4. Review of Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party

4. Review of Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party

March 8, 1961

Mr. Kenneth S. Templeton

William Volker Fund

Dear Ken:

Martin Van Buren, one of the best presidents the United States ever had, is also one of the most underrated by historians, who generally have dismissed Van as being weak and wily, a mere trickster. Robert V. Remini, in his Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (Columbia University Press, 1959) sets out to right the historiographic balance for a critical period in Van’s life and does a good job of it.

Remini’s book deals not with Van Buren the president but Van Buren the chief architect of the Democratic Party, which emerged out of the era of the 1820s. In this well-written and well-researched book, Remini revises the usual view of historians of Van Buren as a mere political trickster and organizer, who brought about Jackson’s victory in 1823 for purely personal reasons of party intrigue.

Not only does Remini correct the errors of these and other historians in refuting various allegations of trickery (such as the accepted myth that Van Buren introduced the Tariff of Abominations in 1828 intending to defeat it); Remini also shows, in excellent fashion, that Van Buren’s main aim, at which he succeeded brilliantly, was ideological—that he was out to forge an ideologically-based party, and chose General Jackson as the proper vehicle, not vice versa. In this book, Remini shows us some of the true stature of Martin Van Buren.

Historians have generally misleadingly called the era of Monroe the “Era of Good Feelings,” as if everything were quiet and content politically. Remini knows that this was very far from the case. Actually, President Monroe had strong leanings in the direction of the old Federalist cause, and, with the disappearance of the Federalist Party during the War of 1812, Federalists began drifting into the Republican ranks. Monroe began to use the one-party result to bring about “unity,” i.e., to make more and more appointments that were quasi-Federalist and to move, though very cautiously, in Federalist-étatist directions at home and abroad. Though a Virginian, Monroe was never trusted by the great Virginia libertarians, and the problem grew as he began to maneuver to deny the nomination to his “natural” heir, the “Old Republican” William H. Crawford.

The principles of the “Old Republican” cause, the famous “principles of ‘98,” were the principles of American liberty: individual liberty, minimal government, rigid economy, states’ rights, strict construction, opposition to “internal improvements” or to government intervention, “isolationism” and “neutralism” in foreign affairs. What had happened to the great principles of ‘98? After four excellent years under the Jefferson administration, Jefferson and Madison began to desert their old cause in a drive toward war with England, and in that war came the Bank of the United States, internal taxation, high tariffs, larger government, etc. Through these war years, only such patriots as John Randolph of Roanoke and the Quaker George Logan stood fast to the old principles.

Martin Van Buren was never a great theoretician—certainly not in these years. But he sensed the important problem of the early 1820s—the slow, steady withering away of Old Republican principles, what with affairs being conducted by Monroe and Chief Justice Marshall, and Federalists drifting into office. A man who thought brilliantly in terms of parties and politics rather than in theoretical issues, Van Buren saw (1) that the Old Republican principles were dissolving, and (2)—and here was his great contribution—that it was necessary to reconstitute the Republican Party to make it, once again, an ideological vehicle for what were essentially libertarian views.

In the critical 1824 struggle, he therefore joined with his fellow “radicals,” such as the great leader of the Richmond Junto, Thomas Ritchie, to support Crawford, and he was loyal to Crawford to the very end. Particularly important—and Remini captures the drama of this moment very well—was Van Buren’s personal meeting with his idol, Jefferson; this meeting sharpened Van Buren’s Jeffersonian ideology, especially when he realized that Jefferson’s view of the Monroe administration was essentially the same as his own.

After the election, as John Quincy Adams began to unfold the essence of his Federalist plan to aggrandize the national government at home and abroad, Van Buren’s views sharpened as he lashed out at Adams for infringing on individual and states’ rights at home and abroad. Finally, Van Buren set himself the task of building a new party out of this now-dead Republican Party, a party, as he put it, composed of “Old Republican” loyalties carried forward by the magic of the hero, Andrew Jackson.

