VII - Uses of "Protection" Part II: Coming into Power

CHAPTER VII USES OF "PROTECTION," PART 2: COMING INTO POWER A. AN OVERVIEW The Conservative Party, attempting to take the measure of Labour, could see that while Fabians gave currency to a view friendly to Communists regarding Germany, the Labour Party could be relied upon to work with Stresemann; and on the domes tic scene, while Labour encompassed the socializers and the im pudent left-wingers, in general it could be expected to perform like another political party. While the scene in the present chapter lies in the field of domestic politics-an area never unaffected by decisions regarding the Dominions and colonies, and one impos sible to isolate from continental policy-the principal study herein is the peculiar nature of the Party which Fabians built as a robot to express themselves. Although in this chapter data used above reappears, its relation to the whole is different. The accent here is on small items the significance of which would be lost unless the reader were provided with the larger perspective of the preceding treatment. Again the dates run from points back of the point of arrival at power, to find the underlying rapport between Labour and Conservative forces, and the part played by Fabians in this rapport.

In the ensuing discussion of Fabian Socialism in a three-Party field, the following points will come to notice: The effect upon the political parties of having a national " three party" experience in which one Party, only nominally political, was led by pragmatic Socialists who based their premises upon secular sociology, de fined their Socialism as a " purpose underlying a tendency," and evinced a philosophy becoming totalitarian. That the third Party was much like a secular religion was the result of politicizing the economic ordering of society. Traditional political thought was baffled by the new ethos, a quasi-religious fervor animating. a 245 246 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 social centre and invading politics. The experience of political campaigns produced two effects: Clearer articulation of " Labour" which was the precipitate resulting from the compounding of socio-economic fennent and politics, and a new form of Toryism showing the influence of this climate of socio-political opinion.

Liberalism went into eclipse. It lost its identity as methodological opposition to Conservatism and kept only the potentially mis chievous position where it supported either side at will.1 Outside of their unreconcilable philosophies, Toryism and Labour became so alike that in the future one must absorb the other or the ten sions purposely created to maintain differences would create a civil war. Of course, at the philosophical level, Socialism was revolt; " Labour" was anomaly. Here the preparation is made for 1926 and 1931. The third Party forecast the One-Party. The One Party is a chimera but the results in a civilization of development in face of a chimera are alien cultural products. The election was projected on the part of Conservatives to break Labour leadership of Opposition and to garner the liberal or " reform" voting strength, thus freed, for a newly-wise Con servative Party. Fabian leadership of Labour under attack as sumed a "tranquillity" of its o\vn and acknowledged that the Baldwin policy was the same as its own, that only the " spirit"

,vas different in the opposing forces. This assumed tranquillity had for its reason the possibility of agreement with Russia (look ing toward recognition) and the containment of France. Occa sional eruptions of "\vild" Labour feeling had to be disciplined by the intellectual leadership. Meantime, the " ruling class" (the Churchill-Birkenhead type) evinced a forthright way of dealing with" Reds" and" Bolsheviks" without such delicate distinctions as Fabians made. 1 Cf. Sir Harry Slesser, A History of the Liberal Party (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1944), pp. 164 f. He concludes: "if it be false [that Liberalism has converted the other two Parties] the failure of Liberal ism may prove to be an unqualified disaster." He had also said, "a resurrec tion of Liberalism ... may depend upon the possibility of the recapture of the vision of the basic invaluable quality of personality," and he indicated the surrender of juridical determination in civic functions to the adminis trative bureaucracy, inevitable when both other Parties should agree on the surveillance and education of the individual and his welfare.

Uses of It Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 247 With the rising possibility of achieving greater power 2 in Opposition (and with the hope not to have to lead H. M.'s Gov ernment so soon), Fabian editorial policy brushed aside the Churchillian reaction as being too obvious. The Tory conversion to a H Collectivism" which embodied the concepts of the share holder government along w"ith Imperial preference, was for Socialist" a greater menace than the Churchill reaction which now could but divide the Liberals the more; and it became imperative for Fabians to place a stumbling block for Conservative prestige. They must induce Tories to fall into some form of reactionary blundering: Conservatives might revive the veto power of Lords, or legislate the reduction of political power of Trade Unions. Eventually, the only "reactionary" thing in which the Tories remained vulnerable was the question ot tariffs, one on which Fabians were also divided and vulnerable. Long before the Cabinet themselves tentatively raised the question, the Fabian press worried "Protection" out of news and gossip; but when " Protection" was finally offered as a challenge, there arose a pos sibility that that part of Labour which found tariffs a not un mitigated evil might follow the Bald\vin thesis toward a solution of Unemployment. To all appearances, " Protection" was a term of doubtful meaning but as a challenge it was productive of an election obviously designed to reduce Labour's new strength. It put in power a Labour Governn1ent ,vhich stood long enough to turn the tide in Europe before being sent to Coventry if not into the wilderness -for five years. But before that happened, the ex perience of 1923 had taught Conservatives (minus their die-hards) and Labourites '(minus their scene-makers) that they had much in common~always with that difference which a philosophy of Socialism made in men of politics.

Fabian Henderson forced the challenge and clinched the half determination of Mr. Baldwin. Fabian writers produced the slogan: "Protection versus Labour." Yet both sides knew that tariffs "were a weapon against France, the Fabians' bete-noir,. and 2 It has appeared that Labour in Opposition had great power. This was already true when Lloyd George formed the Coalition. Then he feared their Opposition and so sought to bring them into the Government. Cf. Thomas, Ope cit., p. 43.

248 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 that Protection would boomerang against English farmers. (Fabians acknowledged· neglecting the farm problem.) 3 Both sides were informed by an ulterior motivation: The Tory for " itnperial" exchange under Capitalism; Labour for such Dominion cooperation as looked toward a world order and Social istic internationalism. 4 On one side was the slogan" free competi tion " under tariffs-'-the Government being a shareholder; on the other, "free trade," a shibboleth-controls being sought in an international trade axis through State Capitalism. Knowing that the discussion of " empire preference" would by its revelations create poor inter-Dominion harmony, the Fabian leadership of Opposition headed by J. R. Clynes used "Un employment" as the reason for urging an October meeting of Parliament sin1ultaneously with the Imperial Conference, no doubt to be in a position to propagandize the Labour tenets. 5 "Credit"

rather than" Preference" was becoming the underlying principle of the Fabian fiscal policy. So we see the technique of this Socialist Society demonstrated in trying to find the Conservatives guilty of class-minded blunders, while chiding. its own " left-wing" for developing class-configura tions. We see the NS dropping the Capital Levy as not an elec tion issue, and bringing forward an industrial programme as set forth by. the in-and-out Fabian whose Guild-Socialist views it rejected, G. D. H. Cole. We see that Labour had for tactics boundless eloquence flowing from convinced economic determin ism and a crusading enthusiasm which elicited services and goods in place of funds. The factors of Party unity were published for the N S readers: Voting statistics, the manipulation of class-differentials, the pro gramme and a philosophy. In the face of some examples of massS Reported in the U. S. News and World Report (June 11, 1949) is Labour's tentative plan to nationalize farms.

4. J. H. .Thomas almost singlehanded clung to the effort to achieve Dominion cooperation. Cf. the account in Snowden, op. cit., II, pp. 774 f, and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 205 ff. 5 The repercussions in Africa, India, and Canada were notable. Cf. NS, passim, 1923 and 1924. Cf. especially Lord Olivier's letter to, the leader of the Swarajists in Madras, against" communal representation H. and endorsing the policies of Morley and Montague. NS, XXIII, 209 f.

Uses of It Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 249 manipulated and near-riotous polling, the promise of great smooth ness in government was, not unreasonably, made. The Asquith story is illustrative. The techniques of social control were matur ing :-A synthetic riot is a piece of very skilled control. There were to emerge from the Election two forces: Political Conservatism and Socialist-Labour. The latter absorbed the position if not the substance of that "Centre" which Lloyd George and Churchill cerebrated. Labour moved in a quasi religious mood. Fabians wrote of "England," the "constitu tional " way, the typical Prime Minister, the" race," the" nation." Readers at home should fear no change. Abroad, however, some as far away as India looked for a new order. 6 Too soon; but in Europe the dynamism of the Left was captured for the nonce. Anyone going through the materials of this story. can see why the Fabian Government was characterized by unstable equilibrium and easily overthrown a year later. The Party tried to be "constitu tional " and patriotic. It was in reality a secular religion, and out of place" in politics." 7 So far, in a manner, we have presented hypotheses. The documentation for this survey follows. First, however, we should see the position of the" third party" in the political field. The" third party/' Socialist-Labour, was one of equivocal nature and often it manifested dual attitudes.

B. THE THIRD PARTY: ITS EQUIVOCAL NATURE It has been thought that the Baldwin Ministry committed " suicide" at the end of 1923. Close study of the Fabian organ which led the. Labour Party intellectually does not clear up the 8 The expectations of India, for example, are voiced in the Fabian organ, NS, XXIII, passim, but cannot be discussed here. The gold-and-credit standard under which the ruling classes of India, in competent understanding of the English ruling class, debased India's silver .after 1924, was the standard of Fabians as well as Tories. Under .such a standard the ll.lasses were controlled. While the struggle went on between India and England for political power, a Socialist-labour ethos was rising all the while under the· guidance of those represented by Annie Besant, now again a Fabian. In 1931; silver was again rejected in favor of credit, by Fabians for TUC. Cf. LYB (1931), 105-109.

7 Cf. again Richard V. Burke, " A Conception of Ideology for Historians," The Journal of tke History of Ideas, X:2 (April, 1949), 183-198,note 38.

250 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 problem entirely but it reveals that the action of the Baldwin Ministry was not party suicide, and that the issue was not so much Protection as Unemployment involving far-reaching external im plications and internal contradictions. From the internal contra dictions an unbearable situation arose. The conflict lay between those who in the past-Tory or Lib eral-had guided Britain in the world of trade and diplomacy, and the new Labour ethos forming a " third" Party. (It is quite in keeping to speak on the one hand ·of an ethos and on the other, of persons.) At the time, the Cabinet divided on new lines-Tory versus Die-hard-a struggle ultimately seated in agricultural versus urban Toryism. This normal dispute Labour's publicists saw and exploited; but it was not the underlying fissure in the philosophical basis of British political life.

On the surface it might seem that the Opposition which was powered by a new young movement shared all the ideal objectives of both old parties; but socialists remained unsatisfied with the order in which all found themselves. Labour" intellectuals" were capable of making subtle distinctions between method and means, so that Labourite and Tory seemed to be at loggerheads while actively pursuing the same societary ends. The activity in each case arose from a philosophy. The pursuit was inspired by reasons ,vhich must be productive of cultural effects quite diverse. Conservatives (and old school Liberals) conceived of politics and of the political arts as the habiliments of the State. Their ancestral pattern, taken from Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, re tained the imperative, " Render to Caesar! " so accepted the State and political virtue objectively as an organism and a technique fitted for the service of society and the embodiment of divine Authority and order. The philosophy of Socialist-Labour was an end-pro duct of rationalist-liberalism: It did not view the State objectively; so it could not use political science as anything but a means to power for social control. It did not articulate the State as an en tity separate from society, nor respect political science as the ser vant of the inviolahle State. Actually, the philosophies of the Con servative and of the Labour Parties were antithetical; but in 1923, only a vague fear of " revolution !" measured the difference be tween them. Dispute, e.g., on "Protection" conjured up instead a false alike-ness capable of fatally deceiving the nation. TheretoUses of U Protection," Part 2 : Coming into Power 251 fore, the Conservative reaction had tried to pin down the wrestling force; but each time the giant with the middle-class brain struck the earth, contrary to Conservative expectations, he arose with new strength. In 1923, he was put in harness for Tory good purposes, but briefly.

The atmosphere of 1923 was very different from the matutinal freshness of the rise of Socialism in 1919 when the Capital Levy and the profiteers stood forth to do battle. Now Socialism in party politics was "larnin' to be a twoad" in the political pond-to straddle issues and live amphibiously, on tariffs or no tariffs. Call ing itself "Left," the Labour Party was by nature a socio-eco nomic" centre." It too harnessed its own" left," the sentimental Socialists, to its own good purposes. On the domestic front party activity produced exact articulation; and out of the inchoate party materials came three clear forces: Socialism-with-Labour, Liberalism with its memories, Conserva tism with new life and power. Out of the interaction of these parties came the power which ruled England until World War II, the Baldwin-MacDonald unspoken understanding. We have seen the ambiguous Labour Party exercising itself in questions regard ing Russia, France, Germany, also the entrance of America upon the scene, which was closely related to domestic politics. And out side that periphery, never overlooked but not brought under im mediate interpretation, lay Ireland, Egypt, India, and Singapore, 8 8 There was some discussion about South Africa. Smuts in his interna tional actions was a hero to the Fabians and trusted by them to bring about the order they desired without their surrendering to the demands of "im perialism" as the majority of Fabians did in 1902. The Fabian Colonial Bureau was extremely active. East and Central Africa came in for deep study. South Africa was a political problem complicated by Socialist anti racism and Fabian affection for Smuts. Cf. NS, XXII (November 17, 1923), 166. Cf. also, NS, XXIII (April-October, 1924). Again cf. Lord Olivier, Imperial Trusteeship, Fabian Tract No. 230 (London: Fabian Society, 1929) ; also R. C. Hawkins, Central Africa and The League of Na tions, Fabian Tract No. 186 (London: Fabian Society, 1918). Smuts' African Monroe Doctrine was endorsed. Yet when he was overthrown in 1924, the editor did not repine but advised encouragement for a Labour Government in South Africa. Cf. NS, XXIII (April-October, 1924).

Through 1923 and 1924 the Labour-guiding N S was adamant against the fortification of and maintaining of an effective fleet at Singapore. It con252 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919~1931 where the inconsistencies of Fabian practice with Fabian thought were glaring. We here propose to sift the materials in the first two categories only-domestic and dominion affairs-to show how the Fabians worked and what social forces were put into action. The parallels between 1919~1931 and 1939-1949 are striking. If history were merely repeating itself it would be wasted effort to write of· the first date span; but, more than mere parallelism, there is definite continuity. That the continuity was not broken by the unparalleled catastrophes which befell the Labour Party in 1924 and 1931, as the student of the later time-span will find, Labour owes thanks to the Fabian Society. By the end of 1923, when power was thrust upon the Labour Party, the character of Fabian-led Socialism stood fully revealed. This character was evinced by the attitudes as sumed .in reporting domestic affairs and in the techniques demon strated in the use of foreign affairs to produce the tools of domestic control. On the part of Labour the purpose of gaining domestic control or using Fabianism's inherent forces internally had the concomitant objective to create an external front, a Labour front in nations proximately related to England on an economic basis ..

Why was there another General Election in the winter of 1923? It must be said that Labour rank and file seemed not to know why but was made very strongly suspicious that the reason was to take preventive action against Labour by N S reporting. By. their daring to raise " Protection" as a challenge, Conservatives dis closed the fact that they ,vere aware of their own strength, seeing Liberals divided into Asquithians and Lloyd Georgians, and seeing Labour but thinly covering its own weak seams where Scottish ILP members shied away from the English Trade Union dominance, while in Parliament they but uncomfortably mingled with the " intellectual" Socialists who were Fabians. Aware of the potential divisiveness of the question of tariffs among Labour Party mem bers themselves, the Conservatives knew, too, that Labour had no ceped the Japanese paramount interest and noted their infiltration. It advo cated keeping only enough air power to "bargain " with France. Cf. NS, XXII (October 20, 1923), 44, and ibid. (November 3, 1923), 105 £; also, see NS,XXI (May 12, 1923), 129, and NS (June 30, 1923), 349. In NS, XXII, 688, the editor advocated leaving the Japanese. question in the Pacific to the United States and letting Australia defend itself.

