16. Empirical Studies of Labor’s Share

IN THIS chapter I propose to quote, and where it seems helpful to comment on, the crucial findings, expressed verbally, of the statistical economists who have conducted meticulous investigations into recorded experience of changes in income shares.

The most famous (perhaps “notorious” would be a more appropriate adjective) was a thorough and ingenious pioneer effort by Pareto. Publishing his findings in 1897, as the emerging strike-threat system was causing deep misgivings among the prescient, but before it had developed as the strong influence it is today, he summarized the results of his own statistical studies in what is known as “Pareto’s law.”¹ He maintained that if income sizes and the number of persons receiving incomes are plotted on logarithmic scales, the result is an approximately straight line, and that “at all recent times the slope of this straight line” had been constant. But he claimed further that the law holds “in all countries and at all times.”² In a later treatise, Pareto himself warned against hasty deductions from his finding. “Empirical laws,” he wrote, “have little or no value outside the limits for which they were found experimentally to be true.”³ Moreover, I do not think that any economists today accept his apparent suggestion that what his studies seemed to prove had happened over a wide scale would necessarily be repeated under different institutions in later periods.

In any case, Pareto’s statistical procedures (not the data he used) were questioned in the 1930s by Yntema, Gini, and other statisticians. Through visual illusion due to representation on logarithmic scales, his curve suggests a rigidity of the proportions which is today recognized as misleading. But the phenomenon which he sought to illustrate, and for which he was trying to find an explanation remains. His work certainly did demonstrate that, for a variety of reasons which it is difficult to identify empirically, any existing market-determined distribution of income is very difficult to change.

Bowley, making careful studies of income distribution in Britain, and discussing such changes as were discernible over the period 1880 to 1913, remarked: “The constancy of so many of the proportions and the rates of movement . . . seems to point to a fixed system of causation and has an appearance of inevitableness.”⁴ This has been termed “the Bowley law,” although that rigorous and meticulous statistician certainly intended the words “seems” and “appearance” to bear their full meaning.

In 1928, studies by Cobb and Douglas⁵ brought out the fact that the ratio of aggregate wages plus salaries to aggregate value added in manufacture has proved tenaciously stable over time. Many authors have tried to explain or to explain away this relationship (which has become known as “the Cobb-Douglas function”). But a long chain of subsequent painstaking statistical inquiries, assisted by theoretical analysis, has failed to disclose convincing evidence that labor’s share has increased in relation to the nonlabor share. Despite the enormous costs the unions have incurred (in the form of wages foregone, equality of opportunity in the labor market destroyed and social cohesion sacrificed) in efforts to change the proportions, they have seemingly remained obstinately fixed.

Covering the period 1850 to 1910, when the strike-threat influence was relatively unimportant, a pioneer study by W. I. King suggested that the proportion of income enjoyed by labor had fallen from about 78 to about 76 percent.⁶ But even had the data available for that long period been adequate, the imponderables are so many that the seeming decline in labor’s share can hardly be regarded as significant.

Simon Kuznets, in a famous study, presented data showing a rise in labor’s share between the periods 1919–28 and 1929–38 from about 73 to 78 percent.⁷ But the comparison is, of course between a boom, full employment, period in which, as I have insisted, labor’s share can be expected to be well below the average and a period marked by the most disastrous depression of American history, with chronic unemployment, during which, as I have also insisted, labor’s share can be expected to be well above the average. In the case of Kuznets’ figures, this tendency is magnified because he included relief payments in labor’s income.

In another impressive investigation into income shares, D. Gale Johnson, building among other things on the earlier investigations of King and Kuznets, constructed tables which indicated a rise in labor’s proportion over the course of five decades. The data he analyzed suggest that labor’s share of money income in the economy as a whole had increased from 68 percent in 1900 to 75 in 1952.⁸ But Johnson himself pointed out that nearly half of the apparent increase occurred prior to 1929; and that was a period in which the strike-threat influence, although growing in the non agricultural sector (spasmodically and with some setbacks), was still exerted over a relatively small portion of the United States economy.⁹ Moreover, for the earlier period, Johnson was working with inadequate data. From 1929 onward the data become more plentiful and more reliable. Comparing the period 1930 to 1939 and 1940 to 1949, Johnson’s findings show that labor’s share fell;¹⁰ yet it was in the middle of the first period that the Wagner Act seemed suddenly to enhance strike-threat power by more than any other event in the history of labor.

