12. Uncompromising Radicalism as a Promising Strategy

12

Uncompromising Radicalism as Promising Strategy

Philipp Bagus

The first time I came across Professor Hoppe’s work was when, still in high school, I read his introduction to a reprint of the German edition of Mises’s Liberalism. I was fascinated both by Mises’s book and by Hoppe’s compelling statements, and glad to discover in him a leading living scholar in the tradition of Austrian economics, which I was then in the process of discovering. As he was a fellow German I overcame my timidity, traced him on the Internet and sent him an e-mail asking for advice for a place to study Austrian economics in Germany.

To my surprise and pleasure he actually answered my e-mail quickly. I learned to my disappointment that it was impossible to study Austrian economics at a German University. But Professor Hoppe suggested that I attend the Mises University in Auburn, Alabama to get an introduction to this school of thought. He also generously offered his recommendation to get me a scholarship to this event. Later he would recommend me for a fellowship at the Mises Institute; outline an epistemological table for my methodology class; invite me to the Property and Freedom Society Meetings and Private Seminars, and in various other ways promoted and shaped my professional development.

As a mentor, Prof. Hoppe surely can serve as a role model. Supportive though he is as a professor, however, as a scholar he is known to be intransigent. The words he wrote about Mises in the above-mentioned text describe his own attitude very well: “After all Mises was a man of principles, who categorically opposed compromises that were contrary to his theoretical insights; in a time where at republican Universities flexibility and opportunism were demanded for more than ever.”¹ In adopting such an uncompromising attitude, Prof. Hoppe has bewildered and antagonized many colleagues and readers. However, it is precisely this attitude that is also attracting the attention and admiration of individuals who value principles, consistency, rigor, and truth. In what follows I will analyze Prof. Hoppe’s uncompromising radicalism as a strategy to spread Austro-Libertarian theory, and make the case that it is an excellent—and possibly the only suitable—strategy to attain this end.

Prof. Hoppe has never made any compromise in economic theory, even though this could have brought him more influence in the mainstream economic profession. He is well known for his strong methodological stand against the mainstream by defending an extreme rationalism and apriorism.² Moreover, he is an uncompromising scholar also in the political sphere. Here he goes one step beyond Mises, who remained in favor of a minimal state and did not come to the logical conclusion of his own statement:

[t]he program of liberalism . . . if condensed into a single word, would have to read: property, that is, private ownership of the means of production (for in regard to commodities ready for consumption, private ownership is a matter of course and is not disputed even by the socialists and communists). All the other demands of liberalism result from this fundamental demand.³

While Mises remained throughout his life a staunch defender of a minimal state defending the violation of property rights by the government in order to secure them, Prof. Hoppe is more consistent in his political theory and does not hesitate to follow the implication of liberalism to its logical end:

For those members of the movement who still hold on to the classic notion of universal human rights and the idea that self-ownership and private property rights precede all government and legislation, the transition from liberalism to private property anarchism is only a small intellectual step, especially in light of the obvious failure of democratic government to provide the only service that it was ever intended to provide (that of protection). Private property anarchism is simply consistent liberalism; liberalism thought through to its ultimate conclusion, or liberalism restored to its original intent.⁴

The intellectual radicalism of Prof. Hoppe and his strategy towards a free society, i.e., private property anarchy, go hand in hand. Following Etienne de la Boétie, David Hume, and Ludwig von Mises, he emphasizes that government’s power rests on public opinion rather than sheer force.⁵ Without widespread support and voluntary cooperation on part of a large portion of a population governments cannot enforce their will. Consequently, governments can be brought down if a large part of population just ceases its support. In order to achieve this, a minority must convince a majority to end its support of the rulers. Prof. Hoppe likes to call such an energetic minority “anti-intellectual intellectuals” referring to the fact that the vast majority of intellectuals function as corrupted intellectual safeguards of the rulers. The anti-intellectual intellectuals, however, have a good chance of being successful only if they are idealistic and strongly committed, as well as inspired by the vision of a free society, because they will face difficulties in a state-ruled world. Thus, they must have the energy and patience to convince the masses to end their support to the rulers. Here is where Prof. Hoppe’s intellectual radicalism comes in. He rightly assures that:

In fact, there must never be even the slightest wavering in one’s commitment to uncompromising ideological radicalism (“extremism”). Not only would anything less be counterproductive, but more importantly, only radical—indeed, radically simple—ideas can possibly stir the emotions of the dull and indolent masses. And nothing is more effective in persuading the masses to cease cooperating with government than the constant and relentless exposure, de-sanctification, and ridicule of government and its representatives as moral and economic frauds and impostors: as emperors without clothes subject to contempt and the butt of all jokes.⁶

Intellectual radicalism is not only adequate to convince the masses of government failure but also to recruit a dedicated minority, especially among the young. In fact, Rothbard regarded education as the key to success on the road to a free society.⁷ In my opinion the educational efforts should be concentrated on the young. As I can tell from my own experience, young people that are still idealistic can be ignited by excitement and enthusiasm for a logical consistent theory or program. Moreover, young people might still be intellectually flexible, change their world view and have not invested a long time in cooperating with, being assisted by or approving publicly or privately of the state. They do not have to consider their past as a great error having cooperated with the state. Without such a psychic mortgage they are easier convinced of the prospects of a free society. Specifically, they might see their role in the change of the state of affairs into a better direction, the direction of an inspiring ideal. An inspiring uncompromising ideal was already called for by F.A. Hayek:

