IX. Criticisms and Explanations

OIIAPTER IX. CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. § 56. Comparisons of the foregoing chapters with one another, suggest sundry questions which must be answered partially, if not completely, before anything can be done towards reducing ethical principles from abstract forms to concrete forms. We have seen that to admit the desirableness of conscious existence, is to admit that conduct should be such as will produce a consciousness which is desirable-a· consciousness which is as much pleasurable and as little painful as may be. We have also seen that this necessary implication corre sponds with the apriori inference, that the evolution of life has been made possible only by the establishment of connexions between pleasures and beneficial actions and between pains and detrimental actions. But the general conclusion reached in both of these ways, though it covers the area within which our special conclusions n1ust fall, does not help us to reach those special conclusions.

Were pleasuros all of one kind, differing only in degree; were pains all of one kind, differing only in degree; and could pleasures be measured against pains with definite results; the problelns of conduct would be greatly SilU plified. Were the pleasures and pains serving as incen tives and deterrents, simultaneously present to consciousness with like vividness, or were they all imn1ediately irnpending, 01' were they ~ll equi-distant in time; the problems would CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. be further simplified. And they would be still further simplified if the pleasures and pains were exclusively those of the· actor. But both the desirable and the undesirable feelings are of various kinds, making quantitative com parisons difficult; some are present. and some are future, increasing the difficulty of quantitative comparison; some are entailed" on self and some are entailed 'on others; agaiu increasing the difficulty. So that the guidance yielded by the primary principle reached, is of little service unless supplemented by the guidance of secondary principles.

Already, in recognizing the needful subordination of presentative feelings to representative feelings, and the implied postponement of present to future throughout a wide range of cases, some approach to,vards a secondary principle of guidance has been made. Already, too, in recognizing the lilnitations which men's associated state puts to their actions, with the implied need for restraining feelings of some kinds by feelings of other kinds, we have come in sight of another secondary principle of guidance. Still, there remains much to be decided respecting the relative claims of these guiding principles, general and special. Some elucidation of the questions involved, will be obtained by here discussing certain views and arguments set forth by past and present moralists. § 57. Using the name hedonisln for that ethical theory which makes happiness the end of action; and distil1gllish il1g hedonism into the two kinds, egoistic and universalistio J according as the happiness sought is that of the actor himself or is that 01 all, Mr. Sidgwick alleges Its implied belief to be that pleasures and pains are commensurable.

In his criticism on (empirical)egoistio hedonism he says:"The fundamental assumption of Hedonism, clearly st.ated, is that all feelings .considered merely 3S feelings can be arranged· i.n a certain scale 01 desirability, so that the desirability or pleasantness of each bears a definiti ratio 1.0 that of all the others."-Methods oj Ethics, 2nd ed. p. 115.

152 rHE DATA OF ETHICS. A.nd asserting this to be its assulTIption, he proceeds to point out difficulties in the way of .the hedonistio calculation; apparently for the purpose of implying that these difficulties tell against t.he hedonistic theory. Now though it may be shown that by naming the intensity, the duration, the certainty, and the proxiluity, of a pl~asure or a pain, as traits entering into the estimation of its relative value, Bentham has committed himself to the specified assumption; and though it is perhaps reasonably taken for granted that hedonism as represented by him, is identical with hedonism at large; yet it seems to TIle that the hedonist, en1pirical or other, is not necessarily comrnitted to this assulTIption. That the greatest surplus of pleasures over pains ought to be the end of action, is a belief which he may still consistently hold after admitting that the valuations of pleasures and pains are commonly vague and often erroneous. He may say that though indefinite things do not admit, of definite measurements, yet approxi mately true estin1ates of their relative values may be made when they differ considerably; and he may furthel-say that even when their relative values are not deterluinable, it :temain~ true that the most valuable should be chosen. Let us listen to him.

" A debtor who cannot pay me, offers to compound for his debt by making over one of sundry things he possesse~ a diamond ornament, a silver vase, a picture, a carriage. Other questions being set aside, I assert it to be my pecu .. niary interest to choose the most valuable of these; but I cannot say which is the most valuable. Does the pro position that it is my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable therefore beconle doubtful? lYIust I not choose as well as I can j and if I choose wrongly must I give up my ground of <.ihr)ice? Mlist I infer that in matters of business I may not ~v:t on the principle that, other things equal, the more profit3.ble transaction is to be preferred; because in many c~8r;s I cannot say which is the more profitable J CRITICISMS AND EXFLANATIONS. 153 and· have often chosen the less profitable? Because 1 believe that of many dangerous courses I ought to take the least· dangerous, do I make 'the fundamental assumption' that courses· can be arranged according to a scale· or dangerousness j and must I abandon ml belief if I cannot so arrange t,hem? If I am not by consistency bound. to do this, then I am no n10re by consistency bound to give up the principle that the greatest surplus of pleasures over pains should be the end of action, because the 'commen surability of pleasures and pains' cannot be asserted."

