8. The Contraproducente Consequences of the Foreign-Aid Program in Bolivia

8 The ContraproducenteConsequences of the Foreign-AidProgram in Bolivia WILLIAM s. STOKES Introduction In a letter to President Victor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia (released May 14, 1961, in· the United States and May 17 in La Paz, Bolivia), President Kennedy declared that the United States was now ready to assist Bolivia in a long-range economic program to achieve higher standards of living, economic prog ress, and social justice. President Kennedy promised loans and grants for the state tin and oil enterprises, roads, surplus agri cultural products, an airport and a sugar mill (totaling $50,000, 000, including the West German credits), with other projects, such as low-tost worker and farmer housing to be undertaken as soon as the planning ·and programing could be completed. In the last paragraph, President Kennedy said: "This great revolution has blazed a path for others to follow." 1 In the ,official translation of the letter in Bolivia, the sentence reads: 'IThis great revolution has opened the road for other countries to follow." In the headlines to the letter as it was published in the official newspaper of Bolivia is the phrase: "Kennedy Eulo gizes the National Revolution." 2 145 146 The New Argument in Economics Is this a "great revolution"? Has it "blazed a path for others to follow"? Should the President "eulogize" it? Is it worthy of long-range foreign aid?

Bolivia has already been the recipient of aid from the United States (from July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1960, a total of $191, 200,000 in Mutual Security and Economic Program aid; $191, 700,000 if military aid is included).3 President Kennedy has determined that the country should receive more, and apparently he and his distinguished advisers are convinced that the Revolu ci6n N acional is a model for other Latin American countries to follow. It therefore seems legitimate for the scholar and citizen to examine the nature of the Revoluci6n Nacional and the aid it has received from the United States preliminary to a deter mination of the consequences of the President's "strong leader ship" and "bold, imaginative program." The Ideology and Politics of the "Great Revolution" I have described elsewhere the origin of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario or MNR.4 In association with a military lodge, the MNR seized power by force on December 20, 1943. The civilian-military oligarchy proceeded to govern by terror. At least eleven outstanding Bolivians were murdered in the period November 20-25, 1944, alone. The assassinations, tor tures, and official thievery became so universally known that Sumner Welles said that the Government had H ••••turned Bolivia into an immense concentration camp" and, "torture and assassination were daily occurrences."!> Led by professors and university students, urban masses ex ploded into a direct, frontal assault on the centers of dictatorial power in La Paz in July, 1946. When they burst into the governmental palace and finally found President Gualberto Villarroel hiding in a closet (armario)~ they shot him in the chest, and pushed his body out on one of the balconies that front on Ayacucho Street. From there they threw him to the mob below, which finished him off and hung his remains to a lamppost. 6 Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 147 Those leaders of the MNR who escaped began immediately to plan their return to power. In August, 1949, they initiated such mass violence that it probably could be said that a state of civil war prevailed in the country. The army suppressed the uprising in three weeks of fighting. The next attempt, which was success ful, was a two..day attack on La Paz, the center of political power. The fighting from April 9~II, 1952, was fierce. A two column analysis of the violence, published in El Mercurio of Santiago, Chile, on April II, 1958, asserted that at least 5,000 lives were lost.

The original ideology of the MNR was basically Marxist Leninist, although it was revisionist in not contemplating immedi ate affiliation with international Communism. Theorists. such as Walter Guevara Arze and Jose Fellman Velarde accepted historical materialism and the class struggle as central parts of their thinking. Ideally, the exploited masses should destroy the bourgeoisie and establish an economic system of socialism and a political system of dictatorship of the proletariat ("people's democracy"). The theorists argued, however, that Bolivia was obliged to import a third of its food and obtain foreign exchange by marketing minerals in other countries. Whether Bolivia could have socialism, therefore, depended upon whether socialism first succeeded in the large countries. A further difficulty was that class consciousness was not sufficiently developed among the Indians and mestizos to permit dictatorship of the proletariat at once. If Bolivia could not have socialism and dictatorship of the proletariat immediately, what could and should it have?

The MNR theorists answered: Revolucion Nacional. "The Revolucidn N acional/' Dr. Guevara Arze asserted, "does not deny the class struggle but is not based upon it." He added that later, depending upon the world development of socialism, Bolivia could base a revolution on the class struggle. 7 The original program of the MNR included: Opposition to "Judaism" and liberal democracy; prohibition of foreign capital in the media of communication; prohibition of the use of for eigners in command posts in the army; registration and control of all foreign employees in the country; absolute prohibition of the 148 The New Argument in Economics immigration of Jews; abolition of the "great private monopolies"; state control of commercial activities; nationalization of public services; class warfare through a union (alianza de clases) of the proletariat, peasants, and the middle classes against the "anti national superstate" (usually called the rosca) and its servants; and public education and social welfare directed by the state along political and nationalistic lines. 8 Fellman Velarde, who was Minister of Education in 1961, described the programmatic objectives of the MNR in this way: H ••••it is necessary to eliminate imperialism and the great bourgeoisie that serves as its agent, returning to Bolivia the exploitation of its mines, redistributing the land, and diversify ing the economy by means of the creation of new sources of wealth." 9 The men who affixed their signatures to the act establishing the MNR were: Augusto Cespedes, Carlos Montenegro, Victor Paz Estenssoro, Hernan Siles Zuazo, Walter Guevara Arze, and Jose CuadrosQuiroga. In addition, there were eight other leaders who aided significantly in the campaign for power that followed. Io Most of the original founders and their principal supporters have published works that expose their views. Al though Marxist-Leninist conceptions are important in almost all cases, it must be emphasized that the MNR sought nationalis tic applications of Communist formulae. Both Montenegro and Cespedes, for example, assert again and again that the MNR man aged the data of historical materialism better than the scientific Marxists. By this they meant that the "reality" of Bolivia negated the possibilities of a successful class revolution. They thereforeop posed the native Marxist activists and the trained members of the international apparatus who wished to impose the "revealed"

truth of Marxism-Leninism on Bolivia in orthodox Communist fashion. II A major work of Hernan Siles Zuazo published in 1954 revealed intellectual affiliation with Marxism,I2 but in his ad dress to Congress in 1958, President Siles Zuazo repudiated class dictatorship, criticized the Communists, and associated himself with "Christian democracy." 13 Even Siles Salinas (who insists Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 149 that President Paz Estenssoro clearly is a Marxist) asserts that Siles Zuazo is not a "dogmatic Marxist." 14 A Congressman con cerned with Latin American affairs told me in Washington in July, 1961, that Secretary of State Dean Rusk had assured him that President Victor Paz Estenssoro is not a Marxist. On the basis of the books, documents, and interviews available to me, I must conclude that President Paz Estenssoro is a revisionist Marxist-Leninist, whose policies have encouraged Communism in Bolivia.

There is less disagreement as to the Marxist orientation of the leaders of the great labor unions, such as Juan Lechin, Vice President of Bolivia and head of both the Central de Trabaja dores de Bolivia and the Confederaci6n Minera de Bolivia, and Mario Torres Calleja, Secretary General of the Federaci6n Sindical de Traba jadores Mineros de Bolivia or FSTMB. Stalin ists and Trotskyites drew up the famous Tesis de Pulacayo (approved on May 18, 1946), which was adopted as the Programa de Principios of the FSTMB. The essence of the Tesis de Pulacayowas a commitment of the miners to subordinate tempo rary possibilities of economic gain to the greater task of achieving the proletarian revolution. The specific provisions of the Tesis and the Programa paralleled almost exactly the "reforms" of the MNR after the seizure of power in 1952. When Lechin arrived at Huanuni on May 7, 1961, after a trip to the United States to discuss foreign aid, he made a twenty-minute speech to union members to the effect that his visit to the heartland of "im perialism" did not mean a give-away (entreguismo) or betrayal of the working class. He told his audience that they must be prepared to "zig-zag" if they expected to achieve their objectives, and on this point he reminded them that even Stalin made a temporary alliance with Hitler as a part of his long-term stra tegy.u, Perhaps the most important single source of information as to the ideological orientation of the MNR at the present time is the Program of Government for 1960-1964. The program was drafted for the purpose, among other things, of persuading the United States to part with even larger amounts of foreign aid.

150 The New Argument in Economics Nevertheless, the program defends the politically unliberal and economically unsuccessful "reforms" achieved since 1952, some of which were contained in or alluded to in the first program, already discussed. In addition, the part that deals with the nature of the state and the role of law and certain institutions, such as the armed forces and the police, is clearly Marxist Leninist. According to the MNR, the state is an instrumentality at the service of the classes that control the means of production. "Legal norms-which are not mere abstractions removed from reality but part of the social phenomenon-reflect the interests of the economically dominant classes and are obligatory upon the members of society.... The armed forces constitute the apparatus of force of the state and of the social classes that have public power and are designed to fulfill two principal functions.