These findings, says Johnson, “can be explained, in part at least, by the failure of our national income data to record the income produced by government property” (see page 230), “by the effect of increased urbanization . . .” (see page 229), and “by the transfer of labor from relatively capital intensive to capital extensive industries”¹¹ (see page 229).

It seems that, as soon as we make due allowance for the illusory factors discussed above (pages 230–232, 1 to 5), we find that, in Clark Kerr’s words, “labor’s share of national income has remained more nearly constant than any other economic variable in society”;¹² “there is little apparent increase since 1929 in tabor’s share; and it is since 1929 that the great growth in unionism has occurred in the United States. . . . employees are better off to the extent that all income recipients are better off.”¹³ Kerr’s position in respect of constancy of shares seems to be confirmed by the results of all other serious inquiries. Some of these have independently examined the data and tested the inferences of other investigators, as well as having brought out the consequences of different definitions of the categories compared. Thus J. Alterman has shown that, in the corporate part of the economy, the proportional shares of capital and labor were virtually the same during the periods 1922–1929 and 1947–1959.¹⁴ S. Lebergott, whose critical review of earlier statistical work in the field Alterman is discussing, confirms the finding of long-term stability in the proportions (for which he suggests “a market mechanism” is responsible).¹⁵ Dealing with the manufacturing field (in which one would have expected strike-threat transfers to be most effectively achieved, by reason of the typical short-term specificity of the assets), he shows that wages as a percentage of value added (in the United States) had long-term stability over the whole period 1889 to 1954; and he quotes in support the findings of Wooden and Wasson, for the period 1929 to the early 1950s, as also showing “an approximate constancy,” and as being “a more precise measurement.”¹⁶ A study for Canada, by S. A. Goldberg, presents data which suggest at first that the share of wages in aggregate income had risen there between 1926–1930 and 1954–1958.¹⁷ But this impression is dispelled when the author makes his own essential qualifications, which refer to a rapid shift from agriculture to industry and from unincorporated ownership to corporate organization (both of which factors could, as we have seen, have accounted for a rise in labor’s share even if no union pressures had been present).¹⁸ In any case, a critical discussion of Goldberg’s careful investigation by M. C. Urquhart leaves the impression that it is doubtful whether even a moderate rise in labor’s share was really experienced in Canada over the years examined. Thus, “if we include in labor’s share of income that part of the unincorporated enterprise income which should be attributed to it . . . the null hypothesis that factor shares have not changed has not been disproved.”¹⁹

I. B. Kravis begins his study with a claim that he will show “the notion of long-run constancy in relative shares” to be false,²⁰ because he finds “some evidence of a slight tendency to drift downwards”²¹ on the part of the property share since 1929, and he attributes this “slight” apparent transfer from “property to labor”²² to exactly the causes which I myself have suggested would have led us to expect such a transfer.²³ Yet, comparing “averages for overlapping cycles,” he finds that the property share since 1929 “. . . has been characterized by near secular stability. . . .”²⁴ It seems to me that this is his crucial conclusion.

E. F. Denison, examining the ordinary business sector, reaches the conclusion that (excluding the depression and the war years, and making the necessary adjustments) there was “substantial stability” in respect of the employee percentage of income.²⁵ M. Reder, interpreting these findings for the period 1929 to ì952, suggests that is “is tantamount to saying that labor’s functional share of private non-farm output was constant. . . . ”²⁶ And independently discussing an apparent rise in the “employee compensation” share which Denison’s figures suggest, and directing attention to “labor’s functional share” (that is, “employee compensation” after correction for the illusory element due to “self employment”),²⁷ and allowing for a real influence tending to raise labor’s share,²⁸ namely, “an increase in the relative numbers in industries with more than average employee shares,” Reder concludes that “it is quite possible that (this share) . . . has stayed constant in the United States since 1910 or thereabouts.”²⁹ Moreover, he refers to the significant finding that “within individual industries there is also very substantial stability (overtime) of the wage share.”³⁰

Bronfenbrenner’s acceptance as proven “the observed degree of constancy in the relative shares of labor and capital in developed capitalist countries”³¹ has already been noticed.

