X. The Far Eastern Treason

x. The Far Eastern Treason 1:Eforeign policy of the United States in the Far East, from the Yalta conference to the Korean war, was anticipated by Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin in his book Marxism and the Na tional and Colonial Question, a collection of his speeches and articles during the 1920's. Stalin declared that "the road to the victory of the revolution in the West lies through a revolutionary alliance with the colo nies and dependent countries against imperialism." He named China as the most important of these countries, and he laid down a program for the Communists in China: (1) join Chiang Kai-shek in a "united front"; (2) work within and in the rear of Chiang Kai-shek's divisions in order to "disintegrate" them; (3) overthrow Chiang Kai-shek's government and establish a "Soviet China." Addressing a Communist Party meeting in Moscow on Au gust 1, 1927, Stalin said the Chinese revolution was in its second stage, and that the third stage would be "the Soviet revolution." Earlier he wrote: "If Europe and America may be called the front, the scene of the main engagements between socialism and imperialism, the non-sovereign nations and the colonies, with their raw materials, fuel, food and vast store of human material, should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism. In order to win a war one must not only triumph at the front, but also revolutionize the enemy's rear,his re serves."

Having been put on notice by Stalin himself that Soviet com munism regarded the United States as an enemy, the downfall of which would be hastened by revolution in the Far East, offi cials of the Truman administration, particularly in the State THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 159 Department, nevertheless promoted the communist revolution ary cause in Japan, China and Korea. The revolution failed in Japan only because General Mac Arthur, within the limits permissible by obedience to civil authority, modified the procommunistpolicies of the State De partment. Korea might have been saved and China liberated from communism by an American victory in Truman's war, but when MacArthur sought to achieve that objective, Truman was· induced to remove him from command. Now the Com munists, having gained tremendous prestige in Asia by forcing the United States to sue for an armistice, appear to be perma nently ensconced in China and they may yet win all of Korea.

In that eventuality, Japan's position would be perilous. The story of the State Department conspiracy to carry out a communist revolution in Japan has been obscured by just acclamation for the success of MacArthur's occupation pro gram, and is not so widely known as the betrayal of China and Korea. As early as September 19, 1945, only seventeen days after V-I Day, Acting State Secretary Acheson rebuked Mac Arthur, who had predicted that the occupation army could be reduced to 200,000 men in six months. In a statement to the press, Acheson declared that "the occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy." He said the purpose of the occupation policy was to change "the economic and social system of Japan, which makes for a will to war." A year later, in September, 1946, John Carter Vin cent, head of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, re buked MacArthur for issuing a public warning of the danger of communism in Japan. Vincent charged that MacArthur had violated State Department directives to use Japan "for building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union." Vincent was identi fied as a member of the Communist Party in sworn testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, which in vestigated the Far Eastern betrayal in 1951. He denied it.

On July 3, 1945, before Japan surrendered, the ubiquitous Owen Lattimore went to see President Truman and gave him a memorandum stating that "Japan hopes that fear of Russia 160 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION will induce Britain and America to be 'soft' with 'anti-revolu tionary' Japanese big business and to wink at the fact that big business in Japan is as militarist as the militarists." Lattimore also advised the President that China, rather than Japan, would be the key to postwar Far Eastern policy, and that China trained men should replace Japan-trained men in high policy making positions. Lattimore, a self-appointed State Depart ment consultant and former director of Pacific operations of the Office of War Information, was "a conscious, articulate in strument of the Soviet conspiracy," according to the Senate subcommittee's report. His campaign to get rid of the anti communist, Japan-trained men in the State Department was taken up by the communist Daily Worker, which reported on September 6, 1945, that State Secretary Byrnes was shaping a stiff occupation policy for Japan and was replacing old-line policy makers with China experts. At that time the officials most concerned with Far Eastern policy in the State Depart ment were Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary; Joseph W. Bal lantine, director of the Far Eastern Division, and Eugene H.