The first consists of defending the state from its internal enemies. This means defending the groups or social classes that have in their hands the management of the state, as opposed to those social groups with contradictory interests. This constitutes the function of conserving public order .... and necessarily implies a political identification between the armed forces and the dominan t classes. "In the modern state the police are one of the instruments of coercion of the social classes that possess public power." 16 The government established by President Victor Paz Estenssoro in 1952 could not by any stretch of the imagination be described as democratic. The President and his advisers evidenced from the very beginning a passionate intolerance of the opposition. They arrested a former foreign minister, former minister of economic affairs, former chief justice of the Supreme Court, leaders of the major political parties, and many other prominent, even distinguished figures. Secret police organized under a bureau known as Political Control ferreted out the opposition, using unconstitutional methods that rivaled in ferocity those employed by the Nazi and Communist tyrannies. The jails were literally filled with thousands of political prisoners, and President Paz Estenssoro created concentration or "work" camps to ac commodate the overflow. Among such camps were Curahuara Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 151 de Carangas, near Laz Paz, and those at Coracoro, Catavi, and Uncia. I7 The media of communication were intimidated. Presi dent Paz Estenssoro ordered the closing of La Raz6n in La Paz, a newspaper owned by Carlos Aramayo. In Cochabamba, MNR mobs burned and destroyed the daily Los Tiempos.18 The leaders (dirigentes) of the MNR arrogated to themselves "super legal immunities" and acted above constitution, law, or court.

It has been alleged that they looted the public treasury and engaged in fiscal irregularities probably without parallel in Bolivia's history. As late as July, 1961, it was revealed that about $1,000,000, which was supposed to be used to purchase 4,000 tons of lard, had disappeared.1'9 When elections were scheduled for June, 1956, with power to be transferred in August, it was obvious to Bolivian and foreign observers that the official candidate, Dr. Hernan Siles Zuazo, Vice President under Paz Estenssoro, would win. All effective political opposition had been suppressed. In addition, the MNR instituted universal suffrage, which meant, in effect, giving the vote to illiterates. Whereas only about 160,000 citizens were eligible to vote in the 1951 elections, approximately 1,200,000 were eligible to cast ballots in 1956.20 To be certain that no embarrassing slips would occur, the government created an ad hoc committee to draft an electoral statute that would guar antee the effectiveness of the imposicion (rigged election). They gave the illiterate Indians their colored ballots (papeletas de coZores») and Dr. Siles Zuazo became president. 21 Paz Estenssoro departed for England to perform ambassadorial duties but returned to win the 1960 "elections" and assume the presidency once more (with former President Siles Zuazo departing for Uruguay to perform ambassadorial chores).

President Siles Zuazo closed the concentration camps, suc ceeded (early in July, 1957) in removing some extreme left-wing influence from the cabinet and party leadership, and permitted freer expression of opinion in the press. In addition, the Presi dent stated that the thousands of political exiles could return to Bolivia. In fact, however, most requests for the special transit visas (permisos de retorno) were reported to have been denied. AI152 The New Argument in Economics though administrative corruption "reached unknown limits," and Siles had to denounce certain members of the previous administration for having enriched themselves at public ex pense, it is contended that not one person was punished for the operaciones fraudulentas. 22 The MNR endeavored to eliminate the traditional army and to create proletarian armed militias dedicated to the defense of the Revoluci6n N acional. Juan Lechin, who is credited with having formed the militias, has claimed that the rural people (campesinos) made up fifteen regiments, the miners, 10,000 men, the railroad workers, 2,000, and the factory workers, 3,000. When a union was organized, its leaders immediately asked the govern ment for arms for each man. 23 It was reported late in 1958 that at the last mining congress at Colquiri, the following resolution was adopted: "The militias should be strengthened, their com mand centralized, and their discipline ought to be based on the most profound class convictions. The Federation of Miners will arm the workers and at the same time provide them with, an ideological conception of class. The armament of the proletariat and the peasants is one of the great conquests of our class and especially of the miners. The revolution has no more defense than that of the workers' militias." 24 However, the us,e of violence for political purposes, instead of protecting person and property, has sometimes failed to serve the MNR. Sometimes the militias have refused to follow orders or have acted contrary to government policy. Therefore, in recent years the MNR has begun to rebuild the professional army. The army is reputed to total about 80,000 soldiers at the present time,25 and in the 1961 budget the Ministry of Defense received 52,700,000,000 bolivi anos (with only debt service and education receiving more).26 Although the MNR has always officially repudiated the class revolution and professes to represent an alliance of workers, peasants, and members of the middle class, it is a fact that the MNR's policies have desperately injured the middle class, per haps even more than the upper class. The government's policy of inflation, for example, meant that many members of the mid dle class were compelled to debase their standards. Many intelConsequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 153 lectuals and trained people left the country. Others abandoned their professions for black-marketing. Those with capital ex ported it in order to prevent government seizure. The Zondag report declared that inflation " is about to wipe out the small middle class of Bolivia, which is practically the only one that has the necessary education and management ability to give direction to the country." 27 Some writers argue that the MNR should have boldly eliminated the latifundistas (large landholders) as a social class in the first place. 28 There is little evidence that the MNR has curbed Communist infiltration from 1952 to the present. Indeed, there is demonstration of Commu nist presence and influence in the cabinet, legislature, court sys tem, police, unions, and education. 29 There was enough support in the Chamber of Deputies in 1960 to approve a resolution introduced by Deputy Roncal calling for aid for the Cuban Revolution ("to defend the Cuban Revolution is to defend the Bolivian Revolution").3o Since returning to power in 1960, President Paz Estenssoro has. "reorganized" the court system, permitted the Minister of Economy to "intervene" in the management of the newspaper

E1 Diario of La Paz, decreed an estado de sitio (suspension of constitutional guarantees for ninety days beginning June 7), and forced Walter Guevara Arze, Chief of the Movimiento Revolucionario Nacional Autentico, and thirty-one followers, to flee to Peru. The Congress converted itself into a Constituent Assembly, in a manner that seems clearly unconstitutional, in order to add more than a hundred amendments to the organic statute. Some of the amendments purported to give constitutional sanction to previous "elections," while others gave the executive authority to effect economic change without approval from the legislature. Finally, the Communist assault on the Catholic Church has intensified class conflict and resulted in the closing of a Catholic radio station. 31 154 The New Argument in Economics The "Great Revolution" and the Agrarian Reform The Zondag mission described traditional agriculture in Bolivia as economically and socially backward and concluded that reform was "absolutely necessary." 32 The problems were many. Some men owned too much property (latifundismo)J and some too little (minifundismo). The 1950 census revealed that 4.5 per cent of the rural landowners possessed 70 per cent of all private landed property. On the other hand, the small and medium farmers, who made up 90 per cent of the rural popula tion, held only 30 per cent of the land. 33 The evils of the colonato system, characteristic of the central valley and altiplano (highlands) of Bolivia, have been described by many writers. 34 So inefficient was the system of agriculture that large per centages of the foodstuffs domestically consumed had to be imported each year: for 1925-1929, 22.3%; 1940, 23.9%; 1952, 30%; 1953, 37.84%.35 This situation was unnecessary. Bolivia has literally millions of acres of undeveloped land that studies have proved to be suitable for agricultural, pastoral, and extrac tive enterprises. For example, the possibilities for cacao and Brazil nuts are great. Bolivia's rubber is high grade and not likely to be replaced by synthetics. The climate and labor conditions in Yungas are favorable to tea-growing (of which 155 tons worth $200,000 were imported in 1953). Pyrethrum, bananas, corn, rice, sugar, yucca, vegetable oils, tobacco, hard fibers, cusi palms for palm oil, honey, tumeric, cotton, caranday palm wax, quebracho-all could be produced. Although low, govern mentally controlled prices for coffee discourage its production, without such artificial barriers the possibilities were virtually unlimited. Quinna, grown in the Bolivian highlands, is a cereal extremely rich in vitamins and protein content. New varieties of wheat could be grown on the high plains, freeing the valleys for other crops. With an estimated 128,000,000 acres of forest, Bolivia is one of the most richly endowed countries in the world in this resource. 36 Instead of concentrating agrarian reform on national lands, Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 155 the MNR enacted a decree-law on August 2, 1953, which pro vided for expropriation and distribution of lands that were already in use. The official program of the MNR for 1960-1964 describes the agrarian reform as the "most transcendental" of all its conquistas because it liberated more than 2,000,000 campesinos from serHike conditions. 87 The boast evokes sym pathetic response, but the facts must be explored to determine what the effects of the agrarian reform have been.

There is evidence that the main ideological influence in the drafting of the expropriation decree was Marxist-Trotskyite. 38 According to Article 156, hacendados or latifundistas (large landholders) whose lands are expropriated in whole or in part are to be offered compensation in the form of two per cent, twenty-five-year "agrarian bonds." The value of the land was based on the formula of current tax assessment, which must have been calculated to take private property virtually without compensation. The vicious inflation that the MNR initiated further eroded the worth of the bonds. Article 160 provides that the beneficiaries of the land program can pay for the land on the same terms-price according to tax assessment, twenty five years for amortization, two per cent interest. Article 162 sets up a National Service of Agrarian Reform headed by the President. Article 164 gives the President "supreme authority"

over the entire administrative system including (in section d) the final decision, without judicial appeal, on all concessions of titles to land. The Agrarian Law, therefore, provides for a centralized'system of administration without checks or controls on the executive. The President is authorized to appoint whom ever he chooses to administer the program, and he himself has the final vote. As I wrote in 1959, "This kind of unlimited, unchecked authority invites arbitrary action and abuse." 39 Let us see how the scheme has worked. As soon as the decree was signed on August 2, 1953, many Indians seized land "militarily." They took and used whatever they found, including about $15,000,000 worth of cattle, many of which were prize breeding-stock. Although the haciendas (large farms) had been supplying the cities with food, the people 156 The New Argument in Economics who seized or received land proceeded to grow food for them selves alone. The reason for this was that the prices the Bolivian Government offered the farmers for their produce were too low. When there were surpluses, the farmers smuggled their livestock, corn, rice, and other products into neighboring coun tries where they could sell at a profit. Bolivia, the home of the potato, was compelled to import this food from Argentina. Thus, the initial result of the agrarian reform was famine in the cities, which the United States was called upon to alleviate.