Phelps-Brown, asking whether the unions can in fact achieve what their most active members believe is their primary purpose, namely, the winning of “a larger share of the product,” says that “the observed stability of the distribution of the product between pay and profit” suggests that such a purpose is “delusive,” and he gives reasons for holding “that the profit margin in the selling price is in practice not generally compressible by wage rises.”³² During the last hundred years, “the proportionate share of the product accruing to employed labor has not changed widely or cumulatively.”³³ “The trend of the wage-income ratio is conspicuous for its stability.” In Sweden, “the wage-income ratio was no different in 1913 from what it had been in 1961.”³⁴

In his textbook, Samuelson includes among the “six basic trends of economic evelopment” with which he suggests the fundamental “facts of economic history in the advanced nations” . . . can be “summarized,” “Bowley’s law” (see pages 241-242), relating to the apparent long-term fixity of the proportions. He rightly warns the student that all such empirical laws are “only approximate truths.” But after plotting the relevant data, he remarks of the period 1900 to the present, that “labor has kept about the same share of total product, with property also earning about the same relative share throughout the period.”³⁵

Kaldor, who is among those who have stressed the “stability of shares” which, he says, has been experienced “in the advanced capitalist economies over the last hundred years or so, despite the phenomenal changes in the techniques of production, in the accumulation of capital relative to labor and in income per head,”³⁶should have added (in the context of the word “despite”), “and above all despite the enormous increase in the strike-threat influence.”

There are indeed studies which indicate not only the apparent constancy of labor’s proportion of income over long periods of time, but suggest that the strike-threat influence does not cause the percentage share of wages or of employee compensation in occupations subject to that threat to be higher or to increase more rapidly³⁷ than in fields not subject to it. For instance, in 1930 Douglas drew the attention of economists to the fact that, contrasting six highly unionized industries with eight nonunionized industries, and referring to the period between 1914 and 1926, “wages in the nonunion manufacturing industries have risen at least as rapidly as have those in the union manufacturing trades. . . .”³⁸ This finding was accepted with respect but obvious reluctance and skepticism.³⁹ However, later investigations have tended to confirm Douglas’s tentative conclusions. Thus, P. Sultan who, like the rest, finds that “over time, labor’s percentage has remained amazingly constant,”⁴⁰ demonstrates also that the ratio of wage and salary payments plus supplements to income in unionized and nonunion industries between 1929 and 1956 followed “a remarkably similar path.” His conclusion is that, in the absence of runaway inflation or deflation, “union wage/income ratios are likely to approximate those in the nonunion sector, union wage pressures notwithstanding.”⁴¹ That is, movements in labor’s proportion of income in unionized and nonunion industries appear to be correlated over minor cycles of boom and depression.⁴² Moreover, interpreting data presented by Levinson, Sultan shows that while unionized workers were most successful in avoiding wage-rate adjustment during the great depression, during the recovery from 1933 onward, the nonunion workers caught up and during 1934 “received extraordinarily large wage increases.”⁴³ And referring to the fact that, from 1934 to 1937, unorganized workers gained nearly twice as much as the organized workers, he remarks: “It is surprising that at the very moment in history when unions enjoyed tremendous power and influence, the relative wage differential accruing to the union sector should appear to diminish.”⁴⁴ “The mushroom growth of unionism since the mid-thirties has not produced any upheaval in distributive shares.”⁴⁵ Sultan rightly insists, however, that “it is impossible to determine what the distribution of income would have been in the absence of union pressures.”⁴⁶