Dooman, chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWINK). All were veteran foreign service officers with many years of experience in Japan. Grew announced his resignation on August 14, the day Japan surrendered, and Acheson took his place as Under secretary. The day after Acheson took over his new job he announced that Vincent, Lattimore's closest friend in the de partment, would replace Dooman as chairman of the Far East ern Subcommittee of SWINK. Vincent also replaced Ballantine as chief of the Far Eastern Division of the department. For seven or eight months Dooman's subcommittee had been working on an occupation policy for Japan. It was adopted by SWINK on August 29 and telegraphed to MacArthur the same day. However, on September 22, after Acheson had replaced Grew and Vincent had replaced Dooman, the White House issued a new version of the occupation policy. Included among the changes was this statement: "Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribuTHE FAR EASTERN TREASON 161 tion of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander" (a) To prohibit the· retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

"(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large in dustrial and banking combinations which have exercised con trol of a large part of Japan's trade and industry." Dooman, testifying before the Senate subcommittee on Sep tember 14, 1951, said: "It was on the basis of these two clauses that work was undertaken to destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalist class of Japan." "That was the Acheson-Vincent program?" asked Senator Eastland. "Yes, sir," Dooman replied. Dooman said the first step carried out was a capital levy tax of from sixty to ninety per cent on all property in excess of $1,000. "That almost at one stroke wiped out the capitalist class," he declared. The next step was the expropriation of all land in excess of five acres held by anyone owner. Dooman said it was obvious, after the land reform program had been in operation for some years, that it was "not working."

Senator Eastland: "That was a Communist system, was it not?" Dooman: "Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put the limit at 200 acres at that time. But in Japan, where 85 million peo ple are trying to make a living off an area-" Senator Eastland: "1 understand, but they were following the Communist system, were they not?" Dooman: "Yes." The third step was the confiscationof all holdings by any individual in any large company in excess of three per cent. The holdings were transferred to a pool and the Japanese gov ernment was ordered to sell the shares on a priority basis to 162 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION farmers' cooperatives, labor unions, and shopkeepers. The gov ernment was ordered to disregard any relationship between the price offered and the real value of the shares, and was further ordered to finance any bids for the shares by farmers' coopera tives or labor unions. "The net result," said Dooman, "was to destroy the previ ously existing capitalist class. As a capitalist class they no longer exist. Their places have been taken by hordes of black marketeers and Chinese and Formosan thugs of various kinds who have been engaged in illicit trade of various kinds and have amassed fortunes. The net result was to replace people who had traditionally had property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of various kinds."

Dooman said the original occupation policy, prepared by his subcommittee, provided that militarists and suspected war criminals should be purged from positions of authority on the basis of their individual records, as brought out in some kind of judicial proceeding. Under the Acheson-Vincent policy, he said, "people were removed from office on the basis of their occupation. Practically the whole executive branch of Japa nese business, from chairmen of boards down to section chiefs, practically the whole white collar element in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke-not because there was any record against them but because they occupied certain positions." Senator Eastland: "Was it not an attempt to destroy Japa nese capitalism?" Dooman: "In my opinion, it was." Senator Eastland: "As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly, there is a striking similarity between the American policy to ward Japan and the policies laid down by Russia to the satel lite states in Eastern Europe, is there not?"

Dooman: "I think that would be a fair statement." On October 6, 1945, Vincent told a radio audience that all "democratic" parties would be encouraged in Japan. When Vincent testified before the Senate subcommittee he was asked whether the category of "democratic" parties included the THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 163 Communists. "That would include the Communist Party," he said. All during World War II it was the publicly expressed offi cial policy of the United States to aid Chiang Kai-shek's gov ernment and to keep the Nationalist armies in the war against Japan. Early in the war, however, Communists in the govern ment began to underminethe officialpolicy. LauchlinCurrie, an administrative assistant to the President, who was identified by Miss Bentley as a member of her Soviet espionage appa ratus, was responsible for setting up a conference in Wash ington on October 12, 1942, attended by himself, Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, and Earl Browder and Robert Minor, leaders of the Communist Party .1 This conference termi nated with Welles handing Browder a memorandum declaring that the United States favored "complete unity" among all.or ganizations and groups of the Chinese people and "viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'communism' in China."

