THE MEANING OF ECONOMIC CAUSATION

In spite of this, in everyday life, we do not feel under such encyclopaedic obligations; and, even in serious historical explanation, our objective is much more limited. For, while it would be wrong to pick out any single antecedent of I I I APPENDIX any given event and claim that it ,vas the sole cause of that event, it does not seem absurd to single out certain particu lar antecedents and to regard them as the significantcauses. Significant causes in this sense are those antecedents in whose absence the event to be explained would obviously have been different; and they are singled out from other antecedents which it is easy to conceive changed without any obvious effect on the incident under examination. Thus, if the Prussians had not arrived on the field ofWater 100 at a certain critical moment, it is probable that the whole outcome of the battle would have been different. In this sense we can regard their arrival as a significant cause of the allied victory. That they were commanded by Blucher, rather than by some other general of good mili tary intelligence, is a fact which does not seem to have the same importance.

Now, with some events, it is what happens just before which appears to have this critical significance. Let us suppose, for instance, an international crisis which is in course of being settled peaceably. Let us suppose that, by some mistake of a wireless opera tor, a message which was intended to run 'Don't commence hostilities' is de livered with the 'don't' omitted. In such a case we should be justified in regarding the mistake as a significant cause of the fighting which followed. We could, of course, go back into the causes of the operator's conduct, the stresses of a long period of duty, his relations with his wife or his parents ... and for certain purposes this would be a legiti mate extension of the inquiry. But, for most purposes, explanation of the causes of the fighting would be com pleted by the discovery of his mistake. Unfortunately most historical events are not capable of such easy explanation. Very often the immediate ante cedents of an event seem very unimportant compared with 112 MEANING OF ECONOMIC CAUSATION others more remote in time. Wide tendencies discernible in the middle distance may make the minutiae of the immediate foreground seem relatively insignificant. In the history of the causes of the Great War of 1914-18, for instance, it is customary to argue that the details of the comings and goings of the last few weeks before the final outbreak were of small account compared with the history of the broad diplomatic groupings and ambitions which seemed to make such a catastrophe sooner or later almost inevitable. We attach more importance to the Drang nach Osten than to the shooting of the Archduke at Sarajevo.

There are very great dangers in these broader inter pretations. It is very easy to say that such and such a set of influences made such and such an outcome 'almost inevitable'. But one can never be quite sure. Suppose, for instance, that the Archduke had not been shot. Is it quite certain that there would have been a European war? Is it not conceivable that the unstable situation which then obtained might have persisted until some other 'accident' - a shift of political parties in Germany, a reshuffle of the diplomatic corps in Russia - produced a detente in which our history might have taken another and perhaps a happier direction? Nevertheless, we need not make this a pretext for com plete scepticism regarding remoter influences. We may agree that their operation may be deflected by subsequent developments. But if they are of such a nature as seems likely to produce a certain effect, and if that effect actually occurs, the fact that it need not have occurred should not deter us from labelling them as significant causes and giving them due weight in any general description of the incident. It is not repugnant to common sense to say that one of the causes of the American War of Independence 113 APPENDIX was the commercial policy of the English government even though special incidents were needed to set the tinder alight. It is in this sense of general influences tending toward international friction and conflict that we speak of economic causes of war.

3 Motives as Causes The difficulties which arise from the existence of proximate and remote causes are difficulties which affect any kind of explanation, whether of natural events or of human conduct. There are further difficulties, however, which arise only where human conduct is involved. If we are explaining some event of a purely physical nature, say the release of an avalanche or the discharge of lightning, when we speak of a cause, we always refer to an antecedent event also physical in nature. The chain of explanation is homogeneous. But, if we are explaining events in which the conduct of human beings is involved, the word cause can be used in two different senses. We can say the cause of the American War of Independ ence was the desire of the Americans to be rid ofan irksome regulation. Or we can say it was the landing of tea at Boston. In the one case we are referring to a motive, in the other case to an event in the outside world which (inter alia) gave rise to that motive. In the one case a reason is the cause, in the other case an external event. l The two modes of explanation are not in the least in compatible. Indeed, on the assumption that human action 1 In his illuminating work on the subject matter of the social sciences, Dr. Schiltz has made much the same point with his distinction between the 'weil' and the 'um-zu-' motive Alfred Schutz Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt, especially pp. 93-105. See also BODE and STONIER,A New Contribution to the Methodology of the Social Sciences, 'Economica', 1937, pp. 406-42 4.

