II. What Ideas and Sentiments are Ethical

CHAPTER II. WHAT IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL~ § 119. A silent protest has been made by many readers, and probably by most, while reading that section of the foregoing chapter which describes the ethics of enmity. Governed .by feelings and ideas which date from their earliest lessons, and have been constantly impressed on them at home and in church, they have forined an almost indissoluble association between a doctrine) of right and wrong in general, and those particular comluands and in-, terdicts'included in the decalogue, \vhich, contemplating the actions of Inen· to one another in the same society, takes no note of their combined actions against men of alien so cieties. The conception of ethics has, in this ~ray, come to, be limited to that which I have distinguished as the ethics of amity; and to speak of· the ethics of enmity seems ab surd. Yet, beyond question, men associate ideas of right and wrong with the carrying on of inter-tribal and international conflicts; and this or that conduct in battle is applauded or condemned no less strongly than this or that conduct in ordinary social life. Are we then to say that there is one kind of right and wrong recognized by ethics and another . kind of right and wrong not recognized by ethics? If so, under what title is this second kind of right and wrong to be dealt with? Evidently lnen's ideas about conduct are in 326 THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS.

so unorganized a state, that while one large class of actions has an overtly-recognized sanction, another large class.of ac tions has a sanction, equally strong or stronger, 'which is not overtly recognized. The existence of these distinct sanctions, of which one is classed as moral and the other not, is still more clearly seen when we contrast the maxims of C~ristianity with the dog mas of duellists. During centuries throughout Europe, and even still throughout the greater part of it, there has existed, and exists, an hnperative "obligation," under certain con ditions, to challenge another to fight, and an imperative ob ligation to accept the challenge-an obligation much more imperati ve than the obligation to discharge a debt. To eithel" combatant the word "must" is used with ,as much emphasis as it would be used were he enjoined to tell the truth. The" duty" of the insulted man is to defend his honour; and so wrong is his conduct considered if he does not do this, that he is shunned by his friends as a disgraced man, just as he would be had he cornmitted a theft. Beyond question, then, we see here ideas of right and wrong quite as pronounced, with corresponding sentiments of approba tion and reprobatioll quite as strong, as those which refer to fulfilments and breaches of what are classed as moral injunc tions. How, then, can we include the last under ethical sci ence and exclude the first from it ~ The need for greatly widening the current conception of ethics is, however, still greater than is thus shown. There are other large classes of actions which excite ideas and feel ings undistinguishable in their essential natures froln those to which the term ethical is conventionally limited.

§ 120. Among uncivilized and semi-civilized peoples, the obligations imposed by custom are perelnptory. The uni versal belief that such things ought to be done, is not usually made manifest by the visiting of punishment or reprobation on those who do not conform, because J;lon<;onfQrlllityis WHAT IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL? 32'7 scarcely heard of. How intolerable to the .general mind is breacl.'iof usages, is shown occasionally ,vhen a ruler is de posed and even killed· for -disregard of therp: a sufficient proof that his act is held wrong. And weSollletimes :find distinct expressions of moral sentiment on b~half of custonlS having nothing which we should call moral authority, and even on behalf of customs which we should call profoundly hnmoral. I may begin ,vith an instance I have ,named elsewhere in another connexion - the instance furnished by sOlne Mahomedan tribes who consider that one of the worst offences is srnoking: "drinking the shameful," as they term it. Palgrave narrates that 'while "giving divine honours to a creature," is regarded by the Wahhahees as "the :first of the great sins," the second great sin is smoking-a sin in comparison with ,vhich murder, adultery, and false witness, are trivial sins. Shnilarly, by certain Russian sects close .to Siberia, smoking is an offence distinguished from all others as being never forgiven: "every crime can be expiated by repenta;nce except this one." In these cases the repugnance felt for an act held by us to be quite harm less, is of the same nature as the repugnance felt for the blackest crimes: the only difference being that it is more intense.

