Anti-Inflation Policy

The type of measure used for preventing inflation or stopping it once underway must, of course, to some extent depend on the diag nosis of what kind of inflation it is. Especially relevant is the question of whether demand pull or cost push is responsible, and, if both are involved, their relative strength. In general, it might seem that the specificcure for demand inflation is a policy of controlling, restricting, or cutting back overall demand by monetary and fiscal policies, while in the case of a cost-push in flation monetary and fiscal policies are out of place and measures to curb the power of labor unions or possibly to increase competition in oligopolistic industries are called for. The problem, however, is not as simple as that suggests. Let us discuss the case of pure demand inflation first and then the case where cost push is also present. [68 ] We have seen that demand pull is more basic than cost push, because a cost-push inflation could not develop without an increase in aggregate demand.

1 Hence what is said about dealing with pure demand inflation applies also, although with certain qualifications, to. cost-push inflation. These qualifications, which will be taken up, concern the desirability or necessity that measures to control or to cut back aggregate demand be' accompanied or preceded by measures designed to prevent wage push and possibly to control monopoly power of firms in oligopolistic industries. Aggregate demand depends on M and V. We have seen that a prolonged and serious inflation never has developed in the past, and is not likely to develop in the future, without a sharp rise in the quantity of money. But in the short run, changes in V may be dis turbing. Velocity of circulation is, however, not subject to direct control, except by means of comprehensive 2 price freezing and rationing-· -a system of regimentation which in the United States is, and let uS hope always will be, entirely unacceptable as a peacetime policy.

Aggregate demand can be controlled arid, if necessary, cut back and the· quantity of money can be· regulated, either by monetary or fiscal policy. A10netarypolicy comprises discount rates, open market operations, and changes in reserve requirements of private banks as well as more specialized measures dealing 'with particular types of credit-such as stock exchange credit, real estate credit, and con1. The only exception to this statement is a rise of prices while money income (MV) falls, implying severe unemployment or drop in output per head due to war destruction, bad harvests, or· other catastrophes. (In the case of small countries which depend for a large part of their live1i hood on international trade, a sharp deterioration of their international position, entailing a worsening of their terms of trade, constitutes an external factor.) Such cases are, however, rare and at any rate the present inflationary troubles in the U.S. are not of this nature. They will, there fore, not be further considered, although it would not be difficult to formulate policy principles for dealing with such situations.

2 Partial price controls affect V, but do not lead to price distortions and misallocation of productive resources. [ 69] sumer credit. By /iscal policy, we mean variations in government expenditures and government revenues. Through developing a deficit or surplus, the government can add to, or subtract from the expenditure stream and increase or decrease the privately held quan tity of money (money held by the government is usually not counted as money in circulation). Care must be taken, of course, that the changes in the public debt, implied by the existence of a deficit or surplus, are managed in such a way as not to counteract, or at least not completely to offset, the direct effects of the deficit or surplus on aggregate expenditure. The comparative efficiency and merits of monetary and fiscal policies, in general, as well as that of specialized measures in either ~eld, have been discussed many times and at great length.

Only a brief consideration of the salient problems from the point of view of fighting or preventing inflation is possible in this study. Since the anti-inflationary policy objective can be achieved by different measures or combinations of measures, the choice of policy must be influenced also by considerations other than that of containing. inflation-considerations of long-run growth and effi ciency, considerations of social justice, considerations of smoothing the short-run business cycle-considerations which partly overlap and conflict with one another as well as with the anti-inflation objective. Monetary policy has the great advantage that measures can be initiated and changed quickly in case of need, while fiscal policy changes are subject to long delays because they have to go through lengthy parliamentary procedures. Moreover, in countries where the monetary authorities have some political independence-and to some extent this is still the case even in those western countries where the central bank has been formally nationalized 3-monetary policy 3 It is interesting to observe that even in western countries with Socialist governments where the central bank has been nation~lized, the managers of the central bank, who were appointed by Socialist govern ments, usually develop "sound money" attitudes. They then try to pur sue policies of tight money (often in opposition and defiance of the wishes of their governments, which appointed them, but are not always able to is less subject to demagogic political pressures than fiscal policy.