About November 20, 1942, Vincent and John S. Service, both foreign service officers.in China at ·that time, met with Chou En-Iai and Lin Piao, Chinese Communist leaders. Ac cording to Service's report to the State Department, dated Jan uary 23, 1943, the Communists requested intervention by the United States to improve their own situation in China. They wanted the United States to: (a) emphasize the "political na ture" of the world conflict as a struggle between "democracy" and "fascism"; (b) reiterate the hope of seeing "democracy" established in China; (c) recognize the Chinese Communist army as' a participant in the war against "fascism"; (d) appor tion to the Communists a share of American supplies sent to China. American foreign service officersand the OWl launched a propaganda campaign to accomplish these Communist ob jectives. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China from 1944 to 1946, told the Senate subcom mittee that his political advisers, Service, John P. Davies, and 1. Senate IPR Report, p. 182.

164 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION Raymond Ludden, glorified the Chinese Communists and em phasized the "shortcomings, maladministration and unscrupu lousness of the nationalist leaders" in their reports. In contra diction to the Service-Davies reports, Wedemeyer testified that military operations of the Chinese Communists against the Japanese "were not significant." The mission of Vice President Wallace to China in the sum mer of 1944 intensified the pressure on Chiang's government to improve the situation of the Communists. Wallace was ac companied by Vincent and Lattimore. Vincent testified that he first heard about the Wallace mission from Currie. He said he met Wallace in Currie's office.Vincent acknowledged that he advised and influenced .Wallace throughout his journey and particularly during his talks with Chiang. He steered the con versations between Chiang and Wallace toward a settlement with the Communists, and induced Wallace to emphasize that such a settlement was desired by the United States. Vincent's own notes on one conference with Chiang, published in the State Department's White Paper on China, said: "Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked with the U.S.S.R., then there was even greater need for settlement."

In a report to President Roosevelt, dated July 10, 1944, Wallace declared: "... Chiang at best is a short-term invest ment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter." Before leaving China, Wallace sent the President a cable gram recommending the replacement of General Joseph Still well by General Wedemeyer as commander of American forces in China. Apologists for the Wallace mission have maintained that this was an anticommunist recommendation, since Still well was procommunist and hated Chiang, while Wedemeyer was strongly anticommunist and pro-Chiang. However, the of ficial Soviet policy at that time was to keep Chiang's armies in THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 165 the war against Japan, and the Communists desired an effec tive American military adviser for Chiang. The communist Daily Worker supported Wedemeyer's appointment.

The report of the seventh national congress of the Chinese Communist Party, dated May 1, 1945, called for "an inde pendent, free, democratic, unified, strong and prosperous new China." On June 20, 1945, the· national committee. of the American Communist Party adopted a resolution calling for a "strong, united and democratic China." On June 10, 1945, Lattimore wrote a letter to President Truman warning that American aid to Chiang might encourage the Russians to sup port the Chinese Communists. He followed up his letter with a personal visit to the White House on July 3, when he left a memorandum urging "a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between Amer ica, Russia and Britain to build up China as a whole." Latti more said the Communists would have to accept "minority status" but that Chiang "would have to give them real power within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation."