Uses of It Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 253 Party funds. The To.ries had stolen enough thunder from reform movements to entertain the hope of replacing Liberals in the coalescence which Labour must make with one group or the other. This way, they might garner popular support, or better, draw Lib Lab membership to their side,· 'away from Socialist and Trade Union leadership. Any politician could gauge by the momentum the fact that Labour was heading toward a climax. Webb said it would triumph in 1926. If Tories intended to break Labour, they did not reckon acutely enough upon the flexibility of Fabian leader ship which was able to keep Labour ranks intact by synthesizing all antithetical theses and unifying the diverse parts of the Labour Movement. The awareness of political possibilities on the part of the NS kept Labour Party members of the "worker by brain" type in touch with Cabinet news, some of it quite intimate. The N S picked Baldwin to replace Bonar Law before the country was fully aware of the imminence of the latter's resignation. Baldwin's commonplace talent was preferred by the NS to Curzon's "purring felinities." 9 Curzon would have brooked no dictation from Fab ians. NS divulged mysterious overtures to Chamberlainites on the part of the ailing Prime Minister. Of course, to approach the Chamberlains was to sidle up to tariff restoration. The N S noted the swarming off of Lloyd George's party, and its rupture with Labour-to fight the "red peril "-leaving only a remnant of Liberals to coalesce with Lal;>our.1o Nowhere did the NS reveal the part played by the OppQsition in the King's rejection of Curzon for Prime Minister. The definitive biography of Sidney Webb may tell the story. The biographer of Curzon is sure Labour was accountable for Curzon's disappointment. At first sight, the fact that Salisbury in the House of Lords was backing Baldwin against Curzon would seem to have no special significance. But Salisbury had been Lord Privy Seal, 1903-1905, when the Liberals to whom was addressed Sidney Webb's "Intercepted Letter" routed the Tories. While the NS exposed the fact that already Baldwin Was running the political nlachine along with Neville Chamberlain and Sir Douglas Hogg, it remarked that Curzon, save for his 9 NS,XXI (Apri128, 1923),68.

10 NS, XXI (May 5, 1923), 100.

254 Fabianism in the 'Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 "howdah" 1'1 manner, might even then have been heading, as Prime Minister, toward a "combustible climax" had he been in Commons.12 The policy· of Labour early in 1923 seemed to be to try to get along for a V\Thile. There 'were uses for tranquillity. When Bald win officially replaced Bonar Law, the NS noted that here was a businessman who might cope with realities in the Ruhr question although it was aware that the French believed him friendly. Yet at this early date N S raised the question as to whether he was " Die-Hard" o!- Protectionist. And within one week after accept ing Baldwin the NS was criticizing the Government concerning minutiae: Insisting upon punctilios of procedure, the NS pointed out that there was no precedent for the use to which Baldwin put parliamentary recesses 13 and it prophesied his would be the last Conservative Governinent for a long time-reckoning, of course, upon a normal life-span for the Government. Fabians were probing the political situation for something by which to discomfit the Baldwin regime, but gently, lest responsibility come too soon.

The current financial boom in America gave all industry a fillip and emploYlnent as a subject for agitation dropped from view, but only temporarily.'14 Then, BaldV\Tin was seen to be veering toward SOlne cooperation 'with Labour. Curzon in the Foreign Office, succeeded in getting a Russian trade agreement and the Opposi tion, with an eye to recognition of Russia de jure,15 scored a point in getting Baldwin to promise that Parliament would resume in October. Labour power was growing, especially in handling trade disputes. A noticeable movement" back to the unions" took place.16 Stronger unions lneant all the more reason for a trade outlet; so Curzon might be useful; but the N S pitied the Russians for having to put up 'with him. The NS did not seem lacking in objectivity when it reported that the Salisbury group was jealous of Curzan, hence 'Nere backing Baldwin; and asked if the" veiled 1'1 NS, XXI (May 26, 1923), 189.

12 NS, XXI.(May 12, 1923), 132. 13 NS, XXI (May 26, 1923), 186-189. 14NS, XXI (June 2,1923),223. 15 NS, XXI (June 9, 1923),254, and ibid. (June 16, 1923),285. 16 NS, XXI (June 2, 1923),223.

Uses of (( Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 255 history" of the Bonar Law Government was to be repeated. 17 Since this indicated a pursuit of " tranquillity," the N S contented itself with the Ministry's "second class brains" and accepted a policy of tranquillity as better than a rush of defensive reaction. This restraint distinguished British Socialists from Continental agitators; yet it was easy to be restrained when the effort brought so desired a result as recognition of Russia. The N S thought Lord Birkenhead had captured the Younger (" Cabin Boy") anti Labour movement. IS Birkenhead was marked for defeat; and at this time, "Bob" Smillie stood successfully fot Parliament at Morpeth on an ILP Socialist platform running counter to the influence of Birkenhead. All the argument of the Snowden Mond 19 debate (Reform without Socialism versus Reform for Socialism) was rehearsed again-a cloud of fear of Socialism on the tranquil horizon. Smillie was elected on a programme for land redistribution and veterans' assistance. The N S could not ask total tranquillity, and it backed Smillie, fairly, although he was an old-fashioned Socialist of the most " sentimental" stamp. Tran quillity was relative, as was the NS's policy regarding" Labour"

candidates. And tranquil reassurances were given. The NS advised that Liberals should not unite with Conserva17 NS, XXI (June 9, 1923), 256. That meant either that Salisbury would stand in the political equation to Baldwin as Beaverbrook to Bonar Law or as Baldwin to Bonar Law. The NS did not know whether die-hards or reformed Tories should rule Baldwin's Cabinet. (Curzon's was not a Ie second-class" brain, although he commanded little loyalty.) 18 NS, XXI (June 23, 1923), 316. This was to result in his defeat, along with Chamberlain and Churchill, by "wild men" in December, 1923, just when Liberals were entering" coalescence" with Labour. Cf. NS, XXII (December 1, 1923), 232. 19 Cf. Philip Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography, II, 1919-1934 (Lon don: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934), pp. 581-588. The Snowden-Mond Parliamentary debate hinged on the relative merits of Socialism as opposed to "measures of social redress [which] by removing the evil effects of monopoly and waste, will conduce to the well-being of the people." The future Viscount concludes: "Socialism had now become the big issue in British politics." This episode represented an early example of dropping the disguise of Labour politics to disclose the unmitigated Socialism of ~'Labour" leaders. Susan Lawrence memorializing Ellen Wilkinson (FQ :53 March 1941, p. 10) says "she shared Socialist [not "Labour Party"] power for a few brief months."

256 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 tives. This advice was given, ostensibly, because the latter Party tended to dogmatize concerning what had always been viable. Flexibility marked Liberal assent to Socialism which itself was a H tendency" and not a doglua.2o The value of keeping things fluid was understood. The Liberal Party had a strong foothold in cer tain densely populated areas and it was more to Labour's advan tage to keep Liberals amenable to the shifting expedients of Labour than to allow them to adopt the political orthodoxy of the Tories. Massinghalu had lately rejoined the fold of Fabianism by way of journalism. There were already rumors his Nation was to be taken over by the NS. His column, signed" Wayfarer," was, in any case, incorporated into the N S. Weekly, as we know, he con tributed a " Diary" from London or Berlin. Novv he announced that Baldwin's foreign policy was something with which he and his readers could agree. Nevertheless the sequel will show that the N S continued to seem baffled as to what Baldwin's policy was; 21 it seemed to be making an effort to find a basis for cooperation.

With shrewd skill, Labour leadership, especially by means of the Fabian-educated press, controlled its own "sentimentalists" and acquiesced in the Tory policy without approving it. They were sparring for time. On July 7, 1923, Liberals might easily have perceived a distant voiced threat of Labour's coming into power. A contributor 22 wrote that there had transpired during the. week two paradoxical events: 1) Some Labour members in Parliament had behaved riotously and had been suspended 23_Wheatley, Maxton, John 20 NS, XXI (June 23, 1923), 317 f. 2'1 Ibid., 323. 22 Volume XX has no table of contents. In the other volumes a contributor can be identified by finding the page, then the title opposite the name of the writer selected by guess. Political-industrial articles will usually be Cole's; political economic, Sharp's; foreign (far-East), Buxton's or C. M. Lloyd's. " A Political Correspondent Writes" was James Drysdale; NS, XXIII, 11.

Never signed, the column was highly literate, and characterized by figures drawn from the theatre and historical data out of an immediate rather than a renaissance past. His death in 1924 was lamented; he was said to be " nearly infallible" and "irreplaceable." He, like R. Dell, also wrote for the Manchester Guardian. 23 NS, XXI (July 7, 1923),380.

Uses of t( Protection," Part 2 : Coming into Power 257 Muir, and others. (The NS at that time hoped they would soon outgrow their "minority infantilism.") 2) The Labour Party Annual Conference had taken place and had been marked by " dullness not of lethargy but of sobriety and self-restraint." (It is very significant of Fabian control that only a " faint and quickly smothered echo" had reached the Conference from the" scenes" in Parliament.) On the occasion of this Conference Sidney Webb had made the presidential address studied above.24 The commen tary, using a device by which "party line" is set forth as con sensus, pointed out as being the" clear meaning of the Conference" a method and an objective: Gradualism, meaning frictionless change " at each stage only with full public consent" ; and Socialism as the Party objective which was accepted from Mr. Webb without debate or dissent.

Socialism as a policy admits, indeed, of many and incon sistent interpretations; but \Socialism as a general objective remains full enough of meaning to serve as a powerful force for unification. 25 Readers learned that Socialism was not accepted (( sans phrase"; it was " not a body of doctrine but a constant purpose underlying an active tendency of political practice." The writer warned scene makers and impatient Labour members to bear in mind that their actions could be "linked up with the. usual talk about Bolshevism and class-warfare." But-and this was set far enough away from the last expression to avoid being linked up with itThe Labour Party is Constitutionalist to the backbone; indeed, we are tempted to say that it shows too great a respect for the established ways of procedure-a respect it will be driven to modify, at least a little, when it will ---24. Printed as The Labour Party on the Threshold. Reported as U Labour Confers," NS, XXI (July 7, 1923), 382 f.

2~ It must be observed that even though a baffled metaphysician must ask if this dialectic demonstrates "clear meaning," it is a clear demonstration of the leadership's straddling of theses and an exact statement of Fabians' two platforms (dialectic) : 1) A pragmatic adjustment to measures regardless of 'doctrine; 2) a drive to collect the coefficients of reformism into their movement, deliberately called Socialism when perhaps another name would describe it. .

258 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 have to face the real difficulties of exercise of power for the purposes it has in view. 26 These statements might placate some Liberals but Birkenhead, Churchill, and Lloyd George refused to accept the distinction which Fabians made between Labour Socialism with its half-acquiescence in force (what else can the words" driven to modify [constitution a:lisn1] " mean?) and Bolshevism with its open drive for power by civil war or by revolt induced against "reaction." The corrosion of gradualism was too subtle for the electorate to grasp; and so these practical politicians spoke of "Reds" and "force" and "revolution." Echoes of trenchant warnings from the above nan1ed Liberals are discernible in the N S's admonitions to scene makers against incurring such terms of reproach as " Bolsheviks t, or "Reds." The Socialist leadership was cautious and admonished to gentleness. The two strongest Parties in England approached more closely to each other acquiring likeness in practical politics if not in the" spirit" of their" tendency."

Fabian-Labour kept its equilibrium when confronted with Con servatives in possession of all its reform thunder. The new Tory liberalism, counter to its nominal die-hardism, embraced most of the reforms which formed the basis of Labour agitation. Viscount Milner published in 1923 his Questions of the Hour. Largely re printed from the Observer, it had had some currency. The NS ran an unsigned review entitled, "Tory Collectivism." 27 Here Milner's vievvs were accepted vvith approval as being something more than those of a Tory converted both from Gladstonism and from the" idols of retrenchn1ent and laissez-faire." Nevertheless, he nlight believe, as he did, in governmental participation as a "Deferred Shareholder" in industrial organizations to control trusts and collusive price-fixing; he tnight advocate Whitley Councils and a National Industrial Parliament of employers and employed; he might endorse experimental public ownership of certain industries, for exanrple, the collieries; but he did not say that only Socialism could achieve these things-he was still a Tory.

26 NS, XXI (July 7, 1923), 382 f. Italics are inserted. This was a view thoroughly consonant with Laski's Crisis and The Constitution of 1932, that only revolt or civil war could bridge the chasm from King to Socialism. 21 NS, XXI (July 7, 1923),398.

Uses of·(( Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 259 His book performed, it was acknowledged, three services for Labour Party members: 1) It criticized Labour's indifference to the decay of agriculture; 2) it pointed out the welcome fact that " Socialist doctrine" did not include essentially H free trade" or H free imports"; 3) it evoked, by criticizing the tactics of the Opposition regarding Empire administration, emigration, and eco nomic cooperation, the enlightening statement that Constructive thinkers in the Labour Party are beginning to realize that a policy of economic cooperation in the British Commonwealth is not incompatible with the " cosmopolitan" ideal, and may even prove a valuable stepping-stone to the international solution of world problems. 28 So, there were uses for" Preference." In the course of the dis cussion the difference between Labour as a Party and the One-Party was disclosed. The clever reviewer said-and a divisive distinction between Labour and Socialism is· patent-that though the Labour. Party might quarrel with Milner on Imperial problems, Socialists could qave no reason to object to his vie,vs-Labour, once in a position of responsibility, would come around to the Socialist view on el11igration and the "humane administration of our tropical dependencies." 29 Thus it was also disclosed that socialistic "Anti-imperialism" and the acknowledged need for control of ra\v materials would, Fabians guiding, find synthesis eventually, under Socialism if, under a Labour Government, poli ticians should produce nothing more than definitions of the prob lem. Adtnirably astute as this exan1ple of Fabianism is, it entotnpasses a proposition ,vhich any a\vkwardness would render deadly to itself. Enlightened Toryism had equipped itself with leaves taken out of the Labour book. A Fabian thanked the plagiarist for the assistance his writings afforded toward the in28 Ibid. The conversion of "cosmopolitanism" into "true international ism " was the object of study in Webb's Tutorial Classes, it will be recalled.

2'9 Mandated places were to be "humanely" allowed to continue to be "native," in custom, costume, and law. Cf. Rita Hinden, "The Imperial Aspect" in FQ :58 Summer 1948, pp. 15-19. The native system is retained by Lever Brothers. (Cf. T. C. B. Watson, "Margarine" in FQ:25 Spring 1940 pp. 16 f.) But Margaret Cole relates that Ellen Wilkinson" snapped" that she preferred seeing little natives scrubbed and going to Sunday School.

260 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 doctrination and correction of Labour. The N S also accepted the noble Lord's service to itself in propagating its broad tariff princi ples, while it announced that it believed only Socialism, a " differ ent spirit," could eff~ctively vivify either collectivist Tories or particularist Labourites on the ultimate peaks of internationalism. The important thing for us at this point is to see that Labour as a Party, itself was under tutelage to Socialism; 30 also to learn of the new-born convictions which the Tory mentality absorbed from the atmosphere of Labour propaganda. a! Two ingredients make up the substance of this propaganda: Information for the initiated and a pabulum for the naive. The NS revie\v of Lord Milner's book also revealed a political weather eye for large blocks of votes. While attesting willingness to learn about agricultural problems, it bespoke State protection for the consumer as well as the producer. The shepherding of the agricultural workers offered small contentment to farmers themselves; for, of course, organized workers could be induced to vote with urban workers. 32 The N S tempered its pleasure in the Milner adaption of Socialist protectionism with the long view that Protection was a "temporary phenomenon, bound up with· the present system of individualist trading, which is destined to give so The views on "economic cooperation" and "tropical" administration and the position of the Empire in a world order all reappear in the United Nations' Charter. Cf. writings of H. Duncan Hall, e.g., The British Com monwealth of Nations, edition of 1920. Mr. Hall was on the League secretariate and is now working for the Carnegie Endowment for Interna tional Peace. Cf. also, A. L. Lowell, President of Harvard, and H.Duncan Hall, Professor of International Relationships of Syracuse University, the British Commonwealth of Nations in World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, X, No. 6 (Boston, 1927), pp. 573-691.

S'l Cf. Keith Hutchinson, The Decline and Fall of British Capitalism (New York: Scribners, 1950), passim. He shows how Tories enacted most of the laws by which he believes Capitalism fell. 32 Fabian interest in farming marked by the creation of Labour committees, notices of books, e.g., Fabian F. E. Green's study, is traceable in Fabian News. A study of this angle of Fabian activity would be rewarding but could lead to no other conclusion than is found here. There is, clearly, no indication that Fabian Socialism intended to foster an agricultural system essentially individualist. "Industrial democracy," by extension, would turn agriculture into Business; as such it would come under State Planning and price control.