On the other hand, it is probably true that measures of monetary policy (changes in interest rates and availability of credit brought about by discount and open-market policies) unless applied sharply and abruptly in large doses influence expenditure streams and prices slowly, with a lag,· while fiscal policy measures, on the expenditure and revenue side, once they are taken, exert their influence more rf11ickly. However, this advantage of quicker effect, of fiscal.policy over monetary policy, establishes a superiority of fiscal policy only if the handicap of legislative and administrative delays in taking the respective measures has been overcome--a most serious handicap indeed. Even then this advantage of fiscal policy would be important more from the point of view of counteracting the business cycle rather than from that of the anti-inflation objective. The reason is that, while for the former objective quick decision and rapid action are of paramount importance, persistent application and not quick action counts most in preventing chronic inflation.

If the battle against inflation is to be won, monetary and fiscal policy should be coordinated. At the very least they must not be operated at cross purposes. Clearly, the anti-inflationary effect of a tight money policy can be offset by a loose fiscal policy (budget deficit) and a firm fiscal policy (a balanced or overbalanced budget) will not stop or prevent inflation, if it is accompanied by a flabby monetary policy. This does not exclude the possibility that within limits inflationary pressure generated in one area can be offset, or more than offset, by deflationary policy in the other area. Keeping money tight for private business can mean that a government deficit will not cause a rise in prices. The opposite rarely happens but is equally possible, namely, that a tight fiscal policy (budget surplus) may provide the means for credit expansion without causing inflation. remove them) not essentially different from those in non-Socialist coun tries where the central bank is still semi-autonomous,-policies which in these non-Socialist countries are denounced by the leftist opposition, aca demic and political, as conservative and obsolete.

[ 71 ] Such divergent operations, usually of the first kind, are as a rule the result of a lack of coordination, the one arm of government trying to undo the mischief done by the other. But situations may arise in which good reasons could be advanced for consciously operating the two branches of financial policy in a seemingly con tradictory manner. If in an emergency the government has to increase its expenditures quickly, it may not be able immediately to raise sufficient revenue. Tightening of credit can then be employed to prevent inflation. But one should not forget that this kind of policy implies the transfer of productive resources from the private sector, that is, from productive private investment, to the govern ment-an indirect concealed method of taxation. The opposite case, where the inflationary effects of an easy credit policy are offset by a tight budget, is rarely encountered nowadays.

If the budget surplus were produced by taxes on consumption, or still better by reducing government expenditures for useless purposes, this procedure would amount to a policy of forced saving or transfer of resources for productive purposes which could become a potent weapon of economic development, especially in underdeveloped countries. It is a pity that it is so rarely practiced. One could discuss endlessly the relative merits of different· meas ures in the field both of monetary and fiscal policy. To what extent should the former rely on the broad measures of discount policy, open-market operations, and regulating reserve requirements of com mercial banks,' and to what extent on regulating special types of credit (consumer credit, stock market credit, and mortgage credit) ? Should non-bank financial intermediaries be subject to regulation? Is the bills-only policy of open-market operations justified or should the Federal Reserve operate over the whole range of maturities?

SimilarIy, innumerable details concerning fiscal policy arise: Which of the many existing taxes and myriad of government expenditures should be changed? No doubt many of these decisions have their bearing upon the problem of long-run efficiency and growth, short-run stability and social justice-not to mention questions of political expediency, feasibility, and strategy. But it would be self-defeating if endless de bates and inability to agree on the optimal package of anti-inflation policy-optimal from the point of view of growth, short-run stability, and social justice-should delay or prevent adoption of any effective policy against inflation, which in the long run is so inimical to these same objectiv.es. So far we have discussed policies against demand inflation. Com binations of monetary and fiscal, in one word financial, measures are indicated in that case. Let us assume now that there are good reasons to believe that wage push, too, is in the picture which, as we have SCt:h) is undoubtedly the case at the present time. Although often asserted, it is wrong to say that monetary policy is of no use against that type of inflation. Monetary policy, fiscal policy, or any combina tion of the two that prevents expansion of demand will also prevent a price rise resulting from or intensified by wage (or other cost) increases. But it must be admitted that it will do so only at the price of permitting a certain amount of unemployment-how much de pending upon the strength of the wage push. It should be observed that in this respect fiscal policy is in precisely the same position as monetary policy, which is often ignored or overlooked by the critics of monetary policy.