Lattimore's proposal was the essence of the program laid down by Stalin, a program frankly desig~ed to achieve a Soviet China. It was the policy demanded by Mao Tse-tung's Com munist Party in China and by the Communist Party of the United States. After Lattimore's visit to the White House, it became the official policy of the United States government. On November 28, 1945, Vincent, the new director of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, drafted suggestions for a course of action closely following Lattimore's recommen dations to the President. On December 9, 1945, Vincent drafted a memorandum for the War Department for its guidance in sending directives to General Wedemeyer in China. This mem orandum, signed by Byrnes, said the President and Secretary of State were anxious that "the unification of China by peace ful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible." It quoted a statement by Byrnes, made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 7, that Chiang's govern166 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION ment "must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the government," and that American influence would be exerted to encourage concessions, both by the central government and by "the so-called Communists." Thus the Sec retary of State had adopted the communist propaganda line that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists but merely agrarian reformers.

The Vincent memorandum to the War Department also stated that President Truman had asked General Marshall to go to China as his special representative in efforts to bring the Chinese Communists into the central government. The War Department was requested to issue instructions to General Wedemeyer that the transportation of Chinese troops to North China for action against the Communists was to be held in' abeyance pending the outcome of Marshall's discussions with the Chinese leaders. This was directly contrary to General Wedemeyer's recommendations. On November 20, reporting to the War Department, the General said: "I have recom mended to the generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts upon establishing control in North China." The memorandum to the War Department, signed by Byrnes but drafted by Vincent, together with a statement of policy issued by the President on December 15, 1945, constituted Marshall's instructions for his China mission. Vincent testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee that he wrote the original draft of the President's statement, that Marshall ex panded it, and that final changes were made by the' State De partment before the President issued it. He admitted that it closely followed his outline of a suggested course of' action, dated November 28.

Using language taken verbatim from the resolution of the Communist Party, the President's statement called for "a strong, united, democratic China." It proposed a national con ference of Chinese leaders to unite China, and declared that "all armed forces" in China should be "integrated effectively into the Chinese National army." This meant, of course, that THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 167 Chiang should unite the Chinese Communist armies with his own, as Stalin had demanded. Finally the President's statement promised American assistance as China moved "toward peace and unity," implying that Chiang would get nothing. if he re fused to form a coalition with the Communists. When Marshall arrived in China at the end of 1945, accord ing to the StateDepartment'sown procommunistWhite Paper, the Nationalist government "possessed an estimated five to one superiority in combat troops and in rifles, a practical monopoly of heavy equipment and transport, and an unopposed air arm."

The report of the Internal Security Subcommittee relates that Chiang's divisions were chasing the Communists northward and the prospect of a Nationalist victory was at its highest. It is inconceivable that the Nationalists, with all these advantages, could have been defeated by the Communists if the United States had aided them on a scale commensurate with American assistance to Greece. Instead of aiding Chiang, however, Mar shall cut off all American supplies for a period of ten months and brought other pressure to bear in an effort to force Chiang to bring the Communists into his government. Even the ship ment of war supplies actually purchased by the Chinese, in cluding surplus materials on the islands of the Pacific, was suspended by Marshall. It was Marshall's boast: "As chief of staff I armed 39 antiCommunist divisions; now with a stroke of the pen I disarm them." He was authorized to grant a loan of $500,000,000 to Chiang, and that was withheld. Marshall instituted truce teams, made up of one Nationalist, one Com munist' and one American, and when the Communists were hard pressed they would agree to discuss truce terms. These discussions gave them time to regroup, bring up supplies, and prepare for new offensives.

Marshall and the Communists made their supreme effort to get a cease-fire when the Nationalists were advancing toward the Kalgan pass, through which the Reds were moving thou sands of troops from China into Manchuria, where the Rus sians were waiting to equip them with arms captured from the Japanese. This was a critical phase of the betrayal of China.