At the close of his chapters on empirical hedonism, Mr. Sidgwick himself says he does "not think that the cummon experience of mankind, impartially examined, really sustains the view that Egoistic Hedonism is necessarily suicidal;" adding, however, that the "uncertainty of hedon istic calculation cannot be denied to have great weight." But here the fundamental assumption of hedonism, that happiness is the end of action, is .still· supposed to involve the assumption that "feelings can be arranged in a certain scale of desirability." This we have seen it does not: its fundamental assumption is in no degree invalidated by proof that such arrangement of therll is impracticable. To ltfr. Sidgwick's argument there is the further objection, no·· less serious, that to whatever degree it tells against egoistic hedonism, it tells in a greater degree against universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism. He admits that it tells as much ; saying "whatever weight is to be attached to the objections brought against this assumption [the com· mensurability 6f pleasures and pains] must of course tell against the present method."· Not only·does it tell, but it tells in a double way. I do not mean merely that, as be points out, the assumption becomes greatly conlplicated if we take all sentient beings into account} and if we include posterity' along with . existing individuals. I IDf3an that, taking as the end to be achieved the greatest happiness of ~he existing individuals forming a single community) the set 154 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

of difficulties standing in the way of egoistic hedonism, is compounded with another set of difficulties no less great, when we pass from it to universalistic hedonism. For if the dictates of universalistic hedonism are to be fulfilled, it must be under the guidance of individual judgments, or of corporate judgments, or of both. Now any one of such judgments issuing from a single mind, or from any aggregate of minds, necessarily eUlbodies conclusions respecting the happinesses of other persons; few of them known, and the great mass never seen. All these persons have natures differing in countless ways and degrees from the natures of those who form the judglnents; and the happinesses of which they are severally capable differ from one another, and differ from the happinesses of those who form the judg ments. Consequently, if against the method of egoistic hedonism there is the objection that a, man's own pleasures and pains, unlike in their kinds, intensities, and times of occurrence, are incornmensurable; then against the method of universalistic hedonism it may be urged that to the in commensurability of each judge's own .pleasures and pains (which he must use as standards) has now to be added the much more decided incommensurability of the pleasures and pains which he conceives to be experienced by innumerable other persons, all differently constituted from himself and from one another.

Nay more-there is a triple set of difficulties in the way of un,iversalistic hedonis111. To the double indeterminateness of the end has to be added the indeterminateness of the nleans. If hedonisln, egoistic or universalistic, is to pass from dead theory into living practice, acts of one or other kind must be decided on to achieve proposed objects; and in estimating the two methods we have to consider how far the fitness of the acts respectively required can be judged. If, in pursuing his own ends, the individual is liable to be led by erroneous opinions to adjust his acts wrongly, much more liable is he to be led by erroneous opinions to CRITICISMS AND. EXPLANATIONS. 155 adjust wrongly more complex acts to the more con1plex ends constituted by other 111en' ~ wel£ares. It is so if he operates singly to benefit a few others; and it is still more so if he cooperates .with Inany to benefit all. Making general happiness the immediate object of pursuit, iruplies numerous and complicated instrumentalities officered by thousands of nnseen and unlike persons, and working on millions of other persons unseen and unlike. :Even the few factors in this inl111ense aggregate of appliances and processes whiGh are known, are very imperfectly known; and the great mass of them are unknown. So that even supposing valuation of pleasures and pains for the community at large ismore practicable than, or even as practicable as, valuation of his own pleasures and pains by the individual; yet the ruling of conduct with a vie·w to the one end is far more difficult than the ruling of it with a view to the other. Hence if the nlethod of egoistic hedonism is unsatisfactory, far more un satisfactory for the same and kindred reasons, is the method of universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism.

And here we conle in sight of the conclusion which it has been the purpose of the foregoing criticism to bring into view. The objection made to the hedonistic nlethod contains a trnth, but includes with it an untruth. For while the proposition that happiness, whether individual or genoral, is the end of action, is not invalidated by proof that i.t cannot tinder either form be estimated by measurement of its cOlllponents; yet it may be admit,ted that guidance jn the pursuit of happiness by a mere balancing of pleasures and pains, is, if partiaJly practicable throughout a certain range of conduct, futile throughout a much wider range. It is quite consistent to assert that happiness is the ultimate aim of action, and at· the same time to deny that it can be reached by making. it the immediate aim. I go with ]\{r. Sidgwick as far as the conclusion that "we must at least admit the desirability of confirming or correcting the results of auch comparisons [of pleaEures and pains] by any other J56 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