Uses of it Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 261 place more and more to c00perative and collective enterprise." (Of course, this spells Fascism.) Socialism and Imperialism could not be joined but Labour under Socialist guidance might find a formula for world cooperation through Empire administration. With these nice distinctions, vital ones, indeed, the Socialist in tellectuals baffled and bedeviled the politicians of the old parties. It would seem there was something esoteric in "the spirit." Labour did not con it exactly and Toryism could not learn it. At least the vocal Churchill-Birkenhead- Lloyd George group were determined to defeat it as H Red." The Liberal Sir John Simon had tried to use" gradualism" too in his campaign. The NS found his definitions faulty. Gradual ism such as Sir John Simon professed was not satisfactory. He was fated to be H negative." 33 It was discovered that a Grey and Curzon " duet" in the House of Lords under the leadership of Haldane (Labour's H gramo phone," perhaps) seemed to cant of new found hannonies between the Tory tenor and the Labour counterpoint. 34 A columnist made readers aware of a new break in old " Coalie " party unity: Bald win, Grey, and Curzon were aligned against Lloyd George, Churchill, and sometimes, Birkenhead. The latter group planned a H centre party." The writer pretended not to be too sure of Haldane's position. This centre-party was never more than an adumbration, projected by a brilliant idea to realign Conservatives who had learned the reform programme with Labour men who disliked outright Socialism along with Liberals of the Churchill stamp. This made an outline of the heart of England even as the Centre in Germany once delineated a· central German culture; but the Centre Party of· Germany represented an activity external to H the Centre." The Fabians saw it taking shape, with distaste.

83 NS, XXI (July 21, 1923),434. 8. Haldane's Problem of Nationalisation had been reviewed in FN, 1921, by J. H. Macrae-Gibson. Even with the introduction by R. H. Tawney and H. J. Laski, the reviewer, an authority on Whitley Councils, warned Fabian readers that there was a certain naivety in Haldane's viewpoints on the army and the civil service (he did not say" fascistic") which should give democratic Socialists pause when choosing candidates for office. This Fabian's judgment did not prevent Haldane from occupying a' ministerial post a little later. He was a Webb associate. NS, XXI (July 21, 1923), 436.

262 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 They prevented its growth; it was never more than an idea. The Haldane-Baldwin " gran10phone " indicated that the socio-economic centre politicized by Fabians claimed the forces which the Churchill-Birkenhead scheme needed. It was too late. By July 28, the suspended ILP members were reinstated. 35 The N S thought the affair had had" factitious importance," that" one of the greatest barriers between the classes is their inability to appreciate each other's form of humor." Now, Fabians could not have been ignorant of the fighting reaction caused inevitably by reference to "the classes." They professed not to endorse class warfare. It would be hard to find a more adroit handling of such a problem as the obstreperous backbenchers presented: The paternal, half-sympathetic warning to these earnest men that they were making a "class" of themselves. The incident, however, enabled 1fr. Baldwin to face down his" die-hards " and assert his leadership, although the· effect was not constructive. On August 4, the Political Correspondent, becoming extretnely clairvoyant, noted the effect of such" facing down" : The impatience recently manifested by the Conservatives at the negative domestic policy of the leaders may be expected to become acute, probably finding expression during the recess in demands for a plunge into Preference and Protection, anti-Trade Union legislation, Second Chamber restoration and other forms of party suicide.36 Fabians could keep their path of tranquillity ,vhile the" wild men"

from Glasgow induced a reaction destined, in full strength, to be lethal in the subject. The prophecy was imperfect: " In what may be their last Parliament," Conservatism could not conceivably allow " its reactionary instincts to be immobilized" for another session. The ne\v " collectivism of Conservatism" was expected to produce reactivation of inherent" reactionary instincts." 37 If Tories might thus be induced to endorse tariffs, tighter trades dispute laws, and a revived veto in Lords, these blunders would ruin them. Never the1ess, the full length of "suicidal" reaction was never run. 35 NS, XXI (August 4~ 1923),486. 36 Ibid. Italics inserted. 87 NS, XXI (August 4, 1923), 488.

Uses of U Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 263 Tories heeded the warning and became more and more like their antagonists. Divisions in the Cabinet were revealed again to the N S readers w,hen, on August 11, it was· divulged that Baldwin was supported by Curzon, Lord Robert Cecil, and Mr. Neville Chamberlain against the very politicians who had championed Baldwin for Prime Minister rather than Curzon-Lord Salisbury, Mr. Amery, Mr. Bridgeman, Sir W. Joynson-Hicks, all die-hards, and " domestic tyrants," who might be expected to bolt. It seemed to be the Ruhr question which made the cleavage now, although the tariff question set harder lines of division. Eventually, the Tories eliminated all the " reactions" except tariff, and split on this old fiscal argument alone,38 so Baldwin went to the people. In doing so he dished his die-hard reactionaries and arrived at a 1nodus vivendi, if not an understanding, with Labour. How deep was the rapport between the two parties was to be demonstrated after the climax and denouement of Labour politics in 1924.

The historical minded columnist appealed to Baldwin to revert 88 Tariffs would have been quite possible along with a "reconstruction" program involving Government participation, or even with the lend-spend program (Keynesian) advocated later. The issues of the day, "retrench ment" versus welfare-spending, were never differentiated from the issue of "Protection" versus Free Trade. Welfare spending could have been had along with tariffs. Ostensibly, Labour stood for Empire Preference and Free Trade; Tories stood for Preference and Protection. The more inde pendent the member states of the Empire became, the more pressure for Protection. Socialist Labour tolerated Preference as "economic coopera tion." The Tory view was that protected industries meant fewer unemployed laborers to "dump" on the Empire, less relief in "doles," possession of an economic weapon against France. Actually," Free Trade" was, as an Opposition slogan, mere" politics," a doctrine held in disbelief by Fabian Socialist leaders themselves. When the NS Correspondent called the campaign a throw-back to 1840 he was not stating a fact which he must have recognized, that only persistence of a style of thinking forced any "liberal" to profess a free-trade credo. The new Labour style would have another fetish, "true internationalism." Internationalism for Labor-qua Labor connotes uniform standards of working conditions and pay, elimina tion of "coolie" labor, together with a flow of raw materials unhampered by a profit-from-scarcity policy. Socialist internationalism, accepting all of these proposals, eschews, "naivete," and aims at political control of com merce by Socialists-in other words, Power.

264 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 to precedent and to seek the arbitrament of the House of Commons (where, indeed, Opposition by asserting itself on either side of the tariff question would gather more power). Asquith, he re called, had timidly done so in the matter of the reluctantly formed Coalition he had headed. The correspondent had heard that Austen Chamberlain was about to be invited to leave his party. (Knowing the Chamberlain preoccupation with tariff, one might then have suspected the Cabinet breach was even fraternal.) And the correspondent stated for what it was worth the facts of the case of Mr. McKenna. Baldwin had proposed making him Chan cellor of the Exchequer overlooking, it was alleged, the fact that the nominee should have a seat in Commons. It was well known that Mr. McKenna was a " free-trader," although he was the author of the Protection of Industries Act and at the same time he was heralded as the man possessed of the genius needed to save Europe. He was not elected.

The convert [McKenna] was expected to swallow every thing, and it is rather straining credulity to suggest that it was some belated scruple about Free Trade that stood in the way of the experiment. 39 The hint to appeal to Commons could only have been a dare. There was enough concrete protectionism in Labour to have respected Chamberlain and enough free trade Millism to have re joiced at McKenna's accession to the Cabinet malgre-Chamberlain. Yet neither Chamberlain nor McKenna should have any real sup port from Labour-in-Opposition. The Fabian-minded publication was but prodding the tariff question into the open, at the time. It is very' evident that the spokesman and columnist did not desire a dissolution. In fact, only the \veek before, he had said that the Opposition had done no better than the Asquithians. Now he said he believed Baldwin could have the support of both Houses if he would show" a restrained but not too dejected version of the spirited John Bullish tradition of his political ancestors." He meant that Baldwin. should assert British hegemony over France in Europe; a thing the P.M. could not do without some tool-war or tariffs.

89 NS, XXI (August 11, 1923), 512.

Uses of it Protection," Part 2 : Coming into Power 265 On August 25, 1923, the prediction regarding Austen Chamber lain was invalidated. The latter resumed the leadership of the Conservative Party. The Correspondent presented a puzzled air about the "francophile" and "gallophobe" alignments in the Cabinet; but he was clear about the" protectionists of the Mid lands pulling in one direction and the Free Traders of Lancashire in the other." He wondered if " mischief" were not the Chamber lain "game." 40 The connection of tariff questions with French policy was. becoming apparent. The Fabian had nothing to gain from allowing union men and H workers· by hand" to learn, from any interpretation he might make, of the beginnings of an effort of the Government to deal with France by tariffs. It was Neville Chamberlain, the Postmaster General, the one time Minister of Health under Bonar Law and Baldwin, who became Chancellor of the Exchequer, in place of McKenna.

Chamberlain observed that McKenna's defeat revealed his party's weakness. Although Neville Chamberlain noted in his diary his efforts to ingratiate himself with the Labour people (somewhat like the action of a Roman Senator making it up with the Goths) he recorded that Stanley Baldwin had to remind him of his manners, because it was his custom to treat them like" dirt." (Yet we see him persuading MacDonald to stay in office in 1931.) The awk wardness of his position resulted from his reformist attitude and his sympathy with the Labour leadership in its struggle with the left-wingers. Chamberlain, it was well known, was a francophile. A change was developing in the attitude of Labour toward France. On September 1, 1923, a sense of bonheur was detectable in an NS article, " Politics," describing amorphous party masses, blurred party lines, " tranquillity" in a word: 1) Curzon's was the opinion of all England, [2)] ... a Labour Prime Minister would act very much as Mr. Baldwin is acting, [3)] . . . the Labour Party is in almost .. complete agreement· with that most "Conser vative" of non-party .organisations, the Federation of British In.dustries [FBI], on unemployment.

The balance was precarious, however: ~o NS, XXI (August 25,1923),560.

266 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 Mr. Asquith may not quarrel with Mr. Baldwin, but Mr. MacDonald sooner or later certainly will.... The Federation of British Industries is for the moment at one on the most urgent of domestic problems, with the Trades Union Congress ; but it is, we may be sure, but a transient alliance.41 When division should develop in this alliance, the Liberal Party would have to decide to move left or right. The writer hoped that in two or three years there would emerge but two major parties; .he was indifferent as to whether it was the name Liberal or Con servative which was to disappear. He hoped for an early return of party spirit. 42 This sequence shows that party lines were falling along lines of worker and owner demarcations and that this stratification did not produce well-articulated political parties, naturally, i.e., unartificially. Here was a Fabian blind spot. They were incapable of forming the concept that economic division could only unnaturally be politicized.

Massingham led out with the shock designed to produce dif ferentiation when, on September 22, he reported what he consid ered Baldwin's failure in the matter of the French-Ruhr problem!3 H These things virtually destroy the Baldwin legend, which many of us have tried to sustain so long as there was the shadow of ground for believing it." This was euphemistic in the extreme. Now, he believed, there ,vould be Opposition with two-thirds of the political sense of the nation behind it.44 In the same strain, the Political Correspondent pondered, at the end of September, 41 Baldwin had served as financial secretary to the Treasurer of FBI and had headed the Board of Trade. Who's Who lists only his educational and political activities. . 4.2 NS, XXI (September 1, 1923), 584 £. 43 The Curzon Note protesting occupation was sent August 11. Strese mann took office August 12, and suggested a Rhine Pact on September 2.

On September 27, the German passive resistance ended. Cf. Wolfers, op. cit., p. 394. Dell said later (NS, XXII, 171) that the English Government was believed to have advised the Germans to end it. But in October (ibid., 33) the German action was a mystery to the NS. Mrs. Hamilton, op. cit., lets it be known that Madame Stresemann was a person particularly well liked by Arthur Henderson. Of course, this could not be a point emphasized at the time we are concerned with. 44 Wayfarer, "London Diary," NS, XXI (September 22, 1923), 672 f.

Uses of it Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 267 whether Mr. Baldwin were a "whole-hogger" or a mere "mug wump," whether he were loath to break with his" praetorians," whether he would yield to "a new Protectionist push," whether he were looking to the Imperial Conference to boil up the fiscal issue and leave it to cool in the "multifarious Dominion Parlia ments." The writer had lost his assurance that an appeal to Commons could rid Baldwin of: his die-hard encumbrance. 45 It is allowable surely to question whether or not it was the Tory· Party which developed the" Protection" issue originally. The Fabian organ was working on it in early Fall, and creating the link-up of fiscal policy with foreign affairs and Dominion policy. The Imperial Conference met on October 6, and the NS was unhappy that it met behind closed doors. The British public was understanding, the N S said, but it should rightly learn what went on, especially in the economic sessions. About this time, J. R.

Clynes, as chairman of the Labour Party's special committee on unemployment, in correspondence with the 1:1inister of. Labour, had ascertained that nothing concrete was proposed concerning Unemployment at Cabinet meetings during the recess. The Labour Party therefore demanded the reconvening of Parliament, and the NS suggested that Party members and the Trade Unions work up such a canlpaign that the matter of Unemployment ,,,ould be first on the agenda of Parliament. Nevertheless Labour offered no concrete propositions, not a road to repair nor a schoolhouse to build nor a leaf to rake. With the removal from the political fore ground of nationalization and the capital levy, it would be reason able to expect at least a makeshift program to be offered. The connection between the agitation for open conferences on the Empire level and for the reassembling of Parliament is patent enough. It afforded propaganda to the" labour" constituency of each delegation to a conference doomed to failure.

In connection with the Imperial Conference, the ideological leadership of Labour exposed some Socialist accommodations: 1) They were all imperialists now because the Empire had disap peared-"-but the author of the article, " The British Commonwealth of Nations," assumed a critical attitude toward Australia and New Zealand and the" maniacs" in England who held out against tariff ·45 NS, XXI (September 29, 1923), 696.

268 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 reform; he said," We are not ourselves fanatical Free Traders." 2) Now, "inter-Imperial" trade was desirable and, with General Smuts, the.·writer hoped that the Dominions would help " swing the influence of the British Empire into world politics." 3) Desir able also, was the creation of an instrument for" keeping effective touch between London and the Dominion Capitals," viz., some kind of asselnbly.46 No doubt a means of penetrating such a council would be found by Fabians. 47 The Fabian Colonial Bureau was ready with a Colonial programme deeply concerned with coopera tive handling of raw materials. 4s As it sought to do in England the Fabian organ sought to direct the attention of the Dominions to pqlicies outside the domestic periphery, in order to develop, in the international political hinterlands, labour-Socialist sentiment.

Such a direction had ideologically unifying effects, internally, similar to those obtained by an attack from outside. Two follow ing points show the effect of thus loosely defining Fabian tariff policy. The presage of things to come, made on October 6, 1?23, proved correct. Having learned it "with surprise," the correspondent retailed the story of a split in the Cabinet on fiscal principles and a move for· dissolution ; also of a campaign of "education" for " Protection" in the North, and he admitted . . . so favorable a moment for recapturing the industrial vote from Labour and at the same time .catching the country in a tariffist mood, is not likely to recur. 49 The Imperial Conference had precipitated the Protection problem. With perfect consistency, an article, "Protection for Wool," in the same issue, i.e., October 6, set forth the Fabian concept of 46 NS, XXI (October 6, 1923),728 f.

47 Fabian Ernest Davies, M.P., son of A. E. Davies, LCC, the saviour of Fabian Society in the late '30's, is presently Parliamentary secretary to . Mr. Hector McNeill, one-time British representative in the United Nations at Lake Success. Mr. McNeill is listed in the Fabian Socialist Propaganda Committee inFN, 52 :11 (December, 1941). 48 Its work, especially in connection with India and Africa, and its contri bution to the Trusteeship System and the Chapter thereon in the United Nations' Charter, would make an edifying and rewarding study. Cf. especially the writings of Fabians Rita Hinden and Arthur Creech-Jones. 49 NS, XXI (October 6,1923),728.

Uses of It Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 269 tariff and at the same time provided a picture of the way Fabian Socialism would work in the world of trade; Bradford, England, through its Chamber of Comme:ce, had demanded protection for its wool industry on the eve of the Imperial Economic Conference. The Fabian writer gave Bradford short shrift, and revealed both the secret of its timing· and .the connection with the fact that French producers at 'the time had a differential advantage. He " pressed" for the admission that "a depreciated exchange in itself does nothing to facilitate the sale of goods, unless the internal level ()f prices fails to readjust itself to the changed external con ditions." So, even if France was profiting temporarily, there was no reason to safeguard Bradford, especially since she had done ·so well during the postwar boom. "Practical considerations of expediency" were the only ones governing the question of . . . Free Trade versus some form of discrimination .