168 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION In a treaty signed on August 14, 1945, Chiang had accepted the terms of the Yalta agreement, and the Russians had recog nized the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. The Russians also solemnly promised to support the Nationalist government. In violation of this treaty, they refused to permit Chiang to land troops in Manchuria, either at the port of Dairen or on the Manchurian airfields. The Russians held Manchuria until the Chinese Communists could move in, equip themselves with Japanese, Russian, and American lend-lease arms, and prepare for the conquest of China. In September, 1946, the Communists served notice on Mar shall that a cessation of Nationalist military operations against Kalgan would be a prerequisite to their participation in peace negotiations. Marshall warned Chiang, according to the White Paper, that if the situation continued to deteriorate "the Com munists would be driven to seek and be dependent upon out side support, such as Russian aid, which would make the task of peaceful settlement more difficult." Chiang replied that oc cupation of Kalgan was "absolutely essential to the national welfare." This so infuriated Marshall that he threatened to go home and sever American relations with China. Chiang, alarmed by Marshall's threat, submitted truce proposals of his own, but the Communists rejected them. On October 10, 1946, the Nationalists finally captured Kalgan. Marshall continued his pressure on Chiang for a truce, and on November 9th Chiang yielded. He issued an unconditional cease-fire which gave the Communists the breathing spell they wanted.

Admiral Charles M. Cooke, who commanded the United States 7th Fleet in Chinese waters in 1945 and 1946, testified before the Senate subcommittee that the thirty-nine Chinese divisions equipped with American arms were in effect disarmed when their ammunition supplies were shut off, and were de feated by the Communists. Marshall's coalition plan, which never was accepted, called for the reduction of Chiang's army to ninety Nationalist divi sions and the incorporation of eighteen communist divisions into that army. The communist divisions were to be trained THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 169 and equipped by the United States. At a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 19, 1946, Acheson was asked by Representative Rogers (R.., Mass.): "Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us?" Acheson replied: "Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations charter .... Under the principles and procedure of the charter, if anyone wished to employ force against us, I am sure that we would veto that." It cost the United States more than 145,000 casualties, including 30,000 killed, to "veto" the use of force against us in Korea.

Sumner Welles, in Seven Decisions that Shaped History, con dones Roosevelt's part in the Yalta sellout, but he can find no justification for the Acheson-Marshall betrayal of China. De spite Moscow's tactics in imposing communist governments on Poland and other eastern European countries in the .fall of 1945 and early 1946, Welles remarks, Marshall tried "to brow beat Chiang Kai-shek" into bringing the Communists into his government. ., Before he went .to China, Marshall had been warned of the real nature of the Chinese Communist movement by a compre hensive report submitted on July 5, 1945, by Brigadier Gen eral P. E. Peabody, chief of the military intelligence service. This report was a major project of the service which studied 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books in its preparation. It said: "The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the interna tional Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy, which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their his tory the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and fol lowed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism."2 When Marshall was asked about this report by Senator Bridges at the Senate MacArthur hearing on May 8, 1951, he 2. Senate IPR Hearings, p. 2305.

170 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION said he had no knowledge of it,. a statement which seems in credible. He acknowledged, however, that the Chinese Com munists "insisted" in his presence that they were devoted ad herents of Marxism -Leninism-Stalinism, and that "there was never any doubt in my mind, and never any thought that there was any misunderstanding about it." Marshall knew this all the time, yet as late as January 7th, 1947, on his departure from China to become Secretary of State, he issued a public statement protesting that in Chiang Kai-shek's government there was a "dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government .... They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that co operation by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could defi nitely settle the issue."

In July, 1947, Truman sent General Wedemeyer to China to make an appraisal of the situation. Wedemeyer reported to the President on September 19th, 1947, that the situation was grave, and that its continued deterioration "may result in es tablishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in a Communist-dominated China which would be inimical to United States interests. This spreading internecine struggle within China threatens world peace. Positive steps should be taken to end hostilities immediately. Soviet aims in the Far East are diametrically opposed to and jeopardize United States interests in China in that their aims envisage progressive expansion of Soviet control and dominant influ ence. Realization of their aims in China would threaten United States strategic security. . . . In order to preclude defeat by Communist forces, it is necessary to give the National govern ment sufficient and prompt military assistance under the super vision of American advisers in special military fields. American aid to China should be moral, material and advisory. It should be an integrated element of our world-wide policy of military assistance to certain nations. . . . American military aid to China, ground, sea and air, would, if appropriately supervised, THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 171 contribute to gradual development of stability in the Far East and lessen tpe possibility of a Communist-dominated China."

