as Englishmen. Upon this subject there was nothing more in Fabian News until November, 1922, when the campaign was in full swing., Then, the help asked was specified as "personal service" and use of vehicles. Funds received were more abundant than anticipated.

There were now fifty-four candidates. Names long familiar to one who has followed Fabian fortunes over the years of their history recurred upon the .list. As we have seen above, ten out of the fifty-six Fabians were successful: D. Adams, Clement Attlee, Noel..;Buxton, William Graham, Arthur Greenwood, G. Lansbury, H. Snell, J. Stewart, B. Tillett, Sidney Webb. Hender son came in at a by-election. From seventy-six Labour members, the Parliamentary representation of Labour rose toone hundred and· forty-two (out of· four hundred and. fifteen Labourcandi dates) .77 Other familiar Fabian names figuring in the .. election and not hitherto mentioned, or seldom remarked, were: .Ethel Bentham, G. P. Blizard, Hugh Dalton, J. P. Davies, J. A. Lovatt Fraser, A. Susan Lawrence, J~ J. Mallon, H. T .. Muggeridge, Mrs. Marjorie (Wedgwood) Pease, F. W. Pethick:-Lawrence, H. W. Samuels (a barrister, authority on labor law; not Viscount H. L. Samuel, ,who was a close friend of the Webbs), Frank Smith,· Ernest T4urtle, T. S.B. Williams.

75 FN, XXXII:l (January, 1922). This set-up was patently such as to insure Fabian control of Labour candidates who had not the immediateback ing of union funds. 76 Loc. cit., p. 202. 77 FN, XXXIII :12 (December, 1922).

190 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 Perhaps it was only coincidence that the election of 1923 fol"" lowed a barrage of books attacking Capitalism. Conservatives were not unaware of the power of such an attack to articulate a party-to draw strength away from Liberals and increase that of Labour. TheWebbs' new book, The Decay of Capitalist Civili zation,78 had sold out its first edition. With its "theory of the leisure class" it linked itself to Thorstein Veblen's thesis, which the Webbs recommended,79 and to John M. Keynes' "ringing phrases," for example, "The war has disclosed the possibility of consumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to many." Re j ecting Marx's "pretentious blunders in .abstract economic theory," it endorsed his" presenting the drama of modern civili sation with the bourgeois as the villain of the piece." 80 While the Webbs apologized for destructive criticism they offered a very positive incentive to the labor-electorate, the picture of a governtnent which could "feed' and clothe and house and equip them for peaceful and fruitful production if the same steely in centive [the war effort,-meaning force] were applied." Like re sorting to unorganized sabotage, " moral remonstrance and virtuous indignation are useless; if the game is to be one of pull-devil-pull baker . . . capitalism . . . will die by violence, and civilisation will perish with it from exhaustion." The worker was not to destroy civilisation along with Capitalism. With the ideas went a strategy: First the Party, then .the Labour Government; the, former produced by an attractive platform and the latter by a compromised program. Then the law must produce a "steely incentive."

The events and current problems of this election year brought to the shelves of the Fabian Bookshop works of famous ex Fabians: Graham Wallas' Our Social Heritage, H. G" Wells' Washington and the Hope of Peace; J. A. Hobson added Incen18 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The Decay of Capitalist Civilization (Lon don: Fabian Society, 1923). They proffered gratitude to "our oldest friend and comrade, Mr. Bernard Shaw, who kindly undertook the revision of the proofs in the midst of .a General Election when we were otherwise engaged," p. v. The election was that of 1922. 79 Ibid., p. 33. 8Q Ibid., pp. 165 f. This is the theme of Heartbreak House.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 191 tives in the New Social Order and his Problems of a New World.81 In regard to these last named books, Hobson was applying to specific problems his theories which F. W. Galton clarified in 1923; 82 Excessive saving operates through deficient demand for commodities to slacken the sinews of production and produce more capital goods than are able to be put to full productive use. There was, he said, too much saving, and general overproduction ; old theories of credit. and prices did not account for business cycles. He sharpened the Keynesian outline. The books entered into the creation of Party and platform. Fabian eclecticism found no difficulty in contemplating simul taneously the Hobson and Keynes problem related to excessive production, and the Webb and Keynes idea of encouraging vast production by government to care for a total population, as the government cared for an army in wartime. The Fabian creed of no-orthodoxy lent itself to selectivity; ideas that were solvents of the old order and indifferent to the divine origin of Natural Law, and propositions which urged social stratification in an artificial economic regimen for which Socialism supplied. a cohesive ele ment, met with Fabian agreement. The 1920's were the years of corrosion of capitalistic institutions. The 1930's were to be the years of discussion of Planning.