Lichtenstein tells us that when Muliha-wang, king of the lVlatelhapees (a division of the Bechuanas), ",-as told that Europeans are not permitted to have more than one wife, "he said it was perfectly incomprehensible to him how a ,vhole nation could sublnit voluntarily to such extraordinarJ la'ATs." Similar was the opinion of the Arab sheikh who, along with his people, received the account of m~hogamy in England with indignation, and said" the fact is simply impossible! How can a man be contented ,vith Olle wife 1" N or is it only men ,vho think thus. Livingstone says of the Makololo "Tomen on the shores of the Zalnbesi, that they were quite shocked to' hear that in England a man had only 328 THE INDUCTION~ OF ETHICS. one wife: to have only one was not" respectable." So, too, in Equatorial Africa, according to Reade, " If a man marries, and his wife thinks that he can afford another sponse~ she pesters him to marry again; and calls him a 'stingy fellow' if he de clines to do so."

Silnilar is the feeling shown by the Araucanian women. "Far from being dissatisfied, Or entertaining any jealousy toward the new-comer, she [one of two wives] said that she wished her husband would marry again; for she considered it a great relief to have some one to assist her in her household duties, and in the maintenance of her husband." No notion of irnmorality, much less criminality, such as "\ve associate with bigamy and polygalny, is here entertained; but, contrariwise, when a wornan calls her husband a " stingy fellow" if he does not take a second wife, we have proof that monogamy is reprobated. Ideas relevant to the relations of the sexes, still more pro foundly at variance "\vith our own, are displayed in many places. Books of travel have made readers familiar "\vith the fact that among various races, a traveller entertained by a chief is offered a wife or a daughter as a ten1porary bed fellow; and the duty of hospitality is held to require this offer. In other cases the loan takes a somewhat different shape. Of the Ohinooks we read :" Among all the tribes, a man will lend his wife or daughter for a fish-hook or a strand of beads. To decline an offer of this sort is, indeed, to disparage the charms of the lady, and therefore give such offence, that although we had occasionally to treat the Indians with rigour, nothing seemed to irritate both sexes more than our refusal to accept the favours of the females."

Still Inore pronounced is the feeling shown by the members of an Asiatic tribe ,vhich Errnan visited. "The Chnckchi offer to travellers who chance to visit them, their wives, and also what we should call their daughters' honour, and resent as a deadly affront any refusal of such offers." Here 'we see that deeds which among ourselves would be classed among the profoundest disgraces, are not only re garded without shmne, but declining to participate in them causes indignation: implying a sense of ,vrong . ..A..s it concerns in another way the relations of the sexes, ViHAT IDEAS AND S]tNTIMENTS ARE ETHICAI~? 329 I may instance llext a further contrast between the senti lnents entertained by many' partially-civilized peoples, and those which have arisen along with the advance of civiliza tion. Interdicts· on luarl'iages between persons of different· ranks, breaches of which have in some cases brought the severest punishment, date back to very early times.' Thus, in the .2J£ahabharata we read that Draupadi refused the "ambitious Karna," saying :-" I wed not with the base born." And then, COIning down to comparatively modern times, we have the penaltie~ entailed on those who broke the laws against me8allianoes; as in France during the feudal period, on nobles who married beneath them: they were ex cluded from tournalllents, and their descendants also. But ~he condenlnation thus manifested five centuries ago is not paralleled now. Though '. a certaIn amount of reprobation is in SOUle cases shown, in other cases there is approbation; as witness Tennyson's "Miller's Daughter" and Mrs. Brown ing's " Lady Geraldine's Courtship." IIere the different feel ings excited, though like in nature to those we call moral, are not concerned \vith either supposed divine commands or with acts usually classed as lnoral or'irnmoral.

. Returning to the uncivilized races, I Inay instance the con ceptions associated with the division of labour between the sexes. Concerning various tribes of American Indians, North and South, we read that cuStOlU, limiting the actions of the lllen mainly to war and the chase, devolves on the women all the Inenial and laborious occupations; and these customs have an imperative sanction. Says Falkner con cerning the Patagonians :"So rigidly are" the women" obliged to perform their duty, that their husbands cannot help them on any occasion, or in the greatest distress, without incurring the highest ignominy." And these usages are fully approved of by the women them selves; as witness the following extract concerning the Dakotas :'.' It is the worst insult one virago can cast upon another in a moment of 330 THE INDUOTIONS OF ETHIOS. altercation. 'Infamous woman I' will she cry, 'I have seen your husband carrying wood into his lodge to make the fire. Where was his squaw, that he should be obliged to make a woman of himself ~ , "