method upon which we may find reason to rely j" and I then go further, and say that throughout a large part of conduct guidance by such comparisons is to be entirely set aside and replaced by other guidance. § 58. The antithesis here insisted upon between the hedonistic end considered in the abstract, and the method which current hedunisln, whether egoistic or universalistic, associates with that end; and the joining acceptance of the one with rejection of the other; commits us to an overt discussion of these two cardinal elements of ethical theory. I may conveniently initiate this discussion by criticizing another of Mr. Sidgwick's criticisuls on the method of hedonism. Though we can give no account of those siulple pleasures which the seuses yield, because they are undecomposable, yet we distinctly know their characters as states of consciousness. Conversely, the complex pleasures formed by compounding and re-compounding the ideas of silTIple pleasures, though theoretically resolvable into their components, are not easy to resolve; and in proportion as they are heterogeneous in composition, the difficulty of framing intelligible conceptions of them increases. This is especially the case with the pleasures which accompany our sports. Treating of these, along with the pleasures of pursuit in general, for the purpose of showing that (( in order to get them one must forget them," Mr. Sidgwick remarks:"A man who maintains throughout an epicurean mood, fixing his aim on his own pleasure, does not catch the full spirit of the chase; his eagerness never gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to the pleasure its highest zest and flavour. Here comes into view what we may call the fundamental para.dox of Hedonism, that the impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant.

defeats its own aim. This effect is not visible, or at any rate is scarcely visible, in the case of passive sensual pleasures. But of our active enjoyments gene rally, whether the activities on which they attend are classed as' bodily' or as , intellectual' (as well as of many emotional pleasures). it may certainly be said t.hat we cannot attain them, at least in their best form, so long as we concentrate our aim on them."-Methods of Efl1Jics, 2nd ed.p. 41. Now I think we shall not regard this truth as paradoxical CRITICISMS AND EXPIJAl\ATIONS 157 after we have duly analyzed. the pleasur~ of pursuit. The chief components of -this pleasure .are ;-first, a renewed consciousness of personal efficiency (made vivid by actual success and partially excited by impending success) which consciousness of personal efficiency, connected in expe rience with achieved ends of every kind, arouses a vaguo but massive consciousness of resulting gratifiyations; and, second, a representation of the applause which recognition of this efficiency by others has before brought, and will again bring. Games of skill show us this clearly. Con sidered as an end in itself, the good cannon which a billiard player makes yields no pleasure. Whence then does the plea~ure of making it arise? Partly from the fresh proof of capability which the player gives to himself, and p:u"tly from the •imagined admiration of those who witness the proof of his capability: the last being the chief, since he soon tires of making cannons in the absence of witnesses.

When from games which, yielding the pleasures of success, ~Tield no pleasure derived from the end considered intrinsi. cally, we pass to sports in which the end has intrinsic value as a· source of pleasure, we see substantially the sanle thing. Though the bird which the sportsman brings down is useful as food, yet his satisfaction arises mainly from having made a good shot, and from having added to the bag which will presently bring praise of his .skill. The gratification of self-esteem he immediatel.r experiences; and the gratification of receiving applause he experiences, if nof immediately and in full degree, yet by representation; for the ideal pleasure is nothing else than a faint revival of tho real· pleasure. 'rhese two kinds of agreeable excitetnel1t present in the sportsman during the chase, constitute the mass of the desires stimulating him to continue it; for aU desires are nascent forms of the feelings to be obtained by the efforts they prompt. And though while seeking more birds these representative feelings are not so vividly excited as by success just achieved, yet they are excited' b1 158 Tn E DATA Oli' ETHICS.

imaginations of fl;rtber successes; and so make enjoyable the activities constituting the pursuit. Recognizing, then, the truth that the pleasures of pursuit are much more those derived froIn the efficient use o£ Dleans than those derived from the end itself, we see that" the fundaruental paradox of hedonisln" disappears. These ren1arks concerning end and means, and the pleasure accompanying nse o£ the n1eans as added to the pleasure derived fronl the end, I have made £01" the purpose of drawing attention to a fact of profound significance. During evolution there has been a. superposing of new and more con1plex sets of means upon older and simpler sets o£ means; and a superposing of the pleasures accompanying the JIses of these successive sets of Ineans; with the result that each of these pleasures has itself eventually becolue an end. Webegin with a simple animal which, without ancillary appliances, swallows such food as accident brings in its way j and so, as we may assume, stills some kind or craving.