However, about one-third of the food supplied by the United States was smuggled out of the country, and much of the rest went into black markets. Little reached the consumers who needed it most, although they waited hours in lines (colas) to get it. In December, 1956, prices of United States food were raised from their formerly artificially low points of ten to twenty per cent of cost to market levels. Price controls were abolished. These actions encouraged local production to some extent. 40 The National Service of Agrarian Reform was characterized by "dishonesty, ignorance, and negligence." The local administra tion-called juntas rurales-produced "anarchy" and "insecur ity" in the countryside. Trips to acquire data to implement the reform became expeditions of "pillage." Aside from "gifts" in kind, the members of the juntas collected "fees" from the Indians they were supposed to benefit. A law of December 22, 1956, replaced the juntas by a new administrative system, but the results were no better. The new appointees, like the old, demanded food, drink, gifts, and fees for their "labor." In many instances, the owner was not present at the time his property was investigated, but the officials proceeded to sign the form declaring that the proprietor had ceded his property to the Indians "freely and voluntarily." It usually took several months to conclude the preliminary part of the paper work. When the documents were transferred to higher authority, they entered a "long winter sleep," although awakened promptly by "gifts."

From the National Service of Agrarian Reform, the docu ments passed to the Minister of Campesino Affairs, and from Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 157 there to the Legal Department of the Presidency, and finally to the Primer Mandatario (the President) himself. In the long meantime, the campesinos} "orphans without direction," became adventurers. They sacked houses, occupied properties, and sub jected the owners to terror and extortion. Many of the agitators who encouraged such activity were members of the MNR. The lawyers prolonged land cases to increase' their fees. The administrative and legal work was done so poorly that a second examination was often required (called a replanteo) to correct the mistakes made. The surveyors demanded "gross sums" for their services (such as 50,000 bolivianos each from 320 ex-colonos of the property "Cocamarca" in the province of Arque in Cochabamba). The campesinos were thus compelled to pay for lawyers, surveyors, judges, secretaries, and other officials, as well as for sealed paper, stamps, etc., in order to obtain titles to land. The total amount invested often was more than the market value of the land. For this reason, ".... a great number of ex-colonos prefer to buy their parcels." 41 In his address to the national congress in 1958, President Siles Zuazo estimated that it would take thirty to forty years to complete the agrarian reform. 42 However, Beltran and Fer nandez (1960) have calculated that if the "rhythm" of the first period of the reform-1953-1956-were followed, it would take 485 years to redistribute the land. If the increased pace of the 1956-1959 period were to continue, it would take 108 years.43 As of May, 1960, the government had granted 63,414 titles to 44,100 heads of family, involving 1,510,832.57 hectares, of which only 820,707.82 hectares went into individually held plots. In addition, 23,431 titles were almost ready for distribution to 12,670 heads of family.44 The average size of holding extended to campesinos has been 3.61 hectares. 45 Production has increased in some crops, espe cially sugar. It has fallen in others, such as wheat. However, it seems plain that the agrarian reform, even in instances in which a farmer has been able to secure title to land, has created frac tionalized plots too small to encourage hopes of prosperity among the masses of rural peoples. Benjamin Maluenda, a Chilean 158 The New Argument in Economics agronomist, reported in November, 1958, that the agrarian re form had had only one result: the subdividing of property.46 Martinez Marquez, writing in June, 1961, concluded that after eight years, the agrarian reform had not resulted in increased production, lower prices of products, improvement in the living conditions of the peasants, or lessened political tensions in the country.47 State interventionism in agriculture may have pro duced political consequences, however. Two Bolivian deputies have charged that an "immense tonnage" of coca leaves are being processed into cocaine in a factory in Santa Cruz, which is managed by Senator Luis Sandoval Moron, the "right arm of the government." The cocaine is allegedly exported to pay for arms flown in from Cuba, stored in Santa Cruz and Cocha bamba, and from there distributed in Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina in preparation for other fidel.azos (Castro-like cOUpS).48 Finally, even Augusto Cespedes, one of the founders of the MNR and editor of the official newspaper, La N acion) admitted that the agrarian reform had produced contraproducente conse quences (the reverse of expectations), at least in the rich Cochabamba valley. He uses such words and phrases as the following to describe what has happened: "Unproductive," "an archy," "new tyranny," "disorder," "lower agricultural produc tion," and "negative results." 49 The "Great Revolution" and the Nationalization of the Tin Mines In response to their enchantment with nationalization of the means of production and the planned economy, the MNR seized

the three great tin interests-Patino, Aramayo, and Hochschild -on October 31, 1952.50 Both evidence and logic argued strongly against nationalization. The Bohan report (1942) concluded without qualification that the three large companies ".... are without a doubt superior to any staff which the Government of Bolivia, alone or with official American assistance, could put into the field." 51 However, the leaders of the MNR and their left wing supporters had the terms of an ideology to fulfill, and in Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 159 addition they could see that the companies were prosperous. They thought that by seizing the tin mines they would make a great killing. For example, Anaya-a Marxist-Leninist-de clared that the nationalized mines would make enough money to pay for the agrarian reform; the electrification of the country; the colonization program; the construction of light and heavy industry; petroleum development; the building of schools, hos pitals and the like on a "great scale"; and the development of water, air, and land transportation and communication. 52 Dr. Hernan Siles Zuazo, one of the founders of the MNR and President from 1956-1960, read a paper at the Universidad Mayor de San Sim,on in Cochabamba on October 11, 1954, in which he declared: "For many years, Bolivia will depend on the produc tion of its extractive industry." 53 The best proof of the grandiose expectations of the MNR nationalizers and planners is found in the statement of the President of the Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), the state mining enterprise, made in 1959.

Guillermo Bedregal asserted that from the very moment of the decree of nationalization it was their expectation to finance "all our ideals of social justice" through operation of the mines. 54 The leaders of the MNR and their supporters had long depicted the tin companies as exploitative, imperialistic enter prises that contributed little to the welfare of the country. The decree of nationalization itself asserts that the tin companies paid to the government only a "tiny part" (minima parte) of the value of tin exports. The companies, the decree states, "were practically exempt" from the payment of taxes. What they paid to the government would scarcely cover the most essential needs of the country, while the owners were "accumulating enormous fortunes" for themselves. The fact is that the mines before nationalization paid a large part of the taxes collected by the government. Rene Ballivian shows what the revenues were for the period 1921-44,55 and even Anaya admits that the taxes the mines paid in 1948 amounted to 47.45 per cent of the total revenues of the government. 56 The Bohan report demonstrated that Bolivia, almost alone among tin-producing nations, taxed its exports of tin very highly. There were thirty separate tax 160 The New Argument in Economtcs laws dealing with export duties. The result was that twenty per cent of the elF value of tin exported was returned to the government. 57 Although the MNR did not formally nationalize the medium and small mines, almost the same effect was achieved by govern ment policy. The Ford, Bacon, and Davis survey of 1956 said: "As a result of this extreme taxation of private mines, the government has maneuvered the significant private mines into a position where they are, in effect, nationalized without the government having the headaches of their operations." The government's take was often 100 per cent of the profits, and the survey found that 25 per cent of the mines were operating on a nonprofit basis as of June, 1956. The MNR took 41-56 per cent of net sales income without regard to the profit or loss of the mine or its replacement needs. In addition, the MNR estab lished a complete monopoly of purchase and sales of all minerals, control over all imports of necessary equipment, and complete con trol of the Central Bank in regard to foreign exchange for the private mines. The number of small private mines declined by over 1,600 in the period 1953 through 1954. More would have ceased operations if it had been possible to do so without confiscation by the government. "The major reasons for these conditions are attributable almost entirely to the unfavorable political climate and adverse economic environment for private initiative and private investment." The Ford, Bacon, and Davis survey concluded: "No other country in the Western Hemisphere takes so much from industry profits, and no other mining country in the Western Hemisphere has created such a condition of exhausted working capital and lack of self-sustaining mine opera tions as has Bolivia." 58 The management of the nationalized tin mines by the govern ment of the MNR was an immediate and disastrous failure. As Victor Andrade, long-time member of the MNR and Ambassador to the United States at the time, admitted in 1957, "Most of the tin mined since 1952 has been at a loss..... Almost every pound of tin taken from the Bolivian mines since 1952 has been at a loss." 59 Utilizing figures supplied by Guillermo Bedregal, Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 161 President of COMIBOL,6o I have prepared a chart that demon strates what has happened through 1958: RECORD OF MANAGEMENT OF NATIONALIZED BOLIVIAN TIN MINES TIN PRODUCED, TIN EXPORTED VALUE, TIN, KILOS, FINE COMIBOL COMIBOL 1952 27,346,902 25,245,369 $65,090,390 1953 26,034,007 29,'974,273 61,360,919 1954 25,850,417 25,141,095 49,684,404 1955 23,484,543 23,793,512 48,035,681 1956 22,996,621 22,843,206 49,632,838 1957 21,648,353 22,389,816 45,488,068 1958 17,384,476 14,074,511 28,482,446

Although the above official figures do not go beyond 1958, studies of more recent COMIBOL statistical data indicate that the MNR has not been able to correct its mistakes. Production continues to decline. Costs continue to increase. One analysis (COMIBOL figures) shows a 59 per cent decline in production of the nationalized mines from 1952 to 1960.61 Pacheco Arana, with the aid of official sources, concludes that the losses of the state enterprises from November, 1952, to December, 1959, amounted to 307,517,365,657 bolivianos. 62 Losing money on eight een out of twenty nationalized mines in 1960, the government sustained a total loss for that year of 149,243,733,581.45 bolivi anos.63 According to Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez, President of COMIBOL, the loss was approximately $10,000,000 in 1960 and $60,000,000 for the entire period of state operation. 64 The cost of production for the years immediately preceding April 9, 1952, was estimated to' be $.70 per pound. According to COMI BOL, the cost rose to $1.17 by 1959 and $1.29 by 1960.65 Why could private enterprise operate the tin mines profitably?

