V. Restraints on Displays of Ability

CHAPTER V. RESTRAINTS ON DISPLAYS OF ABILITY. § 411. Beyond the material advantages which men give and receive under the system of .social co-operation, they give and receive non-luaterial advantages. These are the benefits, or satisfactions, or pleasures, obtained during social intercourse; and which mayor may not be appor tioned in the most desirable ways. Here the office of nega tive beneficence is that of so restraining the actions which bring such gratifications to self, as to allow others to obtain their shares. The superiorities, bodily or luental or both, ·which enable one citizen to exceed others in gaining wealth, but which, as we have seen, he ought not to utilize to the extreme, regardless of others' welfare, are superiorities which may also bring to him an unusually large share of approbation. Or an unusually large share of approbation may come to one who has superiorities of' another order, Gonducive,say, not to material prosperity but to popularity. In such cases there arises the question-How far shall the superior push his ad vantages? To what extent shall he refrain from using his greater faculties; so that others may obtain applause,or may not experience the pain of defeat ~ Difficult questions grow out of these. The battle of life through which all higher powers, sub-human and hunlan, have arisen, may rightly be carried out of that activity which has sustentation for its end, into that activity which 58 ~W) • • 308 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE.

has for its end the pleasures given by superfluous play of the faculties. In the absence of this competition, partly bodily but mainly Inental, social intercourse would lose its salt. And yet in this field, as in the other, syrnpathy ought to produce a self-restraint limiting the pleasures of success. § 412. A forin of selfishness occasionally displayed, and rightly condemned, is that of nlen who display without bounds their relnarkable conversational powers. Of vari ous brilliant talkers we read that on some occasions the presence of others who vied with them, raised obvious jealousies; and that on other occasions, in the absence of able competitors, they talked down everyone, and changed what should have been conversation into monologue. Contrariwise, we sometimes hear of those who, though capable of holding continuously the attention of all, showed solicitude that the undistinguished or the modest should find occasions for joining in the exchange of thoughts: even going to the extent of "drawing them out." Men of these contrasted types exemplify the absence and presence of negative beneficence; and they exemplify, too, the truth, commonly forgotten, that undue efforts to obtain applause often defeat themselves. One who monopolizes conversation loses more by moral reprobation than he gains by intellectual approbation.

Over the dinner table, or in groups of persons otherwise held together, there frequently occur cases in which an erroneous statement is mode or an invalid argument urged. One who recognizes the error may either display his superior knowledge or superior logic, or he Inay let the error pass in silence: not wishing to raise the estimate of himself at the cost of lowering the estimate of another. Which shall he do ~ A proper decision implies several considerations. Is the wrong statement or invalid argu ment one which will do appreciable mischief if it passes RESTRAINTS ON DISPLAYS OF ABILITY. 309 • uncol~rected ? Is the person who utters it vain, or one whose self-esteem is excessive ~ Is he improperly regarded as an authority by those around? Does he trample down others in the pursuit of applause? If to some or all of these questions the answer is-Yes, the correction may fitly be lllade; alike for the benefit of the individual him self and .. for the benefit of hearers. But should the error be trivial, or should the credit of orie who makes it, not higher than is proper, be unduly injured by the exposure, or should his general behaviour in social intercourse be of a praisewo;rthy kind, then sympathy may fitly dictate silence negative beneficence'may rightly restrain the natural desire to show superiority.

Of course much of what is here said respecting the carrying on of conversation or discussion, applies to the carrying on of public controversy. In nearly all cases the intrusion of personal feeling-makes contro versy of sn~all· value for its osten~ible purpose-the estab lishlllent of truth. Desire for the eolat which victory brin~s, often causes a mercilessness and a dishonesty', which hinder or prevent the arrival at right conclusions.) Negative beneficence here conduces to public benefit 'while it mitigates private injury. Usually the evidence may be' marshalled and a valid argument' set forth, without dis-' crediting an opponent in too conspicuous a manner. Small slips of statement and reasoning, which do not affect the general issue, may be generously passed over; and generosity nlay fitly go to the extent of admitting the strength of the reasons relied on, while showing that they are inadequate. A due negative beneficence will respect an antagonist's arnour pfropre j save, perhaps, in cases where his dishonesty, and his consequent endeavour to obscure the truth, denland exposure. Lack of right feeling in this sphere has disastrous public effects. It needs but to glance around at· the courses of political controversy and of theological controversy, to see how extreme are the 310 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE.