Olearly this indignation is the correlative of a strong moral feeling enlisted on behalf of the prescribed conduct. But if~, among ourselves, any women were left, as among the Esqui maux, "to carry stones [for building housesJ, almost heavy enough to break their backs," while "the 111en look on with the greatest insensibility, not stirring a finger to assist them," moral reprobation would be felt. As there are no specific injunctions, divine or hurnan, referring to transactions of these kinds, the strongly-contrasted emotions which they ex cite in ourselves and in these uncivilized peoples, must be ascribed to unlikenesses of customs-unlikenesses, however, which are thelnselves significant of innate emotional unlike nesses. As further illustrating in a variety of "rays these differ ences of feelings akin in nature to those we call moral, though not ordinarily classed as such, I may, without com menting upon each, here append a series of theIne " The Caffers despise the Hottentots, Bushmen, Malays, and other people of colour, on account of their not being circumcised. On this account, they regard them as boys, and will not allow them to sit in their company, or to eat with them."

" A l\fayoruna, who had been baptized, when at the point of death was very unhappy ... . because, dying asa Christian, instead of furnish ing a meal to his relations, he would be eaten up by worms." " The Bambara washerwomen ... were stark naked, yet they manifested no shame at being seen in this state by the men composing our caravan." And a kindred statement is made concerning the Wakavi rondo by Thomson, who describes their women as neverthe less altogether modest, and, remarking that "morality has nothing to do with clothes," says of these people that" they are the lnost moral of all the tribes of this region, and they are simply angels of purity beside the decently-dressed Masai." "I found that the married men," among the Hassanyeh Arabs, says Petherick, " felt themselves highly flattered by any attentions paid to their better halves during their free-and-easy days. [Their marriages are for WHAT IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS .ARE ETHICAL? 331 three or four days in the week"only.] They seem to take such, attentions as evidence that their wives are attractive." .

Among the Khonds, " so far is constancy to a husband from being required in a wife, that her pretensions do not, in the least, suffer diminution in the eyes of either sex when fines are levied on her convicted lovers; while on the other hand, infidelity on the part of a married man is held to be highly dis honourable, and is often punished by deprivation of many social privileges." I have reserved for the last, two reularkable cases in which feelings like those which we class as moral, are definitely ex pressed in ways to us very surprising. The first concerns the Tahitians, who were described by Cook as without shame in respect of actions which among ourselves especially ex-, cite it, and as feelin~ shame in respect of actions which among, ourselves' excite none. These people were extremely averse to 'our custom of eating in society. "They eat alone, they said, because it was right." The other instance, equally anomalous, is even more startling. In Vate "it is consid ered a disgrace to the family of an aged chief if he is not buried alive." A. like usage and accompanying feeling ex isted in Fiji.

A son said, when about to hury his mother alive, "that it was from love to his mother that he had done so; that, in consequence of the same love, they were now going to bury her, and that none but themselves could or ought to do so sacred an office! . . . she was their mother, and they were her children, and they ought to put her to death." The belief being that people comlnence lifein the next world at the stage they have reached when they leave this world; and that hence postponement of death till old age entails a subsequent miserable existence. Thus we have abundant proof that with acts which do vio lence to our Inoral sentiinents, there are associated, in the minds of other races, feelings and ide~s not only warranting them but enforcing then1-They are fulfilled with a sense of obligation; and non-fulflhnent of them, regarded as breach of duty, brings condemnation and resulting self reproach.

§ 121. Everywhere during social progress custom passes 332 THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS~ into law. Practically speaking, custonl is law in undevel .... oped societies. "The old Innuits did so, and therefore we nlus\" say the existing Innuits (Esquimaux); and other un~ civilized peoples similarly express the constraint they are under.- In subsequent stages, customs beCOITle the ackno,vl edged bases of laws. It is true that afterwards the body of laws is made up in part of alleged divine comlnands the themistes of the Greeks, for example; but in reality these, supposed to come from one who was originally an apotheosized ruler, usually enforce existing customs. Leviti c~(;s shows us a whole body of -practices, many of them of kinds which ,vould be now regarded as neither religious nor moral, thus acquiring authority. Whether inherited from the undistinguished forefathers of the tribes, or ascribed to the will of a deceased king, customs embody the rule of the dead over the living; as do also the la,vs into which they harden.