Why have the state enterprises failed to do so? The question evokes agreement on some points and basic disagreement on others. Let us examine first the areas in which there is sub stantial agreement. I t cannot be denied that the MNR and its leftist supporters encouraged the belief for years that, when the state nationalized 162 The New Argument in Economics the tin mines, the workers would achieve "gains" such as higher wages, shorter hours, less discipline, less work, and more fringe benefits. Aside from the fact that the unions were led by Marxists Leninists ..Trotskyites and anarchosyndicalists for the most part, the masses of the workers wanted their gains, and at once. They got them. A decree of December, 1953, created the so-called "worker control" (control obrero) under which the unions would elect representatives for one year to participate in the management of the mines. The consent of the control obrero was required for all personnel changes-hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, trans fer; the control obrero must approve action on absenteeism, theft, sabotage; supervise allocation of housing, commissary sup plies, distribution of mining materials and explosives.; sign all purchase orders; check on health and safety conditions; report to union officials and workers; and he had the right of veto over management's actions. If the management should object, the issue· is referred to COMIBOL and the miners' federation. If no agreement is reached, the case then goes to the Ministry of Mining. As the Minister of Mines is "always a leading member of the union" (for example, in 1961 the Minister of Mines was the Marxist Nuflo Chavez Ortiz), the records of the cases show that most of the decisions have favored the control obrero. I am indebted to the Ford, Bacon, and Davis report for the above data.

The report also asserts that H ••••the mines are very much lacking in competent supervision, and the working conditions have greatly deteriorated." There was a decrease in underground labor efficiency averaging 15 per cent in the first five years of state operation of the mines. The working force of the national ized mines continually increased, rising from 28,998 in 1952 to 34,500 in 1955. Safe practices and conditions were "much below minimum standards." The report declares that there was a lack of materials, lack of discipline, disrespect for safety rules, lack of enforcement authority, pilfering of critical materials, lack of safety training, and interference from political groups. There was an increase of 61 per cent in the frequency of fatal accidents per 1,000,000 shifts worked in 1955 as compared to 1953. The Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 163 commissary (pulperia is the word used in Bolivia) subsidy in some mines amounted to more than the total direct mining and milling costs at the mine. The workers enjoyed eighty paid holidays in 1955.66 The findings of the Zondag and Freeman reports were essen tially the same. Zondag found that contrary instructions poured in on the ,mine managers from many and different sources-the Minister of Mines, the Board of Directors of the Mining Corpora tion, the General Manager of the Mining Corporation, the union, and the control obrero. Labor had six channels of recourse to higher authority over their own management. The union exer cised actual control over the commissary in many of the mines.

The stealing of minerals and supplies was prevalent. There were daily interruptions of work for union meetings. The foremen and supervisors could not exercise their authority, as the unions refused to approve any dismissals. Many workers used up their sick leave at the urging of the unions. The mine doctors were afraid to reject workers with "subjective complaints" for fear of losing their jobs. Zondag found much "featherbedding" in COMIBOL's mines. The Freeman report indicated that the average mine worker earned almost as much as a cabinet officer, although the Bolivian miner produced only one-tenth that of a United States miner in a comparable type of work.o7 When Siles Zuazo was president, he boasted about the social security "gains" Bolivian workers enjoyed. "I should like you to show me," he challenged, "any other underdeveloped country which has so high a percentage of its workers covered." 68 I would argue that it is hard work, low wages, saving, few fringe benefits, and productivity-all leading to capital accumulation-which is what underdeveloped countries need if they desire to improve themselves economically. President Siles Zuazo's own figures indicated that the Social Security system added greatly to the costs of production and contributed to the state's vast deficits.

Zondag found that Social Security costs were 67.5 per cent of the employee'S wage: Family subsidy, 13 per cent of wage; rent al lowance, 14 per cent; social security, 5.5 per cent; professional risks, 5 per cent; two extra months' pay and other benefits, 10 164 The New Argument in Economics per cent; Sundays and bonus holidays, 20 per cent. Ever since 1954, wages must be paid for seven days per week even if no work is performed by anyone on Sunday. Two months' extra salary are paid at the end of the year; medical and pharmaceutical supplies are furnished free if there are over 80 employees in the enterprise; regular wages are paid for 90 days to sick workers; 90 days' notice or three months' wages are required for dismissal; with proper notice a fired employee is entitled to one month's pay for each year with the company; if the employee has worked in one place for eight or more years, he gets this amount even if he resigns; finally, the employer is prohibited by decree from reducing the number of his employees. 69 The psychology (mentalidad)) encouraged by the MNR, that to work less means to gain more, has resulted in a large number of strikes and work stoppages. Martinez Marquez estimates that the average number of strikes per year was 300 for the period 1952 to 1957. In 1958, the total was about 600.70 The president of COMIBOL reports, somewhat sadly, that the union and its representative in the Ministry of Mines succeeded in getting $7,600,000 for "fictitious labor." 7l COMIBOL even resorted to an incentive system as a means of persuading the miners to work a little more. On October 31, 1958, the government announced that those workers who stayed on the job for a year would be granted a substantial increment. Some districts took advantage of the offer. Now, however, the union-the FSTMB-insisted that the offer represented a labor gain (conquista laboral) and de manded that all districts should receive the bonus, including those that had struck so much and done so little that the state enterprise suffered a $4,000,000 loss as a result of their activity.72 Very recently the MNR has appealed to the unions to replace the Tesis de Pulacayo) which had a Marxist-Leninist proletarian revolution as its purpose, with the Tesis de Telamayu) which has as its purpose subordinating temporary workers' "gains" for the "vital necessities" of the Revoluci6n National. 73 Siles Zuazo argues that the reasons for the failure of the state to operate the mines economically are: low prices, insufficient capital, worn-out machinery, inadequate electrical power, and Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 165 an excessive number of workers who are kept on because of "elementary social justice." 74 Beltran and Fernandez assert that what Bolivia imports costs about 300 per cent more than in 1945.

Tin was selling for $.65 per pound in 1945; therefore, Bolivia should get three times that price of tin or $1.95 per pound just to "break even." 75 If this kind of argument is a~cepted, then it would follow that an international commodity or cartel agree ment with the United States buying tin at high fixed prices would be logical. The United States has already purchased much tin from Bolivia for political purposes, and our stockpiles exceed strategic requirements (as of July, 1961) by about 150,000 tons. 76 In any event, the contention that low prices explain state failure is erroneous. According to the Statistical Bulletin of the International Tin Council in London, except .for the higher prices produced by the Korean "police action" in 1951 and 1952, the price per pound, fine, prior to expropriation was: 1948, $.98; 1949, $.98, and 1950, $.93. Since nationalization, "low prices" and the Soviet dumping of tin in 1957 and 1958 cannot explain the deficits of the Corporaci6n Minera. Using the above source, we find that the price in 1953 was $.91; 1954, $.89; 1955, $.92; 1956, $.98; 1957, $.94; 1958, $.91; 1959, $.98; and 1960, $.99.

Other explanations are put forth, but they are hardly credible. Lopez Rivas, for example, blames the "democratic," "capitalistic," "monopolies" of foreign countries for the state's failures." Basic disagreement exists, as to whether socialism or capitalism can best operate the means of production. All the independent studies, surveys, and reports that I have been able to read take the position that the inherent difficulties of socialism negate the possibilities of successful operation of the mines. The Keenley side report, written before the MNR seized the mines, states: "Even if nationalization of the mining industry were theoretically desirable, it would be wholly impracticable in Bolivia under present conditions. The government has neither the financial resources nor the technical and administrative competence to undertake any such task." 78 The United States has supplied the MNR with more than $191,000,000 in financial assistance and promises more" but the management of the state mines still lacks 166 The New Argument in Economzcs technical and administrative competence. A lawyer's group within the MNR (La C·elula de Abogados del MNR) issued a public statement in August, 1961, which accused the management of COMIBOL of such administrative ineptitude and dishonesty that state operation of the mines could only be termed "dis astrous." The group called for the immediate resignation of the top officials, including Guillermo Bedregal, President of COMIBOL.79 All the recent reports assume that socialism will not prove economically viable and that therefore the MNR must return to a free economy. The Zondag report insists that a free economy is required ".... because only a free economy can stop the present drain caused by the activities of speculation and runners of contraband. Only a free economy can force people to work again instead of making a few pennies by standing in line. Only a free economy will create confidence in the foreign investor which, once established, will result in the Bolivian investor bringing back vast amounts of capital now hoarded abroad." 80 The Ford, Bacon, and Davis survey, the most complete and thorough of all the studies, asserts: "Both the technical and economic problems are surmountable, and the industry should be able to overcome its present difficulties provided the govern ment takes the necessary steps in the available time to give Bo livia the economic and investment climate it needs." The same survey makes absolutely clear that it is not price or lack of subsidization that is causing the trouble: "It must be noted that during the past four years the nationalized mining of Bolivia has enjoyed the highest metal prices in the history of the industry, and, furthermore, the country has been subsidized by United States government tungsten contracts to the sum of about six and one-quarter million dollars annually. The Bolivian tin industry has been subsidized through all the Longhorn smelter contracts to an amount estimated at about three-quarters of a million annually." The survey concludes finally that Bolivia's only hope" .... is through revival of private mining activity." 81 It is not only the nationalized tin mines that are mismanaged and deficit-ridden, but all the other socialized industries as well.

Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 167 The president of COMIBOL stated in 1959 that 70 per cent of the economic activities of Bolivia were state-owned and operated. This figure included not only the mines but factories, railroads, the state oil enterprise and other activities. 82 Even in the face of the most overwhelming evidence that socialism is a failure in Bolivia, the United States has almost literally leaped to support the system. For example, the MNR called in Salzgitter A.G., a West German Government holding company with min ing activities, to survey COMIBOL. There were some reports that Salzgitter might assume managerial responsibility under a production contract. At this time the Soviet Union allegedly an nounced that it was prepared to give Bolivia a $10,000,000 tin smelter. The United States almost instantly changed its policy position of refusing credits to COMIBOL as a state enterprise born of expropriation. The United States agreed to put up $10,000,000 for re-equipment and concentration plants as well as exploration work to find new tin deposits. 83 The United States should have told the Bolivian planners and the unions-one of which threatened to march on the capital if the Soviet offer was not accepted-84 that a tin smelter does not make economic sense for them. The Bohan report made this point clear as long ago as 1942. The Ford, Bacon, and Davis survey established that the direct operating costs of a tin smelter in Bolivia would involve an estimated $491 per fine ton, about 90 per cent higher than in. foreign smelters, mainly because of the costs of imported materials and supplies. Also, there should be proved ore reserves for twenty-five years of operations in order to justify a smelter, something that is lacking in Bolivia. 85 Despite the evidence that the Soviet offer should have been described as spurious, the United States responded to the Com..

munist "challenge" by establishing the important policy that this country is now prepared to subsidize nationalized industries whether just compensation is provided or not. Although the United States accepted Mexican expropriation of private oil properties with a token compensation, it had been a policy of this country, until President Kennedy's edict, not to reward confiscators ..

168 The New Argument in Economics What about payment for the expropriated mines? The gov ernment promised to pay in the decree of expropriation. The decree in Article 3 listed certain values that it said would be taken into account when a final settlement was reached. The government promised in Article 10 to reach a final settlement before December 31, 1953. In reaching the figure of real worth of the properties, the decree threatened in the preamble to subtract sums for alleged nonpayment of taxes or alleged non compliance with fiscal provisions of the law in the past. Prior to settlement with the companies, the government promised in Article II to pay three per cent interest on the values described above, and in Article 12 to deposit in the Banco Central de Bolivia two per cent of the gross value of all minerals exported by the nationalized mines to be used as a fund to begin paying the owners of the mines for their property. Under the "reten tions" system, the Patino, Aramayo and Hochschild groups re ceived through September, 1959, a total of $16,825,581.34, ac cording to the President of COMIBOL.86 Even these sums were apparently given grudgingly. The President of COMIBOL says they were paid as a "necessity" and an "imperative" in the face of "sabotage" and "judicial embargoes" initiated by the former owners. S7 As the New Frontier increases Bolivia's stipends under the foreign-aid program, there might be enough money to make up the deficits and even to pay the former owners for the mines.

There were other consequences of the grandes conquistas and transformaciones profundas of the MNR. When the state enter prises failed and incurred great deficits, the planners printed paper money. This had the effect of producing a fantastic infla tion. By December 31, 1958, the Revoluci6n Nacional had printed and put into circulation ninety times as many bolivianos as ex isted in 1952, when they seized power by force. The exchange rate in 1952 was reported to be about Bs 110-$1 up to Bs 160 $1 on the free exchange. By 1955, the exchange rate was up to about Bs 14,000-$1. On December 16, 1956, the government was persuaded to accept and put into effect a stabilization program devised by United States experts. The boliviano was to be stabilized at Bs 7,750-$1, but by January, 1959, the exchange Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 169 rate was Bs 12,500-$1. The plan failed, even though the United States provided $25,000,000 to back up the boliviano. The Banco Central, as of March 31, 1952, had in its vaults 344,961 gold pounds sterling and 17,765 kilos in gold bars. By December 31, 1957, only 2,921 kilos of gold remained. An editorial in Ultima H ora dated January 3, 1959, asserted that not even an adarme (the sixteenth part of an ounce) of the gold remained. 88 Accord ing to official data, the general index of the cost of living in Bolivia (1953-100) had risen by August, 1960, exactly 3,031 per cent or 30.3 times. 89 The "Great Revolution" and United States Foreign Aid In the following quotations, I hope to provide some of the flavor of the United States foreign-aid program in Bolivia ($191,200,000 as of June 30, 1960) through a sampling of com ments from a 1960 document of the United States Operations Mission to Bolivia 90 (emphasis mine).

In a letter from Rey M. Hill, Director, to Juan Haus Solis, Minister of Economic Affairs (1960), there is a reference to "an inadequate control system." As of August 6~ 1960~ the Government of Bolivia/Distributors owed Bs. 16.5 billion. This amount has been outstanding two to four years. As of August 6~ 1960~ Government of Bolivia/Distributors owed Bs. 4.1 billion. This amount has been outstanding three to four years. A portion of the funds that was used to purchase new commodities has been poorly handled. Also sight should not be lost that the Government of Bolivia/lm porters did not abide by the terms of payments as outlined in these agreements . . . . . large sums were still outstanding. As of August 6, 1960~ the Gov,ernment of Bolivia/Importers owed Bs. 6.3 billion. This amount should have been paid two years ago to the stabilization account. The end results are that poor recordswere maintained, some of the equipment was sold without accountability, and the sales proce.eds used for other purposes.

The Mission on a monthly basis since August, 1957, has requested 170 The New Argument in Economics the Government of Bolivia to provide information on the funds ac cruing to it. To date no reports have been submitted. The largest single amount as of August 6, 1960, due the special account counterpart is Bs. 9 billion owed by the Gov'ernment of Bolivia/Y.P.F.B. for Avgas. This amount has been owed since 1958. In re United States dollar aid: Cooperating governments usually assume the leading role to control the aid commodities/equipment and submit to the United States Mis sion reports regarding the arrival, distribution, usage, and storage of the commodities equipment .... In Bolivia the information re quired for these purposes has not been furnished by the Governm(?nt of Bolivia. Costly errors are in abundance The real difficulty regarding the monitoring and auditing of local currency projects has been the failure of the project sponsor to estab lish a separate bank account for the project funds and to submit quarterly progress and financial statements. Here again the key to the solution lies with the Ministry of Economy. One solution that is con sidered rather drastic is to cut off funds to the project until the project sponsor abides by the t·erms of the project agreement. Less drastic would be an educational program of utilizing the press and word of mouth that any project agreement entered into must be abided by.

Since for six years most of the project sponsors have not abided by the reporting requirement of the agreements, it is considered advisable to begin the educational program immediately, and if this measure is not effective, commence to take drastic steps to cut off funds beginning January 1, 1961. As of August 6, 1960, the Mission had issued 210 reports con taining 506 recommendations to the Bolivian Government. UUn fortunately seldom have any of these recommendations been acted upon." leA equipment valued at $20,500 ((remained in the ports for two years." No replies have been received to any of the above correspondence.

Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 171 Many other recommendations pointing out misuse of funds~ nonuse of equipment, etc.} that have not been acted upon. Since no reports hav'e been forthcoming from the Bolivian Govern ment on the amount of funds accruing for deposit . .•. In re some Bs 3 billion: T his amount was not deposited to the special account counterpart in accordance with the economic assistance agreement between our two governments but was transferred directly to the Ministry of Finance. Since the present handling of import duty funds is not in con formity with the Mutual Security Act of 1954.... . . . . the failure of the Government of Bolivia to provide r.eports of any nature or have the project sponsors abide by the terms of the project agreement. End-Use/Audit Reports: It was necessary for this staff to work two and one-half years to account for the amounts owed by distributors who, as agents for the Government of Bolivia, sold the ICA food and cotton arriving during the 1954-1958 period. These reports are available to the Government of Bolivia. They point out that Bs. 20.6 billion is still owed . .... For the past year a part of the End-Usej Audit staff has field-checked the use of the ICA hardware items. These field checks have included two detailed surveys of the ICA commodities/equipment that has re mained for long periods of time in the Chilean and Peruvian ports .

. . . . . These reports point out ICA financed equipment remaining in the ports from one to three years and det,eriorating} equipment purchased for certain projects and remaining in its original crates for long periods of time after arriving in Bolivia} misuse of local currency funds} and failure to file insurance claims within the statutory period. A letter (n.d.) from Rey M. Hill, Director, to Juan Haus Solis, Minister of National Economy, refers to manipulations of Coun terpart Funds. In a letter from Jorge Tamayo Ramos, Minister of Economic 172 The New Argument in Economzcs Affairs, to the Superintendent of Banks, dated June 6, 1960, in re Point IV funds: "This action could be considered embezzle~ ment with the aggravating circumstance of swindle." u • •••many irregularities have taken place." Exhibit A-Montellano & Company: "Credito Hipotecario has illegally retained the amount of Bs. 52J262}420 for its own use."