With brilliant organization, allying himself with “Old Republican” forces, such as Ritchie, in other states, Van Buren succeeded in forging the new party, converting the purely personal Jacksonian movement of 1824 into a libertarian-ideological Jackson party of 1828. In short, realizing that Jackson’s ideological views were barely formed, Van Buren pushed Jackson into the Old Republican camp by presenting him with a fully structured Jacksonian party along those ideological lines.

Thus was the great Democratic Party born, and so well was it forged that it was to continue along a similar ideological path for the rest of the century. (It was one of the ironic quirks of history that Van Buren’s tragic shift into the anti-Southern camp, causing him to oppose the admission of Texas in 1844, broke up the Democratic Party on the slavery issue, an issue that was to cripple the party for generations.)

This, of course, is not to imply that Van Buren was a pure, or notable, libertarian theorist; he always trimmed, for example, on the tariff question, undoubtedly due to pro-tariff sentiment in New York and the North. But his services as a political organizer were first-rate, and, in Remini’s account, he at last receives his due.

Remini’s work, as I’ve said, is well written and well researched—and worth reading for any student of American political history. There are numerous indications of unfortunate bias on the part of Professor Remini, however, which should be noted:

1. How properly Remini understands the “Old Republican” principles is open to question, especially as, at the conclusion, he speaks in terms of the Democratic “people,” the “many” versus the Federalist “few,” the Democrats as the party of the “common man,” etc. This is mainly rubbish and reflects orthodox historiography. Actually, as Remini himself shows, Van Buren did yeoman work for the caucus system of nominations, in loyalty to Jeffersonian principles, and also, for quite a while—and in face of fierce local opposition—opposed democratizing the electoral laws in New York. Also, Remini, in presenting the usual view about extensions of suffrage in this era, ignores the recent research of Robert Brown, Chilton Williamson (which, to be sure, was published after Remini’s book), and others, which indicate that the extent of democratizing voting in this period was very small. (A recent study has shown that a significant increase of votes, in proportion to total adult males, only came in the election of 1840, which confirms what I have long suspected: that the real outpouring of “democracy” and mass voting came as a result of demagogic campaigning by the desperate Whigs in 1840, led by the conniver Thurlow Weed.)
2. Remini, several times, attacks Van Buren’s loyal adhesion to states’ rights and strict construction, deprecating various constitutional amendments that Van Buren proposed to limit government power still further (e.g., the power to spend on internal improvements). (Van Buren, by the way, wanted to limit state, as well as federal, internal improvements.)
3. Remini attacks Van Buren for his loyal adhesion to the cause of William Crawford in 1824.
4. Remini several times levels unwarranted and deprecatory personal attacks on various eminent statesmen. Most flagrant is his dismissal of the great Randolph as “lunatic” and “half-crazed.” (It was during this very period, by the way, that Randolph was influential in forming the subsequently libertarian social philosophy of Thomas H. Benton.) Remini further dismisses Rep. George Kremer of Pennsylvania as a “ridiculous” figure, without telling us why. Kremer distinguished himself as being one of the purest libertarian politicians in the history of the United States, voting against almost every appropriation bill, every extension of government, etc. (Once, he voted against the “extravagance” of paving Washington’s streets!)
5. Remini calls the doctrine of nullification “pernicious.”
6. Van Buren’s idea of curbing executive appointment and other power, Remini dismisses brusquely as flagrantly partisan.
7. Remini makes too much of a concession of “greatness” to the designs of John Quincy Adams.

It seems indicated that Remini, while certainly approving of Van Buren, and doing a service by concentrating on Van and rehabilitating his reputation, is himself far from a believer in the Old Republican principles for which Van Buren fought. He seems to be more of a current-type historian, favoring the supposed “democracy” and common-man aspects of Democratic-Republican doctrine. However, I am looking forward to the biography of Van Buren—who has virtually no biographies—on which Remini is apparently working—with great interest.