Here we have the primary end or llutrition with its accorn panying satisfaction, in their simple forms. We pass to higher types having jaws for seizing and biting-jaws which thus, by their actions, facilitate achievement of the primary end. On observing animals furnished with these organs, we get evidence that the use of them becomes in itself pleasurable irrespective of the end: instance a squirrel, which, apart from food to be so obtained, delights in nibbling every'thing it gets hold or. Turning from jaws to limbs we see that these, serving SaIne creatures for pursuit and others for escape, similarly yield gratification by their exercise; as in lamhg which skip and horses which prance. Haw the combinad use or limbs and jaws, originally subserving the satisfaction of appetite, grows to be in itself pleasurable, is daily illustrated in the playing of dogs. For that throwing down and worrying which, when prey is caught, precedes eating, is, in their mimic fights, carried by each as far as he dares. Coming to means still more remote from the end.

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 159 namely, those .by which creatures chased are caught, we are again shown by dogs that when no creature iscaug~t there is still a gratification in the act of catching. The eagerness with 'which a dog runs after stones, or dances and barks in anticipation of jumping into the water after a stick, proves that apart from the satisfaction of appetite, and apart even from the satisfaction of killing prey, there is a satisfaction in the successful pursuit ot a moving object. Throughout, then, we see that the pleasure attend ant on the use ot means to achieve an end, itself becomes an end. Now if we contemplate these as phenomena of conduct in general, some facts worthy of note may be discerned-facts which, if we appreciate their significance, will aid us in developing our ethical conceptions. 011e of them is that among the successive sets of means, the later are the lnore remote from the primary end; are, as CQ ordinating .earlier and simpler means, the more complex; and are accompanied by .feelings which are nlore repre sentative. Another fact is that each set of mean~, with its accornpanying satisfactions, eventually becomes in its turn dependent on one originating later than itself.

Before the g"ullet swallows, the jaws must lay hold; before the jaws tear out and bring within the grasp of the gullet a piece fit fol" swallowing, there must be that cooperation of limbs and senses required for killing the prey; before this cooperation can take place, there needs the much longer cooperation constituting the chase; and even before this there must be persistent activities of limbs, eyes, anc1 nose, in seeking prey. The pleasure attending each set of acts, while making possible the pleasure attending the set of acts which follows, is joined with a representation of this subsequent set of acts and its pleasure, and of the others which succeed in order; so that along with the feeling3 accompanying the search for prey, are partially aroused the feelings accompanying the actual chase.. the actual do12 160 THE DA.TA. OF ETHICS. strnction, the actual devouring, and tIle eventual satisfaction of appetite. A third fact is that the use of each set of means in due order, constitutes an obligation. Mainte nance of its life being regarded as the end of its conduct, the creature is obliged to use in succession the means of finding prey, the means of catching prey, the means of killing prey, the means of devouring prey. Lastly, it follows that though the assuaging of hunger, directly associated with sustentation, remains to the last the ultimate end; yet the successful use of each set of nleans in its turn is the proximate end-the end which takes temporary precedence in authoritativeness.

§ 59. The relations between means and ends thus traced throughout the earlier stages of evolving conduct, are traceable throughout later stages; and hold true of h~man conduct, up even to its highest forms. As fast as, for the better Inaintenance of ll£e, the simpler sets of means and the pleasures accompanying the uses of them, conle to be supplemented by the more complex sets of means and their pleasures, these begin to take precedence in time and in .imperativeness. fro use effectually each nlore complex set of nleans becomes the proximate end, and the accom panying feeling becomes the ilnmediate gratification sought j though there maybe, and habitually is, an associated conscious. ness of the remoter ends and remoter gratifications to be obtained. An example will make clear the parallelism. Absorbed in his business the trader, if asked what is his main end, will say-making money. He readily grants that aehievement of this end is desired by him in furtherance vf ends beyond it. He knows that in directly seeking money he is indirectly seeking food, clothes, house-room, and the comforts of life for self and family. But while admitting that money is but a means to these ends, he urges that the money getting actions precede in order of time and obligation, the .various actions and concomitant pleasures subserved by CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATrONS. 161 tbem; and he testifies to the fact that making money has becon1e itself an end, and success in it a source of satis faction, apart from these more distant ends. Again, on observing more closely the trader's proceedings, we find that though to the end of living comfortably he gets money, and though to the elld of getting money he buys and sells at a pro£t, which so becomes a means more immediately pursued, yet he is chiefly occupied with means still more remote from ultimate ends, and in relation to which even the selling at a profit brcomes an end. ]'01" leaving to subor dinates the actual measuring out of goods and receiving of proceeds, he busies himself mainly with his general affairs inquiries concerning markets, judgments of future. prices, calculations, negotiations, correspondence: the anxiety from hour to hour being to do well each one of these thing~ indirectly conducive to the making. of profits. And these ends precede in time and obligation the effecting of profitable sales, just as the effecting of profitable sales precedes the end of money-making, and just as the end of money-making precedes the end of satisfactory living. Ilis book.