We do not bow down before the Free Trade idol, or hold that what Manchester thought yesterday England is bound to go on·thinking evermore. 50 But, according to the N S writer, this case of Bradford was an 6xample of the work of "powerful vested interests"; the mu nicipality had been able· to persuade the Trade Unions to go only so far with them as to endorse an inquiry, the unions, to the editor's relief, having stated in advance that they did not believe in protection and that not only specific industries should be studied but all those protected under the Safeguarding of Industries Act. Even this dutiful recitation of Fabian preachments got small meed of praise. In the editor's opinion the return of big business was the Trade Unions' fault. They had been" too slow" after the war when the "scientific" methods used during the war· were discarded. These methods had consisted in bulk buying and the elimination of middlemen from commercial transactions; "We showed how the costs could be lowered and the world trade organ50 Here Manchesterism is dropped from the Fabian eclectic liberalism as, during .the same year, were Ricardianism and Cobdenism. NS, XXII (October 20, 1923), 36. Ricardianism was now a reproach to sentimentalists; and Cobdenism to Free-trade Labourites (or to unionists· who made "mis takes "). But who would not say of Labour, as Marx said of Cobden, that their heart and calico were in Moscow? Cf. infra, Chapter IX, note 11.

270 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 ized scientifically from top to bottom." An elucidation of prin ciples ended the article: We want to see the Empire bound closely together into an economic confederation; we do not want to see it take the wrong turning towards a Customs Union. This is not because we have a strong theoretical dislike for Customs duties, but because we are concerned, not so much with imposing handicaps on the foreign producer as with im proving the efficiency of our own methods of production -in which we include those of the whole Empire-and with squeezing out the water-in the form of unproduc tive capital and labour-now employed in redundant speculative and trading processes .... A tariff is too often a cloak for inefficiency or speculation; we want an adaptation to present and future conditions of the scien tific methods which were applied to the solution of the wartime problems. 51 That "scientific organisation of the whole course of production frem the primary producer to the seller of the finished goods"

might not exclude protection was not denied. Presented here, it must be observed, was a blueprint of a section of the corporative state; the entrepreneur is not eliminated but the state assumes the planning function, meeting with other corporatively formed States in the Empire Assembly whose design is indicated above.52 The British Fabian Socialist industrial method was indefinite in 1923. It had "scientific" appeal and seemed to advocate a system of international control. There was an obvious tendency toward a one-world policy-the word is anachronistic. 53 Proponents of that Protection which international political-economic planning 51 NS, XXI (October 6, 1923), 729 f. ,52 In fascistic ordinance, the whole order would be politicized. In an ideal communistic ordinance, the state would be removed after the entre preneur, and all orders would be run by committees elected by the worker owners. It is conceivable that more than one party could exist in a fascist ordination because the state survives and supersedes its corporative parts.

The socialist-communist ordination replaces the state with the One-Party. 53 E. H. Carr, The Soviet Impact on the Western World (London: Mac millan and Company, 1946), pp. 23 f. As E. H. Carr writes in 1946, "Noth ing substantial had been added to Marx's vague notion of a self-organisation of the workers into communes or communities of producers." He cites Lenin's words of 1918 in corroboration, and shows that Britain learned the Uses of (( Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 271 would require had no concern for Bradfords which were particu laristic, dominated by H interests," subversive of the vacillating unions. Apparently still hoping to avoid the election, the Correspondent wrote more guesses about Neville Chamberlain's protectionism and Baldwin's effort to have McKenna, a free trader, in the Exchequer. He said Baldwin was a Jekyll-Hyde personality; but the appearance of inconsistency was equally characteristic of N S.

Wayfarer Massingham pointed out the preference-protection dilemma of Labour and the fact that the Herald was a free trade paper. He added significantly that the women's votes were shat tering to any tenderness toward the Dominions-higher prices of tinned fruits nlattered greatly to them.54 Ambiguity on Prefer ence was perfectly explicable pending an election, the women's vote was larger than the farmers'. Even after the Plymouth H plunge," \vhen Baldwin plumped for Protection publicly for the first time, the Fabian writer implied that Baldwin's motive was political, directed toward particular constituencies. He would have 'readers believe the Bonar Law pledge not to touch tariffs in the current Parliament "vas insincere. A Labour-Protectionist blend was proposed, he had heard, \vith Lloyd George and another Coali tion Cabinet. He imagined the " palaver" about Protection was intended to try the sentiments of Yeovii, Warick, and Rutland. If by-elections in these places went against him, Baldwin would at last be free to get down to H a run of brilliant government suc cesses" unmarred by Protectionisln which ,voud otherwise only defeat him. The \vily writer suggested indirectly that Protection might be forgotten if the seemingly It forbidden" topics, Trade Union election fund~ and Second Chamber reconstruction were introduced :-If there must be an election,NS hoped the Tories would make class-minded blunders.

But after the death of Bonar Law and the end of the briefest Prime Ministership and the most turbulent Parliament (also the least effective), as reported November 3, Baldwin went H whole hog" for Protection in speeches· at Swansea. He seemed to be benefits of State overall planning and the inadequacy of the profit-motive alone, not from Socialist thought but from the war effort. 54. NS, XXII (October 20, 1923),43 f.

272 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 openly expecting Labour support. (We have seen above, how Henderson got an election out of this, instead.) The Fabian spokesman suggested he "bring his universals down to particu lars," to obtain this support. This" glacial theme" had recalled the tariff problelTIof 1906. It was asked if the challenge had been made to the Opposition or to Conservative die-hards; if Protection were the issue, even. It was certain Neville Chamberlain had monitored the Plymouth speech. Was it not equally certain that he had outbluffed his chief? Perhaps an election could be avoided. It ,vas said that Salisbury, while backing Bald,vin to worst Curzon, ,vhom N S considered one of the" dangerous" men in the Cabinet, would not permit a dissolution until the veto of the House of Lords was restored. 55 It seems that if Tories could not be brought to publish a reactionary programme, they would find one could be made for them by propaganda. This sort of writing helped Bald ,vin to divorce the die-hards.

But by November 10, an election was in the offing and the NS, tongue in cheek one suspects, asked, "Who on earth can have -devised it?" The prospect offered nothing for agriculture and little for industry. Then the editor endorsed the theory that the overthrow of Labour was the intention. Conservatives had the most money to spend; Labour had nothing save human assets which it were unwise to overlook. 56 The gauntlet had been thrown down; and N S publicists articulated the issues. Picking up Lord Cecil's remarks, which dismissed both Protection and the Labour proposals as " quack remedies," the correspondent proclaimed them the alternatives of the election,57 thereby devising the campaign slogan. Meantime, Clifford Sharp, writing "The General Elec tion," admitted that the Labour Party's Free Trade convictions were not deep; if Protection won, it could get along with Labour; but Labour did " mean business" by its unemployment programme, the real hope of the nation,58 according to the Fabian editor.

As to the exact nature of the schemes, the readers had need of ·55 NS, XXII (November 3, 1923), 107 £. Salisbury was still trying to do this in 1933 (cf. Feiling, Ope cit., p. 237). It was a II reactionary" move Fabians could have made capital of and invites deeper study. 66 NS, XXII (November 10, 1923), 129. 57 Ibid., 132. 58 NS, XXII (November 10, 1923), 132 f.

Uses of ti Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 273 other sources of information. Writers seemed to be idling, wait ing for a chance to come to grips with a project. Nationalisation and the Capital Levy were not mentioned now save in the inner circles of Fabianism. A platform endorsing" Production for need' and not fOF profit" seems to have been as far as Sharp would go. Averse to subsidy for farmers, the Fabian spokesman had nothing to say of subsidy for industry. Viewing election prospects he noted that Labour was in a mood of enthusiasm in which material difficulties vanish. To thousands of young men, Labour policy is a religion. . . .59 Another columnist fairly shouted that at last a " catastrophe," \and one that was "irremediable" for Conservatives, had been p~o duced. The new Conservative policy of Protection would be a blow to Agriculture, to Labor-" which after all is a national interest" -and to the import trade. Meanwhile, Massingham, seeking, it seemed, to allay worries as to national safety, wrote of the "unspoken entente with the Opposition " of Baldwin's Gov ernment, on foreign policy, especially. In the opinion of this writer, this is a very significant admission. At the time, it went unchallenged and unrepeated.

Editorials, always more lucid than Wayfarer's or the Political Correspondent's columns, stuck to immediate propositions and were outspoken. If foreign policy generated the underlying dis agreement, this was not hinted where it was said, " To be led by a Baldwin and a Bridgeman, an Amery and a McNeill, with Lord Derby as Nestor, must be a discouraging and a depressing experi ence." This was to say that their Tory spirit was obnoxious to the new spirit. But" What a tangle to explain to the electorate! " Baldwin had made terms with Free Trader Derby and refused to do so with Austen Chamberlain. At any rate, Labour had the best 59 NS, XXII (November 10, 1923), 139. The arrangement of either Wayfarer's ideas or those of U A Political Correspondent" does not reveal the writers' thesis. Interpreting their remarks was a task suited to the "intellectual" rather than the workingman. It was characteristic of Fabians to be making the Government's 'foreign policy a constant target for criticism and at the same time to lay claim to having the same objectives-and it was not mendacious. The spirit of the opponents was different.

274 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 rhetorical talent and the clearer course. The handicap of the Capital L.evy was to be dropped as utopian, though the editor hoped the House of Comlnons "will keep it in the forefront of their programlne." The editor advertised for free cars and for money, voluntary help and unpaid \vork. 60 Wayfarer too, advised dropping the Capital Levy, and re-echoed the editor's ideas, adding only that he suspected the Lords and Dukes \vere withdrawing from the Cabinet or demanding Balfour's return. (Arthur James Balfour's international success was well known. Thus to recall his name exposed the Tory effort to deal with the international side of the struggle,61 and to call upon the talents of the "ruling class.") "Honest IVlr. Baldwin," said C. M. Lloyd, ,vas protesting inconsistently that there would be no tariff on wheat or meat no matter what other tariffs were raised. That the question was linked to external policy, Lloyd showed by comparing viewpoints: vVhile the Tories sought to save Europe from Socialisation at the hands of l\1r. MacDonald, Labour planned Empire cooperation for full employment. The Fabian had a clear grasp of the im plications of "wheat and meat" for the Empire but he only pointed out that Protection which did not cover agricultural products was not" honest." Thus Mr. Lloyd expressed the gen eralline taken by Fabian leadership: They professed" free trade"

and advocated some tariffs in order that Trade Union mentality might be satisfied and Labour Party unity secured. Fabian propositions could wait. 62 ,Baldwin should have no credit for his concern for the tables of the poor, however. 63 The Socialist 60 NS, XXII (November 17, 1923), 165. 61 Ibid., 175.· Having articulated "Protection" the Labour intellectuals rejoiced in the fact that the Tories could not explain their position to the electorate. The latter were not to be upset by the Capital Levy. 62 NS, XXII (November 17, 1923), 168. 63 Great international planning, Imperial or Socialist, was prone to over look immediate things and local human needs. The old line politicians had at least ~ care for these problems. Guild Socialism was immediately con cerned with them; but the overlooked principles of "free association" and " subsidiarity" would have taken care of them. Cf. G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism, Fabian Tract No. 192 (London: The Fabian Society, 1920)~p. 3; The "control of industry by the workers" is what Guild Socialism means.

The old Socialists' idea had been a "conception of democracy as an organi sation of consumers." On page 5, Cole says, obliquely criticizing Fabian Uses of it Protection," Part 2: Coming into PO'Wer 275 offered no solution for the problem which" free trade" posed for agriculture: Protection for meat and wheat would bring more land under cultivation and hire more agricultural workers. On the•other hand, "agreements" at the international level primarily concerned the industrial workers and encouraged governmental plan ning of agricultural production in disregard of rural life save as a means of success for industrialism :-The Kulak in England was to liquidate himself; scant Socialist concern was evinced for him. Fabian Cole caused some embarrassment when, fortuitously, no doubt, three of his books came out coincidently with the "off the bank" election. The review of these three books of 1923, Trade Unions in Munitions, Workshop Organisation, Labour in the Coal Industry, marked the distressing differences between Fabian Trade Union expedients and the strong Scottish ILP principles. Cole's work, it was said, was" Utopian." His notions about industry wide organization were based upon the example of the" unofficial"

steward of the Clydeside. (One recalls Kirkwood.) Clydeside demonstrated, it was unfairly stated, " a destructive revolutionary movement" which· constituted a threat to Trade Union Organiza tion as well as a threat to Capital, even though it represented for Cole the struggle for "democratic control of industry" to take place after depression should be ended. In this way, the Fabian weekly impressed upon Trade Unions its own leadership of worker opinion toward Labour Party voting. Whether the delinea tion of the ILP-Clyde situation was correct or not, is irrelevant. As the Correspondent realistically pointed out a bit later, if Baldwin won on a Protection policy, he would be out of office in no time, because Bonar Law's Glasgow, even if ship building were acceler ated, as it currently was, would not tolerate tariffs. It is evident that that portion of Fabian-Socialist thought which was uncom nlitted to free trade would have its own troubles in Glasgow. It cannot be too clearly stated that Fabian gradualness involved set ting aside Socialist principles and substituting a " tendency" when the occasionden1anded the surrender. Little by little the differentactics, " You want the various democracies, the various proletariats, to be organising in such a way that they can effectively cooperate, not organising all the world over in accordance with some hard and fast mechanical system which ignores national differences." But Cole re-embraced Fabianism.

276 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 tiating characteristics of a movement like Glasgow's were altered in favor of conformity, by Fabian technique. It produced a syn thesis finally by grappling itself upon one principle possessed in COlunlon by London and Glasgow socialist-labor; that was political labor organization. As stated elsewhere, relativism governed the choice of Fabian expedients. 64 The· practice had its reaction upon the character of Fabian Socialism. A new body of thought, British, practical, utilitarian, humanitarian and pacifist, was growing out of the rejection both of continental·· .doctrinairism and of particularism of any kind. Demonstration from the criticism of Cole's work and the Fabian attitude toward Bradford must suffice for the time being. In addition, it should be said· the student cannot avoid formulat ing conceptual patterns which' might be named "the two plans"

of Socialism: Anarchy and totalitarianism. These plans had in common "democracy in industry," whether in a stateless society or under state Capitalism; in both, the Party furnished the dyna mism-planning, control, motivation. Fabianism in 1924 was capable of making an adjustment of H tendency" under mere regu lated free enterprise. To all appearances Fabians simply intended to establish a few controls like Government Corporations-transi tion, this was, and not a plan. Like a construct in physics, the kinetics of Fabianism are demonstrable; its potentials bear watch ing; what it was doing was not all its" spirit" made it capable of doing. In 1923 the Fabian Society, as a body, had arrived at no agreement on either" plan." Nothing is more significant in the world today than the collapse of Socialistic [ILP] doctrines ... [The" virtue which has passed out of Socialism"] has diffused itself through men of many different groups. . . . It will group men anew-to their surprise often and mortification at their strange new companionships.65 This was said while dismissing forever the ILP. It was written 64. Cf. Viscount Haldane, Human Experience (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1926).

85 Cf. Cole, "English Socialism in 1924," NS, XXIII (September 6, 1924), 613 f. He terms Socialism an old faith whose "virtue" has not gone into Communism. The article destroys the raison d'etre of the ILPand and silently lights their path into Fabianism.

Uses of "Protection/' Part 2 : Coming into Power 277 by Cole who in September, 1924, was getting over a bout with Communists in the FRD and was in transition himself, en route back to the Fabian Society which he rejoined formally in 1929. He was beginning to see the worker-controlled world beyond the monolithic State which is a platonic shadow of a State. The ethos of Socialism led to a vision of self-detennination at the industry level, to "freedon1" from economic stress and social tension whereby producers worked for themselves, the consumers. That " savings" in consumers' or in producers' hands and in the hands of owner-employers contributed to "national assets" was never accepted or affirmed. The sleeping partner, Government, became the Planning State. The Planning State subsuming all economic processes must become the withered-away State because it destroys the national· assets of its individualities, its own matrix. Cole shared this ideal concept with Marx. 66 Political ordering and private law would disappear or be subsumed in a paternalistic central committee. Courts would then be guided only by equity which, in the absence of absolute ethical standards, must devolve upon Party policy. The Webbs and Shaw and those who under stood them in the Society realized that their very benevolence would make it impossible for the deceived Socialists to comprehend that they were all being led into the one-plan, One-Party, commune (" commune" means a not-state) ruled .by the elite.61 Only Beatrice worried about the H intrigue" she found herself involved in, yet she was the most outspoken on the idea of rule by an elite.

