VI. The Formula of Justice

ment of justice and the idea of justice-arising from converse with this condition; we are now prepared for giving to the conclusion reached a definite form. We have simply to find a precise expression for the compromise described in the last chapter. The formula has to nnite 0,. positive element with a negative element. It must be positive in so far as it asserts for each that, since he is to receive and suffer the good and evil results of his actions, he must be allowed to act. And it must be negative in so far as, by asserting this of everyone, it iInplies that each can be allowed to act only under the restraint imposed by the presence of other8 having like claims to act. Evidently the positive element is that which expresses a pre-requisite to life in general, and the negative element is that which qualifies this pre requisite in the way required when, instead of one life carried on alone, there are many lives carried on together.

Hence, that which we have to express in a precise way, 46 JUSTICE. is the liberty of each limited only by the like liberties of all. This we do by saying :-Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man. § 273. A possible misapprehension must be guarded agaillst. There are acts of aggression which the formula :is presumably intended to exclude, which apparently it does not exclude. It may be said that if A strikes B, then, so long as B is not debarred from striking .A in return, no greater freedom is claimed by the one than by the other j or it nlay be said that if A has trespassed on B's property, the requirenlent of the formula has not been broken so long as B can trespass on A's property. Such interpretations, however, mistake the essential meaning of the formula, which we at once Ree if we refer back to its origin. For the truth to be expressed is that each in carrying on the actions which constitute his life for the time being, and conduce to the subsequent maintenance of his life, shall not be impeded further than by the carrying on of those kindred actions which maintain the lives of others. It does not countenance a superfluous interference with another's life, committed· on the ground that an equal interference may balance it. Such a rendering of the forID.ulais one which implies greater deductions from the lives of each and all than the associated state necessarily entails; and this is obviously a perversion of its meaning.

If we bear in mind that though not the inlmedjate end, the greatest sum of happiness is the remote end, we see clearly that the sphere within which each may pursue happi .. ness has a limit, on the other side of which lie the similarly limited spheres of action of his neighbours; and that he may not intrude on his nejghbour's spheres on condition that they may intrude on his. Instead of justifying sggression and counter-aggression) the intention of tho THE FORMULA OF JUS'l'ICm. 47 formula is to fix a bound which may not be exceeded on either side. § 274. And here, on this misapprehension and this recti fication, an instructive comme:q.t is yielded by the facts of social progress. For they sho1" that r in so far as justice is concerned, there has been an iadvance from the incorrect interpretation to the correct interpretation. In early stages we see habitl~al aggression and counter aggression: now between soci~ties and now between indi viduals. Neighbouring tribesi fight about the limits to their territories, trespassing first on one side and then on the other j and further fights are entailed by the require ment that mortality suffered shall be followed by mortality inflicted. In such acts of revyDge and re-revenge there is displayed a vague recognition 6f equality of claims. This tends towards recognition or definite limits, alike in respect of territory and in respect of bloodshed ; so that in some cases a balance is maintained between the numbers of deaths on either side.

Along with this growing conception of inter-tribal justice goes a growing conception or justice among members .of each tribe. At first it is the fear of retaliation which causes such respect for one another's persons and posses sions as exists. The idea of justice· is that of a balancing of injuries-" an eye for an eye and a tooth £01' a tooth." This remains the idea during early stages of civilization. After justice, as so conceived, ceases to be enforced by the aggrieved person himself, it is this which he asks to have enforced by the constituted authority. T'he cry to the ruler for justice is the cry for punishment-for the infliction of an injury at least as great as. the injury suffered, or, otherwise, for a compensation equivalent to the loss. Thus the equality of clainls is but tacitly asserted in the demand to have rectified, as far as may be, the breaches of equality.

48 .JUSTICE. How there tends gradually to emerge from this crnde conception of justice the finished conception of justice, it seems scarcely needful to explain. rrhe true idea is generated by experience of the evils which accompany the false idea. Naturally, the perception of the right restraints on conduct becomes clearer as respect for these restraints is forced on men, and so rendered more habitual and more general. Men's incursions into one another's spheres constitute a kind of oscillation, which, violent at the outset, becomes gradually less with the progress towards a relatively peaceful state of society. As the oscillations decrease there is an approach to equilibrium; and along with this approach to equilibrium comes approach to a definite theory of equilibrium. Thus that primitive idea of justice in which aggression is to be balanced by counter-aggression, fades from thought as fast as it disappears from practice; and there comes the idea o£ justice here formulated, in which are recognized such limitations of conduct as exclude aggres sions altogether.

NOTE. For the views of Kant concerning the ultimate principle of Right, see Appendix A..