keeping best exemplifies the principle at large. Entries to the debtor or creditor sides are being .made all through the day; the items are ciassified and arranged in such way that at a monlent's notice the state of each account may·be ascertained; and then, from tiule to time, the books are fbalanced, and it is required that the result shall come right to a penny: satisfaction following proved correctness~ and annoyance being caused by error. If you ask why all this elaborate process, so remote £l'om the actual getting of money, and still more remote from the enjoyments of life, the answer is that keeping accounts correctly is fulfilling a condition to the end of money-making, and becomes in itself a proxinlate end-a duty to be discharged, that there may be discharged the duty of getting an income, that there may be discharged the duty of maintaining selfJ wife, and children.

Lb~ TilE DATA OF ETHICS. Approaching as we here do to moral obligation, are we not shown its relations to c~nduct at large? Is it not clear that observance of Inoral prineiples is fulfihnent of certain general conditions to the sllccessful carrying on / of special actl"ities? That the trader may prosper, he must not only keep his books correctly, but must pay those he employs according to agreement, and must nleet his engagements with creditors. May we not say, then, that conformity to the second and third of these requirements is, like conformity to the first, an indirect means to effectual use of the more direct means of achieving welfare? May we not say, too~ that as the use of each more indirect means in due order becomes itself an end, and a source of gratifica-_ tion; so, eventually, becomes the use of this most indirect means? And may we not infer that though conformity to moral requirements precedes in imperativeness conformity to other requirelnents; yet that this imperativeness a:-~ses from the fact that fulfilment of the other requirements, by self or others or both, is thus furthered?

§ 60. This question brings us rounel to another side of tIle issue before raised. When alleging that empirical utili tarianism is but introductory to rational utilitarianism, I pointed out that the last does not. take welfare for its im mediate object of pursuit, but takes for its immediate object of pursuit conformity to certain principles which, in the nature. of things, causally determine welfare. And now we see that this amounts to recognition of that law, traceable throughout the evolution of conduct in general, that each later and. higher order of means takes precedence in time and authori. tativeness of each earlier and lower order of means. The contrast between the ethical methods thus distinguished, made tolerably clear by the above illustrations, will be made still clearer by contemplating the two as put in oppo'sition by the leading exponent of empirical utilitarianism. Treat.

ing of legislative aims, Bentham writes:CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATION8. 163 ,. But justice, what is it that we are to· understand by justice ~ and why not bappiness but justice? Wh~t happiness is, every man knows, because, what pleasure is, every man knows, and what pain is, every man knows. .But what justice is,-this is what on every occasion is the suhject-matter of dispute. Be the meaning of the •word justice what it will, what regard is it entitled to otherwise than as a means of happiness."* IJet U'S first consider the assertion here made respecting tbe rel \ative intelligibilities of these two ends; and let us afterwards consider what is implied by the choice of happiness instead of justice. Bentham's positive assertion that "what happiness is every man knows, becanse, what pleasure is, every man knows," is met by countera~sertions equally positive . ." Who can tell," asks Plato, "what pleasure really is, or know it in its essence, except the philosopher, who alone is conversant with realities."t Aristotle, too, after com menting on the different opinions held by the vulgar, by the poljtical, by the contemplative, says of happiness that "to some it seems to be virtue, to others prudence, and to others a kind of wisdom: to some again,these, or some one of these, with pleasure, or at least, not without pleasure; others again include external prosperity."i And Aristotle, like Plato, comes to the remarkable conclusion that the pleasures of the· intellect, reache9. by the contemplative life, constitute the highest happiness! § How disagreements concerning the nature of happiness and the relative values of pleasures, thus exhibited in ancient times, continue down to modern times, is shown in Mr. Sidgwick's discussion of egoistic hedonism, above comn1ented upon. Further, as was pointed out before, tho indefiniteness attending the estimations of pleasures and pains, which stands in the way of egoistic hedonism as ordinarily conceived, is immensely increased on passing to universalistic hedonism as ordinarily conceived; since its * Constitutional Code, chap. xvi, Supreme Legislative-Section vi, Om.ni competence.