The ideal policy would, of course, be to remove the cost push at the source while keeping a tight rein on aggregate demand by means of financial policies. We shall presently consider what pre cisely is meant by removing cost push and how this aim might be accomplished. It is clearly a very difficult task which may be accom plished only gradually after long delay. In the meantime, monetary and fiscal policies must remain the first line of defense against infla tion even if wage push is unquestionably present. The reasons for this statement are the following. We cannot be sure how strong the wage push really is. Maybe only a little unemployment will be required to stop it. There is no sure way to find out other than to try. Moreover, once inflation has pro ceeded for a while, some transitional unemployment will result when inflation is stopped, even in the absence of a real wage PUShd Hence the monetary brakes on inflation must not be released imme diately when some unemployment appears. The monetary medicine must be allowed to work for a sufficient period. In addition, what ever the basic strength of the wage push, we can be sure that it is intensified (if not originally brought about) by the inflation, which it may have helped to create or at least to accelerate. Concretely, a prolonged inflation cannot fail to strengthen labor unions by giving them endless opportunities of easy though partly spurious and illusory successes. They will want to continue the wage increases after inflation has been stopped or slowed down-a habit from which they can be disabused only gradually.

But to repeat, the ideal, least painful, and least costly method of stopping a wage-push inflation-or more precisely an inflation which contains an element of wage push-is to remove the wage push at the source or at least to reduce it to innocuous proportions. If there were competition in the labor market, it would be easy to prevent inflation by monetary and fiscal policy,. and with a stable price level the wage level would rise roughly in proportion to the gradual rise in average labor productivity. Or if the wage level could somehow be so manipulated as to rise in proportion to the gradual increase in average labor productivity, the price level could be maintained roughly stable without causing unemployment. I say uroughly," because there is no guarantee that full employment equilibrium may not require slight deviations between the rise in the wage level and the rise in average productivity; in other words, between marginal and average productivity of labor. Suppose average.

productivity of lapor (i.e., ~tput per m~n-hout) rises largely because of heavy capital investment,' then the share ~f labor in total output may have to go down; the equilibrium wage would still go up but not quite in proportion to the rise of output per head. If, on the other hand, overall output and output per head rise largely in consequence of improvements in labor skills or of ucapital saving" inventions and improvements, the share of labor in total output would go up and equilibrium wages would have to rise s~me what faster than output per head. [ 74] The fact that over many years the share of labor income in total national income has been fairly stable, 4 a phenomenon that has often been observed and commented upon, would seem to warrant the conclusion that only slight deviations between the rise in the wage level and the level of average productivity are required to maintain equilibrium at full employment. It is for this reason that we can regard a wage level which rises parallel with av~rage· labor pro ductivity as a rough yardstick for non-inflationary -wage policy.

How can the wage level be prevented from outrunning the average productivity of labor? The wage level is, of course, a highly abstract concept. It is not a policy variable, at least not in a free enterprise economy. This does not mean, however, that the problem is in any sense unreal. In practice, it reduces to the question of whether and how the power of the big labor unions can be curbed, because the big labor unions are the spearhead of the wage push. Wages and salaries of non-unionized workers and employees follow the road bulldozed by union pressure. Naturally, there are delays, but in a prolonged inflationary climate these lags tend to become shorter and shorter. Taking a broad view, it is remarkable and a tribute to the flexibility and competitive vigor of the American economy at large and the labor market in particular, how little influence union pressure seems to have on the wage and salary structure. Union pressure pushes up the level of money wages without causing large lasting distortions in relative wages and salaries.:i (It is very doubtful on the other hand whether the real wage level can be influenced by union pressure. ) If union pressure on the wages of unionized workers is kept under control, no inflationary wage movements need be expected to 4 Especially if one excludes years of deep depression and \var years, the stability of the share of compensation of employees in national income is remarkable.

5 There are, of course, exceptions. Teachers' salaries are a case in point and while they last, the distortions are painful and damaging. If demand pull is relieved by 1110netary and fiscal policies and the wage push is not correspondingly eliminated, the distortions caused by union wage policy will become greater than they are under inflation. [ 75 ] emanate from· the non-unionized employees. Wages and salaries there are, of course, subject to demand pull. This means that in case demand is so controlled as to keep the price level stable, wages and salaries will be pulled up roughly parallel with average productivity; but we need not fear that an independent upward thrust from that quarter would imperil either employment or price stability.G But how can union power be curbed? Some of the leading experts on labor think it just cannot be done. The late Professor S. H. Slichter, who clearly saw the dilemma posed by union wage pressure, repeatedly said that nothing could be done to curb union power to raise wages except to create an intolerable amount of unemployment, and he therefore accepted slow creeping inflation as the lesser evil.