Simler reaches almost identical conclusions. Dealing with the period 1929 to 1954, he finds that in the private sector “labor’s share in unionized industries has generally not increased more than in nonunionized industries”;⁴⁷ and he comments further that, if other years had been chosen for comparison, it would look as though unionism must have had adverse effects on labor’s share! His conclusions are unequivocal. Using Levinson’s data he finds that, between 1919 and 1929, “the influence of unionism on labor’s share had been non-existent,” and that between 1929 and 1947, a tendency for the figures to indicate a rise in labor’s percentage (from 56 to 59.3 percent) is to be explained by “factors other than unionism.”⁴⁸ He finds further that “the hypothesis that there exists a positive and significant correlation between the strength of trade unionism and labor’s relative share of income is not confirmed by the available data for the manufacturing sector of the American economy. . . . The hypothesis originally asserted by Dobb and since advanced by others, that ‘where wage earners are strongly organized in trade unions, one might expect labor to succeed in obtaining a larger share of the product than elsewhere’ is contradicted by the experience in the manufacturing sector of the American economy in the first half of the twentieth century.”⁴⁹ And yet it is in this particular field, the manufacturing sector, in which the importance of fixed, nonversatile assets are most important, that I have shown the possibility of exploitation of investors to have been greatest.

Kenneth Boulding, concluding an essay in which he submitted “a partial rehabilitation of the wage fund doctrine,” and advancing the thesis that the distribution of income “is largely independent of what happens in the labor market,” comments (without reference to the empirical studies with which he obviously expects his readers to be aware) on “the evident impotence of trade unions in increasing the share of labor in national income”;⁵⁰ and Clark Kerr, weighing up, together with his own investigations, a whole range of independent inquiries in the field, finds that “labor’s share, . . . industry by industry, has fared no more favorably in unionized industries than in nonunion industries.”⁵¹

Again, among those who have reviewed previous investigations into labor’s share, we find Albert Rees, who is satisfied that “no effect of unions on labor’s share . . . can be discovered with any consistency,”⁵² that is, that when adjustment of the data to allow for some of the illusory factors which I have listed above (pp. 230–233) has been made, there is “a remainder that shows no particular relation to union power.”⁵³ Whenever the aggregate output of the community is increasing more rapidly than the population of working age, the unionized and the nonunionized sectors of the economy enjoy intermittent increases in real earnings, and during inflations’ intermittent increases in money earnings, for exactly the same reasons. That is, Rees insists, the union gains “would . . . have taken place even without the union.”⁵⁴

Bradley also, summarizing the findings of post-World War II empirical investigations conducted by some of the economists whose work I have been quoting, and by other authorities, says that, over the periods studied, “wage gains did not occur entirely or even largely in those industries and trades where most workers were represented by unions. Nor were wage losses restricted entirely or largely to the industries or trades where most workers were not represented by unions. In terms of real wages the two groups did about equally well.”⁵⁵

The same considerations apply to wage rates fixed under legal enactment. In an important article from which I have already quoted, Yale Brozen has concluded, from a careful study of United States data, that such wage-rate increases as have been gained via successive amendments of the minimum wage Statute “would have come anyway in most cases within two to five years” because “the wage rates of low-paid employees in non-covered occupations have been rising at 4 percent per year since 1949. . . . What successive amendments to the minimum wage statute have done is to jump rates in the year of application. Very slow rates of increase then occur in the following years . . .”⁵⁶ (My italics.)

Experience under inflation gives special emphasis to the point these economists are making. If there were no strike-threat influences present, and any measure of inflation occurred, prices would increase and the demands for all kinds of productive services (in terms of money) would increase more or less in proportion to the prospective prices of final products. Inflation makes it profitable for entrepreneurs to bid up the money price of labor in the same way that the growth of real income similarly makes it profitable for entrepreneurs to bid up the real price of labor. Strike-threat pressures have never been needed to bring about such revaluations.

But what does remain true is that, when the extent of the use to be made of the strike threat has not been fully anticipated, and its consequences not allowed for, investors are exploitable. This truth has been constantly stressed since the earlier chapters. But the corollary has been equally stressed that expectations of exploitation will not continue to be wrong indefinitely. Hence, any redistributive tendencies due to this cause will be temporary. Evidence of such temporary influences on income shares is discernible in empirical studies. These influences have, however, obviously been insufficiently important, in relation to others, to show in most of the aggregate figures. What empirical investigations have apparently established is that workers in newly organized industries may gain through the strike threat, sometimes appreciably;⁵⁷ although after a while the unionized workers cease to gain further in relation to workers in nonunion occupations. This is, of course, direct confirmation of the thesis I have just reiterated.⁵⁸ I conclude that if all the other determinants of the relative shares can be assumed to have been tending to establish a near constant ratio, the failure of the strike threat system discernibly to change that ratio can be attributed to the factors discussed in the previous chapter.