Statements made after the election show a capacity for synthesiz ing both" plans," in favor of H more public ownership" and" less state interference." This implied lessening the number of legal 66 Some liberals argue· that the Marx-Cole apparatus allows so, many sodo-economic elements to escape" planning" as either to defeat the evils inherent in their conclusions or permit toleration of dual systems; Marxist cum non-Marxist existing together. However, we are presently concerned with the effects produced from trial use of the pattern. Chesterton said that Christianity had never been tried. We rejoin, the pattern alone has produced marked effects on society. So must it be with Marxism. 81 Cole is still beaconing toward the utopia of freedom which he feels lies beyond the transitional condition of State Capitalism. Cf. his ~riticism of the Party's Programme of 1950. And Shaw maintained to the ~nd what he said in 1931: "We are either Communists or MacDonald-Snowdens, whatever that is." These points are noted elsewhere in this study.

278 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 roadblocks in the path of functionalism. Balfour, Lloyd George, Asquith, most of the old statesmen, were baffled and the politicians of "second-class brains" bewildered by this thing called a third party. It was a party preoccupied by ballots and administrative enactments, but one whose members seldom worried about the " rule of law," or the judicial system. C. CLASS AND STYLE On November 17 a letter signed by Ratllsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson was printed in the N S. It declared that there was no doubt that the election had been precipitated by the Con servatives of set purpose to break the power of Labour, a party without funds but with vote-getting appeal and a somewhat positive outlook on foreign policy. These Labour Party leaders-Hender son acting in a dual role-made a plea for contributions to a Labour Special Election Fund. The office was not at the Fabian headquarters. It will be recalled that the Fabian Society main tained a fund to support Fabian candidates who were endorsed by the Labour Party. 68 As he surveyed opposing Parties, the Fabian editor saw other factors of the campaign: 1) The voting strength, 2) the appeals to inverted middle-class snobbery, 3) the pro gramme and philosophy. The Conservatives had taken a risk, indeed. Bonar Law had gleaned five million votes; eight million votes had created the Lab-Lib Opposition then in existence. 69 Furthermore,· the very greatness of the statesmen now united in the Liberal ranks, Lloyd George, Churchill, Birkenhead, on ac count of the style of thinking created by prevalent Labour Party mentality, was not an asset to themselves. The editor sensed that it was becoming the style to disparage those born to prominence or gifted beyond standardized norms. Votes· would follow the style.

The N S did not speak very plainly: " Lloyd George is taboo and Mr. Churchill is anathema . . . in many constituencies. The Tory candidate would not accept the help of Lord Birkenhead at any price." It would seem that on the level of popular psychology 68 NS, XXII (November 17, 1923), 176. 69 Ibid. From these statistics it would seem that Baldwin's Party did not even take a calculated risk but intended to ground the lightning of Socialist Labour.

Uses of It Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 279 some had acquired a " ruling-class" stigma. Actually, however, these three above-named liberals were "red-baiters" and the Tories who shunned Birkenhead's aid seemed to seek two ends: Their own party's well-defined articulation, and to put the Lab Lib-Socialist fusion· to good use on the level of foreign policy. At the end of November, the editor of the NS answered the " song" of the Press which currently proclaimed that the Labour Party was running so many middle-class candidates that it was not a workingman's party, and unworthy of Trade Union sup port. 70 He answered that he approved the " broadened basis," of brain and hand workers becau'se the Party needed middle-class men in Parliament and the workingman liked a national party with out any" exclusive appeal to a particular class." This was signifi cant i a National-Unionist effort was being exerted to alienate Trade Unions from Labour, and swiftly the Fabian glossed over the trace of discord. 71 The new" Socialist snob" was appearing. It was generally understood that Fabians believed the union leaders were overworked and tired and that brain workers should replace them in Parliament. But the editor came back to the main issue.

Again, he 'asked, "who in the world " believed Baldwin would get a mandate? Protection was a bogus issue. "Protection is a phantasm; Free Trade is the status quo." Labour alone, while 70 NS, XXII (November 24, 1923), 199. Elizabeth Brandeis, "Memories of a Socialist Snob," reviewing Beatrice Webb's Our Partnership in The Progressive, Vol. 12 (August; 1948), 31 f., points up the "essentially anti democratic character of her' [Beatrice Webb's] Socialist beliefs," her" faith in efficient public administration, in government by a high-minded elite . . . ," her advocacy of "a substantial measure of compulsion of the individual in the interest of the community." 71 The truth was that union leaders liked II class" and its accoutrements and preened themselves a good deal on their association with Royalty and nobility. It even softened Kirkwood to the point of apologizing for his harsh speech, that he yielded to Lady Astor's invitation to meet the Prince of Wales at her home in order to get some action on completing the Queen Mary.

Beatrice Webb would not take the title, Lady Passfield, and accepted ex clusion from the peeresses gallery in the House of Lords but she let it be known she had visited there to hear Lord Passfield speak in that historic assembly. Margaret Cole has no pretensions to nobility and needs none. She can boast of her friendship on the literary level with Chesterton and her association with Naomi Haldane Mitchison and the Countess of Warwick.

280 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 fighting for its life as were the others, had a programme for unem ployment :-The programme· was not immediately forthcoming. At last, but two weeks before election, a concrete industrial platform took shape for the N 5's readers, and that its author was G. D. H. Cole should not surprise students accustomed to Fabian criticism of Fabians,72 The Fabian spokesman for the Glasgow style of thinking became the spokesman for the united Party. " One thing needful," he wrote, was a remedy for unemployment: To increase the volun~e of work not of doles, to develop or encourage plans which now were blocked by the timidity of capital or the retrenchment policy of old-fashioned economics. A coal conservation scheme allied to electrical development had been frittered away after the war by the "interests." Transport de velopment connected with improvements in the canal systems had been ,vrecked by the " Luddism " of the railway owners, lik'ewise the proposal to exploit small ports. To build roads, expedite drainage and afforestation, expand plants, only Labour (by Fabian spokesmen) urged. To,vn and regional housing projects and technical education had been resisted by the rest with the result in the last case of throwing more young people upon the labor market.

It is in nothing inconsistent that Cole should delineate the most concrete of plans while unable to attain full approval of his Guild man's doctrine. Perhaps the best synthesis of the "two plans" appeared in the criticism, H Mr. Bertrand Russell's Socialism," in the same issue.73 Russell's work met with more approval than Cole's. At the time Cole was nationally but Russell internationally famous. The latter's group-guild ideas and his ideal of non-central government ,vere accepted in the light of his internationalism and his anti-war viewpoint. But ,vhere his philosophy fitted the cur rent pragmatic scheme best was seen in his notion of world unifi cation and pacification based upon he knew not which of three possibilities: American hegemony, a Western European bloc, or Russian dominance. The Fabians expected their expedient accept ance of empire preferences to lead to a \vorld order or at least to the discovery of a principle upon which to build a cooperative world. That is \vhy Russell's work was more acceptable than 72 NS, XXII (November' 24, 1923),220.

73 Ibid., 220.

Uses of It Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 281 Cole's particularistic ideals. It was an adaptable philosophy. But it was Cole's programme which was the Labour Party's boast of uniqueness. It took tremendous effort to keep the non-miscible elements of labor and socialism together. Cole's programme appealed to workers and presented expedient proposals. No press supported any Labour candidate,74 but Labour strength increased in Manchester among other industrial centers .. (Manchester had been a Liberal stronghold where the Manchester Guardian shared the talents of correspondents like Robert Dell and James Drysdale with the NS-not to speak of Asquith irenics, Keynesian economics and what Webb called the" tendency of polit ical practice "). Significant indeed was Mr. Churchill's candidacy not for" Tory and Labour Lancashire" but for Leicester where " an attack on a Labour seat [was] considered better tactics than a challenge to Conservatism." 75 This was indicative of growth in Labour Party sentiment independent of Trade Union senti ment. But Trade Unions too took on new growth. Apathy was waning and a wave of strikes, temporarily subsided, threatened -oorecur unless the new demands being formulated in current industrial conferences should be met after Election.

So· in the world of Labour [the editor of the NS wrote] political and industrial activity are working together, with only this difference, that the better the Labour Party fares in the Election the less likely are the extreme counsels to prevail, or to be needed, in the industrial organisations. The indications are that, more than at any previous time, the Labour forces are achieving a balanced development of industrial and political ac tivity.76 The N S was aware of a unique balance in Britain as it surveyed Russia, Italy, and Germany, where with rising dictatorship the 74. NS, XXI (September 1, 1923), 591. The Daily Herald was about to collapse but was rescued, principally by TUC money. The Cooperatives refused to assist. Cf. NS, XXI (September 15, 1923), 638; also NS, XXI (June 2, 1923), 230. 75 NS, XXII (November 24,1923),200. 76 NS, XXII (December 1, 1923), 231. Italics are inserted.

282 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 Trade Unions were disappearing. 71 The third party had not only a hold in the hustings and unions; it fastened upon outright c1ass consciousness. Fabians knew that the balance of trade unionism and political socialism in the Party was precarious. The abov'e reassurances against " extreme counsels" were writ ten in the same week that the NS Correspondent speculated upon the returns from Paisley. He recalled that in a triangular fight, the first time Asquith had won by 2,000 votes; the second time, in a straight fight with Labour (Asquith had actually two Labour opponents), by only 200 votes.78 The commentator half guessed that the Conservative vote would elect Asquith; 79 and in fact the election of 1923 saw Asquith reelected by 790 votes. But the effect of this reaction against Labour candidates, however slight, was increased class-mindedness. The most ironic circumstance of the third party tangle was that the anti-Asquith Labour Party 11 For example, in reference to Italy, cf. NS, XXI (August 11, 1923), 510. In reference to Russia: Lenin controlled the trade unions by a capital istic plan, the NEP, by which the industrial worker was given all political power by representation. (We have noted elsewhere the document which shows how the unions recovered from their" mistakes," in grasping the real meaning of Bolshevism.) Under a dictatorship and a one-party system, this placed all power over the unions in the Party, and therefore, in the Secre tary's hands. Cf. NS, XXII (February 2, 1924), 472 f, where Cole con tributes "The Socialism of Nikolai Stalin." C. M. Lloyd had hailed. the NEP as a policy which took the "hands" of Moscow off the peasants' "necks." NS, XX (March 3, 1923), 621 f. He was pleading. for conces sions to Russia, like giving her a free hand in the Straits, in order to get her trade, ahead of the French. "Soviet" had once meant power in people's (peasant's) hands. "The Soviet" power was transferred to the industrial level exclusively and Lloyd's reported liberation of the peasant was special pleading.

78 Cf. Spender and Asquith, Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, pp. 347 f. Spender gives a 300 vote majority. 79 To the observer, the Paisley situation reveals an eddy in the Labour Party stream of force which was beyond Fabian control. A counter-invasion of Paisley came from Glasgow. At Paisley, a man whose career represented the apotheosis of Liberalism, finally met defeat at the hands of bloc-voting democracy. Mrs. Violet B. Carter (nee Asquith) describes the experience. Cited in Spender and Asquith, op. cit.} pp. 347 f. On December 1, 1923 (NS, XXII, 233 f), Cole said that if Asquith became Foreign Minister he would have Labour support and if Clynes became Foreign Minister he· would have Liberal. support, Uses of (( Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 283 set forces in motion in 1920, when the combined efforts of J. H. Thomas, Ramsay MacDonald, Lord Haldane, Charles Trevelyan, and Arthur Ponsonby, ably countered by University men from Glasgow, failed to defeat hinl,-forces which matured simul taneously with an overwhelming Tory reaction, nation-wide in 1924.80 The 1923 Election was the last time Conservatives would save a Liberal in Paisley. The next time, "controlled" Labour forces would take command and harness the forces from Glasgow to the bandwagon of Rosslyn Mitchell. But in 1923 Tory votes brought the Asquith success which led to Labour's accession to power. Otherwise, he would have been defeated in 1923 by the group which beat him in 1924. The fact that Asquith was re sponsible for the Labour Government and for its instability and final overthrow explains the raid. But the story is less illustra tive (. f the way Labour was garnering its constituencies, than of the way Fabian l~adership was approaching a Conservative posi tion. The exig~ncies of politics prevented society from dividing into two classes, the majores and the' minores.Nevertheless, the big names were gone, and Fabians intended that through them selves the minores should rule. At the cost of running ahead of the story the new forces operating in Paisley must be studied in order to discover their nature; they were beginning to function in other constituencies less well recorded. The great Liberal who had stood in 1920 for most of the things Fabians advocated, such as revision of the Versailles Treaty, liberation of Ireland, Free Trade, and German reconstruction, was defeated by ... the jungle tactics of Glasgow ... cold-blooded, organised obstruction and rowdyism, drilled yells and catcalls and the howling of uninspired and unspontane our insults ... argument and appeal . . . [played] no part whatsoever . . . [for] a new generation of young men who had ripened into voters, almost it seemed since the last election, were determined to give a solid class vote to Labour no· matter what we (or their own leaders either ... ) said or did ... an enregimented [sic] class army against which ideas and reasoning were quite powerless. 81 80 Spender and Asquith, Ope cit., pp. 330 and 344 f.

81 Ibid., pp. 348 f. This was Labour, ILP, at work in the hustings.

284 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 The fact that Glasgow's Rosslyn Mitchell had wept over Asquith's defeat in his favor 82 is indicative, even symbolical, of the effects these politicians found in forces they could and did unleash. Asquith was the victim of the Liberal dilemma whether to become an out and-out anti-Socialist Party or remain the Party of "ordered progress," and a make-weight with Labour. He fell between two schools of progress-Socialist gradualists and Socialists· in a hurry. In spite of Labour opposition in his constituency, to a certain extent, he had collaborated with the Fabian inspired Party in Parliament, refusing to take an outright anti-Socialist position. His biographer says he hoped to prevent a bourgeois versus work ing-class division 83 in English society. Ironically enough, the year that marked the first great defeat of the new Party was marked by his own defeat by a well-articulated class vote. Re venge for what Labour spokesmen chose to consider his calcu lated· wrecking machinations called forth something like a class (( putsch" in Paisley. It is .not certain whether or not the leader ship of Labour could unleash or check at will, these class-line forces; but l\1rs. Carter listed "organized obstruction" and " drilled yells." So far it would seem that Socialism in Britain was motivated by pragmatic reasons of Party and chose not to act solely for the shock and thrill of manipulating the mass mind.

If Asquith strove to prevent a bourgeois versus worker cleavage, the Fabians also eschewed "class-warfare"; but a weapon of class warfare, the "class army" did Labour's vengeance upon Asquith to elect a Fabian-from Glasgow. The techniques make n1emorable historical data. It is doubtful if as yet politicians realized that the collaborator-liberal faced an unenviable fate which no claims of gratitude could ward off. Nevertheless, Rosslyn Mitchell is listed on all Fabian candidate rosters in the 1920's. Cf. e.g., FN, 35 :11 ,(November, 1924). Because the Labour candidate was Mitchell the rowdyism was favorable to Fabian purposes. Intriguing is the situation wherein English Labour intellectuals fought" uni-.. versity men" from Glasgow who supported Asquith in 1920, and then joined' in "jungle tactics" with Glasgow men against Asquith in 1924. 82 Ibid., p. 350. 83 Ibid., p.. 343. Asquith evinced the wisdom of the old-school patriot politician who knew that in the two-party system the political life of a people moves not in the horizontal but the vertical interaction of civil groups.

Uses of (( Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 285 D. TARIFFS: A BASIS OF UNDERSTA!'fPING Vis-a-Vis AUTHORI TARIAN EUROPE To resume the domestic story of the Election of 1923, Mr. Drysdale, the Political Correspondent,84: tattled that it was sus pected that the Protection issue had been raised to forestall Lloyd George who was returning from America, there having let it be known he meditated upon tariff reform. He had .perceived the developments of the future far in advance of either Tory or Labour Parties. His electioneering genius was feared and re spected. Moreover; his Party was reuniting. When Mr. Amery had boasted of "forestalling the forestaller," it had seemed a bit of whistling· in the dark. While neither the wraith of a reunion of Liberals 85 nor the ghost of a constructive Center Party, designed to capture half-free-trad~ Liberals, part-protectionist Tories, and workingmen ill at ease with Socialism, can explain the unwanted Election, some explanation as to why Tories risked it and Labour precipitated it ·lies with both these spectres. The return of Lloyd George from America is symbolic~if nothing more---for, upon the welter of foreign financial problems, simul taneously, the long shadow of America approaching had fallen.