He insisted, however, that money must be kept sufficiently tight so as to prevent the price creep from becoming a trot or gallop. We have already taken issue with the idea that it is possible to have a continuing price rise of, say, 2 to 3 percent a year without. the creep tending to become a trot, whereupon a monetary or fiscal policy of holding the price rise to 2 or 3 percent a year must lead to unemployment. Let me repeat, because it is being so often misunder stood, that the issue is not whether it is likely that there will be galloping inflation in the United States. I am inclined to agree with Slichter and others that it is very unlikely that the price creep will actually become a gallop for the simple· reason that the Federal Reserve will refuse to permit the large increase in the supply of money which would make galloping inflation possible. But the 6 An impression to the contrary, nan1ely, that wages and salaries of non-unionized personnel can exert inflationary pressure of their own, is sometimes created by delayed adjustment of such salaries to increased unIon wages.

The erroneous impression of an independent \yage push operating in the unorganized sector of the labor market may als6 be created, if demand for labor happens to be strong for that kind of labor. The sharp rise in research and scientific development expenditure entailing a sharp increase in demand for certain professional workers in recent years is a con spicuous example. This is, ho,vever, in reality, a case of demand pull and not of cost push. [ 76 ] point at issue is another one, to wit, that as soon as the creeping in flation tends to accelerate beyond the creeping pace, keeping inflation to a creep by controlling demand without stopping the wage push will produce unemployment and slack. Here I wish to make the point that Slichter's theory is highly implausible in another respect: If it is possible, even in the face of a continual price rise, as Slichter evidently assumed, to prevent wage pressure from becoming so strong as to necessitate a price rise of 4 percent per year or more-why should it be entirely impossible to do it little better so as to prevent a price rise altogther? On the other hand, if it is really impossible to prevent a wage push \vhich necessitates a price rise of 2 to 3 percent per year, can we then be so sure that we shall be able to prevent one which necessitates a 4 or 5 percent rise of prices? The categoric statement that less than 2 or 3 percent is entirely impossible while more than 4 or 5 percent is possible, sounds highly implausible, to put it mildly.

I find it difficult to believe that our society should be unable to curb union power without resorting to measures so drastic as to be difficult to reconcile with individual freedom and free enterprise. Such drastic measures would be compulsory arbitration, government wage fixing, or splitting or dissolution of unions. At any rate, there are less extreme reforms and changes in policy which have never been tried or at any rate not persistently applied; these should be given a trial before more drastic measures are contemplated. First, unions have acquired over the years de jure or de facto numerous immunities and exceptions which go far beyond anything accorded to business and other private associations.i It is difficult to believe that legal refC?rms restoring a more balanced power equili brium between the parties in wage bargains, and eliminating violence and other abuses, would not have some effect in relieving inflationary wage pressure.

7 See the authoritative study L~gal l111111unitiesof Labor Unions} Ros coe Pound, American Enterprise Association, Washington, 1957; and E. H. Chamberlin, "Labor Union Po\ver and the Public Interest" in The Public Stake in Union Porver} edited by Philip D. Bradley, Univer sity of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 1959, pp. 3-20. [ 77 ] Secondly, and probably more basic and important than legal reform, is a change in the attitude of public opinion and of all branches of the government. It should be possible to arouse public opinion to the dangers of wage inflation and to bring its weight to bear on unions which by force of crippling strike and intimidation impose inflationary wage increases on the economy. Then the aroused public opinion could force the government, in its executive as well as in its legislative branch, to pick up some courage, instead of maintaining a studious neutrality in wage bargaining and issuing platitudinous appeals to everybody to behave, or outrightly capitulat ing to striking unions and bringing pressure on employers to capitu late. If instead of that unions were told in no uncertain words that their wage demands are inflationary and intolerable, one could expect to observe quickly a marked tendency for moderation in wage bargains.