t Republic, Bk. ix. ; Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. i. chap. 8. § Bk. x, chap. 7 104 THE DATA OF ETHICS. theory implies that the imagined pleasures and pains of others are to be estimated by the help of these pleasures and pains of self, already so difficult to estinlate. And that anyone after observing the various pursuits into which some eagerly enter but which others shun, and after listening to the different opinions concerning the likeableness of this or that occupation or amusement, expressed at every table, ~hould assert that the nature of happiness can be fully agreed upon, so as to render it a fit end for direct legislative action, is surprising. The accompanying proposition that justice is unin telligible as an end, is no less surprising. Though primitive nlen have no words for either happiness or justice; yet even among them an approach to the conception of justice is traceable. The law of retaliation, requiring that a death inflicted by one tribe on another, shall be balanced by the death either of the nlurderer or SOlne member of his tribe, shows us in a vague ~hape that notion of equal ness of treatment which forlns an essential element in it. When we come to early races who have given their thoughts and feelings literary form, we find this conception of justice, as involving equalness of action, becoming distinct. Among the Jews, David expressed in words this association of ideas when, prnying to God to "hear the right," he said-" Let nlY sentence come forth from thy presence; let thine eyes behold the things that are equal ;"

as also, among early Christians, did Paul when to the Colos.. sians he wrote-" Masters, give unto yo~r servants that which is just and equal." Commenting on the different meanings of justice, Aristotle concludes that "the just will therefore Le the lawful and the equal; and the unjust the unlawful lind the unequal. But since the unj ust man is also one who takes more than his share," &c. And that justice was simi larly conceived by the Romans they proved by including undex-it such meanings as exact, proportionate, irnpartial, severally implying fairness of division; and still better CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 165 by identification of it with "equity, which is a derivative of cequus: the word requus itself having for one of its meanings just or impartial. This coincidence of view arnong ancient peoples respecting the nature of justice, has extended to modern peoples; who by a general agreement in certain cardinal principles which their systems of law embody, forbidding direct aggressions, which are forms of unequal actions, and forbidding indirect aggressions by breaches of contract, which are other forms of unequal actions, one and all show us the identification of justice with equalness. Bentham, then, is wrong when he says "But what jusLice is,-this is what on every occasion is the subject-matter of dispute." He is more wrong, indeed, t,han has thus far appeared. For, in the first place, he misrepresents utterly by ignoring the fact that in ninety-nine out of every hundred daily transactions between men, no dispute about justice arises; but the business done is recognized on both sides as justly done.

And in the second place if, with respect to the hundredth transaction there is a dispute, the subject matter of it is not (( what justice is," for it is admitted to be equity or equalness; hut the subject matter of dispute always is what, under these particular circumstances, constitutes equalness ?-a widely different question. It is not then self-evident" as Bentham allege~, that happiness is an intelligible end while justice is not; but, contrariwise, examination makes evident the greater in telligibility of justice as an end. And analysis shows why it is the more intelligible. For justice, or equity, or equal ness, is concerned exclusively with quantity under stated condit,ions j whereas happiness is concerned with both q~lantity and quaUty under conditions not stated. When, as . in case of theft, a benefit is taken while no equivalent benefit is yielded-when, as in case of adulterated goods bought or base coin paid, that which is agreed to be given in exchange as of equal value is not given, but some166 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

thing of less value-when, as in case of broken contract, the obligation on one side has been discharged while there has been no discharge, or il1.COlllpletedischarge, of the obligation on the other; we. see that, the circumstances being spec1"jiedJ the injustice complained of refers to the relative alnounts of actions, or products, or benefits, the natures of which are recognized only so far as is needful for saying whether as fJnuch has been given, or done, or allowed, by each concerned, as was implied by tacit or overt understand ing to be an eq~tivalent. But when the end proposed is happiness, the circumstances fJoem,aining unspecified, the problem is that of estimating both quantities and qualities, unhelped by any such definite measures as acts of exchange imply, or as contracts imply, or as are implied by the differences between the doings of one aggressing and one aggressed upon. The mere fact that Bentham himself includes as elements in the estimation of each pleasure or pain, its intensity, duration, certainty, and proximity, suffices to show how difficult is this problem. And when it is remembered that all pleasures and pains, not felt in particular cases only but in the aggregate of cases, and severally regarded under these four al.lpects, have to be compared with one another and their 1'e]a tive values deter~ mined, simply by introspection; it will be manifest both that the problem is complicated by the addition of indefinite judgments of qualities to indefinite measures of quantities, and that it is further complicated by the multitudinous ness of these vague estimations to be gone through and summed up.

But now passing over this assertion of Bentham that happiness is a more intelligible end than justice, which 'we find to be the reverse of truth, let us Dote the several implications of the doctrine that the supreme legislative body ought to make the greatest happiness of the greatest number its immediate aim. It implies, in the first place, that happiness may be CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 167 eompassed by metllods framed directly for the purpose, without any previous inquiry respecting the conditions that must be fulfilled; and this presupposes a belief that there are no such conditions. For if there are any conditions without fulfilment of which happiness cannot be compassed, then the first step nlust be' to ascertain these conditions with a view to fulfilling them; and to admit this is to admit that not happiness itself must be the immediate end, but fulfilment of the conditions to its attainment must be the immediate end. The alternatives are simple :-Either the achievement of happiness is not conditional, in which nase one mode of action is as good as another,or it is condit/ionaI, in which case the required mode of action must be the direct aim and not the happiness to be achieved by it.