" Protection" had some connection with the industrial· program 'which was proposed 'by and among those who were afraid that the Socialist's" new social order" would prevail in a world order. Fabian criticism of the foreign policy of the Baldwin Government showed that the new order was imminent to a degree. On the other hand, the Tory Party had not broken from the Coalition in 1922, bootlessly; it now had an opportunity equal with the Labour Party to increase its breadth and power. In this student's opinion an hypothesis that there existed an understanding between Labour and Tory leaders is supported by certain intangibles in the 84: It was not then known who this Correspondent was. He was recognized as the trusted correspondent of the Manchester· Guardian in the· galleries of Parliament. It is an interesting point that both Drysdale and Robert Dell wrote for both the N S and the .Manchester Guardian. Thomson wrote in The Nation of New York and Rebecca West in the New Republic. Ernest Thurtle was the British agent for The Nation (of New York).

85 (C •••admitted [by pooling their funds] to a foretaste of the advantages of a Capital Levy," as the facetious correspondent wrote.

286 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 data: 1) There was the Henderson-MacDonald access to the Socialist councils of Europe now desperately cornered by the Communists. 2) There was some intuition that Stresemann would be able to get left-wing support for his policies if he could work with some one not officially connected with the Entente, and some few persons knew of Henderson's friendly rapport with Madame Stresemann (something which recalls that he had man aged the ardent Mary MacArthur and had preserved her confi dence in him even when his measures-as sometimes it hap pened-defeated her Trade Union purposes). There was also the all-too-sudden pouncing of Henderson upon the" Plymouth plunge" speech, (which purported to be merely a feeler and not "whole hog" as at Chelsea) wherein Baldwin gave the signal " Protection" and Henderson leaped to the response, "We'll get an election out of this! " at a time when nobody wanted an elec tion and. so much in the NS statements, as we have seen above, supported the view that Conservatives and Labour could agree on most points.

Labour was learning much from the discussion of tariffs, and trying as hard as ever Lloyd George did to carry water on both shoulders-some tariffs and no tariffs; and the Party in general hoped not to have to take full ministerial responsibility· so soon as 1924. One last effort on the part of the NS and Fabians to shift the burden of looming responsibility upon other shoulders showed in the article, "Post Election Prospects," written by Clifford Sharp, December 1, 1923.86 Baldwin was no longer master, he noted, but the Liberals had money and talent; even though Birken head and Austen Chamberlain had been ousted by " wild men," 87 there was still Lloyd George who stood in satisfactory opposition to Poincare. It made no difference whether Liberals or Labourites led; the Capital Levy was out and Nationalisation could wait. Labour would have to sacrifice prestige, however, if it were to enter Coalition. Under Labour leadership there might be a pos sibility ·0£ having Asquith and Lloyd George in the Cabinet, in Foreign and Colonial Offices respectively. Let it he Asquith or 86 NS, XXII (December 1, 1923), 232. Cf. also, Hamilton, Henderson, 596.

87 This is not a counterpart of the Asquith story. It is a play, contrived to imply there were" wild men" on both sides.

Uses of (( Protection/' Part 2 : Coming into Power 287 Clynes, Simon or Henderson, even MacDonald-it was all one. Baldwin's only fault was his inability to make Europe pay atten tion: 88 A choice between setting up a government of all talents able to cope with France 89 and a straight Labour government, which could be undermined and sunk, was made in favor of the latter possibility by the Liberals who, in readiness to connive in any contrivance of the Conservatives to shatter the Labour Party early in its life, entered into coalescence with Labour to create a government. By December 15, it seemed MacDonald would become the next Prime Minister; and it was learned he planned to head the Foreign Office, also. Fabians Webb, Clynes, Snowden, were to run Par liament,9o Now~ at last, there would come recognition of Russian Government de jure. Two businesses, the Marshall and the Becos Companies, were ready· to open trade with Russia to the extent of about £40,000,000.91 To the query why this sudden quiet on 88 At this very moment the decision had already been made in Mr. Webb's house that Labour would not refuse to serve, nor would it enter a Coalition, nor make the Speech from the Throne a Socialist declaration. Cf.

Hamilton, op. cit., p. 235. 89 There was an understanding no doubt which the N S could not pry out by its carping at the Baldwin" vacation" in France. Cf. NS, XXI (Sep tember 22, 1923), 661; also, ibid. (September 29, 1923), 171. In spite of Dell's report that gossip had it H. M.'s Government told Germany to sur render, an NS contributor said Poincar,e forced Germany to surrender. 90 NS, XXII (December 15, 1923), 289. It came out that NUR, J. H. Thomas' organization, had contributed to the Labour Party. ten thousand pounds .for the election. Thomas' inclusion in the Cabinet was repugnant to some Fabians. Cf. Mrs. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 236. The NS attitude toward his actions was generally critical, as it was toward Clynes. Thomas was "not admirable" (NS, XXII, 438 f); Clynes, "inept" (NS, XXIII, 2). Both of these political labor leaders, always under Fabian tutelage, took vengeance in their memoirs by giving the Fabian Socialists little credit for the force of the Labour Movement, by fairly ignoring them. In .their persons Fabians notified labor unions that political leadership was better left to "the Party," i.e., the intelligentsia. Actually, political acumen was not the gift of either section of the Movement, unioneers or "experts." The Party constituted the political machine in every constituency, made the programme, dictated the vote. They needed but one politicianand they had two, Henderson and-a better politician-MacDonald.

91 NS, XXI (September 8, 1923), 605. Also, cf. NS, XXI (September 15, 1923), 634.

288 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 Labour's part, and this reluctance, the answer is to be found in the picture of Europe where elements. which Socialists call the forces of reaction were taking a hand, while a new hope blew from the West. Authoritarianism was rising in Europe coincidently with the re-entry of America upon the scene of economic chaos. This study cannot include the story of the rise of Mussolini. The NS reporting his methods and successes,92 early expressed disagree ment with his system of proportional representation,98 which some Liberals advocated.94 Concerning P. R., Fabian Professor Herman Finer examined the question and settled it for the Fabians in the negative. He referred to the extant devotion to J. S. Mill's political synthesis, and, characteristically British and Fabian, Dr. Finer concluded: Institutional change is not less a matter of experience than of logic. Proportional representation, where it has been tried, has not notably improved the quality of legis lative assemblies. It does not, otl analysis, seem endowed with the remedial virtues inherent in its aesthetic appear ance. Our Electoral System suffers from temporary rather than permanent error. What it needs is to be built upon· the foundation of vote"rs educated to a, judg ment made with full minds. It is in a change of social principles rather than of voting expedients that· we shall find the results we require. 95 The opinion that Mussolini and Lenin were the exceptional states men 96 in Europe and the acknowledgement of II Duce's diplomatic 92 NS, XXII (June 16, 1923), 286.

98 It is to the everlasting credit of the Fabians that they rejected PrOM portional Representation. Cf. Herman Finer, The Case Against Proportional Representation, Fabian Tract No. 211 (London: Fabian Society, May, 1924). H. • • men and organisation which look to making the world safe and happy for democracy might better turn their attention to examining the conditions of research and policy-making ~ithin the Parties, rather than occupy their time in preserving [Millism] an ancient and sterile faith," p. 13. Graham Wallas was a teacher of Herman Finer. 94 NS, XXIII, p. 124. Nevertheless, P. R. was distinctly adopted as a principle in Labour and the New Social Order, Webb's basis for the Labour Constitution. 95 Finer, The Case Against Proportional Representation, p. 14. 96 NS, XXII (October 13, 1923), 1.

Uses of it Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 289 prowess by the hint that Italy had swayed British diplomacy in the matter of the Corfu incident showed a certain respect for the master of Italy.91 .Although there was present in all accounts a note deploring his rowdy methods, Mussolini was not held account~ able for the barbarities of Fascism, as Lenin was excused for the atrocities of the Cheka.98 The editor of the N S as late as February 9, 1924, found Mussolini " pernikity" but" not so bad as his speeches." 99 The rise of "reaction " and one mode of its expression in the form of Fascism increased the expediency, for any English Gov ernment, of encouraging the .Left in Europe, as a matter of policy.'100 Dictators unhampered by palpable popular antipathy would be hard to deal with. In the upshot, Labour, despite Fabian hankering for the cool shades of Opposition, was called to fulfill a mission in Europe by an electorate fundamentally con servative, awaiting the American solution for economic chaos on the Continent.

To see the kind of information \vhich N S provided and to know that Webb and his associates could interpret the data, if the rank and file could not, improves the chances of understanding what it was Sidney Webb 101 ul?-dertook to do by his letter to the 97 NS, XXI (October 6, 1923), 732. 98NS, XXIII, p. 3. 99 NS, XXII, p. 498. 100 NS, XXI (September 22, 1923), 662. Margaret Cole shows that she detested the Dolfuss government more than the Hitler or Mussolini dictator ship. (Cf. Growing Up. 171.) Fabians '~rescued" Austrian Socialist " comrades" who fled from " Red Vienna" (of which Mrs. Cole speaks with predilection). She indicates that, for her, Hitler was preferable to a Catholic "reaction." Her information came from Hugh Gaitskell and social democrats who supported the communist version of the story of the firing on the Karl· Marx Hof, "killing my Viennese comrades . . . this was two years before Guernica, remember." She links the two incidents; "Guer nica made up my mind [that her socialism was communism albeit unblemished by Stalinism and that she abhorred what she conceived to be Catholic reaction]." In speaking of these matters Mrs. Cole descends from the level of "secondary passions." (Cf. Lord Olivier, "Moral" in Fabian Essays.) 101 NS, XXII (December 15, 1923), 301. Webb, Massingham said, had revised his Liberal figures downward and Conservative and Labour predic tions upward, as of December 1. (NS, XXII, 266.) Did Labourites have better means of forecasting the vote than "the rest"? Mrs. Carter, on the 290 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 editor: "Why All This Doubt?" the erstwhHe editor asked. lo2 Then he outlined the resolution of the doubt quite simply: When its leader should be called by the King, upon the vote of non confidence after the defeat of amendments to the Address, Opposition must accept responsibility. By alternative, it must commit itself to silence or bootless criticism. Responsibility, by the law of life and growth, must be undertaken alone; the matter of " difference in spirit" made Coalition impossible.- The Fabian vatican had spoken: The inclusion of Lloyd George and Asquith in a Cabinet with MacDonald was impossible. The Labour Party must act alone, and fall, wiser for the experience of responsibility.

Opinion and action taken with regard to the French and German situation exetnplified the attitude of Fabian Socialists toward the European question enough to demonstrate it for our purposes, as has been done in the previous chapter. It would be most reward ing to study Fabian opinions on Hungary where the Horthy Regency displeased them and their respect for Bela I{un paralleled that for Lenin. loa It would repay the time given to it to measure eve of Asquith's defeat, in 1924, felt sure he would be elected by a 1000 vote majority. 102 Ibid., 294. Webb had resigned "more than a year ago," having differed with Clifford Sharp, the current editor. There was no real breach. Webb was Chairman of the Labour Conference which adhered to the Capital Levy; Sharp dropped the Capital Levy from the campaign platform. Although Glasgow insisted on retaining it, it was not good" politics" and so was shelved by NS. The Fabian left and right hands were not unaware, actually, each of the other's doings.

103 NS, XIV (January 17, 1920), 426, was tolerant of Bela Kun, unsym pathetic with Count Apponyi, ridiculed Churchill and others who "smell Bolshevism" everywhere in Europe and revealed England's hand in trade connections in Buda-Pest. Difference" in spirit" is shown in this attitude on trade in Buda-Pest and trade with Russia. Cf. NS, XV (April 10, 1920), 2, where it spoke out against the anti-Communist reaction, naming it "White Terror" and saw no excuse for curbing labor organizations, even though infested, as they must have been, with Communists. That the Prole tariat saw no middle way between reaction and Socialism was an observation well taken. The NS regretted. "Red Terror" and II White Terror" indis criminately and the reaction which set in,· as well. On February 15, 1920, the NS printed a letter from Alexander Broz (Czechoslovak Press Bureau in London) quoting the Minister, General Friedrich. It described conditions heing reenacted everywhere in Europe: Failure of the promises of the Entente, and of Coalition; deception by "pacifism, socialism, communism"; Uses of it Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 291 the not unlimited Fabian satisfaction with the eventual Christian Social republic of Austria where a· "Fabian" was the first presi dent of the Austrian Federation '104 and to assay the effect of the publication and comment by C. M. Lloyd of Hilaire Belloc's sug gestion of a Catholic-bloc and Austrian hegemony which would be as "authoritarian," '105 as it was imagined the Vatican desired. 106 Suffice it to say that as authoritarianism, from which Fabians failed. to distinguish the forces of conservation or of mere Right, was .about to be welcomed in Europe, a reluctant Labour Party, Socialist led, was about to cast itself from the pinnacle of an English temple.

E. FABIANS STOOD WHERE" PROTECTION" DIVIDED ENGLAND As antagonist in the struggle for a Labour front in Germany and the assertion of hegemony over France,107 the N S had Lord Rothermere's Daily Mail of Paris with its pro-French policy and its criticism of British policy. The N S found the alliance of Lord the rise of Catholic and monarchic forces, standing alone with their last rifles. The NS reported such" reaction" with disapproval. Cf. NS, XIV (February 14, 1920), 552. 104: FN, XXXII (February, 1921). Dr. Michael Hainisch seems to have represented the type of Christian who believed up to the pronouncement of QA (op. cit., p. 43) that Socialism purged of objectionable features might be embraced' by Christians. In an interview with A. Emil Davies which had been denied when requested as bya London County Alderman and accorded when A. E. D. presented a letter from the Fabian Society, Hainisch spoke of his book on private property in a Socialist State and of his belief that Socialism which "represents a sense of duty rather than rights," would arrive" rather through extensions of the cooperative movement in all its branches than by direct State action." A. E. D. later met on the train an Austrian who had attended Fabian Society meetings in Vienna where Hainisch and Count· Metternich, the former Austrian Ambassador in London, and founded a branch of the Society.

105 NS, XXII (December 8, 1923),260. 1'06 NS, XXII (November 17, 1923), 171. Fabians were better prepared than Catholic commentators to 'see that the creative idea in QA was a demand for organization. The Church offered principles on which to construct a social-economic apparatus productive of Social Justice; the Socialists con structed their apparatus with a different" spirit." 107 NSJ XXI (June 16, 1923), 288 f.

292 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 Birkenhead with Lord Rothermere a " conscienceless paradox" 108 not easy to contend with; but it soon after dropped its own franco phobia. TheN S thought· of a zollverein of Fabians' own defin ing-not the usual notion of custolns union-between England and Germany based upon it free trade." It observed that protectionists were nationalists and their objectives rather political than eco nomic,109 and it predicted a struggle between nationalists and Communists in Germany. 1'10 In England and in Germany Fabians intended to occupy the middle ground. .Fabians were half-protec tionists and not nationalists. They spoke of "free trade" only to keep the middle ground in Germany. They hoped to use tariffs to rein France. The NS, assumed it expressed the general feeling of the country when it noted that Baldwin's majority at by-elec tions at Leeds and Portsmouth had been reduced due to resent ment of his francophilism. 111 There was a division in English national life between an upper class, pro-French mind and a labor class, anti-French mentality which the Ruhr question tended to emphasize regardless of the triple party divisions. Without the Ruhr and tariffs, Labour might have been isolated by the upper class sections of the other Parties. As it was, the two questions evoked consensus of the rank-and-file Conservatives with "intel lectual " Labour. When Lloyd George's Party plumped honestly for some tariffs it made it possible for upper-class Liberal and Conservative Parties to fuse against the third Party; but by re fusing to coalesce, the Tories retained the three-Party set-up.112 108 NS, XXI (August 18, 1923),536.

109 NS, XXI (July 28, 1923),463. 110 NS, XXI (August 4, 1923), 485. 1'11 NS, XXI (August 18, 1923), 536. 1'12 When this happened in 1931, it was fatal to the Labour Party. The question of tariffs, however'tentative in 1923, kept them from fusing then. When they fused in 1931, Labour had dropped its gallophobia. In 1922 Tories and Liberals saw the Labour Party as a threat; many Socialists saw it as an instrument of propaganda only. A non-Fabian Socialist, L. MacNeill Weir, The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald, APolitical Biography (London: Seeker and Vvarburg, 1938), p. 99 says Austen Chamberlain and Bonar Law (p. 101) saw the great political danger of "Labour Against the Rest," or a rising popular notion that Labour was" the alternative government" as their g~eatest problem in 1922. At the time of the Chanak crisis the danger headed up to the Constitution vs Socialism. Cf.also ibid., p. 113.