The only action taken by Truman and Secretary Marshall on this urgent and prophetic report was to suppress it for two years. An official compilation prepared by the Defense Depart ment showed tha.t from June 30, 1946, the a.pproximate time when Marshall's embargo went into effect, until Congress ap propriated $125,000,000 for arms aid in 1948, the only as sistance received by China consisted of $17,900,000 in lend lease supplies and about $4,300,000 worth of ammunition left behind by the marines. The $125,000,000 arms aid program voted by the Republican 80th Congress was sabotaged by pro communists in the State and Commerce Departments. Admiral Cooke testified that when some rifles finally reached General Fu Tso-yi, the Nationalist commander in North China, at the end of 1948, they were without bolts and could not be used. The General was forced to surrender to the Reds. On July 27, 1949, after the Communists had overrun half of China, Acheson announced the appointment of a three-man board to review the China policy of the United States. As chair man of the board, Acheson named Philip C. Jessup, who had been chairman of both the American and Pacific Councils of the communist-dominated Institute of Pacific Relations. The other members were Everett Case, who was active in the IPR, and Raymond D. Fosdick, who was active in the Rockefeller Foundation, a financial supporter of the IPR. On August 5, 1949, the State Department issued its White Paper, drafted by the Jessup board, which blamed the Nationalists for the fall of China. A covering letter by Acheson declared that the Na tionalists were "demoralized and unpopular," and that noth ing the United States could have done would have changed the result in·,C4~na. The issuance of the document jarred the morale of the N&tionalists and weakened their hold on the ter ritory which the Communists had not overrun.

Early in October, 1949, a three-day conference in the State Department, presided over by Jessup and attended by twenty172 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION five invited outsiders, as.well as by State Department officials, reviewed the China question. Seventeen of the twenty-five in vited participants, as well as Jessup and Case of the White Paper board, were active in the communist-controlled IPR. The invited participants included Marshall, then head of the Red Cross, and Lattimore. The prevailing view of the confer ence, as shown by an analysis prepared by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, favored recognition of Communist China, encouragement of trade between Japan and Commu nist China, economic assistance to Communist China, and rec ognition that communist conquests in Asia were the natural and inevitable consequence of a revolutionary ferment. Harold Stassen, one of the participants, testified that Jessup told him privately, between sessions of the conference, that "greater logic" lay with the views of the majority. Jessup's name is found in extraordinary company in the August 24, 1953, re port of the Internal Security Subcommittee. When Frank Coe, a veteran of Miss Bentley's wartime Soviet espionage service, was questioned about his relations with some individuals, he answered without hesitation, but when asked about Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Lauchlin Currie, the late Constantine Oumansky (former Soviet ambassador) and Philip C. Jessup, he refused to answer on the ground of possible self-incrimina tion.

On November 16, just six weeks after the State Department conference, Acheson denounced Nationalist China's action in firing on an American vessel, The Flying Cloud, which was running the Nationalist blockade and taking supplies to the Communists. On December 3, Acheson said the United States did not recognize the blockade. On December 23, the State Department sent a memorandum to foreign service personnel all over the world, minimizing the importance of Formosa, ap parently with a view of preparing the way for its fall to the Communists. On January 5, 1950, Truman announced that the United States had no intention of defending Formosa. He said the island should be returned to "China," by which he clearly meant Communist China, pursuant to the Cairo agreement.

THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 173 When the U.N. General Assembly met in September, 1950, the State Department was prepared to depose Chiang Kai shek's regime on Formosa and admit the Chinese Communists to the U.N. The American delegation put the question of the future of Formosa on the assembly's agenda, and John Foster Dulles, who later succeeded Acheson as Secretary of State, wrote a speech advocating a U.N. trusteeship for the island.3 Such a scheme would liquidate Chiang's government and ne cessitate the admission of Chinese communist representatives to the U.N., for China is named by the U.N. charter as a mem ber. Red China's intervention in the Korean War prevented. this final act of betrayal. Dulles never got a chance to deliver his speech. In the Cairo declaration, on December 1, 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek had agreed that Korea, which had been under Japanese domination since the Russo-Japanese War, should "in due course" become free and independent.

In declaring war on Japan on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union announced its adherence to this agreement. At the Yalta conference, in February, 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed informally that Korea should be placed under four-power trusteeship (America, Russia, Britain, and China) during a transition period to prepare it for independence. When Japan surrendered, Washington and Moscow agreed that all Japa nese troops north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Russians and all those south of the parallel would surrender to American Forces. How the decision was reached to divide that unhappy coun try at the 38th parallel is a much controverted question. Sum ner Welles mistakenly reports that "subordinate officers in the Pentagon" hastily recommended the 38th parallel "because it was convenient." State Secretary Acheson, testifying at the Senate MacArthur hearing on June 8, 1951, declared that the dividing.line was proposed by War Secretary Stimson and ap proved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Co3. My information about the Dulles speech was received from a re sponsible member of the American delegation.

174 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION ordinating Committee, and the President. It is a reasonable conjecture that Marshall made the recommendation to Stim son, who was in an advanced state of decrepitude. It is possible also that the line was suggested to Marshall by Soviet generals at Yalta, when they discussed matters relating to Russia's en try into the war against Japan. At all events, the choice of the 38th parallel was not just something that popped into some body's mind, and whoever first proposed it was thinking solely about Russia's interests. Senator Brewster of Maine, who had been delving into the diplomatic history of the Russo-Japanese War, reminded Acheson at the Senate hearing that in the nego tiations preceding the outbreak of that war in 1904 the Rus sions proposed that Korea be divided at the 38th parallel. What the Czar could not get from the Japanese, Stalin evidently got from Marshall.

At the Moscow conference in December, 1945, Byrnes ac cepted a Russian proposal setting up a Joint American-Soviet Commission with instructions to form a provisional Korean government. In consultation with this provisional government, the Joint Commission was to establish a four-power trustee ship, to continue not more than five years. The Koreans, who had not been consulted, violently opposed the trusteeship scheme, and Byrnes expressed hope that the Joint Commis sion, working with the provisional Korean government, would find it possible to dispense with the trusteeship. The Joint Com mission, which held its first meeting on March 20, 1946, reached no agreement and no all-Korean provisional govern ment was established. The Russians refused to lift the iron cur tain that divided Korea at the 38th parallel. When General Wedemeyer was sent to the Far East in 1947 he was instructed to appraise the situation in Korea as well as in China. His report on Korea, submitted to the President on September 19, 1947, but not released until May 1, 1951, said: "Whereas American and Soviet forces engaged in occupation duties in South Korea and North Korea respectively are ap proximately equal, each comprising less than 50,000 troops, THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 175 the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean Peoples' [Com munist] army of 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans, equipped with Japanese small arms.