So the arrangement of lists of candidates, funds and constitu encies went on, together with the heavy barrage of anti-Capitalist ideas; and the tiny Fabian News discovered these large factors. Letters, too, served to reveal much: There was talk about coalescence with Liberals which only pointed up the fact of their lost identity. The intellectual leadership was divided on the point of collaboration with Liberals. A. W. Humphreys, a Fabian 81 Cf. also, S. G. Hobson, Pilgrim to the Left (New York: Longmans Green and Company, 1938). S. G. Hobson was a Guild Socialist and left the Society before· World War 1. J. A. Hobson was a keener student of psy chology than Wallas. These great ex-Fabians continued to be studied by Fabians. 82 FN, XXXIV:4 (April, 1923). Galton had served his apprenticeship in Fabianism as secretary for research for Mrs. Webb for many years.

192 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 and Labourite of some note,83 wrote to the editor taking strong' exception to the views of the NS of the week just past 84 which had found "no division of opinion between Liberal and Labour Parties," as Humphreys quoted, "on all questions of foreign policy and on nearly all questions of domestic policy." He thought the outlook of Asquith and Grey would prove an obstacle to joint effort in the event of such coalescence and he pointed out the impossibility of agreement from Liberals upon the Capital Levy, Unemployment, Nationalisation, and some other items. The important thing about this was the insertion of comment within the published letter by the NS editor: Can you, Sir, imagine Mr. Asquith, Lord Grey, Lord Cowdray, Lord Crewe, Mr. Runciman, ... sponsoring such a measure in. the House of Commons? [Certainly we can.-Ed., NS]. When, where and through whom has the Liberal Party given adhesion to the principle of work or maintenance? [The influential Manchester Liberals have declared for it.-Ed., N S]., . . . Do you claim that the Liberal Party stands fpr nationalisation?

[Many Liberals certainly do-probably most-in the lines of the Sankey Report.--..;..Ed.,NS] .85 Mr. Humphreys worried: "Whether Labour is to make clear its distinction from Liberalism touches the whole spirit and purpose with which it is going into this election." .86 The· standpoint taken by Humphreys was expressed in sterner tones by Walter Scobell, Vice-President of the Frome Divisional Labour Party. He asked space for his letter as "voicing the feelings of avery large pro portion of the electorate." He said the proposal of coalescence 88 A. W. Humphreys', History of Labour Representation was among the books to be. consulted by the Tutorial Classes on Policy and Principles of the Labour Party which were conducted by Sidney Webb II in response to numer ous requests" starting in May, 1918. 84. Reflection upon the speed and dispatch of .the rejoinder and comment suggests a bit of collusion: sentimental socialists who' abhorred Liberalism and. mere Reformism, had to be reassured. Either the Humphrey letter was a plant, so that reassurance should be swift, or the editor showed uncommon dispatch.

85 NSjXX (October 28,1922), 104 f. 86 Ibid.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 193 with Liberals presented " glaring contrast to the hectic refusals of such a suggestion by the Trade Union and Labour leaders at their respective conferences this year." A truce would be a "moral betrayal since Liberalism was directly opposed to Labour's ultimate goal of the Socialist Commonwealth." Liberals saw in trade a "contest" for "domination" leading to "defense" and military contests. Scobell wrote: Your objective is a basis of agreement whereby the legis lative machine can be captured and held for a period of years. Our immediate object is the first round of a fight [therefore]. . . . Truce and·· Coalition will only hinder the steady progress [toward] our ultimate goal, our immediate objective, which was, while keeping king and anthem along with the Red Flag song, the Socialist Commonwealth. Before the war, " Labour was the child which pushed Liberalism forward," now the "Radical Wing" has been lost forever. Rich Radicals, Scobell wrote, made the sacrifices of going through the needle's eye into the Labour camp. " We have no place for those who will not make the sacrifice." 87 The opinions of Humphreys and Scobell exemplified the injured idealism of socialist-labor, harried by Fabian opportunism. They also served to signal that Fabians remained Socialists while the Party they led must compromise and perhaps live with Liberals a little longer.