We have noticed, however, yet other reasons why labor’s share could be expected to have been increasing. Hence, the observed constancy of its share (except through cyclical factors) suggest that strike-threat activity, while it has undoubtedly greatly reduced the flow of wages, has not only failed to transfer income from investors to workers, but everything points to its having worked as a contractionist force on labor’s percentage. (See above, p. 234.)

The passage quoted from Kaldor (see page 245) reflects the general surprise of economists that an apparent big “accumulation of capital relative to labor” has not brought about a rise in labor’s percentage. The most plausible explanation is, I think, the one I suggested above (pages 144–145), namely, that the more exploitable forms of investment, which tend to be the most wage-multiplying, have been avoided. A less wage-multiplying composition of the stock of assets appears to have come into being. The effect of strike threat pressures may, I repeat, have been not only greatly to reduce labor’s absolute income below what it could otherwise have been but even to reduce its relative share in some measure.

In case any reader should still be under misapprehension on the point, the demonstration in this chapter that, in an era in which the strike threat is an established institution, wage rates in unionized industries do not increase more rapidly than those in nonunion activities, does not mean that the strike threat has not succeeded in winning for labor unionists (as distinct from Labor) considerably higher real wage rates on the average than they could otherwise have gained (out of the aggregate real income which the distortions of the system must have greatly reduced). There is no important controversy about this. H. Gregg Lewis has estimated that the unions in the United States have been able to raise the wage rates of their members, relatively to nonunion workers, by between 10 and 15 percent.⁵⁹ However, as the forcing up of wage rates in one field forces down wage rates in other fields,⁶⁰ any absolute gain to the average union worker would have been less than his relative gain, even if there had been no adverse effects upon the aggregate wages flow. But, in the light of the effects of the strike-threat system upon the magnitude and composition of the assets stock, “organized labor” must have shared a much smaller cake. Hence, when the costs of organization to achieve strike threat power and the costs of the occasional exercise of that power are allowed for, a net absolute advantage is probably enjoyed by a very small proportion only of the workers who confidently believe themselves to be beneficiaries. This consideration has an important bearing on the political practicability of reform aimed at the establishment of a nonstrike era. The overwhelming majority of labor unionists would almost certainly benefit.

NOTES

¹ Vilfredo Pareto, Cours d’Economie Politique (Rouge, 1897), Vol. II, pp. 304 et seq.

² These words are the summarization of “Pareto’s law” as presented in the National Bureau of Economic Research, Income in the United States (1922), p. 344.

³ Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel d’Economie Politique (Giard et Brière, 1909), p. 391.

⁴ A. L. Bowley, The Division of the Product of Industry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919).

⁵ C. W. Cobb and P. Douglas, “The Theory of Production,” American Economic Review, supp. (March 1928).

⁶ W. I. King, Wealth and Income of the People of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1915), p. 160.

⁷ Simon Kuznets, National Income and Its Composition, 1919-1938, Vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1938), Tables 22 and 64.

⁸ D. Gale Johnson, “The Functional Distribution of Income in the United States, 1850–1952,” Review of Economics and Statistics, May, 1954, p. 178. Johnson recognized that labor’s share in money income had increased more than its share in real income. (Ibid., p. 180.)

⁹ By the end of the period nearly one-third of the nonagricultural workers were union members.

¹⁰ D. Gale Johnson, op. cit., p. 178.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 175.

¹² Clark Kerr, “Labor’s Income Share. . .,” in New Concepts in Wage Determination, eds. G. W. Taylor and F. C. Pierson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 260. See Kerr’s Table I, column 4, p. 280.

¹³ Ibid., p. 281.

¹⁴ J. Alterman, in Behavior of Income Shares, (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1962), p. 93.