Assuming it conceded, as it will be, that there exist conditions which must be fulfilled before happiness can be attained, let us next ask what is ill1pliedby proposing modes of so controlling conduct as to further happiness, without previously inquiring whether any such modes are already known? The implication is that human intelligence throughout the past, operating on experiences, has failed to discover any such modes; whereas present human intelligence may be expected forthwith to discover them. Unless this be asserted, it·must be admitted that certain con ditions tu the achievement of happiness have already been partially, if not wholly, ascertained; and if so, our first business should be to look fDr them. Having found them, our rational course is to bring existing intelligence to bear on these products of past intelligence, with the expectation that it will verify the substance of them while possibly correcting the form. But to suppose that no regulative principles for the conduct of associated human beings have thus far been established, and that they are now to be established de novo, is to snppose that man as he is differs from man as he was in an incredible degree • .Beyond ignoring the probability, or rather the certainty, 168 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

th.at past experience generalized by past intelligence, must by this time have disclosed partially, if not wholly, some of the essential conditions to the achievement of happiness, B6.ntham's proposition ignores the formulated know ledge of them actually existing. For whence come the conception of justice and the answering sentiment. He will scarcely say that they are meaningless, although his pro.position implies as much; and if he admits that they have mean ings, he must choose between two alternatives either of which is fatal to his hypothesis. Are they supernaturally caused modes of thinking and feeling, tending to make men fulfil the conditions to happiness? If so their authority is peremptory. Are they modes of thinking and feeling naturally caused in men by experience of these condi tions? If so, their authority is no less peremptory. Not only, then, does Bentham fail to infer that certain prin cipleo of guidance must by this time have been ascertained, but he refuses to recognize these principles as actually reached and present to him.

And then after all, he tacitly admits that which he overtly denies, by saying that-" Be the meaning of the word justice what it will, what regard is it entitled to otherwise than as a means to happiness?" For if justice is a means having happiness as its end, then justice must take prece dence of happiness, as every other means takes precedenc~ of every other end. Bentham's own elaborate polity is a means having happiness as its end, as justice is, by his own admission, a means having happiness as an end. If, then, we may properly skip justice, and go directly to the end happiness, we may properly skip Bentham's polity, aud go directly to the end happiness. In short, we are led to the remarkable conclusion that in all cases we must contemplate exclusively the end and must disregard the means. ~ 61 This relation of enc1s to means, underlying all ethical CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS • 169 .8peculation, will be further eluoidated if l\-·C JOln with some of the above conclusions, certain cOllcJnsions drawn in the last chapter. We shall see that while greatest hap ..

piness may vary widely in societies which, though ideally constituted, are subject to unlike physical circumstances, certain fundamental conditions to thE: achievement of this grL\'.1testhappiness, are common to' ali such societies. Given a people inhabiting a tract which makes nomadic habits necessary, and the happiness of each individual will be greatest when his nature is so moulded to the require ments of his life, that all his faculties find their due activities in daily driv!ng and tending cattle, milking, migrating, and so forth. The members of a community otherwise similar, which· is permanently settled, will severally achieve their greatest bappiness when their natures have become such that a fixed habitat, and the occupations necessitated by it, supply the spheres in which each instinct and emotion is exercised and brings the concomitant pleasure. The citizens of a larg~ nation industrially organized, have reached their possible ideal of happiness, when the producing, distributing, and other activities, are such in their kinds and amounts, that each citjzen finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes, while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires.

Once more we may recognize as not only possible but pro bable, the eventual existence of a community, also industrial, the members of which, having natures similarly responding to these requirements, are also characterized by dominant rosthetic faculties, and achieve complete happiness only when a large part of life is filled with resthetic activities. Evidently these different types of men, with their different standards of happiness, each finding the possibility of that happiness in his own society, would not find it if transferred to any of the other societies. Evidently though they might have in common such kinds of happiness as accompany the satisfaction of vital needs) they would not have in commOll sundry other kinds of happiness.