MEANING OF ECONOMIC CAUSATION is influenced by psychological factors, either conscious or unconscious, both are necessary. You cannot leave out one or the other without making nonsense of history. The naive behaviourists who believe that all' human be haviour can be explained in terms ofsuccessive rearrange ments of organic matter could not succeed in writing one page of history in such terms. In the last analysis, however, there is a sense in which the reason is logically prior to the occasion. For the occasion will have different results according to its inter pretation and the system of motives which it evokes. If the Americans had not resented the commercial policy of the English, the landing of tea at Boston would have occasioned no international friction. Hence historical knowledge in its fullest development, while necessarily a chronicle of events, is essentially an explanation of reasons.

Individual reasons may themselves prove to tend to be associated with particular social or material conditions. (There' will be more to be said about that later on.) But the immediate preoccupation of historical explanation, as distinct from general sociology, is essentially the dis covery of reasons. Every social event is due to the action of some individual or group of individu'als. Every indivi dual action is due to some motive, conscious or unconscious. 4 The Nature ofan Economic Cause It is now appropriate to approach our~central problem. What is it which entitles us to refer to a particular motive as being economic in character? What is an economic cause? At first sight the problem is simple. We all speak of economic causes; and if we make allowances for the necessary (and desirable) looseness of unpedantic speech, 115 APPENDIX it is probable that we often succeed in talking sense. It is to be hoped that the subject matter of this book is not radically different from the expectations aroused by its title. Nevertheless, there are certain difficulties arising from the somewhat elusive nature of the concept of the economic, which it is desirable to resolve, if our ideas are to be at all precise.

I t should be fairly clear that we cannot classify wars as economic or non-economic in origin according as they involve or do not involve economic factors ofany kind. For all wars involve economic factors. All wars involve the disposition of limited resources, the counting of costs, the comparison of different objectives. It is not true that a war of religion is indifferent to economic considerations and a war for trade is determined by them. The attaining of either objective necessarily has an economic aspect. On the other hand, if we turn from considerations of means to the realm of ultimate objectives, we are con fronted with the difficulty that, in that sphere, there is nothing which can be described as economic. Every attempt to classify the ends of human activity as economic or non -economic has come to grief in the most obvious confusions. It has been said, for instance, that they are economic or non-economic according as they are material or immaterial. But to obtain shelter - a 'material' end par excellence-may involve no economic problem; while to obtain the delights of architectural beauty - an 'immaterial' end - may raise the economic problem in its acutest form. Again it has been said that ends are economic or non-economic according as they are self-regarding or otherwise. But to satisfy oneself may be much less of an economic problem than to secure the satisfaction of others.

The fact is that there are no economic ends as such; there are only economic problems involved in the achievements 116 MEANING OF ECONOMIC CAUSATION of ends; and these economic problems arise, not because of the nature of the ends, but because of the limitations of the means for securing them.! At first sight therefore there might seem to be a complete impasse. The waging of any kind of war involves economic considerations. There is no kind of ultimate end which can be called economic. Are we to conclude, then, that the search for economic motives is useless? 2 Clearly this would be absurd; we certainly mean some thing when we talk of such things. And fortunately, if we look a Iittle further, it is not difficult to find a way out. If, in everyday speech, we say that a man's motive in doing a certain thing is wholly economic, what we really mean is simply that he regards it only as a way of securing meansfor satisfyinghis ends in general. It he does it with only one end in mind, we do not regard his motive as economic; we regard it as having the character of the end to which it is specific. But if he does it with the desire to increase his power to satisfy ends in general, then we do regard it as economic; and we say that his action has an economic cause.

This way of speaking has its counterpart in the more technical regions of economic analysis. Rightly conceived, the economic man of classical theory is not a man who has no end but the making of money. He is not a man who is concerned only with providing for his own con sumption. He is simply a man who in his capacity as 1 I have dealt with this problem at some length in my Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed., chaps. i and ii. But I did not deal there with the problem of giving some meaning to everyday phrases such as 'economic cause', 'economic factor', etc. What follows may there fore be regarded as a supplement to these chapters. The solution here offered is entirely consistent with the somewhat radical approach of the general methodology there presented. 2 This conclusion has actually been suggested by Mr. Hawtrey. See above, chap. iv, sect.!." 117 APPENDIX producer is concerned with the maximization of general purchasing power. His productive activities are not ends in themselves. They are not immediately subservient to particular kinds of consumption. They are purely in strumental to the augmentation of his power to purchase in general. He may want money for purposes of pushpin or poetry, for egotistical or altruistic reasons. But as producer he has no mixed motives. His motive is purely economIC.