Uses of it Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 293 The Rothermere press, advising the support of a Liberal here and a Conservative there, was especially futile. Fabianism knew better how to invest the middle ground. Another technique contributed to Labour solidarity. The Labour Party was not permitted by its mentors to indulge in particularism of a patriotic, much less a local nature. 1l3 As it was in the matter of Bradford wool, and as in the Poplar affair re garding the Poor Law administration, national or local self interest was deliberately overlooked in the matter of coal. The British coal industries were beginning to benefit from the situation in the Ruhr. No credit was given the Government which had withstood the French suggestion to blockade a strip of German coast and had thus favored the English coal industry.lo1'4 No sus tained objection (there is some criticism, however) to current British or allied occupation of the Rhineland was noticeable in the NS. Nor is there such adverse criticism of the handling of the Saar as of the Ruhr problem. Yet Kantorowicz 115 was ready to Weir finds MacDonald a Fabian still at heart (p. 40) but Weir does not account for Fabian action in his exposition of theniystery, to him, of how a party, not per se Socialist yet committed to U the Capital Levy and Socialism by an Act of Parliament" came in committed to constitutionalism. He con demns MacDonald for accepting the Premiership yet makes no reflection upon the fact that Fabian H. N. Brailsford's New Leader urged the accept ance of responsibility, as did Webb. Weir cites Mrs. Hamilton and relates the surprise of the U propagandists" to learn MacDonald had decided to take and hold office rather than go out on a Socialist Speech from the Throne (ibid., p. 133). .

118 NS, XXII (December 8, 1923), 257. Cole, in 1922 had said U sec tionalism requires to be superseded by a wider loyalty." Cf. NS, XIX (April 22, 1922), 58 f. Guild or corporative idealism embraces subsidiarity and local management. l'U NS, XXI (August 18, 1923), 538. The rejected idea of a blockade is noted in NS, XXII (November 24,1923),208. U5 Hermann Kantorowicz, Germany and the League of Nations, Fabian Tract No. 212 (London: Fabian Society, 1924). Kantorowicz, like Dell, believed the British Government advised Germany to cease passive resistance, even though Baldwin's last note to France had intentionally stiffened German resistance. Kantorowicz also believed the British Government had advised Germany to join the League, then postponed the action. This was doubtless caused by America's coming.into the picture and seeking to induce a reasona ble attitude in France. (Kantorowicz was latera visiting professor in Columbia.) 294 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 tell Fabians that Saar .policy alone kept Germany out of the League. It was April, 1924, before they learned this, however.

The Ruhr-the French occupation of the valley, illegally, was the main argument of British Socialists by which they kept the Labour Party a "third party" and free from a coalescence of both other parties against it. Some tariffs to punish or control France, having been accepted by " free-trade" Labour, could be used equally effectively to control 'Germany. F. FABIAN" CONSTITUTIONALISM" In the winter of 1923, English domestic politics signalled hope to the German left-of-center, by Labour's rising; while Tories had to take the blame for curbing German resistance in the Ruhr and checking German aspirations at Geneva. A succinct summary of the quality of British Constitutionalism, appropriated after the election by Labour's publicists, was con tributed by the diarist, Massingham, and the cosmopolitan, S. K. Ratcliffe, in the issue of December 15, 1923. In telling the story of what happened after the general election of December 6, Way farer 116 pointed out that by not immediately resigning, Mr. Bald win had given Labour a. chance to organize, allowed the Liberals to take their proper share in the" fairly happy issue," and U stopped the special inanity of a Chamberlain administration." 111 Under gone, the Tory disadvantage and Baldwin humiliation had resulted in avoidance of confusion, and had prevented further advantage to the Rothermere-Beaverbrook press. As far back as August, the Times, for its " good feeling and good sense," and the Observer, for its knowledge of governing personalities and" insight into the tradition of English government," had been praised in contrast to that "unspeakable combine" 118 which. had "surpassed its bad 1'16 Wayfarer, "London Diary,"NS, XXII (December 15, 1923), 300.

117 Our italics point out an overlooked element in the usual discussion con.. cerning this period. It is reasonable to hold that a quite different contour would have been given historical lines, had Chamberlain headed a Govern ment in 1924. This shows that Baldwin rejected an alternative in order to put Labour into Government. Chamberlain was loyal and selfless and never understood Baldwin's way of withholding approval. Cf. Feiling, Ope cit., p. 269. 118 Lord Rothermere's Daily Mail of Paris which Lo~d Birkenhead joined Uses of (( Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 295 record in anti-patriotism" (by being pro-French) .1'19 Now in December, Labour marked· the demise of· its partner-party with less heartlessness than Conservatives showed. Liberalism had rendered" service to the State in a critical hour" by " straight forward constitutional tactics" so as not to " end its career in the servitude of a beaten and discredited Tory Party." The Labour Party, which the Liberals now served in Coalescence, not Coali tion, was "a constitutional organisation under sober and ex perienced leadership." With justice, Massingham claimed his toricallegitimacy; politically, the Labour Party was the child" not of Karl Marx, but of English Radicalism and English self-gov ernment." 120 In place of reaction as in 1921 and 1922, Labour would take over "in the cause of social peace," the device of Lloyd George, namely ({ Constructive social reform." Although (( the" problem of the National Debt was to be studied, it should not make trouble. The City was" reassured" that the Capital Lev~ was not to be rushed. But ... the workman will feel that he is getting back some thing of his own. In return he will be asked to do his honest best to make his friends' Government a success.

If Capital assists this fair deal, it will in no way be penal ized. [No crying " Socialism in our time"; this was a Capitalist-dependent Government still.] 121 in "conscienceless paradox," was meant. Cf. NSJ XXI (August 18, 1923), 536. "119 Ibid. "12Q But in these days Laski's Karl Marx and the Webbs' D,ecay of Civil ization sold steadily in the Fabian Bookshop. Cf. every FSAR J 1924-1930. The rate of turnover was only slightly more than that of Shaw's Common Sense of Municipal Trading and Wells' This Misery of Boots. The leader ship was not looking· backward tg.English origins. As to Wells, indeed he was out of the Society but his obituary in FNJ 57:8 (September, 1945), written by Cole, acknowledged the Society's debt to him and his" twin ideas of human unity and world planning." His ideas, Cole said, were not wrodg; there were" temperamental differences" between him and the" Old Gang."

121 Wayfarer, "London Diary," N SJ XXII (December 15,· 1923), 300. The added italicizing of "fair deal" is· self-indicative. Other italics also are inserted. After President Truman's Speech on the State of the Nation, 1949, "fair shares" long in Fabian usage, came into parlance in the United States. "Equality of sacrifice" appeared first in Trqct 188.

296 Fabianism in the Political Life of' Britain 1919-1931 One might ask why it needed saying then that Labour is no outlaw from the Commonwealth. It is a national party-even the greatest of national parties and every crisis with which I am acquainted. has shown that the British quality goes right through the race, and infuses workmen quite as much as dukes, if not a great deal more SO.122 . Mr. 11assingham had just previously described Mr. MacDonald in terms of the oldest tradition: "For all the philistinism of our time," MacDonald's air of distinction was esteemed. Less elo quent .than Jaures, not so supple as Briand, he ranked high in the " Parliamentary movement of the Left." An unspoiled intellec tual, he had kept his style in spite of the demands made by popular leadership; his character was as "stainless as that of Burke or Gladstone." His friendship with the late John Morley and his being .well-travelled were marked assets.

To this description of the orthodox head of England's Govern nlent if we add. the national pride exhibited in a letter to the editor by Fabian S. K. Ratcliffe wherein, citing Burke, Pitt, and Disrae1i, he inveighed against the contemporary habit of saying" this coun try" and not H England," we can learn something about election psychology and Fabian national interest. The letter carried a snide reference to the Scotsmen and Welshmen in politics. It took its lead from a statement in the press criticizing the expression " USSR" as one which dropped the great name of Russia. Rat cliffe, himself an East Anglian, out-heroded the Morning Post, taking it to task for playing on "its favorite theme," "The Socialist Peril," without itself saying plainly, "England!" The incident recalls the 'words of David Kirkwood of the Clydeside. Quoting, in characteristic "fashion, the Bard's lines ending, " This blessed spot, this earth, this realm, this England," the· Scotsman wrote, after the launching of the Queen Mary, "But I wish William Shakespeare had said, 'this Britain'!" Such data are highly indicative of the mentality of the Socialists of Britannia, ruler of waves. If the patriotic outburst came as part of the initial effort to establish a Government by the new Party, it was 122 Ibid.

Uses of· U Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 297 nonetheless quite genuine. And it portrayed more integrity than did Tory squeamishness which avoided breaking the tension be tween old-fashioned patriotism and the new-style indifference to it. It is something not to be forgotten in the study of international Sodalism as exemplified by Fabianism. And it is highly signifi cant .that it was, in a Philistine decade, the Fabians who re discovered the virtue and the culture found in patriotism. The Fabians were clever electioneers pragmatic to a fault, schooled in expediency and hiding their principles as a matter of strategy; but they were .not unconscionable hypocrites; their. equivocation in capturing unions for Socialism and Socialism for the Party and the Party for power was sublimely motivated. It is not uninter esting to note that race and patriotism-not to say nationalism were so emphasized in England in the year that saw the Munich Putsch and the anniversary of Mussolini's so-called March on Rome. Yet it cannot be said that tranquillity ruled for beneath the surface Fabians saw a threat. Taking cognizance of Asquith's expressed opinion that a Government which was forced out had no right to a dissolution and Mr. MacDonald's opinion that the King must send for the leader of the next largest Party but that he need not always grant a dissolution, the author of " Labour in the New Year" 123 said another election would only add " spice and anger .oJ to the Labour sentiment and create a " menacing movement." The possibility was mentioned that a " favorite" might form a govern ment. By 1931 resort to this constitutional expedient was more welcome to the public than it would have been in 1924.

G. FABIANS AND THE UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE PARTY OF " LABOUR" The new Labour Government, calling itself Socialist, lacked a sense of security. Of undetermined fiscal and even monetary prin ciples, of divided political force in the ~1ovem~nt, and of divisive objectives among the unions, Fabians were aware. They at tetnpted a fonn of tutelage of Labour leaders and even of the Cooperative Wholesale Society. Nevertheless, a very stable element in the Movement was contributed by Fabian Women. 123 NS, XXII (January 5, 1924), 358 f.

298 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 Publicists urged a more concrete catalyst than "sentiment" or " rationalisation" in a more direct connection of labor organiza tions with Parliament. Unconsciously following the ancient p.rac tice of unstable tyrants, yet fortunately provided· with a genuine challenge, the Labour Party was led to look abroad for. political activity upon which to focus a common national interest. Some elucidation of these seven itelns· follows. There fell on the scene a new light on currency which the Fabian reviewer regretted came too late for election~ 124 It marked, said the reviewer of Keynes' new Tract on Monetary Reforn~, the end of the gold standard and the substitution of a "dollar standard"; Keynes was "sceptical" of the Genoa plan for i\.merican cooperation. The NS reviewer asked why if gold talue could be regulated like a bank rate by government monopoly, could not the value of wheat; coal and so forth? The reviewer found that Mr. Keynes' thought, however weakened by respect for his banker readers, was a "contribution to collectivist thought."

The editor of the NS 125 remarked upon the "triutrlph" at election time of the (( propagandists," the "non-commissioned" workers in the" ranks of the Labour army." With characteristic Fabian discrimination, he remarked that MacDonald's speech to the celebrating Party (he attended the celebration this time, feel ing more one of the real leaders than an ILP idol) was meant half for the outsiders who must be reassured because they were fearful, and half for insiders who must be restrained because they were impatient. The Party drew its strength, he said, from "active membership in the constituency organisations" rather than from the Trade Unions which financed it. This was tantamount to self-congratulation for innumerable were the occasions when the N S had counselled, somewhat per emptorily, that the unions leave politics to the Labour Party and that local party organization be strengthened; also it had tried to cudgel the trades organizations into leaving their disputes in the hands of a committee of the General Council of the TUC (some thing quite different from. submitting disputes to the tribunal of 124." J. M. Keynes, Tract on Monetary Reform," NS, XXII (January 5, 1923), 372.

125 NS, XXII (January 12, 1924), 382.

Uses of U Protection," Part 2 : Coming into Power 299 an Industry Council). Trade Unions which left politics to the Party and disputes to the Council would be leaving their fate, generally, to Fabians. (Fabian Margaret Bondfield became chair man of the Trade Unions Council early in 1924.) During the period from April to October 1923, some of the following ex amples of quasi-directives came from the intellectual leadership of labor. For example, the NS 126 stated flatly that a joint committee of. the TUC andCWS, headed by the General Council, should have prevented the strike of certain unions against a unit of CWS. Again,127 a dockers' strike, which was "futile" should have been avoided by TUC's having" told them so." In this strike, Mr. Bevin was opposed by the stevedores. There may have been some connection between this fact and that reported earlier,128 that henceforth, individual Communists might represent constitu ent groups in the Party conclaves, although the Communist Party itself could not be a constituent of the Labour Party. However,' the problem which agitators developed was the very real one of " casual" labor on the docks.129 In another instance, the N S 180 urged that the TUC should" plainly tell" bickering unions within the National Union of Railwaymen that TUC would settle their quarrel. This would be to go over Mr. Thomas' head. Fabians faced a· rival Socialist society in the Labour College which, by the autumn of 1923, was fully Marxist and antagonistic to WEA; and then TUC complicated the pattern by endorsing both schools.13l Several pages further on,132 the editor said the Trade Union movement was a "national danger" if ill-led and badly -our italics-u coordinated." TUC, he conceded, was an im provement but the work of the Labour Party "overcast" the 126 NS, XXI, 351.

127 Ibid., 534. 128 Ibid., p. 350. 129 As to Mr. Bevin's Fabianism :He was a party to the reformation of the Society in 1939. He always had NS support. He was a bit more " radical" in his early period. Belonging to " Zip" in the 1920's, he joined the Socialist League with Stafford Cripps (against the" intellectuals") in 1931. C£. Mrs. Cole, Growing Up, pp. 145 and 150. 130NS, XXI, 535. 131 NS, XXI (September 15, 1923),635. 132 Ibid., 726.

300 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 industrial side of the organization within the movement. Again/ 3s TUCwas ordered back in its own corner, as it were, to leave politics to the Party, 'when the editor learned some TU members had argued for Protection. Those bickering Trade Unions must leave the influencing of this worst possible of Governments (1922-1923) to the Party. (That tariffs constituted an economic question rather than a political one, and that Fabians admittedly used Free Trade only as a political slogan, will not confuse but only clarify the techniques of Fabian leadership.) Upon occasion the N S was understanding and benevolent as when it explained away· the Boilermakers' strike which had been undertaken against TUGC counsels. The prolonged strike in the shipyards and that of the bricklayers who had a peculiar H dilu tion" problem showed the N S on the side of the unions rather than concerned with the care of those numerous' ones who were the Hdilutees," as, among the dockers, were the "casuals." 134: H The flow of labour to the docks must be regulated," the NS said. "Regulated" was a strong word to use on the eve of Labour's coming into po,ver .135 Although failures in cooperation must come as one contributor wrote from the fact that TU leaders did not feel" at home" with "the elite" in the movement,136 nevertheless at the time when Labour l\1.P.'s created "scenes" in Parliament and were sus pended, the N S reconciled, if only in print, the most divergent characters, \Vebb and Wheatley. Between the person "ve have learned to think of as the" grey eminence" and one of the" wild men" frotn the Clyde 131 the N S said there was no fundamental 133 Ibid., 728.

134 NS, XXII (November 3,1923),99. 135 NS, XXII (January 26, 1924), 439. The dilution problem came in for more ample discussion in connection with the story of the Wheatley Housing Bill and the Labour Government's view on education. 136 NS, XXII (December 1, 1923), 234 f. 131 Wheatley was a greatly loved leader who could quell an angry Irish crowd with a smile. Cf. Kirkwood, Ope cit., p. 85. "It was John Wheatley who prepared the Dilution of Labour Scheme which became the basis for the whole of Great Britain, and worked perfectly until the end of the war." Ibid., p. 115. Kirkwood's part is shown on page 117. On these pages of Kirkwood the names of John Wheatley, Rosslyn Mitchell, and James Stewart appear in the light which makes it easy to see why Fabians cultivated them.

