IV. The Sentiment of Justice

CHAPTER IV. THE SENTIMENT OF JUSTIOE. § 261. Acceptance of the doctrine of organic evolution determines certain ethical conceptions . .The doctrine implies that the numerous organs in each of the innumer able species of animals, have been either directly or indirectly moulded into fitness for the requirements of life by constant converse with those requirements. Simul taneously, through nervous modifications, there have been developments of the sensations, instincts, emotions, and intellectual aptitudes, needed for the appropriate uses of these organs; as we see in caged rodents which exercise their jaw-muscles and incisors by purposeless gnawing, in gregarious creatures which are miserable if they cannot join their fellows, in beavers which, kept in. confinement, show their passion for dam-building by heaping up whatever sticks and stones they can find. Has this process of mental adaptati9n ended with primi tive man? Are human beings incapable of having their feelings and ideas progressively adjusted to the modes of life imposed on them by the social state into which they have grown? Shall we suppose that the nature which fitted them to the exigencies of savage life has remained unchanged, and will remain unchanged, by the exigencies of civilized life? Or shall we suppose that this aboriginal nature, by repression of some traits and fostering of others, 26 JUSTICE.

is made to approach more and more to a nature which finds developed society its appropriate environment, and the' required activities its normal ones? There are many believers in the doctrine of evolution who seem to have no faith in the continued adaptability of mankind. \Vhile glancing but carelessly at the evidence furnished by com... parisons of different human races with one another, and of the same races in different ages, they ignore entirely the induction from the phenomena of life at large. But if there is an abuse of the deductive method of reasoning there is also an abuse of the inductive method. One who refused to believe that a new moon would in a fortnight become full and then wane, and, disregarding observations accumulated throughout the past, insisted on watching the successive phases before he was convinced, would be con sidered inductive in an irrational degree. But there might not unfairly be classed with him those who, slighting the inductive proof of unlimited adjustability, bodily and mental, which the animal kingdom at large presents, will not admit the adjustability of human nature to social life nntil the adjustment has taken place: nay, even ignore the evidence that it is taking place.

Here we shall assume it to be an inevitable inference from the doctrine of organic evolution, that the highest type of living being, no less than all lower types, must go on moulding itself to those requirements which circum stances impose. And we shall, by implication, assume that moral changes are all}ong the changes thus wrought out. § 262. The fact that when surfeit of a favourite food has caused sickness, there is apt to follow an aversion to that food, shows how, in the region of the sensations, experiences establish associations which influence conduct. And the fact that the house in whi.ch a wife or child died, or in which a long illness was suffered, becomes so associated with painful states of mind as to be shunned, sufficiently THE SENTIMENT OF JUS'.fICE. 27 illustrates, in the emotional regi.on, the mode in which actions may be determined by mental connexions formed in the course of life. When the circumstances of a species make certain relations between conduct and consequence habitual, the appropriately-linked feelings may come to characterize the species. Either inheritances of modifica..

tions produced by habit, or more numerous survivals of individuals having nervous structures which have varieain fit ways, gradually form guiding tendencies, prompting appropriate behaviour and deterring from inappropriate. The contrast between fearless birds found on islands never before visited by man, and the birds around us, which show fear of man immediately they are out of the nest, exemplifies such adaptations. By virtue of this process there have been produced to some extent among lowercreaturos, and there are being further produced in man, the sentiments appropriate to social life. ..Aggressive actions, while they are habitually injurious to the group in which they occur, are not un£requently injurious to the individuals comlllitting them; since, though certain pleasures may be gained by them, they often entail pains greater than the pleasures. Con versely, conduct restrained within the required .limits, calling out no antagonistic passions, favours harmonious 'co-operation, profits the group, and, by implication, profits the average of its individuals. Consequently, there results, other things equal, a tendency for groups formed of members having this adaptation of nature, to survive and spread.

Alnong the social sentiments thus evolved, one of chief importance is the sentiment of justice. Let us now consider more closely its nature. § 263. Stop an animal's nostrils, and it makes fra.ntic efforts to free its head. Tie its limbs together, and its struggles to get them at liberty are violent. Chain it by the neck or leg, and it is some time before it ceases its 28 JUSTICE. attelnpts to m~cape. Put it in a cage, and it long continues restless. Generalizing these instances, we see that in proportion as the restraints on actions by which life is maintained are extreme, the resistances to them are great. Conversely, the eagerness with which a bird seizes the opportunity for taking flight, and the joy of a dog when liberated, show how strong is the love of unfettered move ment. Displaying like feelings in like ways, man displays them in other and wider wa;ys. He is irritated by invisible restraints as well as by visible ones; and as his evolution becomes higher, he is affected by circumstances and actions which in more remote ways aid or hinder the pursuit of ends. A parallel will elucidate this truth. Primitively the love. of property is gratified only by possession of food and shelter, and, presently, of clothing; but afterwards it is gratified by possession of the weapons and tools which aid in obtaining these, then by possession of the raw materials that ~erve for making weapons and tools and for other purposes, then by possession of the coin which purchases them as well as things at large, then by possession of promises to pay exchangeable for the coin, then by a lien on a banker, regis ..

