Preface to Vol. II

PREFACE TO YOL. II. Now that, by this issue of Parts V and VI, along with Part· IV previously published, I have succeeded in com~ pleting the second volume of The Principles of Ethics, which some years since I despaired of doing, my satisfac tion is dashed by the thought that these new parts .are less definite in their conclusions than I had hoped to make them. Complete definiteness was of. course not to be expected: Right regulation of the actions of so complex a being as Man, Iiving "Under conditions so cornplex'as those presented by a society, evidently forms a subject-matter unlikely to adulit of specific statenlents throughout its entire range. The· primary division of it-private conduct-necessarily dependent in part 011 the nature of the individual and his circumstances, can be prescribed but approximately; and gu~dance must, in most cases, be partlydeternlined by a judicial ,balancing of requirements and avoidance of ex trernes., Entrance on the first great division of public con duct~Justice-does, indeed, introduce us to conclusions which are in large degree definite., Happily, into this most important portion of Ethics, treating of.·certain right rela tions between individuals, irrespective of their natures or circumstances, there enters the ruling conception of equity or eqnalness-there is introduced the idea of IJneasure,. and (v) vi PREFACE.

the inferences reached acquire a certain quantitative char acter, which partially assimilates them to those of exact science. But when, leaving this aU-important division, the injunctions of which are pereluptory, and take no cogni zance of personal elements, ,we pass into the remaining divisions-Negative and Positive Beneficence-,ve enter a region in which the complexities of private conduct are in volved with the complexities of relations to the no less COIU plex conduct of those around: presenting problems for the solution of which we have nothing in the nature of Ineasure to guide us, and must commonly be led by empirical judg ments. In view of these admissions some will contend that no aid is here furnished. by the general Doctrine of Evolution. The first reply is that in that chief division of Ethics treat. ing of Justice, it furnishes aid both as verifying conclusions empirically drawn and as leading to certain unaccepted con clusions of importance. If it be said that throughout the final di visions of Ethics, dealing 'with Beneficence, Negati ve and Positive, the conclusions mnst, as above implied, be chiefly empirical; and that therefore here, at any rate, the Doctrine of Evolution does not help us; the reply is that it helps ,us in general ways though not in special ,vays. In the nrst place, for certain modes of conduct which at present are supposed to have no sanction if they have not a super natural sanction, it yields us a natural sanction-shows us that such modes of conduct fall within the lines of an evolv ing Humanity-are conducive to a higher life, and are for this reason obligatory. In the second place, ,vhere it leaves us to form empirical judgments, it brings into view those ·general truths by which our elnpirical judgments should be PREFACE. vii guided-indicates the linlits within which they are to be found.

Beyond serving to reinforce the injunctions of Benefi cence, by adding to the empirical sanction a rational sanc tion, the contents of Parts V and VI have these claims to attention :-First, that under each head there are definitely set down the various requirements and restraints which should be taken into account: so aiding the formation of balanced judgments. Second, that by this methodic treat ment there is given a certain coherence to the confused and often inconsistent ideas on the subject of Beneficence, which are at pr~sent ~ying all abroad. And third, that the coher ent body of doctrine which results, is made to include regu lation of sundry kinds of conduct which are not. taken cog nizance of by Ethics as ordinarily conceived. H. S. London, April, 1893.