V. Succour to the Ill-used and the Endangered

CIIAPTER V. SUCCOUR TO THE ILLUSED AND THE ENDANGERED. § 444. In everyone who is capable of ethical ideas and sentinlents, more than one kind of motive prompts the defense of those who are aggressed upon: especially when they are weaker than the aggressors. There co-operate an immediate sympathy with the pains, mentally or bodily, inflicted; a feeling of indignation agaInst the person who inflicts them; a sense of justice which is irritated by the invasion of personal rights; and (where there is a quick consciousness of remote results) an anger that the estab lished principles of social order should be broken. Who ever is civilized, not in the superficial sense but in the profound sense, will feel himself impelled to aid one who is suffering violence, either physical or moral; and will be ready to risk injury in yielding the aid. The courage shown by one of those hired men who unite in conquering small semi-civilized nations and weak, uncivilized tribes, is to be admired about as much as is the courage of a brute which runs down and masters its relatively feeble prey. The courage of one who fights in self-defence, or who as a soldier fights to defend his country when it is invaded, is respectable-is a proper manifestation of direct egoism in the one case, and in the other case a manifestation of that indirect egoism which makes it the interest of every citizen to prevent national (362) SUOOOUR TO THE ILLUSED AND THE ENDANGERED. 363 subjup;a~tion. But the courage which prompts the succouring of one who is illused, and which, against odds of superior strength, risks the bearing of. injury that the weaker nlay not be injured, is courage of the first order-a courage backed, not as in many cases by base emotions, but backed by emotions of the highest kind.

One might have thought that ·even in a pagan society . . the ill-treatment of the weak by the strong would be universally reprobated. Still 1nore nlight one have thought that in a professedly· Christian society, general indignation "\vould fall upon a bully who used his greater bodily powers to oppress a victim having smaller bodily powers. A.nd most of all one might have felt certain that in educational institutions, governed and officered by professed teachers of Christianity, ever enjoining benefi cence, ill-treatment of the younger and weaker by the elder and stronger ","'ould be sternly· forbidden and severely repressed. But in. our clerically - admin~tered public schools, the beneficence just described as of the highest order, finds no place; but, contrariwise, there finds place an established maleficence. Bullying and fagging, in· past times carried to cr.uel extremes, still survive; and, as happened not long since, a resulting death is apolo gized for and condoned by OIle of our bishops. There is maintained and approved a moral discipline not inappro priate for those who, as legislators and military officers, direct and carry out, all over the ,vorld, expeditions which have as their result to deplete pagans and fatten Christians.

But though public-school ethics and, by transmission, the ethics of patriotism so-caned, do not in practice (whatever they may do in theory) include that form of beneficence which risks injury to self in defending the weak against the strong, the ethics of evolution, as here interpreted, emphasize this form of beneficence; since the highest individual nature· and the higest social type, 364 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. cannot exist without a strength of sympathy which prompts such self-sacrificing beneficence. § 445. And here, before considering the delnands for self-sacrifice arising, not in the cases of injuries threatened by Inaleficent human beings, but in the cases of injurie,s threatened by the forces of Nature, something should be said concerning the courage required for the last as for the first; and, indeed, frequently lnore required, since the forces of Nature are merciless. Very generally the virtue of courage is spoken of as though it were under all circumstances worthy of the sanle kind of applause, and its absence worthy of the sarne kind of contelnpt. These indiscriminating judg Inents are indefensible. In large measure, though not 'wholly, the development of courage depends on personal experience of ability to· cope with dangers. It is in the order of Nature that one who perpetually fails, and suffers from his failures, becoIIles increasingly reluctant to enter into conflict with either organic or inorganic agencies; while, conversely, success in everything undertaken fosters a readiness to run risks-sometimes an undue readiness: each fresh success .being an occasion of extreme satisfac tion, the expectation of which becomes a temptation.