Is it entirely Utopian to persuade union leaders that wage in creases greatly in excess of the rise in overall productivity must drive up prices and, therefore, are, in the last resort, self-defeating and damaging to labor itself? ~1aybe it is Utopian to expect any results from persuasion and to make the individual unions see the problem that way. But then they have not really been told (except by the employers and a few theorists, whose arguments obviously carry little weight). If public opinion understood these simple truths and the government expressed them forcefully, it would make some impression. But it surely is necessary that argument should be backed up by monetary tightness. If monetary policy gives way as soon as a little unemployment appears, and the monetary authorities are ready to bail out by monetary expansion those who engage in inflationary wage policies, the battle of arguments cannot be won.

It will fiat be easy to eliminate inflationary wage pressure. But experience in foreign countries, notably in Western Germany and now also in Great Britain and France, shows that it is not a hopeless task to prevent wage inflation without creating much unemployment and checking growth. Though the task is not easy, neither should the magnitude of the problem be exaggerated. If wage inflation is prevented, real wages would increase just as much. In the long run they would rise even faster. For setbacks and interruptions, which are the consequences of inflation, would .disappear and cyclical de pressions or recessions resulting from other causes than from stopping inflation in the face of wage pressure could be counteracted more quickly and vigorously by monetary and fiscal measures-if the authorities are relieved. of the constant fear that by combating a cyclical depression they would give a fresh push to chronic inflation.

Fortunately, it would require only a small decrease in the rate of increase of money wages to eliminate inflationary wage pressure. It is understandable, however, that politicians are reluctant to grasp the nettle of labor-management relations in general and of labor union control in particular, that they seek refuge in side issues and hire experts to write tons of reports on all conceivable aspects and rami fications of the problem and propose minor reforms on hundreds of matters which do not go to the root of the problem, but enable the politician to stay away from the disagreeable fact of wage push. Let us, therefore, ask whether there is no way out of the dilemma other than that of curbing union power or permitting a certain amount of unemployment, probably not large, but an amount greater than would exist in the absence' of inflationary wage push. Clearly, any policy or measure that tends to increase output per head may be thought to that extent to relieve inflationary pressure by creating a larger margin for non-inflationary wage increases. Now there are many ways in which new policies, changes in policies, and last, but emphatically not least, abandonment and discontinuance of established policies can accelerate growth (output per head).

8 8 It should be superfluous, but unfortunately it actually is necessary, to emphasize that when speaking of measures that may accelerate growth and so relieve inflationary pressure, we mean non-inflationary 1nea,Htres. It is impossible to relieve inflationary pressure by increased spending. It is true that it is often possible, even if we leave highly depressed periods out of account, to get a burst of higher activity by inflationary injections. But the question is how long \vould that activity last and what will come after. At any rate, to say that inflation (as distinguished from an alleged slack) can be cured or relieved by more spending, even [ 79 ] This is not the place to sketch a program for accelerated economic growth. But let me mention a few areas where effective action could be taken. A radical change in agricultural policy would reduce the price level and liberate annually several billion dollars' worth of resources for productive purposes, now wasted in accumulating unwanted surpluses. Large savings could be made in the Veterans' budget and possibly in defense spending. Social Security laws could be changed so as to encourage older workers to stay longer in the labor force by letting them have a part of their pensions even if they continue to work and/or letting them earn higher pensions later. Changes in tax laws to stimulate investment could have a major effect on productivity. There can be no doubt that high mar ginal tax rates, made more onerous by inflation, encourages waste and checks investment. Very substantial tax reductions especially in the higher brackets have greatly contributed to the phenomenal growth of German industrial production since the curre~cy reform in 1948.

However, all these reforms are politically difficult to carry out and even if made, their effect on prices rnay be slow in coming (except the effect of an elimination of price supports). Suppose it were possible after a few years to raise the annual rate of output growth. by 1 or 2 percent, which would be quite an achievement. This would be very desirable on several grounds, but it might not relieve the wage pressure; labor unions may get used to larger wage increases and raise their sights a little bit. If that should happen, and the chances are that it would, the basic problem of wage push would remain. Control of profits and prices in umonopolistic" or Uoligopolistic" industries will be demanded by many as a complement to apolicy of curbing union power. Leaving aside questions of political strategy and expediency, nothing useful can be expected from such policies. The reason for this statement was given earlier. Since there does not exist an independent continual cost push emanating from Uadminisif it were for productive projects, is about as sensible as to suggest that the best method to make a drunk sober is to force whiskey down his throat!