"The North Korean Peoples' army constitutes a potential military threat to South Korea, since there is a strong probabil ity that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal. This probably will take place just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and its armed forces which they have created are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." Wedemeyer recommended the organization,· equipment, and training of a South Korean military force strong enough to cope with the threat from the north. He warned that a Soviet dominated Korea would menace Japan.and the strategic inter ests of the United States in the Far East. This brilliant officer's report, as prophetic as his estimate of the China situation at the same time, was ignored by the Tru man administration. State Secretary Marshall decided even before Wedemeyer returned from his survey to submit the fate of Korea to the United Nations. On September 17, 1947, two days before the Wedemeyer report was presented to the Presi dent, the American delegation put the Korean question on the General Assembly's agenda. Not only did the Truman admin istration reject Wedemeyer's recommendations, but the Ameri can policy on Korea in the U.N. facilitated achievement by the Russians of the objectives which Wedemeyer had attributed to them, as much so as if it had been designed for that very purpose. The first resolution adopted by the assembly, based on an American proposal, created a U.N. commission to facili tate (1) the establishment of. a national government through nation-wide elections and (2) the withdrawal of occupation forces. In this resolution, adopted on November 14, 1947, the United States committed itself to the withdrawal of its occu~ 176 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION pation forces, which was exactly what Wedemeyer said the Russians would demand.

When the Communists refused to permit the U.N. commis sion to enter North Korea, the General Assembly's Interim Committee authorized it to supervise elections in "such parts of Korea as are accessible to the commission." On May 10, 1948, the South Koreans elected a national assembly, and Syngman Rhee, whose party won a majority, formed a govern ment. On December 12, 1948, the General Assembly recog nized Rhee's government as the only lawful government in those parts of Korea where the U.N. commission was able to function. The Russians had set up a puppet regime in North Korea, headed by Kim II Sung. As predicted by General Wedemeyer, the Soviet govern ment, on September 18, 1948, informed the United States that the withdrawal of its occupation forces from North Korea would be completed by the end of December, 1948. In the General Assembly, the Russians were demanding withdrawal of the American forces from South Korea. The United States soon complied. On June 29, 1949, the U.N. commission re ported that it had verified the withdrawal of American occu pation forces. It received no reply when it notified Moscow of its readiness to verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.

The United States left a military advisory group of five hundred members in South Korea to help Syngman Rhee or ganize and train an army. In North Korea, the Russians left a North Korean army of 125,000 men, already trained and well equipped. The United States gave the South Koreans only small arms and automatic weapons. President Rhee repeat edly reminded the American advisory group that the North Koreans had artillery, tanks, and airplanes, and begged for similar equipment, but his requests were rejected. American officers explained that the State Department had ruled that Rhee was to get no artillery, tanks, or aircraft because he might be tempted to use them against the North Koreans.

THE FAR EASTERN TREASON 177 Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek, fought the Communists and was reviled by them with all the opprobrious terms in their lexicon. The State Department faithfully adhered to the com munist "line" on Rhee. The official attitude was expressed with extraordinary candor by Lattimore, a State Department con sultant on Far Eastern affairs, in a Washington dispatch dated July 17, 1949, which nppea.red in the N~w York Compass, a procommunist sheet now defunct. Lattimore wrote: "As the record stands, it is now revealed that Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a strong appeal for the $150,000,000 grant (to South Korea) before a closed ses sion of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Unless South Ko rea gets the money, he warned, it will fall within three months. Simultaneously with this urgent appeal, however, it is also re vealed that the evacuation of American occupation troops from South Korea ... has now been completed For the logic we must go back to the sad precedent of China As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomin tang were doomed, the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate. The problem was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them.... Korea is another chapter in the same unhappy story.

I have yet to meet an American who knows all the facts and ~elieves that Syngman Rhee is either a popular or a competent president of South Korea. In spite of high-pressure elections, his legislature is more badly split against him than China's was against Chiang Kai-shek. The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of $150, 000,000." If there was any doubt that Lattimore was expressing the official State Department attitude, it must have vanished when State Secretary Acheson, addressing the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, declared that Korea was beyond the "defensive perimeter" of the United States, which extended, he said, from Japan, to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), to the 178 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION Philippines. This was notice to the world that the United States would defend neither Formosa nor Korea. As Sumner Welles comments, in Seven Decisions That Shaped History, Acheson's announcement was "an open invitation to the ,North Korean Communists and to their Soviet and Chinese allies to invade South Korea."

They accepted the invitation on June 25, 1950.