We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is a liberal Utopia, a program which seems neither a mere defense of things as they are not a diluted kind of socialism, but a truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibility of the mighty (including the trade union), which is not too severely practical and which does not confine itself to what appears today as politically possible. We need intellectual leaders who are prepared to resist the blandishments of power and influence and who are willing to work for an ideal, however, small may be the prospect of its early realization. They must be men who are willing to stick to principles and fight for their full realization, however remote. . . . Free trade and freedom of opportunity are ideals which still may rouse the imaginations of large numbers, but a mere “reasonable freedom of trade” or a mere “relaxation of controls” is neither intellectually respectable nor likely to inspire any enthusiasm. The main lesson which the true liberal must learn from the success of the socialists is that it was their courage to be Utopian which gained them the support of intellectuals and thereby an influence on public opinion which is daily making possible what only recently seemed utterly remote. Those who have concerned themselves exclusively with what seemed practicable in the existing state of opinion have constantly found that even this has rapidly become politically impossible as the result of change in a public opinion which they have done nothing to guide. Unless we can make the philosophic foundations of a free society once more a living intellectual issue, and its implementation a task which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds, the prospects of freedom are indeed dark. But if we can regain that belief in the power of ideas which was the mark of liberalism at its best, the battle is not lost.⁸

Prof. Hoppe is such a Utopian in the best Hayekian sense. He has, in a sense, fulfilled Hayek’s call, especially with his bestseller Democracy—The God That Failed. With his theory of argumentation ethics and building upon Rothbard’s natural law theory, he has shown that an objective and consistent ethical theory is possible. His work combines two branches, a consistent economic theory with a consistent political and ethical theory into a consistent theory of the social sciences—Austro-Libertarianism—that by its logical consistency, rigor, radicalism, clarity, and explanatory power is capable of inspiring the excitement and enthusiasm necessary to achieve its radical social ends.

I regard his uncompromising position as a good strategy to gain influence in the long term. In the process of persuading others to accept a particular viewpoint, a coherent theory should prevail over an opportunistic strategy. Science always must tell the truth. One should not overthrow principles, tell an untruth, or lie just to persuade others about a particular point of view. Such a strategy is not ethical, and it will destroy one’s consistency and undermine one’s argumentative basis, so much so that in the long run this strategy becomes self-defeating. Making compromises in theory eventually thwarts the one’s own aims as a theorist.

Perhaps making compromises will help to get one’s articles published in a top journal. Maybe dealing with applied topics that are in vogue in the mainstream can help garner a position in a top university. Opportunistic behavior might help assure tenure, respect, and a better income. The temptation to get into ever higher-ranked top journals, ever-better universities, and media outlets can lead some to make ever more substantial compromises. But once one starts with compromises he is on a slippery slope. Of course, this strategy can help one achieve more impact and influence, especially in the short run and among certain intellectuals. But it entails the great danger that one starts to gradually resemble these intellectuals in order to convince them. In fact, the Chicago School has had more influence in academics and politics than the Austrian school through making compromises and advocating various forms of state intervention.

However, what is important for an economist or an economic school is not to have influence but to tell the truth. Fiat veritas, et pereat mundus, to change a famous Latin phrase. There shall be truth even if the world perishes. The original phrase and motto of the Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand (1503–1564) is: Fiat iustitia, et pereat mundus. There shall be justice even if the world perishes. Fortunately, it lies in the nature of man that we do not have to choose between justice and the flourishing of civilization. Justice does not stand in contrast to wealth production but is actually necessary for it. As Rothbard states, “the proper groundwork for this goal [liberty] is a moral passion for justice.”⁹

Sticking to the truth is the best strategy to achieve the flourishing of civilization and liberty. Ultimately it is public opinion that changes the course of the world. People must be convinced of the benefits of liberty and told about the evil of government. Therefore, the truth about liberty must be unequivocally stated again and again. Nothing is more attractive in theory than a coherent, consistent, and stringent position. Prof. Hoppe has demonstrated that consistent theory is beautiful and liable to attract a hard core of students strongly committed to the cause of truth. By sticking to the truth one will not need rhetoric that makes compromises to convey a position since the truth seekers will find the truth. Neither will one need to approve of others’ inconsistent, compromising, and socialistic positions.

By contrast, intellectual compromise entails a strategic disadvantage. An inconsistent theory will lead to false conclusions and will attract those with shallow reasoning who will easily abandon the cause of truth. But compromise—deliberate inconsistency—does even greater harm. There is no logical end in continuing with compromises until the whole original theory is abandoned and falls apart. Eventually the compromising scholar loses respect for his own original position. He ends up in intellectual sloth, stagnating debates, muddled positions, and boring superficialities—an unappealing potpourri.

Prof. Hoppe’s economic and political theory avoids this pitfall. A consistent, rigorous, and radical theory is proposed by a man who does not make compromise in his goal of achieving a free society. In so doing, he inspires others to follow him on the path to that goal. I, for my part, will try to make my own contribution towards that end following Prof. Hoppe’s model. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to him for directing my path from the moment at which I first started reading his introduction to Mises’s Liberalism, and wish him all the best in the future.

Philipp Bagus (philipp.bagus@web.de) is assistant professor of economics at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid.

¹Ludwig von Mises, Liberalismus (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1927; reprint Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1993) p. 16.

²Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “In Defense of Extreme Rationalism: Thoughts on Donald McCloskey’s The Rhetoric of Economics,” Review of Austrian Economics 3 (1989): 179–214; idem, Economic Science and the Austrian Method (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1995).

³Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism: In the Classical Tradition, Ralph Raico, trans. (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, [1927] 1985), p. 19.

⁴Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy—The God that Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 236.

⁵Ibid., p. 289.

⁶Ibid., p. 94.

⁷Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, rev. ed (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1996), p. 297.

⁸F.A. Hayek,“The Intellectuals and Socialism,” in Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 194.

⁹Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press., 1998), p. 264.