Hence, to a considerable extent, tirnidity and courage are their own justifications: the one being appropriate to a nature which is physically, or mor.ally, or intellectually defective in a greater or less degree; and the other being appropriate to a nature which is superior either in bodily power, or strength of enlotion, or intellectual aptitude and quickness. Errors of estimation in this matter may be best excluded by taking a case in respect of which Inen's pre-conceptions are not strongly established-say the case of Alpine explorations. Here is one 'who has constitu tionally so little strength that he is prostrated by climbing two or three thousand feet ; or whose hands are not SUCCOUR TO THE ILLUSED AND THE ENDANGERED. ,365 ,capable of a powerful and long-sustained grip; or whose vision is not keen enough to make hilu quite sure of his footing; or 'who cannot look down a precipice without feeling dizzy; or who so lacks presel}ce of mind that he is practically \paralyzed by an emergency_ All will admit that anyone of these physical or mental deficiencies rightly interdicts the atternpt to scale a mountain peak, and that to make the attelnpt would be a mark not of courage but of folly. Contrariwise, one who to strength of limb adds power of lungs,and with these joins acute senses, a clear and steady head, and resources nlental and bodily which rise to the occasion when danger demands, may be held warranted in a risky undertaking; as, for instance, descending into a crevasse to rescue OIle who has fallen into it. I-lis courage is the natural accompanhnent of his ability.

Such contrasts of natures should ordinarily determine such contrasts of actions; and estimates of ,conduct should recognize theIn-should, in large measure, take the form of pity for the incapacities of one or other kind which fear implies, and respect for the superiorities implied by courage. "In large nleasure," I say, because there are degrees of timidity beyond those which defects justify, and degrees of courage beyond those appropriate to the endowments; and while the first of these rightly deserves reprobation, the last may be duly admired, supposing it is not pushed to the extent o£ irrational imprudence. Speaking generally, then, the sanction for courage must take into account the relation between the thing to be done and the probable' capacity for doing it. The judgment formed must obviously vary according to the age-cannot be the same for the young or the old as for one in the prime of life; must vary with the state of health, which often partially incapacitates; nlust vary with what is called the "personal equation,"" since, when in danger, slowness of perception or of action. is often fatal.

366 THE ETHIOS OF SOOIAL LIFE. The single fact that heart-disease produces timidity-a timidity appropriate to that inability which failure of circulation involves-suffices alone to show that, ~oth in self and in others, the estimated obligation to run a .risk must always be qualified by recognition <:>f personal traits. Even without takiug account of such special reasons, there is, indeed, a prevailing consciousness that some proportion should be maintained between the degree of danger and the ability to meet the danger. It is usual to condelnn as "rash,"· conduct which disregards this pro portion. The saying that "discretion is the better part of valour," though by implication referring only to the risks of battle, is applicahle to other risks; and implies that there should be not approval but disapproval if the danger is too great. Similarly the .epithet "foolhardy," applied to 'one who needlessly chances death or great injury, is an epithet of reprobation; and implies, foo, the perception that not unfrequently a large part of that which passes for courage is simply stupidity-an inability to perceive what is likely to happen. There is in fact generally felt a certain kind of obligation not to risk life too recklessly, even with a good motive.

While the injunction uttered by positive beneficence to succour those who are endangered by the merciless po"Ters ofNature, must be thus qualified, it must, as we shall presently see, be further qualified by recognition of the collateral results, should the effort to yield the succour prove fatal. § 446. From the ~eneral we may turn now to the special. Let us ask what is the obligation imposed by beneficence to rescue one who is drowning. In what cases is the dnty positive, and in what cases Inust it be doubtful or be negatived? Olearly a man who, being a good SWimlller, has the SUCCOUR TO, THE ILL.;.USED AND THE ENDANGERED. 367 requisite ability, and yet makes no effort to save the life of one who, at no great distance, is in danger of sinking, is not only to be condemned as heartless but as worse. If at small risk to hhnself he can prevent another's death and does not, he must ;be held .guilty of, something like passive manslaughter. The only supposable, excuse for him is his consciousness that one who is drowning is apt to grapple his rescuer in such 'way as to incapacitate hiln, and cause the deaths of both-a liability, however, which he might know is easily excluded by approaching the drown ing person from behind.