Of course, therefore, if ideas of duty and feelings of obli gation cluster round custolns, they cluster round the derived la\vs. The sentiment of "ought" comes to be associated with a legal injunction, as with an injunction traced to the general authority of ancestors or the special authority of a deified ancestor. And not only does there hence arise a consciousness that obedience to each particular law is right and disobedience to it wrong, but eventually there arises a consciousness that obedience to law in general is right and disobedience to it wrong. Especially is this the case where the living ruler has a divine or semi-divine character; as "\vitness the following staternent concerning the ancient Pe ruvians:"The most common punishment was death, for they said that a culprit was not punished for the delinquencies he had committed, but for having broken the commandment of the Ynca, who was respected as God."

And this conception, relninding us of religious conceptions anciently current and still current, is practically paralleled by the conceptions still expressed by jurists and accepted WHAT IDEAS AND. SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL ? 333 by most citizens. For though a distinction. is commonly made between legal obligation and moral obligation, in those cases where the law is of a kind in respect of which ethics gives no direct verdict ; yet the obligation to, obey has COlne to be, if not nominally yet practically, a moral obligation., The words habitually used imply this. It is held "right" to obey the law and" wrong" to disobey it. Conforlnity and nonconformity bring approbation and reprobation, just as though the legal injunction were a Illoral injunction. A man who has broken the law, even though it be in a lnatter of no ethical significance,-say a householder ,vho has re fused to fill up the census-paper or a pedlar who has not taken out a 1i~ense-feels, when he is brought before the magistrates, that he is regarded not only by them but by spectators as morally blameworthy. The feeUng shown is quite as strong as it would be were he convicted of aggress ing on his neighbours by nuisances-perpetual noises or pes tilent odours-which are Inoral offences properly so called.

That is to say, law is upheld by a sentiment indistinguish able from moral sentiment. Moreover, in SOlne cases where the two conflict, the senthnent which upholds the, legal dictum overrides the sentiment whic~ ,upholds, the moral dictuln,. as in the case of the pedlar above named. His act in selling without a licence is IIIorally justifiable, and forbidding hinl to sell without a licence is morally unjusti fiable-is an interference with his due liberty, which is ethically unwarranted. Yet the factitious moral sentiInent enlisted on behalf of legal authority, triumphs over the natural moral sentinlent enlisted on behalf 'of rightful free dom. Ho,v strong is the, artificial sanction acquired by a constituted authority, is seen very strikingly in the doings of Joint Stock associations. If the directors of a cOlllpany forIned to carry out a specified undertaking, decide to extend their activities so as to include undertakings not originally specified, and even undertakings wholly unallied to those' 334 THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS.

originally specified; and if they bring before the proprietary their proposals for doing this; it is held that if a majority (at one time a simple nlajority, but now two-thirds) approve the proposal, the proprietary at large is bound by the decision. Should a few protest against being comnlitted to such new undertakings, they are fro'wned upon and pooh poohed as unreasonable obstructions: moral reprobation is vented against such resistance to the ruling agent and its supporters. Nevertheless the moral reprobation should be inverted. As a question of pure equity, the incorporated body cannot enter on any businesses not specified or impliecl. in the deed of incorporation. Those who break the original contract by entering on unspecified businesses, are un justified ; while those who stand by the original contract, however few in number, are justified. Yet so strong is the quasi-moral sanction associated with the acts of a constituted authority, that its ethicallY-V\Trongcourse is thought right, and insistence on regard for the ethically-right course is thought wrong!