Exhibit C-American Export Company: "The report sub mitted by the Controller's Office End-Use Inspector states that two Willys Jeep Station Wagons were handed over to the Minister of Economy without sale slip. "The Cochabamba Mayor's Office received two jeeps under the same condition." Other recent United States government documents merit at least brief examination. Some of the words and phrases from the Selden-Fascell Report for the House Foreign Affairs Com mittee (1961) are: ".... great excess of miners .... inability to fire featherbedded laborers ..... decreased agricultural and mineral production, voluminous contraband traffic, inflationary monetary policies ..... " In regard to the Ford, Bacon, and Davis survey: "Due to political pressure .... the Bolivian Government took no action on the recommendations. The government's ability to implement its decisions is further handicapped by the ex istence of an armed militia of workers and peasants-, infiltrated by Communists." On the United States aid program to Bolivia: "It should be tapered off as soon as possible, and assistance di rected to specific projects." 91 Some data relevant to the MNR in Bolivia may be found in the 1961 Hearings of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Ap propriations of the House of Representatives. Although Dr. Gor don was an administration witness and favored the President's proposals for more aid for Bolivia, this exchange took place: Mr. Passman: "Did not some of your witnesses testify that Bolivia last year was near bankruptcy?"

Mr. Gordon: "It was and is near bankruptcy."

Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 173 Further on in the hearings: Mr. Montoya: "And I notice where they were not suffering any paucity offunds because of such small revenues be cause last year Bolivia, under the mutual security program, received $23 million in special assistance. That is $2 million more than their total revenues. They received $8,870,000 in technical assistance, or a total of $31,870,000. But let us go further with respect to Bolivia. "They received a loan from the DLF of $4 mil lion. That far exceeds their total revenues. "But let us go further than that. This is what adds to the shock-the Export-Import Bank loaned them, during 1958 and 1959, $47.3 million, or approxi mately, in total United States funds, a ratio of about 3 to I." Mr. Gordon, ".... It is true .... we have made, relative to the Bolivian Government revenues, enormous financial assistance in loans and grants together. The Bolivian case is, as I think I mentioned the other day, a par ticularly tragic case. None of us are happy with what happened there, either with respect to their own financial situation, or with respect to the failure so far of our aid program really to get the Bolivian economy even approaching getting on its feet..... I am sure that the future policy should differ very substantially from the past policy in the Bolivian case." 92 On the other hand, in neither public nor private Bolivian sources can one find anything even remotely approaching en thusiasm for the United States foreign-aid program. The kindest words are found in President Siles Zuazo's message to Congress in 1958. He made several very brief noncommittal references to United States aid and then finally used the phrase, "the gen erous cooperation of the people and North American Govern ment," in respect to the program. 93 All the official Program of Government of the MNR for 1960-1964 says is, "The results ob174 The New Argument in Economics tained up to now are, in general, satisfactory." This. is scant praise, and the next sentence says that the results can be improved by application of better methods. 94 Guillermo Bedregal, Presi dent of COMIBOL, says only (1959) that United States assistance is necessary to pay "public expenses." 95 Mario Torres Calleja, Secretary General of the miners' union (the FSTMB) and a Trotskyite, has provided a detailed criticism of United States foreign aid to Bolivia. The truth, he argues, is that in large part the "aid" the United States sent to Bolivia was food and fiber products that the United States overproduced and channeled into Bolivia as a dumping ground. To administer the "aid," the United States has created a gigantic bureaucracy in Bolivia made up of "inept" and "ignorant" men who have contrived to waste the dollar aid so that all Bolivia sees of it are ciphers on paper. The "aid" never involved bringing machines or instruments of production. The United States' objective was simply to dispose of surplus farm commodities in order to solve the farm crisis and to "destroy the agriculture and national in dustries and frustrate the diversification program and self-suffi ciency plans begun in 1952." The North American "experts" are characterized by "incredible ineptitude," the Eder plan for mone tary stabilization was antinational and antiworker, and "imperi alist control of the minerals market" has injured Bolivia. The union leader is against "Yankee plutocracy," "monopolists," and "multimillionaire Yankees." Torres concluded by saying that his union would continue the "anti-imperialist struggle, expressing its solidarity with the Cuban Revolution." 96 Similar ideas are developed by Beltran A. and Fernandez B.

in a serious study published in 1960. The principal reason for United States foreign aid in Latin America is to protect the 30, 40, and 50 per cent earnings "on capital invested" of "North American monopolies." As Latin America is of "enormous" importance to the "monopolies," the United States has put into play "a new form of slavery through the deceiving etiquette of American aid." The food program (of Public Law 480) is not disinterested. The purpose is twofold: (1) to permit the main .. tenance of high prices in the United States by "dumping" the Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 175 surpluses in Latin America; and (2) to prohibit the development of a healthy agriculture in Latin America that might compete with the United States. In this way, it is possible to subjugate the Latin American countries and keep them in a perpetual state of dependency. The United States can use foreign aid to protect both its sources of raw materials in Latin America and also the markets for the manufactured goods of its "monopolistic enter prises." The United States uses "surplus food" (excedentes agri colas) for the purpose of financing military dictatorship and furthering political corruption in order to guarantee a favorable climate for the investments of "North American monopolies."

The United States also provides "technical assistance" to Bolivia, but the means employed are "absolutely fragmentary and super ficial." The authors conclude that United States foreign aid has caused all the failures of the MNR. On the other hand, "the cause of the countries that fight for their liberation can count on the definite help of the socialist world, aid that is a guarantee of the success of an enterprise." '97 Concluding Remarks If it can be assumed that the foregoing analysis is supported by sufficient evidence to merit the judgment of substantial ac curacy, then it becomes crystal clear that President Kennedy's "eulogy" of the Revolucion Nacional as a "great revolution," which has "blazed a path for others to follow," is a profound blunder the consequences of which may prove disastrous for the United States. Undoubtedly the President was advised by trained, traveled, and talented specialists in Latin American affairs to write the letter, promise the aid, and praise the MNR. The names of such men and the reasons for their advice have not been revealed, however.

The Revolucion Nacional is not a "great revolution." It has not "blazed a path for others to follow." It has lessened political liberty and retarded representative government. What is the direction of the present government? A scholar working in Bo livia writes (early 1961): ".... Paz Estenssoro, willingly or un176 The New Argument in Economics wittingly, placed himself in the hands of the far left of the MNR"; and H ••••the drift is toward the left." The same scholar's words and phrases support the thesis of this paper that the MNR's sys tem of socialism and the planned economy is an ignominious fracaso or failure: "stagnating agrarian reform"; "plummeting tin production"; "hyperinflation"; "rising cost of living"; "mass exodus of professionals." 98 The United States must have selected all its officials in Bolivia from the ranks of "imbeciles" and the "deaf," "blind," and "dumb" not to know what has happened in that country in the past eight years, one Latin American writes. 99 Ramirez R. tells us, "We view with surprise the measures adopted by the United States, handing over enormous quantities of dollars to their own enemies." 100 In the view of Siles Salinas, United States aid to Bolivia is designed to provide an example to other Latin Ameri can countries of what not to do-seize land, nationalize, and "plan." 101 One increasingly notes the use of the word antie jemplo (literally, "counterexample") in Latin American publica tions to describe the Revoluci6n N acional in Bolivia. The feeling has assuredly developed, among some Latin Americans at least, that the quickest way to debase a country's economy is to na tionalize it. This may well be the only positive consequence of the United States foreign-aid program in Bolivia.

I submit that the evidence does not and cannot support the view that the MNR is a defender of the ideals and values of American culture. Massive United States aid has nullified the American policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs. of other countries in the Western Hemisphere. The aid program has resulted in rendering the leaders of the MNR subject to extended tutelage by selected United States officials. Even so, no basic principles of the MNR have changed, and only a minute impact on policy can be claimed. I am aware of the fact that it can be argued that the political authoritarianism of the 1952-1956 period has been moderated in certain particulars. Some have insisted, erroneously in my judg ment, that the presidential elections of 1956 and 1960 were "democratic." The reforma agraria has so far permitted indiConsequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 177 viduals to possess, if not to acquire legal title to, land, but there are influential elements in the MNR who agitate constantly for cooperatives or collectives. The public monopoly in oil has been mitigated to permit private exploration under prescribed circumstances. Some recognition of the value of private initiative is to be found in the Progralll of Governlllent for 1960-1964.