tered in a pass-book. That is, there comes to be pleasure in an ownership more and more abstract and more remote from material satisfactions. Similarly with the sentiment of justice. Beginning with the joy felt in ability to use the bodily powers and gain the resulting benefits, accompanied by irritation at direct interferences, this gradually responds to wider relations: being excited now by the incidents of personal bondage, now by those of political bondage, now by those of class-privilege, and now by small political changes. Eventually this sentiment, sometimes so little developed in the Negro that he jeers at a liberated com.. panion because he has no master to take care of him, becomes so much developed in the Englishman that the slightest infraction of some mode of formal procedure at a.

THE SENTIMENT OF JUSTICE. 29 public meeting or in Parliament, which cannot intrinsically concern him, is vehemently opposed because in some distant and indirect way it may help to give possible powers to un-named authorities who may perhaps impose unforeseen burdens. or restrictions. Clearly, then, the egoistic sentiment of justice is a sub jective attribute which answers to that objective require ment constituting justice-the requirement that each adult shall receive the results of his own nature and consequent actions. For unless the faculties of all kinds have free play, these results cannot be gained or suffered, and unless there exists a sentiment which prompts maintenance of the sphere for this free play, it will he trenched upon aud the free play impeded. § 264. While we may thus nnderstand how the egoistic sentiment of justice is developed, it is much less easy to understand how there is developed the altruistic sentiment of justice. On the one hand, the implication is that the altruistic sentiment of justice can come into existence only in the course of adaptation to social life. On the other hand the implication is that social life is made possible only by maintenance of those equitable relations wh~ch imply the altruistic ~entiment of justice. How can these reciprocal requirements be fulfilled?

The answer is that the altruistic sentiment of justice can come into existence only by the aid of a sentiment which temporarily supplies its place, and restrain's the actions prompted by pure egoism-a pro-altruistic sentiment of justice, as we may call it. This has several components which we must successively glance at. The first deterrent from aggression is one which we see among animals at large-the fear of retaliation. Among creatur8S of the same species the food obtained by one, or place of vantage taken possession of by it, is in some measure insured to it by the dread whieh most others feel 30 JUSTICE. of the vengeance that may follow any attempt to take it away; and among men, especially during early stages of social life, it is chiefly such dread which secures for each man free scope for his activities, and exclusive use o£ what ever they bring him. A further restraint is fear of the reprobation likely to be shown by unconcerned members of the group. 'rhough in the expulsion of a " rogue" elephant from the herd, or the slaying of a sinning member of the flock by rooks or storks, we see that even among animals individuals suffer from an adverse public opinion; yet it is scarcely probable that among animals expectation of general dislike prevents encroachment. But among mankind, "looking before and after" to a greater extent, the thought of social disgrace is usually an additional check on ill-behaviour of nlan to man.

To these feelings, which come into play before there is any social organization, have to be added those which arise after political authority establishes itself. When a successful leader in war acquires permanent headship, and comes to have at heart the maintenance of his power, there arises in him a desire to prevent the trespasses of his people one against another; since the resulting dissensions weaken his tribe. The rights of personal vengeance and, as in feudal times, of private war, are restricted; and, simultaneously, there grow up interdicts on the acts which cause them. Dread of the penalties which follow breaches of these, is an added restraint. Ancestor-worship in general, developing, as the society develops, into special propitiation of the dead chief's ghost, and presently the dead king's ghost, gives to the injunctions he uttered during life increased sanctity; and when, with establishment of the cult, he becomes a god, his injunctions become divine commands with dreaded punishments for breaches of them.

These four kinds of fear co-operate. The dread of retaliation" the dread of social dislike} the dread of legal THE SENTIMENT OF JUSTICE. 31 pnnishlDent, and the dread of divine vengeance, united in various proportions, form a body of feeling which checks the primitive tendency to pursue the objects of desire without regard to the interests of fellowmen. Containing none of the altruistic sentiment of justice, properly so called, this pro-altruistic sentiment. of justice serves tem porarily to cause respect for one another's claims) and so to make social co-operation possible. § 265. Creatures which become gregarious tend to become sympathetic in degrees proportionate to their intelligences. Not, indeed, that the resulting. sympathetic tendency is exclusively, or even mainly, of that kind which the words ordinarily imply; for in some there is little beyond sympathy in fear, and in others little beyond sympathy in ferocity. All that is meant is that in gregarious creatures a feeling displayed by one is apt to arouse kindred feelings in others, and is apt to do this in proportion as others are intelligent enough to appreciate the signs of the feeling.

