5. Review of Walter Millis (ed.), A World Without War

5. Review of Walter Millis (ed.), A World Without War

August 23, 1962

Dr. Ivan R. Bierly

William Volker Fund

Dear Ivan:

A World Without War, edited by Walter Millis, is the first product of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions’ Study of War and Democratic Institutions, of which Millis is the staff director.¹⁰⁷ consists essentially of four pamphlets published in 1960 and 1961 by the center.

One essay, by Justice Douglas, may be dismissed quickly. A generally trivial collection of typically Douglasian clichés, its author apotheosizes the United Nations, gradually engaged in building up “world law,” and praises such “wars against aggression” as the Korean War as an example of the UN’s “alternative to force.” Some of the clichés are true, as far as they go, such as the excursion into nineteenth-century international law theory, and its lessons for today (for one thing, this “law” was voluntarily created and came without institutions of world government), but generally it is a fuzzy, confused, and useless piece.

Dr. Harrison Brown and James Real’s “Community of Fear” is certainly better than Douglas’s article, but it is not very important. It is essentially an article stressing the havoc that nuclear war could wreak. There is a good critique of the proposals for mass shelters, and of the kind of moral nihilism and grotesque “optimism” of a Herman Kahn in contemplating all-out nuclear war. But unfortunately, in a factual piece dependent on the latest technology for its relevance, this article is already considerably out of date. We still read here, for example, of the supposed “missile gap” of the United States behind the Russians, etc., a myth that has been recently exploded by the Kennedy administration itself (originally so eager in broadcasting the concept). It has also been rendered obsolete by the new problem of the “counter-force” and “first strike” theories of the Air Force, which have been gaining ground in the administration, and render the discussion of “deterrence” theory quasi-obsolete; and it has also been superseded by the recent brilliant article of the British physicist P.M.S. Blackett dealing with the strategic significance of the Russian failure to exploit the theoretical “missile gap,” as well as of the increasing adoption of “counterforce” strategy.

The heart and soul of this book—and by far the largest part of it, and the most important—is the contribution of Millis himself. This is particularly true of Millis’s first pamphlet, originally also entitled “World Without War,” which has had considerable impact in thought in this field. Millis, in contrasting his theoretical “peace game” to the “war games” of the Kahns and Kissingers, attempts to portray what a world would look like if it were totally disarmed down to police levels, and if, therefore, the “functions” of war had to be performed by other means. In refreshing contrast to almost all the utopian and fuzzy pacifist thinkers in this area, Millis recognizes (1) that, given human nature, a warless world would still have to face considerable struggles for political power, in numerous forms; and (2) the utter impracticality of any scheme of world government, as well as its undesirability in freezing all of the world into uniformity and tyranny. Millis, in short, recognizes the continuing need for revision of frontiers, readjustment of boundaries of state, etc. He recognizes that war, vicious as it has been, at least performed the “function” of such revision.

Millis’s vision of a future disarmed world, then, is one that retains the inevitable power struggles and disdains the usual world government panaceas, propounded by the pacifists. It is a world in which political power struggles will continue through domestic struggles—both peaceful and ideological, and also through conflicts, ideological struggles, local rebellions, and riots, etc.—will still continue, but the world will be freed from the awesome threat of nuclear annihilation.

In showing that the world can be disarmed without assuming either (a) that all men will be angels, or (b) world government, Millis has made a highly significant contribution to peace research. He also states that international inspection of disarmament agreements is relatively easy, especially when that disarmament is general and complete.

It is almost always overlooked that arms inspection is far, far easier, and violations much easier to detect, when the disarmament is complete and general, than if a few missiles or machines are supposed to be scrapped.

There are various weaknesses in Millis’s searching article. For one thing, Millis seems to have no conception of the Communist thesis of “peaceful coexistence” and precisely what it implies. Secondly, his vision of a world confined to guerilla warfare could easily be extended to interstate wars that are so small and local that they could be conducted within the framework of “police” instead of “army” units: e.g., India vs. Portugal in Goa, or Indonesia vs. Holland in Western New Guinea. These small, local wars could also continue.

Furthermore, Millis does not seem to realize that, to be consistent in rejecting world government, he is also obliged to reject the idea of a world police force to enforce the agreement. Furthermore, if such a world police force (which, most unfortunately, the United States has persistently insisted upon in its disarmament proposals) existed, there would be a mad scramble among the power blocs to grab control of it, with the terrible consequences that might ensue. In short, any world “police force” that is heavily armed would negate the very concept of a world disarmed down to local police levels. Millis also fails to deal with suggestions for Great Power policies in the peripheral or “underdeveloped” countries.

Millis also has a general tendency to overweight strictly power factors in international affairs, and to underweight both ideological and economic motivations.

But Millis’s worst and most damaging foible is his view that war also performed certain domestic economic functions, for which there must also be substitutes in the peaceful world of the future. The domestic “function” consists of central planning, government control, government “investment,” and “social cohesion” imposed by the State. To “perform these functions,” Millis calls for a massive increase in statism, government planning, the “public sector” in nonmilitary areas, the government bureaucracy, etc. He also totally misinterprets the old Norman Angell proof that war was noneconomic. Sure, war is uneconomic for the various peoples if there is free trade and free markets (and, hopefully, freedom of migration); but if there is not, then war can confer national economic benefits in the sense of seizing raw material that would not otherwise be available due to tariff, quota, etc. barriers of national autarky.

And Millis absurdly does not realize that central and socialistic planning, far from bringing the world into a new age of harmony, would enormously exacerbate interstate and intercountry conflicts of interest; it is precisely the free market that minimizes such conflicts, and government planning that increases them. The economic part of Millis’s theory is, therefore, totally fallacious and even the direct opposite of correct doctrine. Millis also has the thoroughly socialist view that leaving the labor market free means that “might makes right,” “power rules,” etc. instead of state law, as it presumably should be. Millis’s bent is thus highly socialistic.

Millis’s second part, “Permanent Peace,” dealing with the present world setup, has many interesting insights, but is not as fundamental or challenging as the preceding. It is the application of Millis’s analysis of the dangers of the arms race and of his view of power struggles to the current scene. He has a good critique of the popular “falling domino” theory, points out the nonexistence of the so-called “Congolese people,” etc. Millis is hopeful that the present state can move toward the ideal by means of such tacit agreements not to make war as exist in Latin America.

He is, indeed, unduly pessimistic about the results of his world of guerilla warfare, etc., as he seems to feel that guerilla revolutions in Russia and East Europe would be unfortunate in making conditions less “stable,” etc. Surely, if a people threw off the monstrous tyranny of Communism (and Millis recognizes that his system, for example, would not have enabled Russia to suppress the Hungarian Revolution), any succeeding system would most probably be a gain. Millis, further, tries to be objective about the disarmament positions of both sides, but clearly is poorly informed about exactly what they are, and thus misinterprets the situation.

All in all, a mixed potpourri, heavily biased in the direction of socialism and statism, but—in the case of Millis—engaged in a challenging inquiry into the implications of a disarmed world.