Furthermore, Dr. Rowland Egger, Special Representative of President Kennedy, addressed high officials in the Government of the Revoluci6n Nacional in November, 1961, and said: "Bo livia is destined to a social and economic future of incomparable brilliance," (La Naci6n) La Paz, November 12, 1961). How ever, the basic principles and policies of the MNR, it must be reiterated, have resisted assault. Is there anything in the ex panded program of aid to the public sector, to which President Kennedy has committed this nation, that will persuade the MNR to revise its principles and policies in a more fundamental and substantial way? In candor, one must recognize that, as of July, 1961, President Paz Estenssoro was reported to be intent upon soliciting $150,000,000 in aid from Premier Khrushchev and whatever else he might "cadge" from Red China. 102 Foreign aid, overtly or unconsciously, has become an instru mentality of American foreign policy. If this is true, then it fol lows that the foreign-aid program should be used to defend and advance the interests of the United States. One of the few in terests on which the executive and Congress and the great ma jority of American citizens seem to be agreed is that Communism should not inherit the earth. Modern-day Communism is prin cipally Leninism, and much can be learned about its nature and tactics by examination of Lenin's The State and Revolution and Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism. Communism operates as an international conspiracy with highly developed techniques of internal subversion and sophisticated employment of force and threats of force in international relations. Any country that demonstrates a desire to eradicate internal Communist subversion and external Communist pressure and coercion should be aided by the United States by specific measures designed to accomplish specific results.

178 The New Argument in Economics However, some in the United States assume that the only way to prevent the Latin American countries from becoming Commu .. nist satellites is to extend massive support to left-wing, collectivis tic movements. When the question is raised why such an assump tion should be accepted, the reply usually given is that people are in a hurry to achieve the benefits of technology, and that rapid progress can be won only by permitting the government to control the means of production. In my opinion, this assump tion can and should be challenged. Is not Japan developing more rapidly than India? From what I could see of East Germany with socialism and West Germany with capitalism (summer, 1960), the latter had "turned the clock back" to a superior economic system. Better still, visit the heartland of socialism, the Soviet Union. In so far as the great masses of human beings are con cerned, the Soviet Union is a primitive, backward country. This was, at least, my own observational conviction. However, the best illustration of the falsity of the line of reasoning that the United States can oppose Communism only by supporting left wing "revolutions" is seen in Bolivia. Massive aid has been given. The "public sector" has planned and expanded, but the results have been contraproducente.

The President of the United States has provided a considered solution to this dilemma: Extend even greater aid to left-wing political authoritarianism and economic socialism. To do this, to refer to the Rev'oluci6n Nacional as a model, is to produce confusion and consternation among those public figures of virtue and integrity in Latin America who support principles of in dividualism, voluntarism, representative government, and private initiative and enterprise. Only the Marxists-Leninists and left wing nativist collectivists, who seek to do in other Latin Amer ican countries what the MNR has done in Bolivia, can possibly derive aid and comfort from the policy of the United States. Bills have already been introduced in Chile to expropriate United-States-owned copper mines at a fraction of their real value, with payment to be provided indirectly through funds from the Alianza para el Progreso program. 103 To those who argue that there are no alternatives, that there Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 179 is only one course possible, I must insist that there is always another way, and not infrequently a better way. Such matters are appropriate considerations for another paper and should not unduly encumber the purposes and findings of this investiga tion. However, if the United States desires to inhibit the growth of Communism in Latin America through the. expenditure of public funds, then it must make such funds available to those men who by conviction and policy oppose Communism. If the United States desires to spend public funds to aid other peoples to achieve higher material standards of living, it must make such funds available for governments and policies that make private initiative and enterprise possible. Books, documents, reports, interviews, and observation all lead me to conclude that Bolivia possesses the human and material resources appropriate for in dividual and collective life immensely superior to anything so far enjoyed in that country. The evidence suggests, in my opinion, that the Revolucion Nacional cannot advance the good life, even with massive United States aid. At this point in the argument, the supporters of the MNR usually insist that with drawal of foreign aid to the Revoluci6n N acional would instantly mean that Bolivia would become a Communist satellite. It is my judgment that United States support of the MNR has already led Bolivia closer to Communism than at any time in the history of the country, and that continued support of the men and policies of the Revolucion N acional will continue to advance the cause of Communism. If United States aid to Bolivia were withdrawn, the MNR would fall from power, and probably very quickly. Other Bolivians-talented, educated, competent, patriotic-and dedicated more to the ideals, values and objec tives of the United States and the Western World than the MNR'ers, are ready to assume power. Those familiar with Latin America know who these men are. It is possible that they and not the Communists would emerge with control of the state.

180 NOTES The New Argument zn Economics 1. Office of the White House Press Secretary, for release to A.M. papers, Sunday, May 14, 1961, Monday, May 15, 1961. 2. La Nacion (La Paz, 7 de mayo de 1961). 3. International Cooperation Administration, Office of Statistics and Re ports, United States Foreign Assistance and Assistance from Interna tional Organizations (March 31, 1961), p. 60. 4. William S. Stokes, "The Revolucion Nacional and the MNR in Bo livia," Inter-American Economic Affairs (Spring, 1959), pp. 28-30. 5. New York Herald Tribune (July 31, 1946). 6. For details and documentation of this episode, see Stokes, op. cit.} pp. 30-32. 7. Alberto Cornejo S., Programas politicos de Bolivia (Cochabamba, Bolivia: Imprenta Universitaria, 1949), p. 164. See also pp. 159-164, 170-175. Other relevant sources include: Nestor Taboada Teran, A n tologia de. cuentos de la revo1ucion (La Paz: Talleres Gnificos Bolivi anos, Publicaciones SPIC, 1954), passim; Republica de Bolivia, E1 libro blanco de la independencia economicade Bolivia (La Paz: Subsecretarfa Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1952), p. 188; Secretaria Ejecutiva del Comite Politico Nacional del MNR, E1 pensamiento revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro (La Paz: E. Burillo y Cia, 1954), p. 303; Saturnino Rodrigo, Diario de la revo1ucion nacional (La Paz: Libreria Editorial "Juventud," 1955), p. 389; Andres Townsend Ezcurra, "La revoluci6n nacionalista de Bolivia," Humanismo (Mexico, D.F.: No.1, jul., 1952), pp. 49-50; Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, The Tragedy of Bolivia (New York: Devin-Adair Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 103-118.

8. Cornejo S., op. cit.} pp. 147-151. See also Walter Guevara Arze, Plan de politica economica de 1a revolucion nacional (La Paz: Ministerio de Exteriores y Culto, 1955), p. 200. 9. Jose Fellman Velarde, Victor Paz Estenssoro: E1 hombre y 1a revolucion (La Paz: Alfonso Tejerina, 1954), p. 95. 10. Augusto Cespedes, El dictador suicida (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1956), p. 245. 11. See Carlos Montenegro, Documentos (La Paz: Imprenta "Nacional," 1954), pp. 50, 52-55, 62-71; Cespedes, op. cit.} pp. 246-249. 12. Hernan Siles Zuazo, "Hacia la planificaci6n de la economfa boliviana," Revista de la Facu1tad de Economla y Finanzas (Oruro, julio-diciembre de 1954), passim. 13. Hernan Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al honorable Congreso Nacional} 6 Agosto 1958 (La Paz: Talleres de la Editorial del Estado, 1958), pp. 8, 34, 60, 85, 95, 101. 14. Jorge Siles Salinas, Lecciones de una revolucion. Bolivia: 1952-1959 (Santiago: Editorial Universidad Cat6lica, 1959), pp. 59, 62.

15. E1 Diario (La Paz, 8 de mayo de 1961). See also E1 Mercurio (Santiago, 13 de marzo de 1961); IVlario Padilla A., "El Movimiento Nacionalista Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 181 Revolucionario," Semana (21 de noviembre de 1960); Tesis de Tela mayu (La Paz: n.p., 1960), pp. 1, 6; Presencia (La Paz, 30 de mayo de 1961); La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 22 de junio de 1961); Samuel Mendoza, "La situaci6n en Bolivia," El Mercurio (Santiago, 9 de marzo de 1961); El Diario (La Paz, 17 de abril de 1961). 16. Programa de Gobierno. Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario. Ter cer Gobierno de la Revolucion Nacional} 1960-1964 (La Paz: E. Burillo, 1960), pp. 113, 115-116, 121. 17. El Diario (La Paz, 12 de febrero de 1958; 14 de mayo de 1958; 16 de noviembre 1958); El Mercurio (Santiago, 25 de oetubre de 1958; 2 de agosto de 1961); La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 13 de julio de 1961); Cronica (Coehabamba, 31 de julio de 1961); Ostria Gutierrez, Ope cit.} pp. 205 219.

18. Ultima Rora (La Paz, II de abril de 1958); Ostria Gutierrez, Ope cit.. pp. 137-140; La Nacion (Buenos Aires, 11 de marzo de 1958). 19. Ultima Rora (28 de julio de 1961); EI Diario (La Paz, 18 de diciembre de 1958); Presencia (La Paz, 13 de febrero de 1958). 20. New York Times (June 15, 1956); Ostria Gutierrez, Ope cit.} pp. 128-129. 21. Ultima Rora (LaPaz, 21 de febrero de 1958). For a defense of the Siles Zuazo administration, see Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al honorable Con greso Nacional} Ope cit.} pp. 116 and appendices. 22. Ultima Rora (La Paz, 2 de abril de 1958); El Mercurio (Santiago, 25 de octubre de 1958; 11 de abril de 1958); Ultima Rora (La Paz, 10 de abril de 1958); La Prensa (Lima, 23 de noviembre de 1958); see also EI Diario (La Paz, 16 de noviembre de 1958); Pedro Zilveti Aree, La hora de la verdad (n.p., 1958), pp. 13-16; Ostria Gutierrez, Ope cit.} pp. 219-220. ~3. Ercilla (Santiago, 8 de septiembre de 1955); see also Mario Padilla A., "El Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario," Semana (Noviembre 21, 1960).