A Fabian problem was revealed in this correspondence. Whereas the NS offered a strategy, the dissident response con tained no programme save to fight· on pure principle and with none of the pragmatic compromise which Beatrice Webb mourned. " How Far is "Intrigue Permissible? " she asked her diary in 1922, when engaged in· retrospect. 8~ It is important to note these elements in Labour Party thinking because of their bearing upon future political events. Whether Fabians were confused and ultimately opportunistic, or skilled in finding the lead strings in opposing groups, must be the reader's conclusion. Perhaps they thought Liberalism was· dead, never to rise and reclaim the domi81 Ibid. 88 Cf. Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership, p. vi.

194 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 cile which Fabianism had appropriated. Taking cognizance of the N S's warlike attitude toward France and the fighting language of Labourites, brings the reflection that Fabian leadership permitted and waited for every such expression, indulged in fighting talk itself, then came forward with strategic oil for a peaceful surface. In the matter of the letters, the N S,89 in agreement with the left wing of the Party, replied it would be better if the Labour Party abstained from office for another decade. However, not Party interest but national consideration must guide it and the argument of leaders of Labor proved their inability " to realize the national responsibilities of a Party which ostensibly seeks to express the national will." Fabians spoke to unionists and to Socialists, pure political science, seeking to impose unity on the incongruous elements in the Party.

As was noted above in another connection, under the leadership of Fabians, the Party was in a position to dictate a part of the policy by which it "vas Stanley Baldwin and not Lord Curzon who suc ceeded the ailing Bonar Law. Baldwin's vulnerability could not have been unperceived. The last word, "unemployment" in the Scrooge-like Christmas message of 1922 bore divisive implica tions. There would have to be a showdown on Protection. Churchill thought that Baldwin undertook a preventive attack on the problem to cut off a resurgence of Lloyd George's prestige. Churchill was to write that Baldwin was a more perfect Socialist than MacDonald. 90 This opinion merely serves here to show why Fabians would support Baldwin and not the admirable but stub born Cttrzon. Sylvester points to Bonar Law's Parliamentary Private Secretary, J. C. C.Davidson, as the agent of the Baldwin cause to Lord Stamfordham. Davidson's personal ambition found its reward in both the 1923 and 1925 Baldwin Cabinets. He would not have to be an intimate acquaintance of MacDonald, Webb, or Henderson or the other Fabians, his colleagues in Parliament, to know that it was shrewd politics to run with the current and that its force was real. Ronaldshay depicts the part played by Labour in the defeat of Curzon: It \vas Lord Stamfordham's unpalatable task to convey --~89 NS, XX (October 28, 1922), 94.

90 Cf. Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 21.

Labour on the Threshold, Part 2 to Lord Curzon the decision of the King that, since the Labour Party constituted the officia,lOpposition in the House of Commons and were unrepresented in the House of Lords, the objections to a Prime Minister in the Upper Chamber were insuperable. 91 195 Curzon himself had expressed this principle in 1917. The NS said that nobody wanted Curzon because his manners were so bad. It is remarkable, how Labour spokesmen covered their tracks, at this moment of greatest importance when the class forming the Socialist-led Labour Party settled with finality a constitutional question regarding the class o~ the Premier-a question left dangling since the days of Salisbury. In any case, it could not be expected that a proud and sensitive character such as Curzon's should be discriminatingly evaluated by Fabian publicists. Lord Curzon himself wrote: "the Opposition party in the House of Commons being in the majority a Labour party, the King thought that· the Head of the Government must be there to answer them." 92 Blanche Dugdale's 93 narrative supports this exposition, adding only that Lord Balfour confirmed the King's views from his own experience as leader in Salisbury's day, and noting that four of the IVIinisters \vere peers. In fact, politicians of the bourgeois n1entality who \vere well·able to gauge the ground-swell, Mr. ·Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Bridgeman, Home Secretary, had expressed to Lord Salisbury their hope that Baldwin would succeed Bonar Law. The" root of unrest" was pushing against the edifice of the constitution.

91 Ronaldshay, op. cit., pp.352 and 367. 92 Ibid. 93 Blanche Dugdale, Ope cit., pp. 360 £.