Here surely we have a way of making precise the dis tinction for which we are looking. The causes of war are to be regarded as economic if the objective is purely instrumen tal to securing for some person or persons a greater command of resources in general-a greater power of choosing alternative types of real income. They are to be regarded as non-economic if the objective is not in strumental to anything further - if it is definitely an end in itself rather than means for a number of ends. ' At first sight this may appear very remote and abstract. But it fits very well with everyday 'usage. In everyday speech, we should say that a war waged to spread the principles of a certain religion, a genuine crusade for instance, was due to non-economic causes. But the causes of a war that was waged to secure better openings for trade or freer access to certain raw materials (the so-called Opium Wars of the last century, for instance), we should certainly describe as economic. Both types of war involve economic problems in that both involve problems of the disposi tion of scarce means - scarce man power, scarce capital, scarce natural resources. Both types of war may be waged by men having a multiplicity of ultimate ob jectives. But, in the one case, the war is a means to a specific and ultimate end; in the other, it is merely instru mental to the achievement of ends in general. The char118 MEANING OF ECONOMICCAUSATfoN acteristic of the economic motive is the lack of specificity of the means with which it is concerned. 1 5 The Rules ofHistoricalExplanation Now in investigating the historical significance of economic causes in this sense, one rule must always be obligatory. In diagnosing the causes of any particular war (or war in a situa tion of a particular type) , it is not enough to say that economic interests are involved; we must specify whose economic interests. In analysing the phenomena of social life, we must always remember that, although the individual is affected by his social environment, yet action in society is always the action of individuals; and it ·is always the conceptions by individuals of their own and other people's interests which are the subject of conscious action. In order that military action by the government of a national group may be said to be due to economic causes, it is not necessary that the economic interests of every member or a majority of the nation should be involved. It is indeed, as we have seen, not impossible that this should be so. But it is not necessary that it should be so. It is quite easy to think of cases where the interest is merely that of the absolute monarch or of a group of predatory financiers. Irour diagnosis is to be adequate, it is essential that, at every stage, the connection between economic interest and the economic subjects who have the interest should be very clearly indicated.

At the same time, it is important also to show that the interests diagnosed are actually realized and operative. 1 Following the same line of analysis, the distinction within the sphere of general strategy between military and economic objectives will be seen to be a distinction between objectives having more or less specific utility for the ends of particular operations. The destruction of a cargo of iron ore is an economic objective; the destruction of steel guns is military. 119 APPENDIX To show that such and such a war was due to economic causes it is plainly insufficient to shovv that certain groups or classes benefited after the event. It is hardly possible to think of any war in history which has not brought some benefit to someone. But the benefited are not necessarily the responsible. Because sculptors and monumental masons did well out of the boom in war memorials after the Great War of 19I 4-I 8 we should not say that they bore any great responsibility for its outbreak. The receipts of the manufacturers of armaments and the owners of raw materials used in war are obviously raised by the outbreak of war, or at least by measures of warlike preparation.

But it is a far cry from the recognition of this very obvious fact to the. demonstration that wars are the result of the pressure of armament interests. To show that economic interests play a partin the causation of war, it is not enough to show that they benefit ex-post; it is necessary to show that it was thought that they would benefit ex-ante, and that this conviction was an operative factor in the actual framing of policy. This is not a demonstration which can be undertaken by purely speculative methods. To establish the signifi cance of economic causes we have to show their actual operation in practice. To understand the mode of working of any kind of cause, it is proper and useful to construct models, as it were, of typical situations, and to investigate how different motives may be conceivedto operate. But to establish a logical possibility is far from establishing an historical influence or a present tendency. To do this it is necessary to show, not merely that the factors postulated in the model were actually present in certain circumstances; it is necessary also to show that they were the important and significant factors. A theory may be misleading, not merely because of logical inconsistency, but also because 120 l\1EANING OF E(jONOMIC CAUSATION of inadequacy to the facts of the situation; and as we have seen, it is probable that some at least of the attempts which have been made to explain war in terms of economic causes have been deficient for just this reason. They are not logically impossible. But they do not fit the facts. It is not logically impossible, for instance, that all wars and dangers of war might be due to the machinations of the manufacturers of armaments. But reference to the facts seems to show that, while occasionally such measures may have been effective, it is a gross error ofperspective to suggest that they have been proportionally very important. Only by continual testing of hypotheses by reference to historical fa.ct can we hope to make progress in such inquiries.