¹⁵ S. Lebergott, in Behavior of Income Shares, p. 57 (see above, p. 223).

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁷ S. A. Goldberg, The Behavior of Income Shares, pp. 189 et seq.

¹⁸In the employment shift to agriculture, a real factor (see 5 on p. 229) and an illusory factor (see 5 on p. 232) are involved. In the shift to employment in corporations, the factor is illusory (see p. 231, number 4).

¹⁹ M. C. Urquhart, in The Behavior of Income Shares, p. 272.

²⁰ I. B. Kravis, “Relative Income Shares in Fact and Theory,” American Economic Review (1959), p. 917.

²¹Ibid., p. 931.

²² Ibid., p. 918.

²³ He says, “The number of man-hours worked has not expanded as fast as population . . ., while reproducible capital (in constant prices) has nearly doubled in relation to man-hours.” “The greater responsiveness of the supply of capital to the demands of a growing economy has led to price-induced substitution with existing techniques and probably also to capital-using innovations.” (Ibid., p. 918.) And finally, “a change in the industrial composition of employment and income” was a factor. (Ibid., p. 946.)

²⁴ Ibid., p. 931.

²⁵ E. F. Denison, “Distribution of National Income Since 1929,” in Survey of Current Business, 1952.

²⁶ M. Reder, “Alternative Theories of Labor’s Share,” in M. Abramovitz, The Allocation of Economic Resources (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959), p. 197.

²⁷ See p. 231.

²⁸ See pp. 229-230.

²⁹ Reder, op. cit., p. 197.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 200.

³¹ M. Bronfenbrenner, op. cit., p. 284.

³² E. H, Phelps-Brown, Economics of Labor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 184-5.

³³ Ibid., p. 220.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 222.

³⁵Paul Samuelson, Economics (7th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 719.

³⁶ N. Kaldor, “Alternative Theories of Distribution,” Review of Economic Studies, 1955-56, p. 84.

³⁷ On private gains achievable by unions (at the expense of consumers and laid-off or excluded workers) see p, 248.

³⁸ Paul H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930), p. 592.

³⁹ Consider, for example, the discussion by H. A, Millis and R. E, Montgomery, Labor’s Progress and some Basic Labor Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938), pp. 212-3.

⁴⁰ P. Sultan, Labor Economics, (Henry Holt, 1957), p. 73.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 389.

⁴² During World War II, the proportion enjoyed by the unionized industries did increase relatively, probably because price controls were more important in the unionized industries (see above, pp. 000-000) and because war demands for the output of the unionized industries increased relatively to demands for the output of nonunionized industries, involving overtime payments in the former as well as a larger proportion of demand not subject to market rationing.

⁴³ Sultan, op. cit., p. 191.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 393.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 384-5. Could it not be that entrepreneurial anticipations had already caught up?

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 384-5.

⁴⁷ N. J. Simler, The Impact of Unionism (University of Minnesota Press, 1961), p. 41.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 40-41.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

⁵⁰ K. Boulding, in David McCord Wright, ed., The Impact of the Union (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1957), p. 148.

⁵¹ Kerr, op. cit., p. 283.

⁵² Albert A. Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 94.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 95.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 81.

⁵⁵ P. Bradley, Labor Unions and Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Association, 1959), p. 63.

⁵⁶ Y. Brozen, “The Effect of Minimum Wage Increase on Teenage Employment,” Journal of Law and Economics (1969), pp. 121-122.

⁵⁷ For example, Arthur M. Ross, “The Influence of Unionism Upon Earnings,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1948, pp. 263-286.

⁵⁸ A neat statement of the empirically-based principle is that “new unionism has been the source of relative wage advantage . . . whereas continuing unionism has not.” Arthur M. Ross and William Goldner, “Forces Affecting the Inter-industry Wage Structure,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1950, pp. 254-281.

⁵⁹ H. Gregg Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wage Rates in the United States, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 193.

⁶⁰ Every “contrived scarcity” entails an “incidental plenitude”. (See Chapter 7). I am not overlooking here the frequent tendency of nonunion undertakings which are competing with union undertakings to match duress-enforced wage-rate increases, in order to discourage the spread of unionization to their activities.