§ 122. How then are ethical ideas and sentinlents to be defined-How, indeed, are they to be conceived in any con sistent way? Let us recapitulate. Throughout the past, and down to present days in most minds, conceptions of right and wrong have been directly associated with supposed divine injunctions. Acts have been classed as good or bad, not because of their intllinsic natures but because of their extrinsic derivations; and virtue has consisted in obedience. Under certain circum stances, we find conduct regarded as praise,,-rorthy or blarneworthy according as it does or does not inflict . suffering or death upon fellow-beings; \"'hile, under other circurDstances, we find the praise or blame given according as it does or does not conduce to the 'welfare of fellow beings. Then there is the opposition between hedonism and ascetichnn: by some approbation is felt for deeds which WHAT IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL? 335 apparently conduce to the happiness of self or others .or both; while, contrari"lse, others look with reprobation upon a way of living which makes happiness an end.

By this, class the· perceptions of good and evil conduct, along with ·love of the one and hatred of the other, are traced to a moral sense; and ethics becoll1esthe. interroga tion of, and obedience to, conscience. Contrariwise, by that class such guidance is ridiculed; and calculations of conse quences, irrespective of sentiment of·right or theory of right, occupy theethicaI sphere. Universally in early stages, and to a considerable degree in late stages, the idea of ought is associated with conformity to established customs, irrespec tive·of their natures; and when established customs grow into laws, the idea of ought comes to be associated with obedience to laws:: no matter whether considered intrinsically good or intrinsically bad. Clearly, therefore, the conceptions of right, obligation, duty, and the sentiments associated with those conceptions, have a far wider range than the conduct ordinarily con ceived as the subject-matter of moral science. In different places and under different circumstances, substantially the same ideas and feelings are joined with classes of actions of totally opposite kinds, and also with classesof actions of which Inoral scie¥ce, as ordinarily conceived, takys no cognizance.

lIenee, if we· are to treat the subject scientifically, we must disregard the limits of conventional ethics, arid consider what are the intrinsic natures of ethical ideas and senti ments. § 123. A trait common to all·forms of sentiD:?entsand ideas to be classed as ,ethical, is the consciousness of authority. The natureo£ the authority is inconstant. It may be that of an apotheosized ruler or other deity supposed to give cOmmands. It maybe that of ancestors "\\~ho have be queathed JIsages, with or without· inJqnctions .to follow them. It lllay be that of a living ruler who makes laws, or '23 836 'fEE INDUCTIOltS OF ETHICS. a military commander who issues orders. It may be that of an aggregate public opinion, either expressed through a gov ernment or otherwise expressed. It Inay be that of an im agined utility which everyone is bound to further. Or it n1ay be that of an internal monitor distinguished as con science.

Along,vith the element of authority, at once intellectu ally recognized and emotionally responded to, there goes the elernent, more or less. definite, of coercion~ The conscious ness of ougld which the recognition of authority implies, is joined'with the consciousness of m~l8t, which the recognition of force irrlplies. Be it the power of a god, of a king, of a chief soldier, of a popular government, of an inherited cus tom, of an unorganized social feeling, the~eis always present the conception of a power. Even when the injunction is that of an internal monitor, the conception of a power is not absent; since the expectation of the penalty of self-reproach, which disobedience nlay entail, is vaguely recognized as co ercive. A further component of the ethic"al .consciousness, and often the largest conlponent, is' the represented opinion of other individuals, who. also, in one sense, constitute an authority and exercise 'a coercion. This"

either as actually hnplied in others' behaviour, or as iInagined. if they are not present, commonly serves Inore than anything else to restrain or impel.' How large a component this is, we see in a child \vho blushes when '~Trongly suspected of a transgression, as much as when rightly suspected; and probably most have had proof that, "rhen guiltless, the feeling produced by the conceived repro bation of ?thers is scarcely distinguisluiole from the feeling which would 'be produced by such reprobation if guilty. That aniInagined public opinion is' the chief .elelnent of consciousness in cases where the acts ascribed or'.colnmitted are intrinsicall,y ,vrong, is shown when this. imagined or expressed opinion refers to acts which are not intrinsically WHAT IDEAS AND. SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL? 337 wrong. The emotion of shame ordinarily'" accompanying some gross breach of social convention which is nlorally indifferent, or even morally praiseworthy (say wheeling home the barro,v of a costermonger who has lamed~ hiniself), may be quite as strong as the elllotion of shame which fol lows the proved utterance of an unwarranted libel-an act intrinsically wrong. In the majority of people tltefeeling of ought not 'will be more peremptory in the first case than in the last.