When we refer to historical fact, however, we are likely almost always to be confronted by the difficulty that motivation is not simple. In the majority of cases where wars of any importance are involved, we find that more than one type of cause has been operative. We find that different groups with different types of motives have been influential. We find that even within one group, or within one individual consciousness a mixture of motives has been present. It is perhaps possible to discover pure cases. Few would argue, for instance, that the First Crusade was tainted by much economic motive or that the Fourth was inspired by very much else. But such cases are the excep tions. In most cases we find the desire for general wealth, lust for glory or revenge, devotion to duty or the dictates of particular religions, not to mention all sorts of cruder unconscious motives, all operating side by side. Con sidering the complexity of social action, it would be surprisingif this were not so.

Recogni tion of this obvious fact does not, however, mean that inquiries concerning the action of particular causes are useless. For what we are out to do is, not to 121 APPENDIX establish (or to refute) a uniform explanation of history, but to discover the role played by a particular type of cause in different types of situation. We want to discover, not whether or not economic causes are exclusively operative in the causation of war, but what is the significance of the part they play in different situations. We may not often find cases where the economic motive is exclusively operative. But we are content if we can find cases where it is predominant - or at least strongly co-oper.ative with others. And although this is often a task of great difficulty , there is no reason to suppose that it is a task which cannot be undertaken. It involves indeed the kind of judgment upon which most decisions of everyday life regarding human relations are necessarily taken. We cannot attain quantitative precision here; for quantitative judgments in such a sphere are almost unthinkable. But there is no reason why, with due critical self-consciousness, we should not arrive at some sense of proportion.

6 Social Structuresas Causes There is yet another sense in which we may speak of economic causation. Our inquiry has not been purely or even predomin antly historical. It has not been limited to the explanation of particular incidents. The object has been to discover, not merely whether economic causes have operated in particular cases, but also whether there are any common characteristics of the different particular cases and whether there are typical situations in which they may be expected to recur. The ultimate aim has been not history but sociological generalization. Thus, for instance, we found that some wars were waged in the interests of particular groups of investors. But our inquiry did not rest there. We went on to inquire in what circumstances such groups 122 MEANING OF ECONOMIC CAUSATION would be politically influential, and whether there were broader features of the social and political situation, which accompanied such influence. And having found that there were such features, following an intelligible usage of everyday speech, we spoke of them too as causes.

It is just at this point that we need once again some precise means of distinguishing economic from other influences. Fortunately the same mode of approach that we found useful earlier, enables us to make the distinction which we need here. If the institutions whose existence is accompanied by the emergence of such tendencies are concerned with the organization of general power to satisfy a variety of ultimate needs, then we may describe them as economic; if they are concerned with the achieve ment of more specific ends then they fall under some other heading. Thus if, as l\tlarxian communists have contended, the urge to certain types of ':Var is ultimately associated with the institution of private property in the means of production, we should be entitled to describe it as economic in origin. Again if it were to be associated with certain forms of the institution of slavery, it would fall into the same category. If, on the other hand, it were to be asso ciated with certain forms of political organization or the prevalence of certain religions, it would not come under this classification.

Now obviously here, as in the case of more restricted investigations, the influences may not be pure. There is in fact a strong probability that typical situations con ducive to conflict may be the resultant of more than one general kind of influence. There is nothing which obliges us to assume that all social phenomena must be capable of being attributed to one kind of cause. And clearly even the influences which we take as ultimate may themselves have more than one aspect. Private property, for instance, 123 APPENDIX may serve the economic purpose of organizing general productive power; but it may also be held in certain cir cumstances to derive its status from motives less instru mental in nature - desires for self-expression or the preservation of independence and so on. But this need not deter us. Here, as in the investigation of the motivation of particular actions, our concern is, not to establish an ultimate sociological monism, but to attempt to indicate the existence and the relative weight of influences which, on the level of inquiry which we chose, may be taken as ultimate data. In the final analysis nothing is assumed to be ultimate. It is merely a question at what point it is convenient to break off.

In the foregoing essay, the investigation was broken off at the point at which it was discovered that the existence of independent sovereign states, both directly and indirectly, gave rise to clashes of interest which were likely to lead to war. It was not denied that the existence of independent sovereign states was itself capable of further explanation. But it was felt that, since the main aim of the essay was to find causes susceptible of elimination, the discovery of this critical weakness in a political structure obviously capable of modification, was a point at which that aim might perhaps be said to have been sufficiently realized. 124