170 THE DATA OF ETHICS. But now mark tllat while, to achieve greatest h&'ppines~ in each of such societ,ies, the special conditions to be fulfilled must differ froul those to be fulfilled iu the other societies, certain general conditions must be fulfilled in all the societies. IIarlllonious cooperation, by which alone in any of them the greatest happiness can be attained, is, as we saw, made possible only by respect for one another's claims: there must be neither those direct aggressions which we class as crimes against person and property, nor must there be those indirect aggressions constituted by breaches of con tracts. So that ITlaintenance of equitable relations between men, is the condition to attainment of greatest happiness in all societies; however much the greatest happiness attainable in each may differ in nature, or amount~ or both. And here a physical analogy may fitly be used to give the greatest definiteness to this cardinal truth. A mass of matter of whatever kind, Inaintains its state of internal equilibrium, so long as its component particles severally stan~ towards their neighbours in equi-distant positions. Accept ing the conclusions of modern physicists, which imply that each ulolecule moves rhythn1ically, then a balanced state· implies that each performs its movements within 8 space bounded by the like spaces required for the move ments of those around. If the molecules have been so aggregated that the oscillations of some are more restrained than the oscillations of others, there is a proportionate insta.bility. If the nUInber of" them thus unduly restrained is considerable, the instability is such that the cohesion in some part is liable to fail, and a crack re.sults. If the excesses of restraint are great and ill ultitudinous, a trifling disturbance causes the mass to break up into smaH fragments. '1'0 which add that the recognized remedy for this unstable state, is an exposure to such physical condition (ordinarily high ternperature) as enables the molecules so to change their relative positions that their mutual restraints become equal on all sides. And now observe that this holds what"

CRITICIS:M:SAND EXPLANATIONS. 171 ever be the n~tures of the molecules. They may be simple ; they may be compound ; they may be .composed of this 01' that matter in this or that way. In other words, the special activities of each molecule, constituted by the relative move ments of its units, may be various in their kinds ~nd degrees; and yet, be they what they may, it remains true that to preserve internal equilibrium throughout the mass of mole.. cules,· the 'mutual limitations of their activities must be everywhere alike. And this is the 'above-described pre-requisite to social equilibrium, whatever the special natures of the associated persons. Assun1ing that within each society such persons 'are of the same type, needing for the fulfilment of their several lives kindred activities, and though these activities may/be of one kind in one· society and of another kind in another, so admitting of indefinite variation, this condition to social equilibrium does not admit of variation. It must be fulfilled be£orecomplete life, that is greatest happiness, can be attained in any society; be the particular quality of that life, or that happiness, what it may. * § 62. After thus observing how means and ends in conduct stand to one another, and how there emerge certain Con clusions respecting their relative claims, we may see a way to reconcile sundry conflicting e~hical theories. These severally eUlbody portions of the truth; and simply require combining in proper order to embody the whole truth.

The theological theory contains a part. If for the divine will, supposed to be supernaturally revealed, we substitute th.e naturally-revealed end towards which the Power mani. fested throughout Evolution works; .then, since Evolution has been, and is still, working. towards the highest life, it follows that conforming to those principles by which the. highest life is achieved, is furthering that end. The doctrine * This nni versaI reqnirement it was which I had in view when choosing fOl my first work, published in 1850, the title BociaZ Statics.

1'72 THE DA.TA. OF ETHICS. that perfection or excellence of nature should be the object of pursuit, is in one sense trne; for it tacitly recognizes that ideal form of being which the highest life implies, and to which Evolution tends. There is a truth, also, in the doc trine that virtue nlust be the aim; for this is another form of the doctrine that the aim must be to fulfil the conditions to achievement of the highest life. 'rhat the intuitions of a moral faculty should guide our conduct, is a proposition in which a truth is contained; for these intuitions are the slowly organized results of experiences received by the race while living in presence of these conditions. And that happiness is the supreme end is beyond ques tion true; for this is the concoillitant of that highest life which every theory of moral guidance has distinctly or vaguely in view. So understanding their relative positions, those ethical systems which make virtue, right, obligation, the cardinal ainls, are seen to be complementary to those ethical systems which make welfare, pleasure, happiness, the cardinal aims.

Though the moral sentiments generated in civilized men by daily contact with social conditions and gradual adaptation to them, are indispensable as incentives and deterrents; and though the intuitions corresponding to these senti ments, have, in virtue of their origin, a general authority to be reverently recognized; yet the sympathies and antipathies hence originating, together with the intellectual expressions of them, are, in their pl~imitive forms, necessarily vague. To n1ake guidance by them adequate to all requirements, their dictates have to be interpreted and made definite by ~;cience; to which end there nlust be analysis of those conditions to complete living which they respond to, and from converse with which they have arisen. And such analysis necessitates the recognition of happiness for each and all, as the end to be achieved by fulfilment of these conditions. Hence, recognizing in due degrees all the various ethica'1 theories, conduct in its highest form will take as guides.

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 173 innate perceptions of right duly enlightened and made precise by· an analytic intelligence; while conscious that these guides are proxinlately supreme solely because they lead to the ultimately supreme end, happiness special and general.