If, now, we look at the nlatter apart froln conventional classifications, we see that where the consciousnesses of au thority, of .coercion, and of public opinion, cOlnbined in dif ferent proportions, result in an idea and a feeling of obliga tion, we Juust class these as ethical irrespective of the kind of action to which they refer. If the associated conceptions of right are sirnilar, and the prolnpting emotions similar, we must consider th.e mental states as of the same·nature, though they are enlisted on behalf of .acts radically opposed. Or rather, let us 'say that, with the exception of anidea and a sentimelitincidelltally referred to, Vire must class them as forming a body of thought and feeling which may.be called pro-ethical; and which, with the Inass of Inankind, stands in place of the. ethical properly so called. § 124. For no,v let us. observe that the ethical sentiInent and idea properly so called, are independent of the ideas and sentiInents .above described as derived £roln external authorities, and coercions, and approbations-religious, po litical, or social. The ,. true' moral consciousness' which we name ~onscience, does not. refer to those extrinsic results of conduct 'WThich take the shape of praise or blaIne, reward or pUllishrnent, externally 'awarded; but it refers to the intrinsic results of conduct ,vhieb, in part and by some in tellectually perceived, are mainly and by rrlo~t, intuitively felt .. The lnoral consciousness proper does not contemplate qbligations.as artifi~ially iznposed by an extern.~l pO'wer; 338 THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS.

nor is it chiefly occupied with estinlates of the alnonnts of pleasure and pain which given actions may produce, though these may be clearly or dimly perceived; but it is chiefly occupied with recognition of, and regard for, those condi tions by fulfihnent of which happiness is achieved or misery avoided. The sentiment enlisted on behalf' of these con ditions is often in harnlony with the pro-ethical sentiment .. cOlnpounCl,edas above described, though from titne to time in conflict with it; but whether in harmony or in c.onflict, it is vaguely or distinctly recognized as the rightful ruler: responding; as it does, to consequences which are not arti ficial and variable, but to consequences which are natural and permanent. It should be remarked that along' with established su premacy of this ethical sentiment proper, the feeling of ob ligation, though continuing to exist in the background of consciousness, ceases to occupy its foreground; since the right actions are. habitually performed spontaneously or from liking. Though, while the moral nature is imperfectly de veloped, there may often arise conformity to the ethical sen timent under a sense of compulsion by 'it; and though, in other cases, non-conforlnity to it may cause subsequent self reproach (as instance a renlelnbered lack of gratitude, which may be a source of pain without there being any thought of extrinsic penalty); yet with a nloral nature completely balanced, neither of these feelings will arise, because that ,vhich is done is done in satisfaction of the appropriate desire.

And now having, mainly for the purpose of Inaking' the statement complete, contemplated the ethical sentiment proper, as distinguished froln the pro-ethical sentiment, we may for the present practically dismiss it from our thoughts, and con sider only the phenomena presented by the pro-ethical sen timent under its various forms. For throughout the remain ing chapters of this division, treating inductively of ideas and. feelings about conduct di~played by mankind at large, WHAT IDEAS AND SENTIMENTS ARE ETHICAL? 339 we shall be concerned almost exclusively 'with the pro-ethical sentiment: the ethical sentilnent proper being, in the great nlass of cases, scarcely discernible. Before entering on the task indicated, let me add that a good deal which approaches to repetition ·will be found in the immediately-succeeding pages-not repetition in 80 far as the evidence given is concerned, but in so far as the car dinal ideas are concerned. In the preliminary discussion to which this chapter and the preceding one have been devoted, it has been necessary to state in brief SOlne of the leading conceptions which a general inspection of the phenoITlena suggests. These conceptions have now· to be set forth in full, along with the masses of facts which give birth to theIne But while it seems well to apologize beforehand for the re currence, in elaborated forms, of ideas already expressed in small space, I do not altogether regret having to elaborate the ideas; since there ,vill be afforded occasion for further emphasizing conclusions which can scarcel.y be too much dwelt upon.