Uses of (( Protection," Part 2: Coming into POUler 301 difference in thought. Both were revolutionaries. Both were " constitutional." Both were "evolutionary." Although" scenes" were useful, they were· inexpedient for a Party which, unlike that of Parnell who used the technique to good effect, was headed for responsibility and power .138 Coal miners and their leaders were usually not scolded by the N S. One recalls that Webb from 1922 represented a coal mining. district and that he had been on the Sankey Committee in 1919. Once theN S 139 editor evinced a hope the miners could settle a current dispute without Government intervention. It must be remarked that this evinced a radically" associational," even H syn dicalist," viewpoint; but H. M.'s Government was Labour then and had to be impartial. And this was but shortly after the N S had criticized NUR splinter unions and had said that Mr. Thomas was not " admirable" in his struggle with Mr. Bramley " who was not strong in tact" while even Fabian T. C. Cramp's manifestoes were not "allaying bitterness" 14°-TUC should work to make the Railway workers one union. When the new general charter of TUC was adopted and a new secretary named, the N S did not supply the names of officers but noted that the separation of politics and Trade Union activities was consummated and advised that " demands" rather than H resolutions" be the expression of such activities. 141 The .distinction between "demands" and " resolutions" marks the difference between representatives and those represented, of course; constituents make demands, legis lators and political policy makers pass resolutions. Whether union men resented such directives or not, their mounting power to demand was to be dissipated by the reaction to the brief episode of a "Labour" Government. But in 1923 they were under tutelage.

The names of Mitchell and Stewart appear in all the lists of Fabian candi dates in the elections from 1922 onward. One must distinguish Labour candidates and Fabians who were Labour candidates. There existed a Labour Election Fund and a Fabian Parliamentary Election Fund. Presum ably a Fabian might receive help from both. The Fund was not usually totally expended. Cf. any FSARfrom 1924 to 1930. 138 NS, XXI (July 7, 1923), 379 and 385 £. 189 NS, XXII (March 1, 1924), 590. 140 NS, XXII (January 26, 1924),438 f. Bramley was on Fabian lists by 1919. 141 Ibid., 655.

302 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 The Cooperative Party, now a constituent of the Labour Party, refused to become part owner with the Trade Unions and the Labour Party of the Daily H erald.142 The editor' of the N S regretted the failure thus to get " new blood" in the paper. The polite tone indicated respect for the Cooperators' acumen, but the known financial plight of the newspaper suggests a different interpretation. The Cooperative movement was growing. The same page of the N S carried an item which served as a special signal to a marked group: A. V. Alexander,1-43 Cooperative Member of Parliament and head of the Cooperative Congress --once, as had one time been true of unionism, a " stronghold of Liberalism "-had become Parliamentary Secretary to the Presi dent of the Board of Trade. This time the NS did not name his grey eminence, who was, of course, Sidney Webb; the intention was to draw attention of Cooperators' to the prominence they had achieved.

Two prominent women of the 'Labour Party and of the Fabian women's group took their seats in Parliament in January, 1924, with the congratulations of the N S, Margaret Bondfie1d and Susan Lawrence. For the third woman of the Labour trio, Dorothy Jewson (ILP), the NS rather grudgingly added felicita tions, remarking she had" done good work in NFWW." All three had worked in unionizing women workers and in bringing the National Federation of Women Workers into the General Workers' UniQn.144 This was concrete,. but two more subtle ele ments were noted: " sentiment" and "rationalisation." A glance at the Fabian News reveals the prominence, at this time, of women in the ranks of Socialist-Labour, especially in Fabian activities. Indeed a large part was played by women in the constituencies in spreading the " sentiment" which a N S contributor believed, even before the Election, was a greater force than that created by mere numbers of Trade Unionists and Cooperators. These latter, even though their organizations were ipso facto constituents of the Labour Party, might conceivably vote Liberal or Conservative, but 1·42 NS, XXIII (June 14, 1924), 274 f.

143 As of 1949, Defense Minister inH.M.'s Government. 1·44 NS, XXII (December 15, 1923),290 f.

Uses of (( Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 303 the " sentiment" among persons. outside organized labor or CWS would overbalance this loss.145 The extent to which this "sentiment" had contributed to the growth of Labour numbers in Parliament can be measured by some data concerning Fabian Women and women whosecandi dature was supported by Fabians: In by-elections of 1921, out of six Labour candidates, four were women. 146 Of five candidates put up by the Birmingham Fabian Society, three were women; and twenty-four women stood for Labour for Royal Halloway College Fabian Society. In that year, seven out of twenty members of the Fabian Executive were women.t 41 In 1922, out of fifty-four candidates in the general election, four were women. U8 In a by election list in December, 1922, four out of five were women. Although in December, 1923,149 only four women out of sixty Fabians ran in the general election, a by-election list was fifty per cent ,vomen's names. Even though in September, 1923, only two out of twenty-two Fabian candidates were women, in the pre ceding July a by-election list had showed one-third of the candi dates to be women. In November, 1924, \vhere a year before four \vere women out of fifty-four who ran, eight out of eighty Fabian candidates were women. Again, in a by-election list half were women's names. The women's contribution to Labour" senti ment " is patent,150 In an article in the NS, " The Labour Voter" discussed above, there is given a succinct characterization of the process of " Rationalisation" which, if we may borrow an Emersonian phrase, was the" tuning down" of Nationalisation. We have seen 1·45"The Labour Vote," NS, XXII (December 1, 1923),234 f.

H8 FN, XXXII:2 (February, 1921). 141 Ibid. 148 FN, XXXIII :11 (November, 1922). 149FN, XXXIII :12 (December, 1923). 1·50 Beginning in 1942, local Fabian Society news was listed in FN. Women's names were few during the war years. In 1946, however, there were thirty-four leading women's names in seventy-four items concerning locals. Locals up to 1942 were few-five or six at most. Yet the local labor organizations were very active, and women were prominent in them. Great growth in local Fabian Societies came after the reformation in 1939. It would seem that the revived Fabian ethos rejuvenated the Party out in the provinces after the quiescence of 1931-1939.

304 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 how this tuning dov~Tn, or rationalisation was applied to the coal mines by " unification," to the Capital Levy by abeyance, and even to Socialism itself by declaring it a purpose underlying a H tend ency." " Sentiment" and" Rationalisation" were not enough. A more concrete political connection between the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Trade Unions was sought. For example, Frank Hodges, leader of the Coal Miners and a man well thought of in Fabian circles, was elected to Parlialnent and, by the rules of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, must resign his secretaryship of that body-but not of the International Federation which he headed. The NS151 argued for a modification of the rule to allow so favorable a connection to be kept, although it also suggested relieving the incumbent of some of the work. The miners' unions, however, maintained their rule. Those who had allowed " twicers " had been ill-served, as the editor acknowledged.

So much for the survey of the political scene somewhat from the social level as Labour assumed Government in 1924. The new tranquillity had its foundation in reason. The news came as no surprise to NS readers that at the Pilgrim Dinner, reported by Wayfarer on February 9, 1924/ 52 Mr. Kellogg placed the United States within the orbit of the H Super-State," as the N S termed the jurisdiction of the World Court, which had been constituted at the Hague. Kellogg had suggested an arbitration treaty, "com pulsory in character and forming a model," for arbitral and judi cial settlement of disputes between America and Britain. At the same time, making the reason for the "model" obvious, he re vealed the American resolution to press France for the settlement of her war debt. As we turn to a review of the accomplishments \ of the Fabian Government, we see why its best \vork was within the field of foreign relations. And its successes there were to be credited to the leader whom ILP demanded in 1922, now in 1924, the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald.

To summarize briefly we list those items, ,:vhich demonstrated the equivocal nature of the Labour Party and its dual attitudes : its character-political party or secular religion, 2) its use of do151 NS, XXII (December 8, 1923),258. 152 NS, XXII (February 9,1924), 507.

Uses of It Protection," Part 2: Coming into Power 305 mestic when it sought foreign objectives, 3) its proclamation that conservatives forced the election while it precipitated the election itself, 4) its uses of " tranquillity" and quarrel with Curzon, 5) its dual attitude toward its own "sentimental" socialists, 7) its " constitutionalism" and destructionism, 8) its H cosmopolitan ism" and unitary internationalism, 9) its double· meanings for " refonn" for "class" for "collectivism," 10) its ambiguity on H free trade," on tariffs, on imperialism, 11) its pretended tension between Cole-ism and Webbism-between No-State and All State, 12) its seeking law to remove the rule of law. These twelve points of meditation the one word " protection" evoked. Because the consideration of them advances the study of Fabianism in the political life of Britain, several· of .these points were given separate treatment: the electioneering use of class and style, the use of tariffs as a basis of inter-party understanding England vis-a-vis authoritarian Europe-and the almost self-sacri ficing acceptance of the role of wrecking French ascendencyby Fabianism. MacDonald ,vas the instrument of Fabianism despite his equivocal position in the Society. So was the Party. Men and Party might collapse; Fabianism was less destructible.

H. 11ACDoN ALD AND THE "SENTIMENTAL SOCIALISTS" There was a voice that cried in the wilderness for years. L. MacN eill Weir, the author of the only biography of MacDonald to which Mrs. Cole referred in her Beatrice Webb/ 53 virulently blames MacDonald's character for the compromises which the Labour Party made during the election period, and after. Weir, although he declares that the Labour Prime Minister was still a Fabian at heart,154evidently cannot see that it was the presence and action of Fabianism which ghosted these compromises. It is a fact that Henderson, Thomas, and Snowden, rivals in international ism, union leadership, and Socialism, although they were Fabians, voted against MacDonald and for Clynes for Party Leader. Sidney Webb backed MacDonald, whose name had been proposed 153 Margaret Cole, Beatrice Webb, p. 162. By ignoring the works of M. A. Hamilton and Lord Elton, Mrs. Cole evinced bias.

154 Weir, op. cit., p. 40.

306 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 by Emanuel Shinwel1.155 All the compromises MacDonald made were those dictated by. the N S and by Webb. All the aspirations he betrayed were those of the" sentimental" Socialists, like Weir: When he decided to assume the Government, to maintain tradition in the matter of costume, not to make a Socialist Speech from the Throne, to muzzle the Clydesiders by warning the Tories that " scenes" in Parliament would not be tolerated, to hold the Capital Levy and Treaty Revision in abeyance-these were all Fabian compromises. Fabian Webb and the N S writers knew Mac Donald's weaknesses of character. He had struggled for the leadership among them, as he struggled against the ascendency of Henderson and Snowden .15 1 6_the former representative of Party preference for English Trade Unionism against Clydeside shop stewardism; the latter, of undiluted ILP-ism against Trade Union ism. MacDonald was immensely popular among those followers of Keir Hardie ,vho reverenced the great name long after losing the non-political principles he tried to give them. MacDonald was always the acclaimed orator at Labour Conferences. 151 The new Prime Minister possessed aplomb and had entree to European circles. Undoubtedly, he was also the best dialectician on his feet of all this breed of dialecticians. He was indispensable to the Fabians who were not noted for charm so much as for intellect.

Weir reprQaches MacDonald bitterly for the treatment accorded Henderson in the matter of Cabinet. appointments. He does not comprehend that Fabian Major Thomson, a long-time associate of Webb, served much more as amanuensis than merely as a golf ing partner domiciled at Lossiemouth with the future Prime Min ister at the time when the latter was making his Cabinet selections. Weir cannot trace the source of the shrewdness which, he cynically ackno\vledges, was manifested in the selection of names highly representative of every constituent elelnent of the Labour Move ment, a selection which placed Fabians in vital positions in the Ministry: Arthur Henderson became Home Secretary because he 155 Ibid., p. 108. Shinwell later defeated MacDonald at Seaham in 1935. Cf. ibid., p. 527.Seaham was Webb's bailiwick. 156 Ibid., pp. 219-221. 151 Writing even in 1938, Mrs. Hamilton, Henderson, p. 370, noted that in July of 1931~ in Berlin, the" British Prime Minister made a great speech."

Uses of (( Protection," Part 2 : Coming into Power 307 would not accept the original plan that he remain in self effacement out in the constituencies in order to maintain Party machinery; Lord Olivier, Secretary for India; Lord Thomson, Secretary for Air ; the Rt. Hon. Sidney Webb, President of the Board of Trade; Major Attlee, UnderSecretary for War; 158 Rt. Hon. P. Noel-Buxton, President of the Board of Agriculture; William Graham, Financial Secretary of the Treasury; Arthur Greenwood, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health; James Stewart, Parliamentary UnderSecretary for Health for Scotland. 159 William Adamson, a Scot, was Minister of Labour. Wheatley, the Clyde leader whom Fabians tried to cultivate, was Minister for Health-a" sop," said Weir, to the Left. 160 It was to reassure the people that there should be no fear of revolution that Lord Chelmsford was made head of the Admiralty; and Lord Macmillan, Lord Advocate for Scotland. These adjustments were characteristic of Fabian tactics rather than of MacDonald's association with Liberals, for which Weir criticizes him.161 Shaw had pointed out the uses to Fabian purposes of the leader's talents, when he had written· that MacDonald had turned from a " fron158 It was not so anomalous a thing as Weir finds it that this post was offered to Henderson, who was then seeking election, and was a pacifist. He had been in the War Cabinet and had prosecuted Kirkwood under the Defense of the Realm Act. A Fabian move most truly, had he accepted, it would have .conduced to the furtherance of Labour Navy reduction plans; but Henderson declined and was elected on a revisionist platform embarrassing to the Prime Minister, to Webb, and perhaps to Mr. Shaw, who was about to settle the League· of Natio'ns, as he said himself, "I . . . proposed the arrangements effected later at Locarno." George Bernard Shaw, "Fabian Failures and Successes," FQ, 41 (April, 1944), Diamond Jubilee Number, page 4.

159 FSAR (1924), 16. As stated above, in a move to "perfneate" the Cooperatives, A. V. Alexander, Cooperative M.P., was Parliamentary Secre tary to the President of the Board of Trade, Sidney Webb. The pairing of H. Morrison and MacDonald, of Thomson and MacDonald, and of Green wood with Wheatley, also, of William Graham (Fabian) with the more ILP-minded Fabian Snowden in the Exchequer and at the Hague, are comparable examples of "permeation." 160 Weir, Ope cit., p. 146. 161/bid., p. 51. Fabian association with Liberals is well known. In 1929 1931 a prime objective on the part of Fabians writing in The Clarion was divorcement from Liberals.

308 Fabianism in the Political Life of Britain 1919-1931 deur" to a "parliamentarian." The point was lost on Weir even when he cited the words from Shaw.162 Weir cannot grasp the sheer Fabianism which he thought was mere confusion in MacDonald's first speech as Prime Minister, January 21, 1924, in which he made a dichotomy of "nature" and "mind" in the Labour Party. He does not appreciate the effort to straddle Labour and Socialism, nor the fact that Mac Donald was signaling to the Socialist-Labourites that Socialism was still in their "nature" and but temporarily out of "mind"; even as Fabians removed the Capital Levy from the campaigns but hoped it vvould be kept in the forefront in Parliament. Mac Donald tried to allay fears of the destruction of the nation, flight of capital, and wild excitement expected by persons aware of· the Socialist nature of the Party so he calmly said they did not have any socialistic behaviour " in mind." With this interpretation, let us look at the passage Weir cites iIi drawing the inference that MacDonald was already a traitor. The wooliness is character istic of Fabian straddling and not of the later confusion in Mac Donald's words due to his broken health around 1935.

This country sooner or later has to become acquainted with the driving hand of Labour. . . . Stories [such] as those told by Sir Robert Horne . . . statements . . . regarding, not what is in our mind, but what is in our nature-a somewhat different thing-regarding, not what we would deliberately set out to do, but what we were bound to do by the laws of God himself-being Labour, to destroy the nation, destroy its credit ... -the sooner that sort of thing is proved to be sheer rubbish the better it will be for everyone coricerned. [With a view to the Clydesiders. ] I hope that the experience which the country and the Empire are to have of a Labour Govern ment will make it absolutely impossible for any such statements to be made or any such ideas to be held. [The Left must be quiet.] 1'63 It can be taken that Sir Robert had looked into the nat~tre of the Labour l\10vement and erroneously ascribed it to what was in the n'lind of the leaders of the Party for present action. Horne 162 Ibid.1 p. 31.