Chapter XV - Outline of Project for Simplified State and Local Politics

The radius included in this way will probably be [ 282] Simplified State and Local Politics that of "commutation"; that is, such that all unit employees can comfortably travel to work day by day, and return to spend the nights at home, say twenty five to fifty miles. 3rd. Abolish all local government within the consolidated area, and set up one common unit government for the whole. Elect at large a Com mission of limited number (from five to seven Com missioners should ordinarily be enough) to whom, as to the Board of Directors of a corporation, shall be entrusted for their term of office the entire control of local legislation, public property, and public ex penditures. Abolish all other elective offices. 4th. Let the Commissioners organize government by appointing a General Manager or Executive, upon whom shall devolve the duties of appointing local Manag~rs or Executives, for each of the former towns consolidated, and of creating a General Staff' and Supply Department, for co-ordinating and sup plying labor and material, to be divided between, or used in common, by all; exactly as is done in railway or other large and extended organizations. No more need be done in changing the form of governmental organization; for once the central Commission is created and installed, it will work out or modify local governmental organization for itself, without further action by the voters.

5th. One element only should be carefully guarded, to wit: the qualifications of the men elected Commis sioners. They should be substantially the same as of the directors of our great corporations, namely: they should be of mature years, ordinarily not less than forty; of unblemished record, and large and successful experience, in constructive business or professional life. Not nore than one should be a lawyer, or of any particular vocation. They should [ 283 ] Too Much Governn'lent-· Too Much Taxation be men of ample means, and should receive no sala ries whatever for their services as Commissioners; but should be content with the honor and the opportun ity of governing their own community. They should be men so well off and so conspicuous as to be quite beyond the temptation to feather their own nests. As the phrase goes: they should be "men who cannot afford" to smirch their own names by corrupt or partisan use of power. They should realize Grover Cleveland's conception that "public office is a public trust."

I think the, reader will agree with" me that under such conditions .the office of Commissioner (espe cially if it were strengthened and dignified by lengthen ing its term, say to the presidential term of four years, or even ten, instead of a single year, as in the case of the great corporations) would be most at tractive to the first men of the community. They would, I am sure, enjoy putting their tested abilities at the service of their fellow-citizens, and could be trusted to be responsive to sound public opinion. Certainly they are now thus responsive, in thousands of instances of modern life, as unsalaried directors of great corporations and trustees of public and semi public institutions. They would be so well known that voters would not be obliged, as I was for nearly forty years in Chicago, to try in vain to find out any thing about party candidates; they could not be men without known history and without ascertainable character.

6th. When a sufficient number of consolidated local units have been created, the next step would be to attempt reorganization of state government along similar lines, namely: election annually of a single (not dual) legislative body-suppose we call it a Senate-composed of a limited number of Senators [ z84 ] Simplified State and Local Politics (fifteen would be plenty) elected at large. It might be that the old New England prejudice for local repre sentation would survive so strongly that each con solidated unit would still insist upon being repre sented in the legislative body. If so, there might be two Senators against each local unit, one elected at large and the other by the voters of the unit itself. That would in practice leave legislation under the control of Senators-at-Iarge, while providing for the representation of local interests. This last would be, however, in my own opinion entirely superfluous; as able and independent Senators elected at large could be trusted to give careful consideration to reasonable local wishes and actual local conditions.

The Senators would appoint the Executive; call him, say the Governor; and leave to him, as to the president of a railway corporation, the appointment and control of the entire personnel of subordinate officials and employees in the service of the state. The Governor would appoint his own department heads, who would be directly responsible to him; they in turn would employ, discharge, and control their department's personnel. He would be respon sible only to the Senate, and would be removable by them at pleasure. The Senate would enact all laws, and the Governor and his administration would simply execute them, that is all. The Judiciary, which should, it seems to me, in... elude all local and appellate courts throughout the state (since even according to present practice the decrees of all local courts are subject to review by the Supreme Court) might well be organized in similar manner; that is to say, the Chief Justice and mem bers of the Supreme Bench entire might be ap pointed by the Senate, and Judges of the lower courts might in turn be appointed by the Chief Justice, [ 285 ] ]"'00 Much Government-Too Much Taxation or the entire Supreme Bench, all for life, removable only by process of impeachment.

The principle of organization throughout would be that the entire personnel of the executive and the judiciary branches of government, \vhose duty is merely to execute the law, should be non-elective, non-partisan, non-political in every way; so that their main interest in life would be, as in private business, the honorable and successful performance of their duties and the earning of their salaries; neither of which should change in the least because of poli tical changes. On the other hand, the Senate, the legislative body, should reflect and be responsive to the shifting of public opinion and the change in public policy. In private life it is a well-known fact that sense of obligation and faithful discharge of duties as manager or trustee for others, or the public, are most certain to be found among men of amplest means, most in dependent position, largest achievements, and highest standards of life and living. Certainly, if it is good sense to make such men directors of our great banks, corporations, and philanthropic institutions, it is in comparably better sense to entrust them with the far larger interests of the entir~ community.

[286 ] CHAPTER XVI CANDIDATES AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE I AM quite aware that every demagogue will promptly roar, at this last proposition, that it would rob the "poor man," American citizen though he be, of all chance at public office; and that selfish plutoc racy would take the place of generous democracy in this supposedly free land. If so, let him roar; that is his vocation! It is true in fact that, under the plan proposed, and indeed under any plan which makes public office at tractive to men of the first ability, such men would seek, and, by reason of that ability would capture and substantially monopolize, public office. But there is no reason based on common sense and good citizenship why they should not do so I Poverty is certainly no qualification for public office; which, once more to quote Grover Cleveland, "is a public trust." Poverty generally means, if it means anything, that a man is poor because he is too lazy, too wasteful, too stupid, or simply too small calibre, to earn, save, and wisely use more than the very least property. Why should that fact be a rea son for entrusting him with the vast property and business of the public? The poor man himself does not hire a carpenter to build him a house, for instance, because the carpenter is poor; or a doctor to attend his wife because the doctor is poor. On the contrary, he is apt to fight shy of paupers all along the line., [ 287 ] Too Much Government-Too Much Taxation He hires a man who knows his job; who for that rea son is usually well off and responsible. His wife buys at the great department stor~ or at, perhaps, the big tencent store; not, however, because they are poor-for on the contrary they are rich. If he puts his week's wages in bank, he is apt to go to the largest and strongest savings bank in town because it is known to be rich, not poor. In one word, the mere fact that a man is poor should, and usually does, discredit him for all positions of important trust; because so long as .he is poor, he is not beyond the reach of temptation. I say this in no contempt of poverty; but in recognition of the fundamentals of human nature. A few pages back I quoted the late Marshall Field's remark, that he would take no office in the gift of the people except that of alderman of the city of Chicago. I forgot to add his further remark, that there was no danger of his being elected, because of the prejudice against rich men. I an swered at the time, and I still think, that he was mis taken; and that if he had offered himself as candidate, especially for election at large, he would have been elected by the overwhelming vote of the poor, the so-called common people. They well knew Marshall Field. His trade had grown great because the public knew that it was sure to get its money's worth over his counters; and I am certain they would have had the same confidence in getting better value from him than perhaps from any other alderman at the City Hall.