perversions of men's beliefs caused by absence of that sympathetic interpretration ·which negative beneficence enjoins. § 413. A few words may be added respecting more spe cial ITlotiveswhich should occasionally prevent the superior from Iuanifesting his superiority. A game of skill is being played with one ,vhose little boy is a spectator. The father's play is such as makes his antagonist tolerably certain of victory, should he put out his strength. But iihe is adequately swayed by the sentiment of negative beneficence, he will, not obtrusively but in a concealed ,vay, play below his strength, so as to let the father beat him. He will feel that such slnall pleasure as triumph might' bring, would be far luore than counter balanced .by synlpathy with the annoyance of the father at being defeated in presence of his son, and by sympathy with the son on finding his father not so superior as he supposed. Though in this course some insincerity is implied, yet that evil is trivial in coruparison with the evils otherwise entailed.

In like Inanner none will doubt that one who, in a dis cussion or in a wit-combat, rnight be easily overcome, may, even though at other times unworthy of consideration, be rightly let off under particular circumstances. Say, for instance, that his fiancee is present. To show that he is ignorant, or that he is illogical, or to utter a witticism at his expense, ,vould be cruel. .A.ll but the unusually callous will see that to shame him before a witness with whom he stands in such a relation, would be an improper exercise of intel lectual power. An interlocutor who is s,vayed by due fel low-feeling, ,vill, in such a case, consent to seem himself ill-infoflued or stupid, rather than inflict the pain which would follow any other course. § 414. Here, then, are ways in which negative beneficence RESTRAINTS ON DISPLAYS OF ABILITY. 311 should operate by voluntarily making a conscious superiority, and thus harmonizing social intercourse.

Perhaps in such cases we see luore (olearly than in others, the propriety of mitigating, so far as we can, the pains caused by inequalities of faculty. As admitted on a previous occasion, the harsh discipline of Nature, which favours the well-endowed and leaves the ill-endowed to suffer, has, fronl the human point of view, an aspect of in justice; and though, as we have seen, it is not permissible so to traverse the norlual relation between conduct and con sequence, as to equalize the fates of the well-endo","redand the ill-endowed, it is permissible to modify its results where this may be done without appreciably interfering with the further progress of evolution. Though many difficulties stand in the way of thus qualifying the Inaterial effects which severally come to the efficient and the in efficient in the battle of life, yet comparatively little diffi culty stands in the way of qualifying the luental effects, as socially manifested.

There are doubtless cases in which display of nlental power in conversation or controversy, conduces to pecu niary benefit, and may hence be regarded as rightly to be taken advantage of in the struggle :for life; but in the cases above instanced, which typify the average cases, the Inore skilled player, or better talker, or keener logician, may hold his greater powers in check without endangering the prosperity of the superior, and may avoid discrediting a competitor without appreciably furthering the prosperity of the inferior. He rnay here diIninish the evils caused by Nature's unfairness, without entailing other evils. And restrainto£ the desire £01' triumph, thus inculcated by negative beneficence, is the restraint of a barbarous desire appropriate to early stages of hurnan evolution. For the pride taken in victory over an opponent, is of like kind whether the opponent fights with hand or with tongue-wields the sword or wields the pen. The mili312 THE ETHICS OF SOCI.AL LIFE.

tant nature which throughout social progress has gloried in successful bodily encounters, is essentially the same militant nature which glories in successful mental encounters. In the interests of a higher civilization, therefore, there should be practised this self-restraint which prevents a needless dis crediting of the mentally inferior.