In two chapters of the Principles of Psychology-" Sociality and Sympathy" and "Altruistic Sentiments "-1 have endeavoured to show how sympathy in general arises, and how there is eventually produced altruistic sympathy. The implication is, then, that the associated state having been maintained among men by the aid of the pro..altruistic sentiment of justice, there have been maintained the con ditions under which the altruistic sentiment of justice itself can develop. In a permanent group there occur, generation after generation, incidents simultaneously drawing from its members manifestations of like emotions -rejoicings over victories and escapes, over prey jointly captured, over supplies of wild food discovered; as well as laments over defeats, scarcities, inclemencies, &c. And to these greater pleasures and pains felt in common by all, and so expressing themselves that each sees in others the signs of feelings like those which he has and is displaying, must be 32 JUSTICE.

added the smaller pleasures and pains daily resulting from lueals taken together, amusements, games, and from the not infrequent adverse occurrences which affect severa] persons at once. Thus. there is fostered that sympathy which makes the altruistic sentiment of justice possible. But the altruistic sentiment of justice is slow in assuming a high form, partly because its primary component does not become highly developed until a late phase of progress, partly because it is relatively complex, and partly because it implies a stretch of imagination not possible for low intelligences. Let us glance at each of these reasons. Every altruistic feeling presupposes experience of the corresponding egoistic feeling. As, until pain has been felt there cannot be sympathy with pain, and as one who has no ear for music cannot enter into the pleasure which music gives to others; so, the altruistic sentiment of justice can arise only after the egoistic sentiment of justice has arisen.

Hence where this has not been developed in any considerable degree, or has been repressed by a social life of an adverse kind, the altruistic sentiment of justice remains rudimentary. The complexity of the sentiment becomes manifest on observing that it is not concerned only with concrete pleasures and pains, but is concerned mainly with certain of the circumstances under which these are obtainable or preventible. As the egoistic sentiment of justice is gratified by maintenance of those conditions which render achieve nlent of satisfactions unimpeded, and is irritated by the breaking of those conditions, it results that the altruistic sentiment of justice requires for its excitement not only the ideas of such satisfactions but also the ideas of those conditions which are in the one case maintained and in the other case broken. Evidently, therefore, to be capable of this sentiment in a developed form, the faculty of mental representation must be relatively great. Where the feelings with which there is to be sympathy are simple pleasures and pains, the THE SENTIMENT OF JUSTICB. 33 higher gregarious animals occasionally display it: pity and generosity are from time to time felt by them as well as by human beings. But to conceive simultaneously not only the feelings produced in another, but the plexus of acts and relations involved in the production of such feelings, pre supposes the putting together in thought of more elements than an inferior creature can grasp at the same time. And when we come to those most abstract forms of the senti ment of justice which are concerned with public arrange ments, we see that only the higher varieties of men are capable of so' conceiving the ways in which good or bad institutions and laws will eventually affect their spheres of action, as to be prompted to support or oppose them; and that only among these, therefore, is there excited, under such conditions,that sympathetic sentiment of justice which makes them defend the political interests of fellow--citizens.

There is, of course, a close connexion between the senti ment of justice and the social type. Predominant militancy, by the coercive form of organization it implies, alike in the fighting body and in the society which supports it, affords no scope for the egoistic sentiment of justice, but, contrariwise, perpetually tramples on it j and, at the same time, the sympathies which originate the altruistic sentirnent of justice are perpetually seared by __militant activities. On the other hand, in proportion as the regime of 8tatus is replaced by the r~qirne of contract, or, in .other words, as fast as volunt.ary co-operation which characterizes the industrial type of ... society, becomes more general than compulsory co-operation which characterizes the militant type of society, individual activities become less restrained, and the sentiment which rejoices in the scope for them' is encouraged; while, simultaneously, the occasions for repressing the sympathies become less frequent. Hence, during warlike phases of social life the sentiment of justice retrogrades, while it advances during peaceful phases ..

34 JUSTICE. and can reach its full development only in a permanently peaceful state.* * Permanent peace does in a few places exist, and where it exists the sentiment of justice is exceptionally strong and sensitive. I am glad to have again the occasion for pointing out that among men called uncivilized, there are some, distinguished by the entire absence of warlike activities, who in their characters put to shame the peoples called civilized. In PoliticaZ Institutions, §§ 437 and 574, I have given eight examples of this connexioll of facts. taken from races of different typ03.