[,80 ] tered" prices comparable to the wage push exerted by trade unions, there is no room in a rational anti-inflation policy for measures to prevent ((mark-up inflation." Any move in that direction would only make things worse by multiplying red tape and diverting attention and effort of business managers away from the pressing problems of increasing efficiencyof production and loweri.ng costs. Some measures in this area which have been proposed byecono mists as powerful antidotes for inflation and are actively sponsored by influential politicians would have opposite effects from those intended. For example, Senator O'Mahoney's plan starts from the theory that Hinflationwill be checked if the pricing policies of the [dominant] corporations are publicly reviewed before increased prices may be made effective" and the Senate Bill 215 of April 1959, which embodies some of O'Mahoney's ideas and has received serious consideration in Congress, provides for public hearings and investigations of large corporations whenever they want to raise prices.

Professor Machlup has convincingly demonstrated 8 that a policy which makes price increases difficult and highly embarrassing would provide the strongest possible inducement for the firms concerned to avoid price reduction. The long-run effect would ·be to freeze prices. In view of the fact that stability of the general price tl,evel requires, as we have seen, that prices of products of progressive in dustries and firms be reduced and be flexible downward, any policy that makes precisely these prices rigid is bound to have inflationary effects in the long run whatever may be the short-run effect at the time when the policy is first introduced. All this does not mean that the substitution of competition for monopoly, wherever the latter exists, would not be desirable. But since the American economy is very comp~titive anyway, not much can be expected from an intensification of antimonopolistic policies.

At best it can be regarded only as a slow-moving reform with un8 See his penetrating analysis in "Another View of Cost-Push and Demand-Pull Inflation," Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1960, p. 138. [ 81 ] certain outcome. There does exist, however, a method of anti monopoly policy, which does not involve the use of expensive bureau cratic machinery, red tape, and endless costly litigations-namely, freer trade. The rise in recent years of foreign industries competing with a long list of American industries (Holigopolistic" as well as competitive) has increased healthy competition and further weaken· ed and made obsolete the theory of administered prices and adminis tered price inflation. Instead of pursuing a policy of harassing business leaders in law COurts and before Congressional committees for alleged ~~profiteering" and monopolistic practices, it would be far better to subject them to still stronger competition from abroad by reducing barriers to im ports. Reductipns of tariffs and other obstacles to imports could and should be bartered for similar reductions in trade barriers in foreign countries.

[ 82 ] PUBLICATIONS ST;UDIES Voluntary Health Insurance in the United States, Rita R. Campbell and W. Glenn Campbell-1960 Unionism Reappraised: From Classi cal Unionism to Union Establishment Go~z Brieh-1960 ' United States Aid and Indian Eco nomic Development, P. T. Bauer 1959 Imt:roving National Transportation Polley, john H. Frederick-1959 The Question of Governmental Oil Import Restrictions, William H. Peter son-1959 Labor Unions and the Concept of Public Service, Roscoe Pound-1959 Labor Unions and Public Policy, Ed ward H. Chamberlin, Philip D. Brad ley, Gerard D. Reilly, and Roscoe Pound-1958. 177 pp. ($4.50) National Aid to Higher Education, George C. S. Benson and john M. Payne-1958 Ag~icultural Surpluses and Export Pollcy, Raymond F. Mikesell-1958 The Economic Analysis of Labor Union Power, Edward H. Chamberlin -1958 PostWar West German and United Kingdom Recovery, David McCord Wright-1957 The Regulation of Natural Gas, james W. McKie-1957 Legal Immunities of Labor Unions, Roscoe Pound-1957 *Automation-Its Impact on Economic Growth and Stability, Almarin Phillips -1957 Involuntary Participation In Union ism, Philip D. Bradley-1956 !he Role of Government in Develop 109 Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Arthur Kemp-1956 The Role of The Federal Government in Housing, Paul F. W endt-19 56 The Uupper Colorado Reclamation Project, Pro. by Sen. Arthur V. Wat kins, Con by Raymond Moley-1956 '*' Federal Aid to Education-Boon or Bane? Roger A. Freeman-1955 States Rights and the Law of Labor Relations, Gerard D. Reilly-1955 Three Taft-Hartley Issues: Secondary Boycotts, "Mandatory" Injunctions, Replaced Strikers' Votes, Theodore R.