VIII. The Sociological View

OHAPTER VITI. THE SOCIOLOGICAL VJEvV. ~ 48. Not for the human rG,ce only, but for every ruc~, t1l(~re are laws of right living. Given its environment and its structure, and there is for each kind of creature a set of actions adapted in their kinds, amounts, and combi nations, to secure the highest conservation its nature permits. The anilnal, like the man, has needs for food. warmth, activity, rest, and so forth; which must be fulfilled in certain relative degrees to make its life whole. Main tenance of its race implies satisfaction of special desires, sexual and philoprogenitive, in due proportions. Hence there is a supposable £ornlula for the activities of each species, which, could it be drawn out, would constitute a system of morality for that species. But such a system of morality would have little or no reference to the welfare of others than self and offspring. Indifferent to individuals of its own kind, as an inferior creature is, and habitually hostile to inuividuals of other kinds, the formula for its life could take no cognizance of the lives of those with ,vhich it came in contact; or rather, such formula would imply that maintenance of its life was at variance with maintenance of their liYes.

But on ascending from beings of lower kinds to the highest kind of being, man j or, more strictly, un ascending THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 133 from man in his pre-social stage to man in his social stage; the formula has to include an additional factor. Though not peculiar to human life under its developed form, the presence of this factor is still, in the highest degree, characteristic of it. Though there are inferior species displaying considerable degrees of sociality; and though the formulas for their complete lives would have to take account of the relations arising £l"om union; yet our own species JS,an the whole, to be distinguished as having a formula for complete life which specially recognizes the relations of each individual to others, in presence of whom, and in cooperation with whom, he has to live. This additional factor in the problem of complete living, is, indeed, so important that the necessitated modifications of conduct have come to form a chief part of the code of conduct. Because the inherited desires which directly refer to the maintenance of individual life, are fairly adjusted to the requirements, there has been no lleed to insist on that conformity to them which furthers 8el£ conservation. Conversely, because these desires prompt activities that often conflict with the activities of others; and because the sentirnents responding to other's claims are relatively weak; moral codes emphasize those restraints on conduct which the presence of fellow men entails.

From the sociological point of view, then, Ethic~ becomes nothing else than a definite account of the forms of conduct that are fitted to the associated state) in such wise that the lives o£each and all may be the greatest possible, alike in length and breadth. § 49. But here we are met by a fact which forbids us thus tc put in the foreground the wel£ares of citizens, individually considered, and requires us to put in the foreground the welfare of the society asa whole. The l~fe of the social organism must, as an end, rank above the lives of its units. Th~se two ends are not harmonious at the outsell; 184 i-HE DATA OF ETHICS. and though the tendency is towards harmonization of them, they are still partially conflicting. As .fast as the social state establishes itself, the pre servation of the society becomes a means of pre~erving its units. Living together arose because, on the average, it rfoved more advantageous to each than living apart; and this implies that maintenance of combination is maintenance of the conditions to more satisfactory living than the com· bined persons would otherwise have. Hence, social self..

preservation becomes a proximate aim taking precedence of the ultimate aim, individ!lal self-presel:'vation. This subordination of personal to social welfare is, how ever, contingent: it depends on the presence or antagonistic societies. So long as the existence of a community is endangered by the actions of communities around, it must rem~~in true that the interests of individuals Inust be sacri ficed to the interests or the community, as far as is needful for the community's salvation. But if this is manirest, it is, by implication, manifest, that when social antagonisms cease, this need ror sacrifice of private claims to public claims ceases also; or rather, there cease to be any public claims at variance with private claims. All along, furtherance of indi vidual lives has been the ultimate end; and if this ultimate end has been postponed to the proximate end or preserving the community's life, it has been so only because this proxi mate-end was instrumental to the ultiulate end. When the aggregate is no longer in danger, the final object or pursuit, the welfare of the units, no longer needing to be postponed, becomes the immediate object of pursuit.

Consequently, unlike sets of conclusions respecting hUIllall conduct emerge, according as we are concerned with a sthte of habitual or occasional war, or are concerned with a state of permanent and general peace. Let us glance at those alternative states and the alternative implications. §50. At present the individual man has to carryon his THE· SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 185 life·with due regard to the lives of others belonging to the same society ; whae he is sometimes called on to be regardless of the lives of those belonging to. other. societies. The same mental constitution having. to fulfil both these requirements, is necessarily incongruous; and the correlative conduct, adjusted first to the one need and then to the other, cannot be brought within any consistent ethical system. IIate and destroy your fellow man, is now the command; Rnd then t.he command is, love a~d aid your fellow man. Use every means to deceive, says the one code of conduct; while the other code RayS, be truthful in word and deed. Seize what property you can and burn all you cannot takeaway, are injunctions which the religion of enmity countenances; while by the religion of amity, theft and arson are con demned as crimes. And as conduct has to ben1ade up of parts thus at variance with one another, the theory of conduct remains confused. There coexists a kindred irreconcilability between the sentirnents answering to the forms of cooperation required for militancy and industrialism respectively. While social antagonisms are habitual, and while, for efficient action against other societies, there needs great subordination to men who command, the virtue of loyalty and the duty of implicit obedience have .to be insisted on: disregard of the ruler's will is punished with death. But when war ceases to be chronic, and growing industrialism habituates men to maintaining their own claims while respecting the claims of others, loyalty becomes less profound,the authority of the .ruler is questioned Of.