But what are we to say when there is less fitness in strength, or skill, or both, to meet the requirements? What if weakness makes long-continued exertion imprac ticable? Or suppose that though he ,has general strength enough, the bystander has not acquired an ability to swim more than fifty yards, while the person to be rescued is considerably further off. Or suppose that, the scene of the threatened disaster being the sea, the power of the breakers is such that once in their grasp there is small chance of getting out again: even alone, much less when helping one ,,,,ho is drowning. Here it seems nlanifest that however much an unthinking beneficence Inay prompt running the risk, a judi~ial beneficence will forbid. An irrational altruism has in such, cases to be checked by a rational egoisrn; since it is absurd to' lose two Iives in a hopeless effort to save one. Other restraints have usually to be taken into account.

A man who is without a wife or near relatives, so that his death will inflict no great amount of mental suffering a Iuan who is not responsible for the welfare of children or perhaps aged parents, may fitly yield to the immediate promptings of sympathy, and dare to do that which should not be done by one whose life is needful to other lives. In such cases beneficence urges and beneficence restrains. Quite apart froln the instinct of self-preservation, the sense 368 THE ETHIOS OF· SOOIAL LIFE~ of duty to dependents may forbid the attelnpt to give that succour which fello\v-feeling instigates. So that nothing definite can be said. Save in the instances first indicated, where the obligation is manifest, the obligation must be judged by the circumstances of each case: account being taken,not only of the qualifi cations nalned, but the value of the person for whonl the effort is made; for the saIne risks should not be run on be half of a criminal as on behalf of one who is noble in character, or one who is highly serviceable to his society.

§ 441. Difficult as are the questions sometimes raised in presence of probable death from dro'wning, they are exceeded in difficulty by questions raised in presence of probable death from fire. In the one case the ability of the rescuer, resulting froin his strength, skill, and quick ness, count for lnnch; and the actions of the element, now quiet now boisterous, with which he has to contend, may be fairly ,veIl gauged by hiln; but, in the other· case, he has to contend with an agent the destructive actions of which are much more terrible, much less calculable, and not to be overcome by strength. Froln titne to tilne we read of those who, at the peril of their lives, have rescued relatives and even strangers from burning houses; and again we read of others whose efforts of like kind have proved fatal. Are we then, under parallel circumstances, to say-Go thou and do likewise? Does beneficence demand disregard of self, carried to the extl'erne that it may very likely end in the sacrifice of a second life ,vithout the saving of a first?

No general ans\ver can be given. The incidents of the case and the special emotions-parental, filial, fraternal, or other-rnust decide. Often the question is one which cannot be answered even if there is absolute self-abnega tion; as when, having brought out a child from one room which is in flames, a par~nt has to decide whether to rush SUCCOUR TO THE ILLUSED AND THE ENDANGERED. 369 into an upper room and rescue another child, at the same time that fire on the staircase threatens death to all. Evidently in such a chaos of conditions and feelings and obligations and risks, nothing can be said. And what is true in this extrenle case is true in a large proportion of the' cases. Ethics is dumb in presence of the conflicting requirements. When not the life of the rescuer only is concerned, but ,vhen loss of his life must lllake other Iives miserable, and leave grave obligations undischarged, interdict rather than injunction may be the ethical verdict.

§ 448. Doubtless it is well for humanity at large to maintain the tradition of heroisIn. One whose altruistic promptings are so strong that he loses his own life in an almost hopeless effort to save another's life, affords an example of nobility which, in a measure, redeems the in numerable cruelties, brutalities, and meannesses, prevailing among men, and serves to keep alive hope of a higher humanity hereafter. The good done in occasionally put ting 'egoism to the blush, Inay be counted as a set-off against the loss of one whose altruistic nature should have been transmi tted. But in all questions of the kind dealt with in this Chapter, we may fitly fall back on the ancient doctrine of the mean. When throwing dice with Death, the question whether Death's dice are loaded may fitly be asked. Even the extreme maxim-" Love thy neighbour as thy self," does not imply that each should value his o,vn life at a less rate than' that of another. Hence it seems in feral?le that though positive beneficence enjoins succouring the endangered where there seems an over-balancing prob ability that life will be saved, it does not enjoin more than this.