24. Ultima Rora (La Paz, 20 de octubre de 1958). 25. La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 18 de junio de 1961). 26. El Diario (La Paz, 3 de enero de 1961). 27. Cornelius H. Zondag, Problems in the Economic Development of Bo livia (La Paz: 1956), pp. 24, 42, 156-157. 28. Fausto Beltran A. and Jose Fernandez B., dDonde va la reforma agraria boliviana? (La Paz: Talleres Graficos Bolivianos, 1960), pp. 24, 185-186, 215. 29. Guillermo Bedregal, La nacionaliz.acion minera y la. responsabilidad del sindicalismo (La Paz: n.p., 1959), p. 23; Guillermo Martinez Marquez, "El dilema boliviano," La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 4 de junio de 1961); Cronica (Coehabamba, 19 de junio de 1961); La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 18 de junio de 1961; 22 de junio de 1961; 13 de julio de 1961); La Prensa (Lima, 12 de agosto de 1961); El Mercurio (Santiago, 6 de julio de 1961). 30. El Diario (La Paz, 18 de agosto de 1960). 31. La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 16 de diciembre de 1960); Guillermo Mar tinez Marquez, "Bolivia en 'estado de sitio' otra vez," La Prensa (Buenos 182 The New Argument in Economics Aires, 3 de marzo de 1961); Cronica (Cochabamba, 19 de junio de 1961); La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 18 de junio de 1961; 22 de junio de 1961; 13 de julio de 1961; 13 de agosto de 1961); El Mercurio (Santiago, 12 de agosto de 1961); La Prensa (Lima, 3 de agosto de 1961); El Diario (La Paz, 3 de agosto de 1961).

32. Zondag, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 33. Beltran A. and Fernandez B., op. cit., p. 18. 34. See Stokes, op. cit., footnote, p. 38. 35. Zondag, op. cit., p. 59. 36. Zondag, op. cit., annex to· chap. V, pp. 1-14, 150. 37. Programa de Gobierno, op. cit., p. 41. 38. Stokes, op. cit, pp. 39-40. 39. Stokes, op. cit., p. 41. 40. Roger A. Freeman, The Revenue Problem of Bolivia (ms. report by the Tax and Revenue Adviser, U.S. Fiscal Mission to Bolivia, La Paz, April 12, 1957. Supplement to Final Report on Assignment in La Paz, November 17, 1956, to April 24, 1957, dated April 29, 1957), passim. 41. Beltran A. and Fernandez B., op. cit., pp. 58-71. 42. Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al honorable Congreso Nacional, op. cit., p. 35. 43. Beltran A. and Fernandez B., op. cit., pp. 75-76. 44. Programa de Gobierno, op. cit., p. 44. 45. Beltran A. and Fernandez B., op. cit., p. 83. 46. EI Mercurio (Santiago, 24 de noviembre de 1958).

47. Guillermo Martinez Marquez, "EI dilema boliviano," La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 4 de junio de 1961). 48. La Prensa (Lima, 12 de agosto de 1961). See also: La Razon (Buenos Aires, 2 de agosto de 1961). 49. La Nacion (30 de octubre de 1960). 50. For the names of the companies that were seized and other details, see Stokes, op. cit, pp. 43-44. 51. Merwin L. Bohan, Report of United States Economic Mission to Bolivia (August, 1942), Pt. IV, p. 4. 52. Ricardo Anaya, Nacionalizacion de las minas de Bolivia (Cochabamba: Imprenta Universitaria, 1952), p. 338~ 53. See Siles Zuazo, "Hacia la planificaci6n de la economia boliviana," op. cit., pp. 23-63. 54. Guillermo Bedregal, La nacionalizacion minera y la responsabilidad del sindicalismo (La Paz: n.p., 1959), p. 9. 55. Rene Ballivian C., Tasas e impuestos sobre la industria minera en Bolivia (La Paz: Otero y Otero y Calder6n, 1946), p. 239. On the other hand, see the MNR position in Fernando Dfez de Medina, Pachukiti y otras pdginas polemicas, con la denuncia por defraudacion de im puestos contra los multimillonarios Patino y Aramayo (La Paz: n.p., 1948), p. 189.

56. Anaya, Nacionalizacion de las minas de Bolivia, op. cit., p. 30. 57. Bohan, op. cit., Pt. VI, pp. 31-32. 58. Ford, Bacon, and Davis, Inc., Report on Mining Industry of Bolivia, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (La Paz: not published, 1956, 9 Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia 183 volumes), Vol. II, Significant Aspects of the Bolivian Mining Industry, pp. 25-35; Vol. I, Summary, pp. 14-15. 59. Victor Andrade, "Bolivia and the Future," Address, Cosmopolitan Club of Pennsylvania State College, February 23, 1957, Congressional Record (March 14, 1957), p. A2095; Address, Morgan State College, Baltimore, April 17, 1957, Congressional Record (May 22, 1957), p. A3923. 60. Bedregal, La nacionalizacion·minera y la responsabilidaddel sindi· calismo, Ope cit., Appendix. 61. Ultima Rora (La Paz, 11 de marzo de 1961). 62. Rene Pacheco Arana, "La nacionalizaci6n de las minas," Presencia (La Paz, 11 de abril de 1961).

63. La Nacion (La Paz, 19 de agosto de 1961). 64. Presencia (La Paz, 28 de julio de 1961). 65. Pacheco Arana, Ope cit. 66. Ford, Bacon, and Davis, Inc., Report on Mining Industry of Bolivia, Ope cit., Vol. III, Significant Aspects of Bolivian Mining Industry, pp. 27-28, 43-44, 73-77, 83-85. 67. Zondag, Problems in the Economic Development of Bolivia, Ope cit., pp. 97-100; Freeman, The Revenue Problem of Bolivia, Ope cit. 68. Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al honorable Congreso Nacional, Ope cit., pp. 78-79. 69. Zondag, Problems in the Economic Development of Bolivia, Ope cit., p.169. 70. Guillermo Martinez Marquez, "Bolivia en 'estado de sitio' otra vez," La Prensa (Buenos Aires, 3 de marzo de 1961). 71. Bedregal, La nacionalizacion minera y la responsabilidad del sindi· calismo, Ope cit., pp. 26-29. 72. Ibid., pp. 44-46. 73. Tesis de Telamayu (La Paz: n.p., 1960), pp. 1-7. 74. Siles Zuazo, "Hacia la planificaci6n de la economia boliviana," Ope cit., p. 41; Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al honorable Congreso Nacional, Ope cit., p.17.

75. Beltran A. and Fernandez B., Ope cit., p. 169. 76. Hanson's Latin American Letter (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1961, Number 853). 77. Eduardo L6pez Rivas, Esquema de la historia economica de Bolivia (Oruro: n.p., 1955), pp. 191, 202. 78. H. L. Keenleyside, Head of Mission, Report of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia (New York: UN, 1951), pp. 48-49. 79. El Diario (La Paz, 3 de agosto de 1961). 80. Zondag, Problems in the Economic Development of Bolivia, Ope cit., p. vii. 81. Ford, Bacon, and Davis, Report on Mining Industry of Bolivia, Ope cit., Vol. II, Significant Aspects of the Bolivian Mining Industry, pp. 2-4; Vol. I, Summary, p. 15. 82. Bedregal, La nacionalizacion minera y la responsabilidad del sindi calismo, Ope cit., pp. 53-54. 83. New York Times (January 11, 1961).

184 The New Argument in Economics 84. Presencia (La Paz, 5 de noviembre de 1960). 85. Ford, Bacon, and Davis, Inc., Report on Mining Industry of Bolivia, Ope cit., Vol. I, Summary, p. 48. 86. Bedregal, La nacionalizaci6n minera y la responsabilidad del sindi calismo, Ope cit., Appendix. 87. Ibid., p. 38. 88. For documentation of the details of the Bolivian inflation, see Stokes, Ope cit., pp. 46-47. 89. Beltran A. and Fernandez B., Ope cit.~ p. 128. 90. Memorandum for Information and Action of the United States Aid Program (United States Operations Mission to Bolivia, September 1, 1960), in Spanish and English, pages not numbered consecutively throughout. 91. Special Study Mission to Latin America: Venezuela~ Brazil~ Argentina~ Chile, Bolivia, Panama, Report by Hon. Armistead I. Selden, Jr., Alabama; Hon. Dante B. Fascell, Florida (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 24-31, passim.

92. Inter-American Programs for 1961; Denial of 1962 Budget Information, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 116, 266. 93. Siles Zuazo, Mensaje al honorable Congreso Nacional, Ope cit.~ pp. 43-44, 90, 92, 106. 94. Programa de Gobierno, Ope cit., p. 141. 95. Bedregal, La nacionalizaci6n minera y la responsabilidaddel sindi calismo, Ope cit., p. 42. 96. EI Diario (LaPaz, 17 de abril de 1961). 97. Beltnin A. and Fernandez B., Ope cit., pp. 9, 124-125, 174-184, 210-211, 217, 219. 98. Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia Today-An Assessment Nine Years After the Revolution," American Universities Field Staff, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1961), pp. 4, 7, 10-11. 99. Cr6nica (Cochabamba, 5 de junio de 1961). 100. La Manana (Asunci6n, 14 de abril de 1961). 101. Siles Salinas, Lecciones de una revoluci6n, Ope cit., p. 43.

102. EI Mercurio (Santiago, 4 de julio de 1961). 103. Hanson's Latin American Letter (Washington, D.C.: August 19, 1961, No. 857).